CVE-2026-46415 (GCVE-0-2026-46415)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-20 15:05 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:53
VLAI
Title
Caddy Defender trusted proxy client IP bypass
Summary
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-21 13:52 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
  • CWE-348 - Use of Less Trusted Source
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7814 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
JasonLovesDoggo caddy-defender Affected: < 0.10.1
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
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            "value": "The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client\u0027s IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy\u0027s trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass."
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