Action not permitted
Modal body text goes here.
Modal Title
Modal Body
CVE-2026-23268 (GCVE-0-2026-23268)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-18 17:54 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:20| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < a407a078cd41b5261b99d822af784bd9f136eb4d
(git)
Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < 4cafce4d6d0a66ec27e3af5637c11901d60189fa (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < 33ee909702e047c94aaf41d4eea35626d509802c (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < 17debf5586020790b5717f96e5e6a3ca5bb961ab (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < 0fc63dd9170643d15c25681fca792539e23f4640 (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < b60b3f7a35c46b2e0ca934f9c988b8fca06d76c6 (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < b6a94eeca9c6c8f7c55ad44c62c98324f51ec596 (git) Affected: b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c , < 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
4.11
Unaffected: 0 , < 4.11 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.253 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.203 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.169 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.130 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.77 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.18 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.19.8 , ≤ 6.19.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.0 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c",
"security/apparmor/include/policy.h",
"security/apparmor/policy.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a407a078cd41b5261b99d822af784bd9f136eb4d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4cafce4d6d0a66ec27e3af5637c11901d60189fa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "33ee909702e047c94aaf41d4eea35626d509802c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "17debf5586020790b5717f96e5e6a3ca5bb961ab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0fc63dd9170643d15c25681fca792539e23f4640",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b60b3f7a35c46b2e0ca934f9c988b8fca06d76c6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b6a94eeca9c6c8f7c55ad44c62c98324f51ec596",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c",
"security/apparmor/include/policy.h",
"security/apparmor/policy.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.253",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.203",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.169",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.130",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.77",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.18",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.253",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.203",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.169",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.130",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.77",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.18",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management\n\nAn unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by\nopening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by\npassing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the\nprivileged process to write to the interface.\n\nThis does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do\nthe write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is\nachieved full policy management is possible and all the possible\nimplications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or\ntarget applications by denying all execution, by-passing the\nunprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for\na local privilege escalation.\n\nThe policy management interface can not have its permissions simply\nchanged from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able\nto load policy to different policy namespaces.\n\nInstead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that\nare a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already\ndone via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate\naccess to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The attacker must be a local user to open the apparmorfs interface files and pass the file descriptor to a privileged process via local IPC mechanisms.\nAC:L - On typical Linux systems (desktop, server, Android), privileged daemons that accept and act on fds from unprivileged users are common (D-Bus services, systemd units). The attacker can reliably identify and leverage such confused deputies.\nPR:L - Requires a basic unprivileged local user account. The apparmorfs interface files are created with 0666 permissions, so any local user can open them.\nUI:N - No user interaction is needed. The confused deputy is a system service/daemon that can be programmatically triggered, not a human user who must take action.\nS:U - The vulnerability and its impact remain within the kernel security authority. While AppArmor policy manipulation is severe, it is standard kernel privilege escalation within the same security domain.\nC:H - By removing AppArmor confinement profiles, the attacker can access information previously protected by mandatory access control policies, enabling arbitrary information disclosure.\nI:H - The attacker gains full policy management capabilities: loading arbitrary policies, replacing existing ones, and removing confinement. This allows arbitrary modification of the system\u0027s mandatory access control, fundamentally compromising integrity.\nA:H - As stated in the commit, the attacker can cause DoS of the system or target applications by loading policies that deny all execution, effectively making the system non-functional."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:20:58.461Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a407a078cd41b5261b99d822af784bd9f136eb4d"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cafce4d6d0a66ec27e3af5637c11901d60189fa"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33ee909702e047c94aaf41d4eea35626d509802c"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17debf5586020790b5717f96e5e6a3ca5bb961ab"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fc63dd9170643d15c25681fca792539e23f4640"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b60b3f7a35c46b2e0ca934f9c988b8fca06d76c6"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6a94eeca9c6c8f7c55ad44c62c98324f51ec596"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425"
},
{
"url": "https://www.qualys.com/2026/03/10/crack-armor.txt"
}
],
"title": "apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-23268",
"datePublished": "2026-03-18T17:54:41.974Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.991Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:20:58.461Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-23268",
"date": "2026-09-20",
"epss": "0.00139",
"percentile": "0.03681"
},
"microsoft_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2026-03-27T14:38:35.000Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-23268",
"id": "msrc_CVE-2026-23268",
"initial_release_date": "2026-03-02T00:00:00.000Z",
"product_status:fixed": "1",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-23268.json",
"version": "2"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c",
