CVE-2026-93631 (GCVE-0-2026-93631)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 13:23 – Updated: 2026-10-23 13:23
VLAI
Title
Zimbra Collaboration Suite OAuth Extension Cross-Site Request Forgery Enables Account Linking
Summary
A cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the OAuth extension of Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Network Edition allows an attacker to link an attacker-controlled external account to a victim's mailbox. The OAuth callback does not bind its state value or authorization code to the initiating Zimbra session and instead selects the destination mailbox from the browser's current authentication cookie. On a deployment with the provider configured, an attacker can induce a signed-in victim to load a callback containing a fresh code for the attacker's provider account. This creates a persistent data source that imports attacker-controlled contacts or events. With bidirectional CalDAV synchronization, appointments subsequently created or edited in the linked calendar are also disclosed to the attacker. ZCS 10.1.16 and 10.1.20 are affected.
CWE
  • CWE-352 - Cross-Site request forgery (CSRF)
Assigner
rapid7 CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 81 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Zimbra Zimbra Collaboration Suite Affected: 0 , ≤ 10.1.20 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-23 12:51
Show details on NVD website

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