GHSA-2452-6XJ8-JH47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-27 11:31 – Updated: 2025-01-27 11:31Summary
Nuxt allows any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.
Details
While Vite patched the default CORS settings to fix https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6, nuxt uses its own CORS handler by default (https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/23995).
https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/client.ts#L257-L263
That CORS handler sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *.
[!IMPORTANT]
If on an affected version, it may be possible to opt-out of the default Nuxt CORS handler by configuringvite.server.cors.
PoC
- Start a dev server in any nuxt project using Vite by
nuxt dev. - Send a fetch request to
http://localhost:3000/_nuxt/app.vue(fetch('http://localhost:3000/_nuxt/app.vue')) from a different origin page.
Impact
Users with the default server.cors option using Vite builder may get the source code stolen by malicious websites
Additional Information
/__nuxt_vite_node__/manifest / /__nuxt_vite_node__/module also seems to have Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, so it maybe also possible to exploit that handler.
https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/vite-node.ts#L39
Although I didn't find a valid module id.
Note that this handler is probably also vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks as I didn't find any host header checks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/vite-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.8.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-27T11:31:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-25T01:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nNuxt allows any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.\n\n### Details\nWhile Vite patched the default CORS settings to fix https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6, nuxt uses its own CORS handler by default (https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/23995).\n\nhttps://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/client.ts#L257-L263\n\nThat CORS handler sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.\n\n\u003e [!IMPORTANT] \n\u003e If on an affected version, it may be possible to opt-out of the default Nuxt CORS handler by configuring `vite.server.cors`.\n\n### PoC\n1. Start a dev server in any nuxt project using Vite by `nuxt dev`.\n2. Send a fetch request to `http://localhost:3000/_nuxt/app.vue` (`fetch(\u0027http://localhost:3000/_nuxt/app.vue\u0027)`) from a different origin page.\n\n### Impact\nUsers with the default server.cors option using Vite builder may get the source code stolen by malicious websites\n\n### Additional Information\n`/__nuxt_vite_node__/manifest` / `/__nuxt_vite_node__/module` also seems to have `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so it maybe also possible to exploit that handler.\nhttps://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/vite-node.ts#L39\nAlthough I didn\u0027t find a valid module id.\nNote that this handler is probably also vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks as I didn\u0027t find any host header checks.",
"id": "GHSA-2452-6xj8-jh47",
"modified": "2025-01-27T11:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-01-27T11:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-2452-6xj8-jh47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-rcgg-rjx6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/23995"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/7eeb910bf4accb1e0193b9178c746f06ad3dd88f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/client.ts#L257-L263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/7d345c71462d90187fd09c96c7692f306c90def5/packages/vite/src/vite-node.ts#L39"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Opening a malicious website while running a Nuxt dev server could allow read-only access to code"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.