CVE-2026-82432 (GCVE-0-2026-82432)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 14:11 – Updated: 2026-09-14 20:03- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/psy1gj77jhf9y3lhp… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Storm Nimbus |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 3.1.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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