CVE-2026-77776 (GCVE-0-2026-77776)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-21 11:22 – Updated: 2026-11-08 14:09
VLAI
Title
Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity
Summary
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-21 21:18 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 7784 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Headroom Labs Headroom Affected: 0 , < 0.36.1 (semver)
Unaffected: 0.36.1 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-08-20 00:00
Credits
Gregory Tan (Grg0rry)
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-77776",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-21T21:18:54.351966Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T21:44:30.707Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "headroom-ai",
          "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/headroom-ai",
          "product": "Headroom",
          "programFiles": [
            "headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py",
            "headroom/proxy/memory_handler.py",
            "headroom/memory/easy.py"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom",
          "vendor": "Headroom Labs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.36.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0.36.1",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Gregory Tan (Grg0rry)"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-08-20T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Headroom\u0027s LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user\u0027s identifier and read or write that user\u0027s stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 9.1,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 9.3,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-639",
              "description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-08T14:09:01.029Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "Pull Request #2207 addressing the assessment findings",
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking",
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207"
        },
        {
          "name": "Header handling in the OpenAI proxy handler at v0.29.0",
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py"
        },
        {
          "name": "resolve_memory_identity seam introduced by the fix",
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "product"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-77776",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-21T11:22:51.779Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-21T11:09:25.553Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-08T14:09:01.029Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-77776",
      "date": "2026-11-10",
      "epss": "0.00613",
      "percentile": "0.49682"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "packageName": "headroom-ai",
                "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/headroom-ai",
                "product": "Headroom",
                "programFiles": [
                  "headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py",
                  "headroom/proxy/memory_handler.py",
                  "headroom/memory/easy.py"
                ],
                "repo": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom",
                "vendor": "Headroom Labs",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "0.36.1",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
                  {
                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "0.36.1",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "Headroom\u0027s LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user\u0027s identifier and read or write that user\u0027s stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication."
          },
          {
            "lang": "es",
            "value": "El proxy LLM de Headroom deriva el propietario de la memoria del encabezado de solicitud x-headroom-user-id. El encabezado se lee directamente en varios puntos en headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, incluyendo las rutas de completado de chat y websocket, y nada vincula el valor al llamador. Un cliente puede, por lo tanto, nombrar el identificador de otro usuario y leer o escribir la memoria LLM almacenada de ese usuario. La soluci\u00f3n introduce una \u00fanica costura resolve_memory_identity en headroom/proxy/identity.py que respeta el encabezado solo para llamadores de loopback o en lista blanca y de lo contrario vincula la identidad a la huella digital del token de proxy o al usuario del sistema operativo. El script de consola pip enlaza 127.0.0.1 por defecto, pero el docker-compose.yml de referencia se env\u00eda con --host 0.0.0.0 con puertos publicados y sin HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN requerido, sobre lo cual el propio servidor advierte al inicio, por lo que un despliegue siguiendo el compose enviado expone las rutas del plano de datos afectadas a la red sin autenticaci\u00f3n."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-77776",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-15T19:10:00.173",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "baseScore": 9.1,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
              "impactScore": 5.2,
              "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ],
          "cvssMetricV40": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "baseScore": 9.3,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ],
          "ssvcV203": [
            {
              "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "ssvcData": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-77776",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "technicalImpact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-21T21:18:54.351966Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-08-21T12:16:36.967",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom"
          },
          {
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py"
          },
          {
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py"
          },
          {
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207"
          },
          {
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-639"
              }
            ],
            "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": {
        "adp": [
          {
            "metrics": [
              {
                "other": {
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2026-77776",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "yes"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "total"
                      }
                    ],
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "timestamp": "2026-08-21T21:18:54.351966Z",
                    "version": "2.0.3"
                  },
                  "type": "ssvc"
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T21:18:55.925Z",
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
            },
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
              "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
              "packageName": "headroom-ai",
              "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/headroom-ai",
              "product": "Headroom",
              "programFiles": [
                "headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py",
                "headroom/proxy/memory_handler.py",
                "headroom/memory/easy.py"
              ],
              "repo": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom",
              "vendor": "Headroom Labs",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "lessThan": "0.36.1",
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "0",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                },
                {
                  "status": "unaffected",
                  "version": "0.36.1",
                  "versionType": "semver"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "Gregory Tan (Grg0rry)"
            }
          ],
          "datePublic": "2026-08-20T00:00:00.000Z",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Headroom\u0027s LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user\u0027s identifier and read or write that user\u0027s stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication."
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV3_1": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "baseScore": 9.1,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "format": "CVSS"
            },
            {
              "cvssV4_0": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "baseScore": 9.3,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
              },
              "format": "CVSS"
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-639",
                  "description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-11-08T14:09:01.029Z",
            "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
            "shortName": "VulnCheck"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "name": "Pull Request #2207 addressing the assessment findings",
              "tags": [
                "issue-tracking",
                "patch"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207"
            },
            {
              "name": "Header handling in the OpenAI proxy handler at v0.29.0",
              "tags": [
                "technical-description"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py"
            },
            {
              "name": "resolve_memory_identity seam introduced by the fix",
              "tags": [
                "technical-description"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py"
            },
            {
              "tags": [
                "product"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom"
            },
            {
              "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity",
              "tags": [
                "third-party-advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity"
            }
          ],
          "title": "Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity"
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-77776",
        "datePublished": "2026-08-21T11:22:51.779Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-08-21T11:09:25.553Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-08T14:09:01.029Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.