{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30858"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T23:56:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-07T17:15:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA DNS rebinding vulnerability in the `web_fetch` tool allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass URL validation and access internal resources on the server, including private IP addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x). By crafting a malicious domain that resolves to a public IP during validation and subsequently resolves to a private IP during execution, an attacker can access sensitive local services and potentially exfiltrate data.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the `web_fetch` tool lacks complete DNS pinning. The application performs URL validation only once via `validateParams()`, but the URL is then passed unchanged to the `fetchHTMLContent()` function, which eventually reaches `fetchWithChromedp()`. The headless browser (Chromedp) resolves the hostname independently without DNS pinning, allowing a time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attack.\n\n**Validation phase (first DNS resolution):**\n```go\nif err := t.validateParams(p); err != nil {\n    // Returns error for private IPs\n    results[index] = \u0026webFetchItemResult{\n        err: err,\n        // ...\n    }\n    return\n}\n```\n\n**Execution phase (second DNS resolution):**\nThe original URL (not the resolved IP) is passed through the execution chain:\n```go\noutput, data, err := t.executeFetch(ctx, p)\n// Calls fetchHTMLContent(ctx, targetURL) where targetURL is the original hostname\n```\n\n**Chromedp execution (vulnerable DNS resolution):**\n```go\nfunc (t *WebFetchTool) fetchWithChromedp(ctx context.Context, targetURL string) (string, error) {\n    // targetURL is not DNS-pinned; browser resolves it independently\n    err := chromedp.Run(ctx,\n        chromedp.Navigate(targetURL),  // Third DNS lookup occurs here\n        chromedp.WaitReady(\"body\", chromedp.ByQuery),\n        chromedp.OuterHTML(\"html\", \u0026html),\n    )\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker controls a domain that can be configured to return different DNS responses to different queries, enabling them to bypass the initial private IP check and access restricted resources during the actual fetch.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Setup:**\n1. Deploy the DNS rebinding server (attached Python file) with the following systemd configuration:\n\n```systemd\n[Unit]\nDescription=DNS Rebinding Test Server\nAfter=network.target\n\n[Service]\nType=simple\nUser=root\nWorkingDirectory=/root/Repos/dns-rebinding-server\nExecStart=/root/.proto/shims/python -u /root/Repos/dns-rebinding-server/server.py --token aleister1102 --domain aleister.ninja --port 53 --global-tracking --ip1 1.1.1.1 --ip2 0.0.0.0 --first-response-count 1 --reset-time 0\nRestart=always\nRestartSec=3\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target\n ```\n \n This configures the DNS server to:\n - Return `1.1.1.1` (a public IP) for the first DNS query\n - Return `127.0.0.1` (localhost) for all subsequent queries\n - TTL is set to 0 to prevent caching\n \n The sequence can also be reset via reset.domain.com (reset to 1.1.1.1).\n \n \u003e Note: We may need to reset the sequence as the TOCTOU attack is not truly reliable and needs to be triggered multiple times.\n\n2. Set up a simple HTTP server on the localhost of the backend service:\n\n ```bash\n python -m http.server 8888\n ```\n\n3. Configure the malicious domain to point to the DNS rebinding server\n\n**Execution:**\n1. Enable web search on an agent.\n2. Prompt the agent to fetch content from the attacker-controlled domain (e.g., `http://attacker.example.com`)\n3. The sequence of events:\n   - **First DNS query** (validation phase): `attacker.example.com` \u2192 `1.1.1.1` \u2713 Passes validation\n   - **Second DNS query** (execution phase): `attacker.example.com` \u2192 `127.0.0.1` \u2717 Bypass achieved\n   - The `web_fetch` tool successfully connects to `127.0.0.1:8080` and returns the local server\u0027s content\n\n**Result:**\nThe attacker gains access to the local HTTP server and can read its content, demonstrating that internal resources are now accessible through the rebinding attack.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/897e8494-f39e-49ce-a02a-5832bb84a73f\" /\u003e\n\nPoC video:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/68daaa87-4b9b-4b6e-b6f6-ee123f5fcda9\n\n### Impact\n**Vulnerability Type:** DNS Rebinding / Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n- Any user or agent with web search capability can exploit this vulnerability\n- The vulnerability grants access to internal services, configuration files, metadata services, and other sensitive resources normally restricted to the internal network\n- In cloud environments, this could allow access to metadata endpoints (e.g., AWS IMDSv1) to obtain credentials and secrets\\",
  "id": "GHSA-h6gw-8f77-mmmp",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T13:21:07Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T23:56:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/security/advisories/GHSA-h6gw-8f77-mmmp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30858"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WeKnora has DNS Rebinding Vulnerability in web_fetch Tool that Allows SSRF to Internal Resources"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:tencent:weknora:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7F3180E7-F262-4100-96C2-4AB5730E75FF",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.3.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WeKnora is an LLM-powered framework designed for deep document understanding and semantic retrieval. Prior to version 0.3.0, a DNS rebinding vulnerability in the web_fetch tool allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass URL validation and access internal resources on the server, including private IP addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x). By crafting a malicious domain that resolves to a public IP during validation and subsequently resolves to a private IP during execution, an attacker can access sensitive local services and potentially exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.0."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WeKnora es un framework impulsado por LLM dise\u00f1ado para la comprensi\u00f3n profunda de documentos y la recuperaci\u00f3n sem\u00e1ntica. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.3.0, una vulnerabilidad de reencuadernaci\u00f3n de DNS en la herramienta web_fetch permite a un atacante no autenticado eludir la validaci\u00f3n de URL y acceder a recursos internos en el servidor, incluyendo direcciones IP privadas (p. ej., 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x). Al crear un dominio malicioso que se resuelve a una IP p\u00fablica durante la validaci\u00f3n y posteriormente se resuelve a una IP privada durante la ejecuci\u00f3n, un atacante puede acceder a servicios locales sensibles y potencialmente exfiltrar datos. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 0.3.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-30858",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-09T17:34:39.527",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-07T17:15:53.523",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/security/advisories/GHSA-h6gw-8f77-mmmp"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}