CVE-2026-53034 (GCVE-0-2026-53034)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-24 16:29 – Updated: 2026-06-24 16:29
VLAI
Title
bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL. CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Initial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1], but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()[4]. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex[5]. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6]. This way we circled back to the peer check idea[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/ Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update: 1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys() Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf. 2. connect() vs BPF program doing update Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only) BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP Plus one more race to consider: CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() ---truncated---
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4 (git)
Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10 (git)
Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317 (git)
Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0 (git)
Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < 37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0 (git)
Affected: c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b , < dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 5.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.15 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.1.175 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.141 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.91 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.33 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.0.10 , ≤ 7.0.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
  "containers": {
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          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/unix/unix_bpf.c"
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            }
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      "cpeApplicability": [
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\n\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state,\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\nthere\u0027s a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\n\n         CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n         --------                            ------------\n\n                                WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n...\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\n                                sock_hold(newsk)\n                                smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                                unix_peer(sk) = newsk\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\nCall Trace:\n  sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\n  sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\n  sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\n  __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\n  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\n  do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\nwas rejected.\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\nunix_state_lock()[4].\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\nspin_lock(\u0026unix_sk(s)-\u003elock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\n\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\nupdate:\n\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\n\n   Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won\u0027t\n   be released until socket fd is released. And that\u0027s not an issue because\n   sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\n\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\n\n   Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\n\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\n\n   Plus one more race to consider:\n\n            CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\n            --------                            ------------\n\n                                   WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\n   sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\n                                   sock_hold(newsk)\n                                   smp_mb__after_atomic()\n                \n---truncated---"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a"
        }
      ],
      "title": "bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update",
      "x_generator": {
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      }
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-53034",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-09T07:44:35.380Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T16:29:41.676Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-53034",
      "date": "2026-07-02",
      "epss": "0.0018",
      "percentile": "0.0778"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-53034\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-06-24T17:17:14.843\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-06-24T17:17:14.843\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nbpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update\\n\\nunix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state,\\nTCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`).\\nsk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that\\nsocket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW,\\nthere\u0027s a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on\\nsocket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL.\\n\\n         CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\\n         --------                            ------------\\n\\n                                WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\\nsock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\\n...\\nsk_pair = unix_peer(sk)\\nsock_hold(sk_pair)\\n                                sock_hold(newsk)\\n                                smp_mb__after_atomic()\\n                                unix_peer(sk) = newsk\\n\\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080\\nRIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0\\nCall Trace:\\n  sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0\\n  sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340\\n  sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240\\n  __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250\\n  __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30\\n  do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0\\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\\n\\nInitial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1],\\nbut that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path\\nwas rejected.\\nThen a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was\\nconsidered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause,\\ni.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing\\nunix_state_lock()[4].\\nIn the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking\\nwould be unnecessarily complex[5].\\nComplexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\\nare allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix\\nlock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock():\\nspin_lock(\u0026unix_sk(s)-\u003elock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken\\nin a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program\\nattempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6].\\nThis way we circled back to the peer check idea[2].\\n\\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba5c50aa-1df4-40c2-ab33-a72022c5a32e@rbox.co/\\n[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240610174906.32921-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/\\n[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/7603c0e6-cd5b-452b-b710-73b64bd9de26@linux.dev/\\n[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/\\n[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/\\n[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/dd043c69-4d03-46fe-8325-8f97101435cf@linux.dev/\\n\\nSummary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap\\nupdate:\\n\\n1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys()\\n\\n   Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won\u0027t\\n   be released until socket fd is released. And that\u0027s not an issue because\\n   sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf.\\n\\n2. connect() vs BPF program doing update\\n\\n   Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to\\n\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only)\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR\\n      BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP\\n\\n   Plus one more race to consider:\\n\\n            CPU0 bpf                            CPU1 connect\\n            --------                            ------------\\n\\n                                   WRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)\\n   sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk)\\n                                   sock_hold(newsk)\\n                                   smp_mb__after_atomic()\\n                \\n---truncated---\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/unix/unix_bpf.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"c63829182c37c2d6d0608976d15fa61ebebe9e6b\",\"lessThan\":\"dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/unix/unix_bpf.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"5.15\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"5.15\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.1.175\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.6.141\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.6.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.91\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.33\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.0.10\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.0.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/041eb6348d73ee5e15fc8161f1eac5a6e8289ca0\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37bfcd164161b47d00b1c3bd20adc816a6977ce0\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4913c94a3adcdbb64c552110c0c243cb1fdbb317\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b7d3b3f8bd4e59eb3af1b11a43c64c0c2db6f4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a94d3dd78ee8b63e6b8ad629081c952c93ee5a10\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dca38b7734d2ea00af4818ff3ae836fab33d5d5a\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
  }
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.