CVE-2026-99012 (GCVE-0-2026-99012)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 12:20 – Updated: 2026-10-24 14:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls
iso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock
and drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can
both pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound.
Caller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can
replace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A
then uses B's destination with the route selected for its own request.
B can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT.
For deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite
iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaving the first connection's reference and conn->sk
back-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the
socket's connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection,
so a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and
access a freed socket.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0
Call Trace:
iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0
iso_conn_del+0x7b/0x1d0
iso_connect_cfm+0x186/0x16a0
hci_conn_failed+0x154/0x280
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3dc/0x7d0
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300
Allocated by task 121:
sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0
bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370
iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300
iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100
Freed by task 121:
kfree+0x121/0x3c0
__sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540
iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340
__sock_release+0xa1/0x260
Check admission under the socket lock and mark the connect operation in
progress before publishing its destination. Keep that flag set across
route lookup and connection setup, rejecting another connect with
-EBADFD before it can change the destination or attach a connection.
Clear the flag after either helper returns, including on failure, so a
failed setup can be retried.
A separate flag is needed because the socket lock must be released before
acquiring the HCI device lock, while BT_CONNECT requires an attached
connection. Keep the existing state transitions and the deferred CIS
completion through iso_sock_recvmsg().
Reject an existing socket attachment in __iso_chan_add() before taking
a new reference or publishing either pointer, so every caller preserves
the connection association. Keep the same-socket, same-connection success
case for deferred CIS setup. Reject an attached socket before BIS setup
so a reusable BIS is not claimed before the attachment is rejected.
In CIS setup, reject a different HCI connection before iso_conn_add()
and drop the per-attempt HCI hold directly. An unowned iso_conn may still
carry another reference after detachment, so its destruction cannot be
relied on to release that hold.
iso_listen_bis() creates a fresh PA HCI/ISO pair under the device lock,
so the temporary iso_conn_put() frees the ISO candidate and drops its
HCI hold on rejection. iso_conn_ready() uses a freshly allocated,
unpublished child with no connection, making the socket-side rejection
unreachable.
Severity
7.8 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a , < 9b6ed57eb8c892ee7566b8c1bd06fdd0053b53de
(git)
Affected: ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a , < 1adcfe232c0f58890c2538211a841100ad0512bd (git) Affected: ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a , < c6489a3a0ac8c07f64cb5b44f005bc518f1048ac (git) Affected: ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a , < 3728f6b0d5990c0d500e929ba10baf93bee24f5e (git) Affected: ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a , < e32d80293a0e1a160d5e5101daa8c82148c07510 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.0
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.0 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.160 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.113 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.57 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.11 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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{
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"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.160",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.113",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.57",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls\n\niso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock\nand drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can\nboth pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound.\n\nCaller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can\nreplace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A\nthen uses B\u0027s destination with the route selected for its own request.\nB can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT.\nFor deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite\niso_pi(sk)-\u003econn, leaving the first connection\u0027s reference and conn-\u003esk\nback-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the\nsocket\u0027s connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection,\nso a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and\naccess a freed socket.\n\nKASAN reported:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0\n Call Trace:\n iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0\n iso_conn_del+0x7b/0x1d0\n iso_connect_cfm+0x186/0x16a0\n hci_conn_failed+0x154/0x280\n hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3dc/0x7d0\n hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300\n\n Allocated by task 121:\n sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0\n bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370\n iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300\n iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100\n\n Freed by task 121:\n kfree+0x121/0x3c0\n __sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540\n iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340\n __sock_release+0xa1/0x260\n\nCheck admission under the socket lock and mark the connect operation in\nprogress before publishing its destination. Keep that flag set across\nroute lookup and connection setup, rejecting another connect with\n-EBADFD before it can change the destination or attach a connection.\nClear the flag after either helper returns, including on failure, so a\nfailed setup can be retried.\n\nA separate flag is needed because the socket lock must be released before\nacquiring the HCI device lock, while BT_CONNECT requires an attached\nconnection. Keep the existing state transitions and the deferred CIS\ncompletion through iso_sock_recvmsg().\n\nReject an existing socket attachment in __iso_chan_add() before taking\na new reference or publishing either pointer, so every caller preserves\nthe connection association. Keep the same-socket, same-connection success\ncase for deferred CIS setup. Reject an attached socket before BIS setup\nso a reusable BIS is not claimed before the attachment is rejected.\n\nIn CIS setup, reject a different HCI connection before iso_conn_add()\nand drop the per-attempt HCI hold directly. An unowned iso_conn may still\ncarry another reference after detachment, so its destruction cannot be\nrelied on to release that hold.