"security/apparmor/include/policy.h",
"security/apparmor/policy.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a407a078cd41b5261b99d822af784bd9f136eb4d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4cafce4d6d0a66ec27e3af5637c11901d60189fa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "33ee909702e047c94aaf41d4eea35626d509802c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "17debf5586020790b5717f96e5e6a3ca5bb961ab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0fc63dd9170643d15c25681fca792539e23f4640",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b60b3f7a35c46b2e0ca934f9c988b8fca06d76c6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b6a94eeca9c6c8f7c55ad44c62c98324f51ec596",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b7fd2c0340eacbee892425e9007647568b7f2a3c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c",
"security/apparmor/include/policy.h",
"security/apparmor/policy.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.253",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.203",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.169",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.130",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.77",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.18",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0F72276A-F3E2-4130-8677-3AA5521A3C83",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.253",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "20DDB3E9-AABF-4107-ADB0-5362AA067045",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.203",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "DBEC0E5D-641C-4E98-A6D9-5799B10CE451",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.169",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C57BB918-DF28-46B3-94F7-144176841267",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.130",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B3D12E00-E42D-4056-B354-BAD4903C03A5",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.77",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "346AD1FB-0CE8-4D9D-8E56-5EB1A4D06199",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.18",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C65A7D85-C7C6-485E-AC35-66A374C73FAC",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management\n\nAn unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by\nopening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by\npassing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the\nprivileged process to write to the interface.\n\nThis does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do\nthe write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is\nachieved full policy management is possible and all the possible\nimplications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or\ntarget applications by denying all execution, by-passing the\nunprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for\na local privilege escalation.\n\nThe policy management interface can not have its permissions simply\nchanged from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able\nto load policy to different policy namespaces.\n\nInstead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that\nare a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already\ndone via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate\naccess to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\napparmor: correcci\u00f3n de que un usuario local sin privilegios puede realizar gesti\u00f3n de pol\u00edticas privilegiada\n\nUn usuario local sin privilegios puede cargar, reemplazar y eliminar perfiles abriendo las interfaces de apparmorfs, a trav\u00e9s de un ataque de adjunto confundido, pasando el descriptor de archivo (fd) abierto a un proceso privilegiado y haciendo que el proceso privilegiado escriba en la interfaz.\n\nEsto requiere un objetivo privilegiado que pueda ser manipulado para realizar la escritura en nombre del proceso sin privilegios, pero una vez que se logra dicho acceso, es posible una gesti\u00f3n completa de pol\u00edticas y todas las posibles implicaciones que esto conlleva: eliminaci\u00f3n del confinamiento, DoS del sistema o de las aplicaciones objetivo denegando toda ejecuci\u00f3n, eludiendo la restricci\u00f3n del espacio de nombres de usuario sin privilegios, hasta la explotaci\u00f3n de errores del kernel para una escalada de privilegios local.\n\nLa interfaz de gesti\u00f3n de pol\u00edticas no puede tener sus permisos simplemente cambiados de 0666 a 0600 porque los procesos que no son root necesitan poder cargar pol\u00edticas en diferentes espacios de nombres de pol\u00edticas.\n\nEn su lugar, aseg\u00farese de que la tarea que escribe en la interfaz tenga privilegios que sean un subconjunto de la tarea que abri\u00f3 la interfaz. Esto ya se hace a trav\u00e9s de pol\u00edticas para procesos confinados, pero los no confinados pueden delegar acceso al descriptor de archivo (fd) abierto, eludiendo la verificaci\u00f3n de pol\u00edtica habitual."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23268",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:21:13.277",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-18T18:16:25.753",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fc63dd9170643d15c25681fca792539e23f4640"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17debf5586020790b5717f96e5e6a3ca5bb961ab"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33ee909702e047c94aaf41d4eea35626d509802c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cafce4d6d0a66ec27e3af5637c11901d60189fa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a407a078cd41b5261b99d822af784bd9f136eb4d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b60b3f7a35c46b2e0ca934f9c988b8fca06d76c6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6a94eeca9c6c8f7c55ad44c62c98324f51ec596"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.qualys.com/2026/03/10/crack-armor.txt"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Important",
"current_release_date": "2026-08-20T13:42:21+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-23268",
"id": "CVE-2026-23268",
"initial_release_date": "2026-03-18T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "274",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: AppArmor: Local privilege escalation and denial of service via confused deputy attack",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-23268.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
OESA-2026-2417 (CVE-2024-56611)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-05-22 11:11 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:11 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MMWe currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn ttrue.So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-referenceNULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.This fixes the report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194Code: ...RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400Call Trace: <TASK> kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7fakpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully
Alexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a RISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2
RISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement the legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.
That warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent domain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X, which has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only valid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply return -ENOTSUPP.
Loongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support without implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations which return an error, so the problem was papered over.
Correct pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add the missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.(CVE-2024-56760)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fix nfs_release_folio() to not deadlock via kcompactd writeback
Add PF_KCOMPACTD flag and current_is_kcompactd() helper to check for it so nfs_release_folio() can skip calling nfs_wb_folio() from kcompactd.
Otherwise NFS can deadlock waiting for kcompactd enduced writeback which recurses back to NFS (which triggers writeback to NFSD via NFS loopback mount on the same host, NFSD blocks waiting for XFS's call to __filemap_get_folio):
6070.550357] INFO: task kcompactd0:58 blocked for more than 4435 seconds.
{--- [58] "kcompactd0" [<0>] folio_wait_bit+0xe8/0x200 [<0>] folio_wait_writeback+0x2b/0x80 [<0>] nfs_wb_folio+0x80/0x1b0 [nfs] [<0>] nfs_release_folio+0x68/0x130 [nfs] [<0>] split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x362/0x840 [<0>] migrate_pages_batch+0x43d/0xb90 [<0>] migrate_pages_sync+0x9a/0x240 [<0>] migrate_pages+0x93c/0x9f0 [<0>] compact_zone+0x8e2/0x1030 [<0>] compact_node+0xdb/0x120 [<0>] kcompactd+0x121/0x2e0 [<0>] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [<0>] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 [<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 ---}
[(CVE-2025-21908)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
Commit b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.
Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c Call trace: try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P) try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L) rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8 rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58 try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90 unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8 do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568 offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670 memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374 memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78 device_offline+0xa4/0xd0 state_store+0x8c/0xf0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---(CVE-2025-21931)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check
When removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is triggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the offloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns false if one of PF is unloaded. In such case, mlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of the alive PF, and the flush is skipped.
Besides, the bridge fdb entry's lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge event handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be ignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted, and the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.
To make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue keeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge notifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond netdev which is already destroyed.
To fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in commit 15f8f168952f ("net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding bond to bridge"), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes invalid state after initialization.
Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 <4c> 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0 RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60 ? die+0x38/0x60 ? do_trap+0x10b/0x120 ? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0 ? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50 ? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30 ? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] ? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390 notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core] mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core] process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390 worker_thread+0x106/0x250 ? bh_worker+0x110/0x110 kthread+0xb7/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK>(CVE-2025-21970)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: Prevent creation of classes with TC_H_ROOT
The function qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() uses TC_H_ROOT as a termination condition when traversing up the qdisc tree to update parent backlog counters. However, if a class is created with classid TC_H_ROOT, the traversal terminates prematurely at this class instead of reaching the actual root qdisc, causing parent statistics to be incorrectly maintained. In case of DRR, this could lead to a crash as reported by Mingi Cho.
