CVE-2026-42027 (GCVE-0-2026-42027)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-04 16:43 – Updated: 2026-09-09 12:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in ExtensionLoader
Summary
Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader
Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3
Description:
The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class.
Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check.
Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load.
Mitigation:
* 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9.
* 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3.
Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-05-05 16:01 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
6 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2y… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… | |
| https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42027 | vdb-entryx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2466527 | issue-trackingx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/v… | x_sadp-csaf-vex |
| https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65126 | vendor-advisoryx_refsource_REDHAT |
Impacted products
8 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache OpenNLP |
Affected:
2.0 , < 2.5.9
(semver)
Affected: 3.0.0-M1 , < 3.0.0-M3 (semver) Affected: 0 , < 1.9.5 (semver) |
guessed | |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25 |
Unaffected:
1788198681 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai:2.25::el9 |
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4 |
cpe:/a:redhat:camel_spring_boot:4
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat Data Grid 8 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_data_grid:8
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat Fuse 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:8
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack |
cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) |
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai
|
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"value": "Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader\n\n\n\n\n\nVersions Affected:\u00a0before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3\n\n\n\n\n\nDescription:\u00a0\n\nThe ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String)\u00a0method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName()\u00a0and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties\u00a0entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom\u00a0check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory\u00a0for factory=, ArtifactSerializer\u00a0for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after\u00a0Class.forName()\u00a0has already loaded and initialized the named class. \n\nClass.forName()\u00a0with default initialization semantics executes the target class\u0027s static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. \n\nExploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory\u00a0or ArtifactSerializer\u00a0subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load.\n\n\n\n\n\nMitigation:\u00a0\n\n\n\n * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. \n * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. \n\n\n\n\nNote: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName()\u00a0is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp.\u00a0prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.*\u00a0must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String)\u00a0before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES\u00a0system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. \n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins\u00a0and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization."
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"value": "Instanciaci\u00f3n Arbitraria de Clases a trav\u00e9s del Manifiesto del Modelo en Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader\n\nVersiones Afectadas: anteriores a 2.5.9, anteriores a 3.0.0-M3\n\nDescripci\u00f3n:\nEl m\u00e9todo ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) carga una clase por su nombre completamente cualificado a trav\u00e9s de Class.forName() e invoca su constructor sin argumentos, con el nombre de la clase obtenido de la entrada manifest.properties de un archivo de modelo. La comprobaci\u00f3n isAssignableFrom existente rechaza correctamente las clases que no son subtipos de la interfaz de extensi\u00f3n esperada (BaseToolFactory para factory=, ArtifactSerializer para serializer-class-*), pero la comprobaci\u00f3n se ejecuta despu\u00e9s de que Class.forName() ya haya cargado e inicializado la clase nombrada.\n\nClass.forName() con sem\u00e1ntica de inicializaci\u00f3n predeterminada ejecuta el inicializador est\u00e1tico de la clase objetivo antes de regresar, por lo que un atacante que pueda proporcionar un archivo de modelo manipulado puede hacer que el inicializador est\u00e1tico de cualquier clase en el classpath se ejecute durante la carga del modelo, independientemente de si esa clase pasa la comprobaci\u00f3n de tipo posterior.\n\nLa explotaci\u00f3n requiere que una clase con efectos secundarios \u00fatiles para el atacante en su inicializador est\u00e1tico (por ejemplo, b\u00fasqueda JNDI, E/S de red saliente o acceso al sistema de archivos) est\u00e9 presente en el classpath, por lo que esto no es una ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo directa; sin embargo, la superficie de ataque crece a medida que la distribuci\u00f3n de modelos de terceros se vuelve m\u00e1s com\u00fan (repositorios de modelos comunitarios, compartici\u00f3n al estilo Hugging Face), donde los usuarios cargan rutinariamente archivos de modelo de or\u00edgenes que no controlan. Un vector secundario y m\u00e1s limitado afecta a las implementaciones que distribuyen subclases leg\u00edtimas de BaseToolFactory o ArtifactSerializer con constructores sin argumentos que producen efectos secundarios: un manifiesto malicioso puede nombrar dicha clase y forzar la ejecuci\u00f3n de su constructor durante la carga del modelo.\n\nMitigaci\u00f3n:\n\n * Los usuarios de 2.x deben actualizar a 2.5.9.\n * Los usuarios de 3.x deben actualizar a 3.0.0-M3.\n\nNota: La correcci\u00f3n introduce una lista blanca de prefijos de paquete que se consulta antes de invocar Class.forName(), por lo que el inicializador est\u00e1tico de una clase no permitida nunca se ejecuta. Las clases bajo el prefijo opennlp. permanecen permitidas por defecto. Las implementaciones que cargan modelos que referencian f\u00e1bricas o serializadores fuera de opennlp.* deben incluir esos paquetes, ya sea program\u00e1ticamente a trav\u00e9s de ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) antes de la primera carga del modelo, o configurando la propiedad del sistema OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES a una lista de prefijos de paquete permitidos separados por comas.\n\nLos usuarios que no puedan actualizar inmediatamente deben asegurarse de que todos los archivos de modelo provengan de or\u00edgenes de confianza y deben auditar su classpath en busca de clases con inicializadores est\u00e1ticos o constructores que produzcan efectos secundarios, particularmente cualquiera que realice b\u00fasquedas JNDI, solicitudes de red u operaciones del sistema de archivos durante la inicializaci\u00f3n de la clase."
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
"assignerShortName": "apache",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-42027",
"datePublished": "2026-05-04T16:43:12.583Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-04-23T14:21:25.317Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-29T19:56:35.694Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.