CVE-2026-85712 (GCVE-0-2026-85712)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-06 21:07 – Updated: 2026-11-09 13:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Chartbrew: Cross-tenant project takeover via body.team_id in /project routes
Summary
Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
Severity
8.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-09 13:27 UTC
CWE
- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/a… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/commit/9db… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/t… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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Sightings
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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