CVE-2026-62313 (GCVE-0-2026-62313)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-21 14:44 – Updated: 2026-08-26 17:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Incus: Project restriction `restricted.containers.privilege=isolated` bypassable by omitting `security.idmap.isolated`
Summary
Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.3.0, project-level enforcement of `restricted.containers.privilege=isolated` can be trivially bypassed, allowing a user to create a non-isolated (shared host idmap) container in a project that is configured to forbid them. The restriction only rejects an explicitly set `security.idmap.isolated=false` (or empty) and fails to enforce anything when the key is omitted entirely. Because an unset `security.idmap.isolated` defaults to `false` (non-isolation), a user simply leaves the key out and obtains exactly the container state the restriction is meant to forbid. This defeats the tenant-isolation guarantee the restriction exists to provide. Containers in the project share the host uid/gid map instead of receiving unique, non-overlapping ranges, weakening the isolation boundary between co-tenant containers and the host. Version 7.3.0 patches the issue.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-26 17:26 UTC
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
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Sightings
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