Prevent the creation of any Qdisc class with classid TC_H_ROOT (0xFFFFFFFF) across all qdisc types, as suggested by Jamal.(CVE-2025-21971)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched: address a potential NULL pointer dereference in the GRED scheduler.
If kzalloc in gred_init returns a NULL pointer, the code follows the error handling path, invoking gred_destroy. This, in turn, calls gred_offload, where memset could receive a NULL pointer as input, potentially leading to a kernel crash.
When table->opt is NULL in gred_init(), gred_change_table_def() is not called yet, so it is not necessary to call ->ndo_setup_tc() in gred_offload().(CVE-2025-21980)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset
Fix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by adding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while configuring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases: - as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and - as part of reset handling
However, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory allocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated resources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:
[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192): comm "kworker/0:0", pid 8, jiffies 4296833052 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 0): [<ffffffff991ec485>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340 [<ffffffffc0a6e06a>] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice] [<ffffffffc09f1027>] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice] [<ffffffffc09f244b>] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice] [<ffffffffc09c2131>] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice] [<ffffffffc09c64af>] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice] [<ffffffff994fbcd3>] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0 [<ffffffff98f07103>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffff98f0b6d9>] process_one_work+0x179/0x390 [<ffffffff98f0c1e9>] worker_thread+0x239/0x340 [<ffffffff98f14abc>] kthread+0xcc/0x100 [<ffffffff98e45a6d>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [<ffffffff98e083ba>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 ...(CVE-2025-21981)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: switchdev: Convert blocking notification chain to a raw one
A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.
In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].
Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().
Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain. Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in the future.
Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process context and listeners are allowed to block.
[1]: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted
ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
but task is already holding lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);
*** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by ip/52731: #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0 #1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0 #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
stack backtrace: ... ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340 switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0 switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340 br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge] br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge] notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0 switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0 ...(CVE-2025-21986)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sched: Fix fence reference count leak
The last_scheduled fence leaks when an entity is being killed and adding the cleanup callback fails.
Decrement the reference count of prev when dma_fence_add_callback() fails, ensuring proper balance.
phasta: add git tag info for stable kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Fix integer overflow in qaic_validate_req()
These are u64 variables that come from the user via qaic_attach_slice_bo_ioctl(). Use check_add_overflow() to ensure that the math doesn't have an integer wrapping bug.(CVE-2025-22001)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: dummy: force synchronous probing
Sometimes I get a NULL pointer dereference at boot time in kobject_get() with the following call stack:
anatop_regulator_probe() devm_regulator_register() regulator_register() regulator_resolve_supply() kobject_get()
By placing some extra BUG_ON() statements I could verify that this is raised because probing of the 'dummy' regulator driver is not completed ('dummy_regulator_rdev' is still NULL).
In the JTAG debugger I can see that dummy_regulator_probe() and anatop_regulator_probe() can be run by different kernel threads (kworker/u4:*). I haven't further investigated whether this can be changed or if there are other possibilities to force synchronization between these two probe routines. On the other hand I don't expect much boot time penalty by probing the 'dummy' regulator synchronously.(CVE-2025-22009)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spufs: fix a leak in spufs_create_context()
Leak fixes back in 2008 missed one case - if we are trying to set affinity and spufs_mkdir() fails, we need to drop the reference to neighbor.(CVE-2025-22071)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod"
This reverts commit e9f2517a3e18a54a3943c098d2226b245d488801.
Commit e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod") is intended to fix a null-ptr-deref in LOCKDEP, which is mentioned as CVE-2024-54680, but is actually did not fix anything; The issue can be reproduced on top of it. [0]
Also, it reverted the change by commit ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.") and introduced a real issue by reviving the kernel TCP socket.
When a reconnect happens for a CIFS connection, the socket state transitions to FIN_WAIT_1. Then, inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() in tcp_close() stops all timers for the socket.
If an incoming FIN packet is lost, the socket will stay at FIN_WAIT_1 forever, and such sockets could be leaked up to net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans.