\n\niso_listen_bis() creates a fresh PA HCI/ISO pair under the device lock,\nso the temporary iso_conn_put() frees the ISO candidate and drops its\nHCI hold on rejection. iso_conn_ready() uses a freshly allocated,\nunpublished child with no connection, making the socket-side rejection\nunreachable."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The attack begins with two local connect(2) calls on one BTPROTO_ISO socket: __sys_connect() reaches iso_sock_connect(), whose pre-fix unlocked admission check lets both calls overwrite iso_pi(sk)-\u003edst and attach different connections. No received Bluetooth message creates those concurrent calls or supplies the state that causes the overwrite.\nAC:L - A process controls both sides by sharing one socket between threads and issuing concurrent nonblocking connects; the patched BT_SK_CONNECTING flag exists solely to serialize those calls. The stranded conn-\u003esk persists until connection failure or abort, so the attacker can retry and close or spray sockets without depending on victim activity.\nPR:L - bt_sock_create() and iso_sock_create() contain no capable() check, so an ordinary user in init_net can create the required AF_BLUETOOTH/SOCK_SEQPACKET/BTPROTO_ISO socket and call connect(). bt_sock_create() rejects non-initial network namespaces, but no administrative privilege is required in init_net.\nUI:N - The attacker creates, races, and closes their own ISO socket; subsequent hci_conn_failed() -\u003e iso_connect_cfm() -\u003e iso_conn_del() teardown is automatic and needs no victim action.\nS:U - The stale socket pointer is used and corrupted inside the host kernel\u0027s Bluetooth/socket memory, yielding an ordinary kernel compromise without crossing a VM, IOMMU, or separate security authority.\nC:H - The overwrite leaves the old iso_conn-\u003esk pointing at a freed, kmalloc-backed struct iso_pinfo; iso_conn_del() passes it through iso_sock_hold() and then reads socket, timer, connection, parent, and callback fields. Controlled heap reclamation makes this kernel UAF usable for high-impact memory disclosure.\nI:H - Through stale conn-\u003esk, iso_sock_hold() increments sk_refcnt and iso_conn_del()/iso_chan_del() manipulate the freed socket\u0027s lock, timer work, conn pointer, state, error, and callback. These writes into reclaimed heap memory support pointer/refcount corruption and control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - The commit\u0027s KASAN trace demonstrates a slab use-after-free in iso_sock_hold() reached through hci_conn_failed() -\u003e iso_connect_cfm() -\u003e iso_conn_del(); dereferencing or locking the freed struct sock can oops or panic the kernel."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:00.497Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b6ed57eb8c892ee7566b8c1bd06fdd0053b53de"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1adcfe232c0f58890c2538211a841100ad0512bd"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6489a3a0ac8c07f64cb5b44f005bc518f1048ac"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3728f6b0d5990c0d500e929ba10baf93bee24f5e"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e32d80293a0e1a160d5e5101daa8c82148c07510"
}
],
"title": "Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99012",
"datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:20:37.472Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.385Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:00.497Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-99012",
"date": "2026-10-24",
"epss": "0.00209",
"percentile": "0.10478"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9b6ed57eb8c892ee7566b8c1bd06fdd0053b53de",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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},
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls\n\niso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock\nand drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can\nboth pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound.\n\nCaller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can\nreplace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A\nthen uses B\u0027s destination with the route selected for its own request.\nB can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT.\nFor deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite\niso_pi(sk)-\u003econn, leaving the first connection\u0027s reference and conn-\u003esk\nback-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the\nsocket\u0027s connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection,\nso a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and\naccess a freed socket.\n\nKASAN reported:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0\n Call Trace:\n iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0\n iso_conn_del+0x7b/0x1d0\n iso_connect_cfm+0x186/0x16a0\n hci_conn_failed+0x154/0x280\n hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3dc/0x7d0\n hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300\n\n Allocated by task 121:\n sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0\n bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370\n iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300\n iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100\n\n Freed by task 121:\n kfree+0x121/0x3c0\n __sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540\n iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340\n __sock_release+0xa1/0x260\n\nCheck admission under the socket lock and mark the connect operation in\nprogress before publishing its destination. Keep that flag set across\nroute lookup and connection setup, rejecting another connect with\n-EBADFD before it can change the destination or attach a connection.\nClear the flag after either helper returns, including on failure, so a\nfailed setup can be retried.\n\nA separate flag is needed because the socket lock must be released before\nacquiring the HCI device lock, while BT_CONNECT requires an attached\nconnection. Keep the existing state transitions and the deferred CIS\ncompletion through iso_sock_recvmsg().\n\nReject an existing socket attachment in __iso_chan_add() before taking\na new reference or publishing either pointer, so every caller preserves\nthe connection association. Keep the same-socket, same-connection success\ncase for deferred CIS setup. Reject an attached socket before BIS setup\nso a reusable BIS is not claimed before the attachment is rejected.\n\nIn CIS setup, reject a different HCI connection before iso_conn_add()\nand drop the per-attempt HCI hold directly. An unowned iso_conn may still\ncarry another reference after detachment, so its destruction cannot be\nrelied on to release that hold.\n\niso_listen_bis() creates a fresh PA HCI/ISO pair under the device lock,\nso the temporary iso_conn_put() frees the ISO candidate and drops its\nHCI hold on rejection. iso_conn_ready() uses a freshly allocated,\nunpublished child with no connection, making the socket-side rejection\nunreachable."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99012",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:52.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:23.867",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1adcfe232c0f58890c2538211a841100ad0512bd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3728f6b0d5990c0d500e929ba10baf93bee24f5e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b6ed57eb8c892ee7566b8c1bd06fdd0053b53de"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6489a3a0ac8c07f64cb5b44f005bc518f1048ac"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e32d80293a0e1a160d5e5101daa8c82148c07510"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.