CVE-2026-68372 (GCVE-0-2026-68372)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-10 12:03 – Updated: 2026-08-17 05:04| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed , < 78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc
(git)
Affected: 11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed , < 7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4 (git) Affected: 11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed , < e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8 (git) Affected: 11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed , < e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.7
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.7 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.101 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.42 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.6 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/core/port.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/core/port.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.101",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.42",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.6",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind\n\nconnector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing\nthe symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via:\n\n if (port_dev-\u003echild)\n typec_attach(port_dev-\u003econnector, \u0026port_dev-\u003echild-\u003edev);\n\nWhen a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race:\n\n1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets\n port_dev-\u003econnector = NULL without calling typec_deattach(). This\n leaves port-\u003eusb2_dev/port-\u003eusb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at\n the USB device that is about to be freed.\n\n2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev-\u003econnector, ...),\n but port_dev-\u003econnector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and\n port-\u003eusb2_dev is never cleared.\n\n3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls\n typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port-\u003eusb2_dev (now a dangling\n pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device()\n -\u003e sysfs_remove_link() -\u003e dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting\n the typec/UCSI partner state.\n\nThis corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on\nthe next dock hot-plug. On affected hardware the dock\u0027s I225/igc NIC fails\nto enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still\ninitialising (\"PCIe link lost\"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits\nigc_rd32 on an already-detached device:\n\n igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached\n igc: Failed to read reg 0x0!\n WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005\n igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc]\n Call Trace:\n igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc]\n igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc]\n igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc]\n igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc]\n report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0\n pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400\n aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430\n aer_isr+0x4e/0x80\n irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0\n\n4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls\n typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port-\u003eusb2_dev\n and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time:\n\n kernfs: can not remove \u0027typec\u0027, no directory\n WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0\n Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi]\n Call Trace:\n sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50\n typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec]\n ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi]\n ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi]\n process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0\n worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420\n kthread+0x10a/0x230\n ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the\n backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free.\n\nFix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing\nport_dev-\u003econnector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side.\ntypec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port-\u003epartner_link_lock,\nso it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:04:17.570Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a"
}
],
"title": "usb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-68372",
"datePublished": "2026-08-10T12:03:50.292Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.386Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:04:17.570Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-68372",
"date": "2026-11-20",
"epss": "0.00168",
"percentile": "0.06209"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/core/port.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11110783f5ea866318831a56353c6f1c3fc0d8ed",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/core/port.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind\n\nconnector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing\nthe symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via:\n\n if (port_dev-\u003echild)\n typec_attach(port_dev-\u003econnector, \u0026port_dev-\u003echild-\u003edev);\n\nWhen a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race:\n\n1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets\n port_dev-\u003econnector = NULL without calling typec_deattach(). This\n leaves port-\u003eusb2_dev/port-\u003eusb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at\n the USB device that is about to be freed.\n\n2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev-\u003econnector, ...),\n but port_dev-\u003econnector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and\n port-\u003eusb2_dev is never cleared.\n\n3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls\n typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port-\u003eusb2_dev (now a dangling\n pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device()\n -\u003e sysfs_remove_link() -\u003e dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting\n the typec/UCSI partner state.\n\nThis corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on\nthe next dock hot-plug. On affected hardware the dock\u0027s I225/igc NIC fails\nto enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still\ninitialising (\"PCIe link lost\"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits\nigc_rd32 on an already-detached device:\n\n igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached\n igc: Failed to read reg 0x0!\n WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005\n igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc]\n Call Trace:\n igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc]\n igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc]\n igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc]\n igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc]\n report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0\n pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400\n aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430\n aer_isr+0x4e/0x80\n irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0\n\n4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls\n typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port-\u003eusb2_dev\n and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time:\n\n kernfs: can not remove \u0027typec\u0027, no directory\n WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0\n Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi]\n Call Trace:\n sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50\n typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec]\n ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi]\n ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi]\n process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0\n worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420\n kthread+0x10a/0x230\n ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the\n backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free.\n\nFix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing\nport_dev-\u003econnector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side.\ntypec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port-\u003epartner_link_lock,\nso it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68372",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:17:45.560",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:30.040",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7714fb896ed308cf13d32d317040adc4f200b8e4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78d361e60caf1999d51bda0e1b1004f5d39fcfbc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00109b5adf71635919248e9ab6300a662e6a3e8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0b291fe117964037e0ba382eff4bb365d531c3a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-05T22:25:50+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-68372",
"id": "CVE-2026-68372",
"initial_release_date": "2026-08-10T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "108",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "92",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: usb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-68372.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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