CVE-2026-66294 (GCVE-0-2026-66294)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-06 10:16 – Updated: 2026-11-06 10:16
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
XML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator
Summary
XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.
An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-91 - XML Injection
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66294.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66294 | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e94078… | related |
| https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/71d99fae12f1d… | patch |
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.7.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.7.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "qcam/saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation reviewer",
"value": "C\u1ea9m Hu\u1ef3nh"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eXML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.Encoder.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e serializes a \u003ccode\u003e{:cdata, characters}\u003c/code\u003e node by wrapping the supplied characters between \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\u0026amp;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e\"\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003e\u0027\u003c/code\u003e, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e substring is to split the section and rejoin it as \u003ccode\u003e]]]]\u0026gt;\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e and serializing it with \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode!/2\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.encode_to_iodata!/2\u003c/code\u003e, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. `Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1` serializes a `{:cdata, characters}` node by wrapping the supplied characters between `\u003c![CDATA[` and `]]\u003e` and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\u0026`, `\"`, and `\u0027`, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a `]]\u003e` substring is to split the section and rejoin it as `]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e`. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\n\nAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with `Saxy.XML.cdata/1` and serializing it with `Saxy.encode!/2` or `Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2`, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the `]]\u003e` is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"value": "XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between \u003c![CDATA[ and ]]\u003e and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters \u003c, \u003e, \u0026, \", and \u0027, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]\u003e substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\n\nAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]\u003e is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-250",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-250 XML Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-91",
"description": "CWE-91 XML Injection",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-hq6g-j46w-wx72"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66294",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66294.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66294",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66294"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 71d99fa in qcam/saxy",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "XML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eRender untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.characters/1\u003c/code\u003e to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of \u003ccode\u003e]]\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e in the untrusted text with \u003ccode\u003e]]]]\u0026gt;\u0026lt;![CDATA[\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e and pass the result to \u003ccode\u003eSaxy.XML.cdata/1\u003c/code\u003e. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or `Saxy.XML.characters/1` to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\n\nIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of `]]\u003e` in the untrusted text with `]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e` and pass the result to `Saxy.XML.cdata/1`. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding."
}
],
"value": "Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or Saxy.XML.characters/1 to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content.\n\nIf a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of ]]\u003e in the untrusted text with ]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e and pass the result to Saxy.XML.cdata/1. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-66294",
"datePublished": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-24T14:10:01.114Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-06T10:16:49.656Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-66294",
"date": "2026-11-07",
"epss": "0.00168",
"percentile": "0.06153"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.7.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.7.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
],
"packageName": "qcam/saxy",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
"product": "saxy",
"programFiles": [
"lib/saxy.ex",
"lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
"lib/saxy/xml.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:cdata/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:cdata/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
"vendor": "qcam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between \u003c![CDATA[ and ]]\u003e and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder\u0027s character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters \u003c, \u003e, \u0026, \", and \u0027, but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]\u003e substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.\n\nAn application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]\u003e is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-66294",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T11:17:16.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-06T11:17:16.317",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66294.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-hq6g-j46w-wx72"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66294"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-91"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.