CVE-2026-80212 (GCVE-0-2026-80212)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-27 14:15 – Updated: 2026-08-27 19:33
VLAI
Summary
An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-27 19:33 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
mitre CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard E 28/100 over 2287 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Ruby resolv Affected: 0 , < 0.3.2 (semver)
Affected: 0.4.0 , < 0.7.2 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
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