GCVE-1-2026-0001
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-01-02 10:20 – Updated: 2026-01-02 13:31| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://gpg.fail/ |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "gnupg",
"vendor": "gnupg",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003eReference to the\u0026nbsp;gpg.fail\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e1.\u0026nbsp; Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/detached\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/detached\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data \"Filename\" Field -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/filename\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/filename\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/formfeed\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/formfeed\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e4.\u0026nbsp; Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/malleability\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/malleability\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e5.\u0026nbsp; Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/memcpy\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/memcpy\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e6.\u0026nbsp; Trusted comment injection (minisign) -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/minisign\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/minisign\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e7.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/notdash\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/notdash\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e8.\u0026nbsp; OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/notsoclear\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/notsoclear\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e9.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/noverify\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/noverify\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e10.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/nullbyte\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/nullbyte\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e11.\u0026nbsp; Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/polyglot\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/polyglot\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e12.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/sha1\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/sha1\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e13.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/trust\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/trust\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e14.\u0026nbsp; Trusted comment Injection (minisign) - \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/trustcomment\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/trustcomment\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Reference to the\u00a0gpg.fail\n\n\n\n\n1.\u00a0 Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/detached \n2.\u00a0 GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data \"Filename\" Field -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/filename \n3.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/formfeed \n4.\u00a0 Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/malleability \n5.\u00a0 Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/memcpy \n6.\u00a0 Trusted comment injection (minisign) -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/minisign \n7.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/notdash \n8.\u00a0 OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/notsoclear \n9.\u00a0 GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/noverify \n10.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/nullbyte \n11.\u00a0 Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/polyglot \n12.\u00a0 GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/sha1 \n13.\u00a0 GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/trust \n14.\u00a0 Trusted comment Injection (minisign) - https://gpg.fail/trustcomment"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://gpg.fail/"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Bundle reference to gpg.fail",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-0001"
}
],
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"datePublished": "2026-01-02T10:20:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-01-02T13:31:14.359346Z",
"requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"serial": 1,
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-0001",
"vulnerabilitylookup_history": [
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T10:20:24.357623Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T10:20:45.873825Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T13:28:12.107109Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T13:31:14.359346Z"
]
]
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.