Usually, FIN can be retransmitted by the peer, but if the peer aborts the connection, the issue comes into reality.
I warned about this privately by pointing out the exact report [1], but the bogus fix was finally merged.
So, we should not stop the timers to finally kill the connection on our side in that case, meaning we must not use a kernel socket for TCP whose sk->sk_net_refcnt is 0.
The kernel socket does not have a reference to its netns to make it possible to tear down netns without cleaning up every resource in it.
For example, tunnel devices use a UDP socket internally, but we can destroy netns without removing such devices and let it complete during exit. Otherwise, netns would be leaked when the last application died.
However, this is problematic for TCP sockets because TCP has timers to close the connection gracefully even after the socket is close()d. The lifetime of the socket and its netns is different from the lifetime of the underlying connection.
If the socket user does not maintain the netns lifetime, the timer could be fired after the socket is close()d and its netns is freed up, resulting in use-after-free.
Actually, we have seen so many similar issues and converted such sockets to have a reference to netns.
That's why I converted the CIFS client socket to have a reference to netns (sk->sk_net_refcnt == 1), which is somehow mentioned as out-of-scope of CIFS and technically wrong in e9f2517a3e18, but is in-scope and right fix.
Regarding the LOCKDEP issue, we can prevent the module unload by bumping the module refcount when switching the LOCKDDEP key in sock_lock_init_class_and_name(). [2]
For a while, let's revert the bogus fix.
Note that now we can use sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for the socket conversion, but I'll do so later separately to make backport easy.(CVE-2025-22077)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: fix pipe accounting mismatch
Currently, watch_queue_set_size() modifies the pipe buffers charged to user->pipe_bufs without updating the pipe->nr_accounted on the pipe itself, due to the if (!pipe_has_watch_queue()) test in pipe_resize_ring(). This means that when the pipe is ultimately freed, we decrement user->pipe_bufs by something other than what than we had charged to it, potentially leading to an underflow. This in turn can cause subsequent too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() tests to fail with -EPERM.
To remedy this, explicitly account for the pipe usage in watch_queue_set_size() to match the number set via account_pipe_buffers()
(It's unclear why watch_queue_set_size() does not update nr_accounted; it may be due to intentional overprovisioning in watch_queue_set_size()?)(CVE-2025-23138)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access
There is a possibility that init_codecs is invoked multiple times during manipulated payload from video firmware. In such case, if codecs_count can get incremented to value more than MAX_CODEC_NUM, there can be OOB access. Reset the count so that it always starts from beginning.(CVE-2025-23157)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: add sanity check for agwidth in dbMount
The width in dmapctl of the AG is zero, it trigger a divide error when calculating the control page level in dbAllocAG.
To avoid this issue, add a check for agwidth in dbAllocAG.(CVE-2025-37740)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/mediatek: Fix NULL pointer deference in mtk_iommu_device_group
Currently, mtk_iommu calls during probe iommu_device_register before the hw_list from driver data is initialized. Since iommu probing issue fix, it leads to NULL pointer dereference in mtk_iommu_device_group when hw_list is accessed with list_first_entry (not null safe).
So, change the call order to ensure iommu_device_register is called after the driver data are initialized.(CVE-2025-37748)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37766)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37768)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37770)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37771)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix dangling pointer in krb_authenticate
krb_authenticate frees sess->user and does not set the pointer to NULL. It calls ksmbd_krb5_authenticate to reinitialise sess->user but that function may return without doing so. If that happens then smb2_sess_setup, which calls krb_authenticate, will be accessing free'd memory when it later uses sess->user.(CVE-2025-37778)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Fix null-ptr-deref in avs_component_probe()
devm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently, avs_component_probe() does not check for this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37793)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sound/virtio: Fix cancel_sync warnings on uninitialized work_structs
Betty reported hitting the following warning:
[ 8.709131][ T221] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 221 at kernel/workqueue.c:4182 ... [ 8.713282][ T221] Call trace: [ 8.713365][ T221] __flush_work+0x8d0/0x914 [ 8.713468][ T221] __cancel_work_sync+0xac/0xfc [ 8.713570][ T221] cancel_work_sync+0x24/0x34 [ 8.713667][ T221] virtsnd_remove+0xa8/0xf8 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276] [ 8.713868][ T221] virtsnd_probe+0x48c/0x664 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276] [ 8.714035][ T221] virtio_dev_probe+0x28c/0x390 [ 8.714139][ T221] really_probe+0x1bc/0x4c8 ...
