Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-63317 (GCVE-0-2026-63317)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-24 08:07 – Updated: 2026-07-24 18:04

Title

Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation in GeneratorFactory via Feature Descriptor XML

Summary

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type. The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T Mitigation: Upgrade to a fixed release. The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-24 18:03 UTC

CWE

CWE-470 - Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1090 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8w…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache OpenNLP	Affected: 3.0.0-M1 , < 3.0.0-M4 (semver) Affected: 0 , < 2.5.11 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Subramanian S

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2026-07-24T18:03:45.763042Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2026-07-24T18:03:38.123Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools",
              "product": "Apache OpenNLP",
              "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "3.0.0-M4",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "3.0.0-M1",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                },
                {
                  "lessThan": "2.5.11",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "0",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "Subramanian S"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
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                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "\u003cb\u003eArbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eVersions Affected: \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e- before 2.5.10\u003cbr\u003e- before 3.0.0-M5\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eDescription:\u003c/b\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThree code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.\u0026nbsp;\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe affected paths are: \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eExploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eMitigation:\u003c/b\u003e \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUpgrade to a fixed release. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. \u003cbr\u003eClasses under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
                }
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            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "other": {
                "content": {
                  "text": "moderate"
                },
                "type": "Textual description of severity"
              }
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-470",
                  "description": "CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (\u0027Unsafe Reflection\u0027)",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-07-24T08:07:57.463Z",
            "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
            "shortName": "apache"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "tags": [
                "vendor-advisory"
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              "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "defect": [
              "OPENNLP-1890"
            ],
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation in GeneratorFactory via Feature Descriptor XML",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "assignerShortName": "apache",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-63317",
        "datePublished": "2026-07-24T08:07:57.463Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-07-16T13:23:13.170Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-24T18:04:05.691Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
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      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-63317

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-24 09:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 13:10

Severity

5.6 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj	Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7	Mailing List, Third Party Advisory

Impacted products

Vendor	Product	Version
apache	opennlp	*
apache	opennlp	3.0.0
apache	opennlp	3.0.0
apache	opennlp	3.0.0

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools",
          "product": "Apache OpenNLP",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3.0.0-M4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.0.0-M1",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.5.11",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "1753EDAE-69EE-4EF0-82E5-C05E0E98ADCC",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2.5.11",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:3.0.0:m1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "57E14048-91DB-4673-9A7B-B15675B3994A",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:3.0.0:m2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "2E738486-C0BD-4FDB-8880-DBC2BA4C0D77",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:opennlp:3.0.0:m3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "FB9FDE8C-5093-4106-99EA-D1C273B81D21",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP\n\nVersions Affected: \n\n- before 2.5.10\n- before 3.0.0-M5\n\nDescription: \n\nThree code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.\u00a0\n\nThe affected paths are: \n\n(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. \n\n(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). \n\n(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.\n\nExploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T\n\nMitigation: \n\nUpgrade to a fixed release. \n\nThe fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. \nClasses under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. \n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Instanciaci\u00f3n Arbitraria de Clases a trav\u00e9s del Descriptor de Generador de Caracter\u00edsticas XML y el Nombre de Formato en Apache OpenNLP\n\nVersiones Afectadas:\n\n- anteriores a 2.5.10\n- anteriores a 3.0.0-M5\n\nDescripci\u00f3n:\n\nTres rutas de c\u00f3digo en Apache OpenNLP cargan una clase por su nombre completamente cualificado a trav\u00e9s de Class.forName() e invocan su constructor sin argumentos sin ninguna validaci\u00f3n previa del nombre de la clase o su tipo.\n\nLas rutas afectadas son:\n\n(1) GeneratorFactory, que lee el atributo \u2019class\u2019 de los elementos generadores en un descriptor de generador de caracter\u00edsticas XML; dichos descriptores est\u00e1n incrustados como artefactos en archivos de modelo (p. ej., modelos TokenNameFinder y POSTagger) y se analizan durante la carga del modelo, por lo que un atacante que puede proporcionar un archivo de modelo manipulado controla directamente el nombre de la clase.\n\n(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), que recurre a interpretar un nombre de formato no registrado como el nombre de clase completamente cualificado de un ObjectStreamFactory; esto es explotable en aplicaciones que pasan nombres de formato no confiables (p. ej., exponiendo el par\u00e1metro -format de las herramientas de l\u00ednea de comandos a entrada externa).\n\n(3) StringInterners, que instancia la implementaci\u00f3n de interner nombrada por la propiedad de sistema opennlp.interner.class; este valor normalmente es controlado por el desplegador, por lo que se refuerza como defensa en profundidad en lugar de ser alcanzable de forma independiente por el atacante.\n\nLa explotaci\u00f3n requiere que una clase con efectos secundarios \u00fatiles para el atacante en su inicializador est\u00e1tico o constructor sin argumentos (b\u00fasqueda JNDI, E/S de red saliente, acceso al sistema de archivos) est\u00e9 presente en el classpath, por lo que esto no es una ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo directa.\n\nMitigaci\u00f3n:\n\nActualice a una versi\u00f3n corregida.\n\nLa correcci\u00f3n enruta las tres rutas a trav\u00e9s de ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), que consulta una lista de permitidos de prefijos de paquete antes de que se invoque Class.forName(), por lo que una clase no permitida nunca se carga, inicializa o construye.\nLas clases bajo el prefijo opennlp. permanecen permitidas por defecto. Las implementaciones que cargan modelos que hacen referencia a f\u00e1bricas de generadores de caracter\u00edsticas, f\u00e1bricas de flujos de objetos o interners de cadenas fuera de opennlp.* deben incluir esos paquetes, ya sea program\u00e1ticamente a trav\u00e9s de ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) antes de la primera carga del modelo, o configurando la propiedad de sistema OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES a una lista de prefijos de paquete permitidos separados por comas.\n\nLos usuarios que no puedan actualizar de inmediato deben asegurarse de que todos los archivos de modelo y nombres de formato provengan de or\u00edgenes confiables y deben auditar su classpath en busca de clases con inicializadores est\u00e1ticos o constructores con efectos secundarios."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-63317",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:10:00.147",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 5.6,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 3.4,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-63317",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-24T18:03:45.763042Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-24T09:16:25.273",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-470"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CCQ5-X868-5P6X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 09:32 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:32

