CVE-2026-34243 (GCVE-0-2026-34243)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-31 15:49 – Updated: 2026-04-02 15:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
wenxian: Command Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow via `issue_comment.body`
Summary
wenxian is a tool to generate BIBTEX files from given identifiers (DOI, PMID, arXiv ID, or paper title). In versions 0.3.1 and prior, a GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from issue_comment.body directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-04-02 15:21 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/njzjz/wenxian/security/advisor… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
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FKIE_CVE-2026-34243
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-31 16:16 - Updated: 2026-07-24 20:10
Severity
Summary
wenxian is a tool to generate BIBTEX files from given identifiers (DOI, PMID, arXiv ID, or paper title). In versions 0.3.1 and prior, a GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from issue_comment.body directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/njzjz/wenxian/security/advisories/GHSA-r4fj-r33x-8v88 | Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
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GHSA-R4FJ-R33X-8V88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:39 – Updated: 2026-03-31 18:54
VLAI
Summary
wenxian: Command Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow via `issue_comment.body`
Details
Summary
A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from issue_comment.body directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.
Details
The workflow is triggered by issue_comment, which can be controlled by external users.
In the following step:
echo identifiers=$(echo "${{ github.event.comment.body }}" | grep -oE '@njzjz-bot .*' | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
the value of github.event.comment.body is directly interpolated into a shell command inside run:.
Since GitHub Actions evaluates ${{ }} before execution, attacker-controlled input is injected into the shell context without sanitization. This creates a command injection risk.
Additionally, the extracted value is later reused in another step that constructs output using backticks:
echo '@${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} Here is the BibTeX entry for `${{ steps.extract-identifiers.outputs.identifiers }}`:'
which may further propagate unsafe content.
PoC
- Go to an issue in the repository
- Post a comment such as:
@njzjz-bot paper123" ) ; whoami ; #
- Observe whether the command is executed or reflected in logs/output
The injected payload successfully breaks out of the quoted context and executes arbitrary shell commands.
As shown in the workflow logs, the injected whoami command is executed, and the output (runner) is printed. This confirms that attacker-controlled input from github.event.comment.body is interpreted as shell commands.
This demonstrates a clear command injection vulnerability in the workflow.
Impact
- Remote attackers can inject arbitrary shell commands via issue comments
-
Potential impacts:
-
Execution of arbitrary commands in GitHub Actions runner
- Access to
GITHUB_TOKEN - Exfiltration of repository data
- CI/CD pipeline compromise
This issue affects all current versions of the repository as the vulnerable workflow is present in the main branch.
Suggested Fix
Avoid directly interpolating untrusted user input into shell commands.
Instead, pass github.event.comment.body through an environment variable and reference it safely within the script:
```yaml - name: Extract identifiers id: extract-identifiers env: COMMENT_BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} run: | identifiers=$(echo "$COMMENT_BODY" | grep -oE '@njzjz-bot .*' | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) echo "identifiers=$identifiers" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
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],
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],
"github_reviewed": true,
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T16:16:33Z",
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},
"details": "#### Summary\n\nA GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.\n\n#### Details\n\nThe workflow is triggered by `issue_comment`, which can be controlled by external users.\nIn the following step:\n\n```bash\necho identifiers=$(echo \"${{ github.event.comment.body }}\" | grep -oE \u0027@njzjz-bot .*\u0027 | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) \u003e\u003e $GITHUB_OUTPUT\n```\n\nthe value of `github.event.comment.body` is directly interpolated into a shell command inside `run:`.\n\nSince GitHub Actions evaluates `${{ }}` before execution, attacker-controlled input is injected into the shell context without sanitization. This creates a command injection risk.\n\nAdditionally, the extracted value is later reused in another step that constructs output using backticks:\n\n```bash\necho \u0027@${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} Here is the BibTeX entry for `${{ steps.extract-identifiers.outputs.identifiers }}`:\u0027\n```\n\nwhich may further propagate unsafe content.\n\n#### PoC\n\n1. Go to an issue in the repository\n2. Post a comment such as:\n\n`@njzjz-bot paper123\" ) ; whoami ; #\n`\n\n3. Observe whether the command is executed or reflected in logs/output\n\u003cimg width=\"658\" height=\"203\" alt=\"poc\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/084ac264-8cb9-4721-8279-26a1da9b891f\" /\u003e\n\nThe injected payload successfully breaks out of the quoted context and executes arbitrary shell commands.\n\nAs shown in the workflow logs, the injected `whoami` command is executed, and the output (`runner`) is printed. This confirms that attacker-controlled input from `github.event.comment.body` is interpreted as shell commands.\n\nThis demonstrates a clear command injection vulnerability in the workflow.\n\n#### Impact\n\n* Remote attackers can inject arbitrary shell commands via issue comments\n* Potential impacts:\n\n * Execution of arbitrary commands in GitHub Actions runner\n * Access to `GITHUB_TOKEN`\n * Exfiltration of repository data\n * CI/CD pipeline compromise\n\n\nThis issue affects all current versions of the repository as the vulnerable workflow is present in the main branch.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nAvoid directly interpolating untrusted user input into shell commands.\n\nInstead, pass `github.event.comment.body` through an environment variable and reference it safely within the script:\n\n```yaml\n- name: Extract identifiers\n id: extract-identifiers\n env:\n COMMENT_BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }}\n run: |\n identifiers=$(echo \"$COMMENT_BODY\" | grep -oE \u0027@njzjz-bot .*\u0027 | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs)\n echo \"identifiers=$identifiers\" \u003e\u003e $GITHUB_OUTPUT",
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"modified": "2026-03-31T18:54:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-29T15:39:56Z",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34243"
},
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}
],
"summary": "wenxian: Command Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow via `issue_comment.body` "
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.