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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ansible-jailexec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55074"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T23:21:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin\u0027s put_file resolved a transfer\u0027s destination to a path on the jail host (\u003cjail filesystem root\u003e + \u003cdestination\u003e) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv.\n\nA party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail\u0027s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail \u2014 a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys).\n\nPreconditions: the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task\u0027s destination before the transfer runs.\n\nPatches: Fixed in 2.0.0. File transfers now run inside the jail via jexec (mkdir -p \u003cdir\u003e \u0026\u0026 cat \u003e \u003cdest\u003e for put_file; cat \u003c \u003csrc\u003e for fetch_file), so every path resolves within the jail\u0027s chroot. An in-jail symlink can at most redirect within the same jail and can no longer reach the host.\n\nWorkarounds: None in affected versions; upgrade to 2.0.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T15:58:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T23:21:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec/security/advisories/GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec/commit/6e80eecb2db7aebd1258fded6ae5c3aba1dd4123"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ansible-jailexec",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/ansible-jailexec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.2.0",
        "1.3.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55074",
    "GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r"
  ],
  "details": "Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin\u0027s put_file resolved a transfer\u0027s destination to a path on the jail host (\u003cjail filesystem root\u003e + \u003cdestination\u003e) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv.\n\nA party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail\u0027s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail \u2014 a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys).\n\nPreconditions: the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task\u0027s destination before the transfer runs.\n\nPatches: Fixed in 2.0.0. File transfers now run inside the jail via jexec (mkdir -p \u003cdir\u003e \u0026\u0026 cat \u003e \u003cdest\u003e for put_file; cat \u003c \u003csrc\u003e for fetch_file), so every path resolves within the jail\u0027s chroot. An in-jail symlink can at most redirect within the same jail and can no longer reach the host.\n\nWorkarounds: None in affected versions; upgrade to 2.0.0.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3658",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T12:16:19.586215Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T11:56:26.241512Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec/security/advisories/GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec/commit/6e80eecb2db7aebd1258fded6ae5c3aba1dd4123"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/chofstede/ansible_jailexec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/ansible-jailexec"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55074"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv)"
}