CVE-2026-54051 (GCVE-0-2026-54051)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-20 16:24 – Updated: 2026-07-21 16:03
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Network-AI has an an OS Command Injection issue
Summary
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.
Severity
9.9 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-21 16:01 UTC
CWE
- CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/securit… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jovancoding | Network-AI |
Affected:
< 5.9.1
|
guessed |
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