Details

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP

Versions Affected:

before 2.5.10
before 3.0.0-M5

Description:

Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.

The affected paths are:

(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly.

(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input).

(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.

Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T

Mitigation:

Upgrade to a fixed release.

The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-24T09:16:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP\n\nVersions Affected: \n\n- before 2.5.10\n- before 3.0.0-M5\n\nDescription: \n\nThree code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.\u00a0\n\nThe affected paths are: \n\n(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. \n\n(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). \n\n(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.\n\nExploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T\n\nMitigation: \n\nUpgrade to a fixed release. \n\nThe fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. \nClasses under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. \n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccq5-x868-5p6x",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:32:21Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T09:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

OPENSUSE-SU-2026:11369-1

Vulnerability from csaf_opensuse - Published: 2026-07-24 00:00 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:16

Summary

opennlp-1.9.5-2.1 on GA media

Severity

Moderate

Scope

1 vulnerability in this advisory, including CVE-2026-63317.

CVE-2026-63317

Recommended: 16 products

Open the full advisory

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63317 (CVE-2026-63317)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-07-24 09:16 – Updated: 2026-10-17 09:46 – Source website

Details

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

N/A (UNKNOWN)


                    
                      medium

References

URL

Type

	https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-63317	REPORT
	https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-63317	REPORT
	https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8w…	REPORT
	https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OPENNLP-1890	REPORT
	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7	REPORT

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "libapache-opennlp-java",
            "binary_version": "1.9.2-1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "opennlp",
            "binary_version": "1.9.2-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
        "name": "apache-opennlp",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/apache-opennlp@1.9.2-1?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.9.1-2",
        "1.9.2-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "libapache-opennlp-java",
            "binary_version": "1.9.4-1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "opennlp",
            "binary_version": "1.9.4-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
        "name": "apache-opennlp",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/apache-opennlp@1.9.4-1?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.9.3-1",
        "1.9.4-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "libapache-opennlp-java",
            "binary_version": "2.3.2-1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "opennlp",
            "binary_version": "2.3.2-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "apache-opennlp",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/apache-opennlp@2.3.2-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.3.0-1",
        "2.3.1-1",
        "2.3.1-2",
        "2.3.2-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "libapache-opennlp-java",
            "binary_version": "2.5.9-1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "opennlp",
            "binary_version": "2.5.9-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
        "name": "apache-opennlp",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/apache-opennlp@2.5.9-1?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.5.3-1build1",
        "2.5.9-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "libapache-opennlp-java",
            "binary_version": "2.5.3-1build1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "opennlp",
            "binary_version": "2.5.3-1build1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "apache-opennlp",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/apache-opennlp@2.5.3-1build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.5.3-1",
        "2.5.3-1build1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type. The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not drop-in remote code execution. T Mitigation: Upgrade to a fixed release. The fix routes all three paths through ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(...), which consults a package-prefix allowlist before Class.forName() is invoked, so a disallowed class is never loaded, initialized, or constructed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing feature generator factories, object stream factories, or string interners outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure all model files and format names are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63317",
  "modified": "2026-10-17T09:46:03Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T09:16:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-63317"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-63317"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/myr446n8t3gv8gq8wbpxm41olx16d8yj"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OPENNLP-1890"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/24/7"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-63317"
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-63317 (GCVE-0-2026-63317)

FKIE_CVE-2026-63317

GHSA-CCQ5-X868-5P6X

OPENSUSE-SU-2026:11369-1

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63317 (CVE-2026-63317)

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