CVE-2026-59341 (GCVE-0-2026-59341)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 09:16 – Updated: 2026-09-16 11:53
VLAI
Title
Sealed Secrets: decryption oracle via Go template injection in unauthenticated controller endpoints
Summary
A security vulnerability exists in the Sealed Secrets controller's unauthenticated POST endpoints. By submitting a modified payload containing custom Go template logic in spec.template.data, an attacker with internal network access can abuse the handler as a decryption oracle to recover the full plaintext of any sealed secret. The POST /v1/verify and /v1/rotate handlers call Unseal() to decrypt target secrets, then render any Go templates found in spec.template.data.* using the decrypted payload as the evaluation context (pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go). Errors encountered during template execution are directly reflected in the resulting HTTP response status codes. Missing AEAD label binding: the spec.template.data field is omitted from the AEAD authenticated-data label binding ciphertext to metadata. As a result, an attacker can copy a target's valid metadata and encryptedData verbatim, satisfying AEAD decryption and label validation, while freely replacing spec.template.data with arbitrary template logic. Side-channel oracle: template execution errors map directly to HTTP response codes. HTTP 200 (OK) indicates template execution succeeded; HTTP 409 (Conflict) indicates template execution failed (e.g. via {{ fail "..." }}). By injecting conditional statements such as {{ if eq (substr 0 1 .password) "S" }}ok{{ else }}{{ fail "x" }}{{ end }}, an attacker receives an HTTP 200 status when a character guess is correct and an HTTP 409 when it is incorrect. This differential response leaks one character-equality bit per request, allowing full secret extraction over successive queries. Attack vector & prerequisites: unauthenticated; requires network access to the controller's internal service port (:8080). Although this service is not exposed to the public internet by default, it is accessible to any pod within the Kubernetes cluster or via a kubectl port-forward connection.
Severity
4.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-15 17:27 UTC
CWE
Assigner
vmware CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 64/100 over 226 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Bitnami sealed-secrets Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.38.4 (semver)
Unaffected: 0.40.0 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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