CVE-2026-89675 (GCVE-0-2026-89675)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 19:45 – Updated: 2026-10-19 08:50| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
e0639dc5805a9d4faaa2c07ad98fa853b9529dd3 , < 9031493ef7369d5c59c4bacc96f0c85965f09a98
(git)
Affected: e0639dc5805a9d4faaa2c07ad98fa853b9529dd3 , < a385cf5e016b748babf94cc664e43a26e17db117 (git) Affected: e0639dc5805a9d4faaa2c07ad98fa853b9529dd3 , < 62c0f6eaf050bb9284c1f9cac6ed1770092e6b95 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
4.20
Unaffected: 0 , < 4.20 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.51 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.4 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown\n\nAn async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller\n(OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the\ncopy kthread:\n\n - find_async_copy() bumped copy-\u003erefcount but left the copy on\n clp-\u003easync_copies, so the reaper\u0027s cleanup_async_copy() could run\n release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both\n put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the\n nfsd_file and freeing it early.\n\n - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses\n of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy-\u003enf_dst,\n nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit\n as \"kthread done, skip kthread_stop()\", so a teardown caller ran\n release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the\n kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF).\n\n - copy-\u003ecopy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on\n return, so kthread_stop()\u0027s get_task_struct() could touch a freed\n task_struct.\n\n - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a\n reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free\n the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight.\n\nFix the teardown lifetime as a whole:\n\n - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init)\n under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the\n list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy().\n Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy().\n\n - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its\n cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy\u0027s s2s_cp_stateids\n entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call\n nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so\n the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and\n manage_cpntf_state() to dereference.\n\n - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before\n wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy();\n call wake_up_process() before list_add().\n\n - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released\n in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread\n exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now\n always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is\n still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so\n nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller\n removes the copy from clp-\u003easync_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs\n exactly once.\n\n - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in\n nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference\n there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free.\n\n - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered\n set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst)."
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown\n\nAn async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller\n(OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the\ncopy kthread:\n\n - find_async_copy() bumped copy-\u003erefcount but left the copy on\n clp-\u003easync_copies, so the reaper\u0027s cleanup_async_copy() could run\n release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both\n put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the\n nfsd_file and freeing it early.\n\n - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses\n of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy-\u003enf_dst,\n nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit\n as \"kthread done, skip kthread_stop()\", so a teardown caller ran\n release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the\n kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF).\n\n - copy-\u003ecopy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on\n return, so kthread_stop()\u0027s get_task_struct() could touch a freed\n task_struct.\n\n - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a\n reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free\n the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight.\n\nFix the teardown lifetime as a whole:\n\n - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init)\n under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the\n list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy().\n Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy().\n\n - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its\n cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy\u0027s s2s_cp_stateids\n entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call\n nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so\n the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and\n manage_cpntf_state() to dereference.\n\n - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before\n wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy();\n call wake_up_process() before list_add().\n\n - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released\n in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread\n exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now\n always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is\n still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so\n nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller\n removes the copy from clp-\u003easync_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs\n exactly once.\n\n - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in\n nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference\n there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free.\n\n - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered\n set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst)."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - The flaw is in nfsd\u0027s NFSv4.2 OP_COPY and OP_OFFLOAD_CANCEL handlers (nfsd4_copy/nfsd4_offload_cancel in fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c), reached by sending COMPOUND RPCs over TCP port 2049 to the in-kernel NFS server; no local access to the host is required.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race by starting an async COPY then issuing OFFLOAD_CANCEL or DESTROY_CLIENTID, and can stall CB_OFFLOAD replies so the embedded callback stays in flight on freed memory; the window is retryable and does not depend on uninfluenced victim state.\nPR:N - Under AUTH_SYS, the default NFS configuration, the server verifies no secret; EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, and OPEN succeed for any host permitted by the export, so a remote NFSv4.2 client needs no kernel-verified credentials or local privileges on the server.\nUI:N - The attacker\u0027s own NFS client issues COPY and OFFLOAD_CANCEL (or DESTROY_CLIENTID) against an already-running nfsd export; no administrator or other user action on the server is required.\nS:U - Impact is kernel heap use-after-free and nfsd state corruption within the same host kernel security authority; it does not cross a VM, hypervisor, or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - Use-after-free of the nfsd4_copy object (including its embedded nfsd4_callback), nfsd_file src/dst objects, and the copy kthread task_struct allows slab reuse that can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel memory reads.\nI:H - The same UAFs enable heap spraying and arbitrary writes; CB_OFFLOAD work and rpc_task callbacks invoke cb_ops function pointers that live inside the freed copy, supporting control-flow hijack.\nA:H - Concurrent release_copy_files() double-puts nfsd_file, kthread_stop() can touch a self-reaped task_struct, and the copy kthread can NULL-dereference nf_dst after teardown, each of which oopses or panics the kernel."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:50:48.585Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9031493ef7369d5c59c4bacc96f0c85965f09a98"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a385cf5e016b748babf94cc664e43a26e17db117"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62c0f6eaf050bb9284c1f9cac6ed1770092e6b95"
}
],
"title": "nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-89675",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T19:45:59.635Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.747Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:50:48.585Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
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}
}
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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