{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "trigger.dev",
          "vendor": "triggerdotdev",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.3.8, \u003c 4.5.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 3.3.8 until 4.5.6, the PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata endpoint passes attacker-controlled operation.key values to new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value) in packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts without rejecting dangerous constructor and prototype path segments. A caller with a normal environment API key can pollute Object.prototype in the shared webapp process, corrupting Prisma queries and Prometheus labels, breaking other tenants\u0027 worker authentication, and causing a process-wide denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-73654",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-18T20:09:01.757",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 4.7,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-73654",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-14T16:33:32.438291Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-13T20:17:30.007",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-1321"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@trigger.dev/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73654"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe run-metadata update endpoint `PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata` applies client-supplied\n\"operations\" by passing the **attacker-controlled `operation.key`** straight into\n`new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value)`\n(`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23`), with **no prototype-pollution guard**\n(`@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21` does not reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype`).\n\nA request with `key: \"$.__proto__.polluted\"` sets **`Object.prototype.polluted`** in the webapp\nprocess. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code\n**process-wide and across tenants** \u2014 including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics\nclient \u2014 causing query failures, **broken authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers**, and an\n`uncaughtException` (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is\nrequired (one request).\n\n## Severity\n\nA single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates `Object.prototype`\nin the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants\u0027 workers (scope change) and degrading/\ncrashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for\nfurther gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- **Introduced** in commit `34f8bd588` (\"Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from\n  children\", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) \u2014 the `JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set()` sink is present from\n  the first commit of `operations.ts`. SDK was at `3.3.8` at that time.\n- **Still present at HEAD** (SDK `4.5.0-rc.7`); `operations.ts` unchanged since 2025-05, and\n  `@jsonhero/path` is pinned at `^1.0.21` (no proto-guard) throughout.\n- **Affected range:** `\u003e= v3.3.8` (metadata operations API) through `v4-beta` / current v4.x \u2014\n  **fixed: 4.5.6**.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts` \u2014 `applyMetadataOperations()` builds a path from\nthe **untrusted** `operation.key` and writes to it, for every operation type (`set`, `append`,\n`increment`, \u2026):\n\n```ts\nconst path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled\npath.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection\n```\n\nThe request schema (`UpdateMetadataRequestBody`) types `key` as a plain string with no validation,\nand `@jsonhero/path@1.0.21` walks `__proto__` as an ordinary segment \u2192 the assignment lands on\n`Object.prototype`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSelf-host `ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta`. Authenticated with a **normal environment\nAPI key** (`tr_dev_\u2026`) and any run id of that environment.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_\u003cenv_key\u003e\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\"operations\":[{\"type\":\"set\",\"key\":\"$.__proto__.polluted\",\"value\":\"PWNED\"}]}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result \u2014 `Object.prototype.polluted = \"PWNED\"` process-wide.** Observed in the webapp logs:\n\n1. **The request\u0027s own query is corrupted** \u2014 `polluted:\"PWNED\"` injected into every object Prisma\n   enumerates:\n   ```\n   prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:\"\u2026\", metadataVersion:2, polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     data:{ \u2026, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" })\n   -\u003e Unknown argument `polluted`\n   ```\n2. **Cross-tenant authentication break** \u2014 the *next* request from a different client (a worker\u0027s\n   `POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue`) fails inside `findEnvironmentByApiKey`:\n   ```\n   prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:\"\u2026\", polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     include:{ project:true, \u2026, polluted:\"PWNED\" } })  -\u003e PrismaClientValidationError\n   ```\n   i.e. one tenant\u0027s request **breaks authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers** \u2192 their jobs stop\n   being dequeued/processed.\n3. **Denial of service \u2014 full process crash.** The `uncaughtException` in prom-client\n   (`Error: Added label \"polluted\" is not included in initial labelset: [ \u0027kind\u0027 ]`) **crashes the\n   webapp process**. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a *different* org/env, with its\n   own API key) had a working request (`POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue` \u2192 HTTP 400, auth OK) **before**\n   the attack; **immediately after Tenant A\u0027s single attack request, B\u0027s request returned HTTP 000\n   (no response) \u2014 the whole multi-tenant webapp was down**. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the\n   process auto-restarting ~3s later (`FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started`). Repeating the attack in a\n   loop yields a **crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants**.\n\n*(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with `ignoreError:true` and still\nreturns HTTP 200 \u2014 the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the\nendpoint\u0027s status code.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nA low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes `Object.prototype`\nin the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:\n\n- **Full cross-tenant denial of service** \u2014 the resulting `uncaughtException` **crashes the webapp\n  process**, taking the service down for **all tenants** (demonstrated: a second tenant\u0027s request\n  returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a **crash-loop /\n  sustained DoS**. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants\u0027 worker\n  authentication, halting job processing.\n- **A prototype-pollution primitive** usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Reject dangerous path segments** in `operation.key` before building the path \u2014 block\n   `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` (and validate the `$.`-rooted JSONHero path shape).\n2. **Build metadata on a null-prototype object** (`Object.create(null)`) and/or use a\n   pollution-safe setter, so `__proto__` cannot reach `Object.prototype`.\n3. Upgrade/replace `@jsonhero/path` for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its\n   `.set()` with a guard.",
  "id": "GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations \u2192 process-wide cross-tenant DoS"
}