It seems we're hitting the error path in virtsnd_probe(), which triggers a virtsnd_remove() which iterates over the substreams calling cancel_work_sync() on the elapsed_period work_struct.
Looking at the code, from earlier in: virtsnd_probe()->virtsnd_build_devs()->virtsnd_pcm_parse_cfg()
We set snd->nsubstreams, allocate the snd->substreams, and if we then hit an error on the info allocation or something in virtsnd_ctl_query_info() fails, we will exit without having initialized the elapsed_period work_struct.
When that error path unwinds we then call virtsnd_remove() which as long as the substreams array is allocated, will iterate through calling cancel_work_sync() on the uninitialized work struct hitting this warning.
Takashi Iwai suggested this fix, which initializes the substreams structure right after allocation, so that if we hit the error paths we avoid trying to cleanup uninitialized data.
Note: I have not yet managed to reproduce the issue myself, so this patch has had limited testing.
Feedback or thoughts would be appreciated!(CVE-2025-37805)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Fix Kernel panic during IRQ handler registration
Resolve kernel panic while accessing IRQ handler associated with the generated IRQ. This is done by acquiring the spinlock and storing the current interrupt state before handling the interrupt request using generic_handle_irq.
A previous fix patch was submitted where 'generic_handle_irq' was replaced with 'handle_nested_irq'. However, this change also causes the kernel panic where after determining which GPIO triggered the interrupt and attempting to call handle_nested_irq with the mapped IRQ number, leads to a failure in locating the registered handler.(CVE-2025-37815)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: apple-soc: Fix null-ptr-deref in apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate()
cpufreq_cpu_get_raw() can return NULL when the target CPU is not present in the policy->cpus mask. apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate() does not check for this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37831)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: avoid NULL pointer dereference in dbg call
cifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so move call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37844)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: debugfs hang_hws skip GPU with MES
debugfs hang_hws is used by GPU reset test with HWS, for MES this crash the kernel with NULL pointer access because dqm->packet_mgr is not setup for MES path.
Skip GPU with MES for now, MES hang_hws debugfs interface will be supported later.(CVE-2025-37853)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: aspeed: Add NULL pointer check in ast_vhub_init_dev()
The variable d->name, returned by devm_kasprintf(), could be NULL. A pointer check is added to prevent potential NULL pointer dereference. This is similar to the fix in commit 3027e7b15b02 ("ice: Fix some null pointer dereference issues in ice_ptp.c").
This issue is found by our static analysis tool(CVE-2025-37881)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value
This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates.
There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use this interpretation of platform_max.
Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.(CVE-2025-37889)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Balance device refcount when destroying devices
Using device_find_child() to lookup the proper SCMI device to destroy causes an unbalance in device refcount, since device_find_child() calls an implicit get_device(): this, in turns, inhibits the call of the provided release methods upon devices destruction.
As a consequence, one of the structures that is not freed properly upon destruction is the internal struct device_private dev->p populated by the drivers subsystem core.
KMemleak detects this situation since loading/unloding some SCMI driver causes related devices to be created/destroyed without calling any device_release method.
unreferenced object 0xffff00000f583800 (size 512): comm "insmod", pid 227, jiffies 4294912190 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N.......... ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 60 36 1d 8a 00 80 ff ff ........`6...... backtrace (crc 114e2eed): kmemleak_alloc+0xbc/0xd8 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2dc/0x398 device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_register+0x28/0x40 __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x1bc/0x380 scmi_device_create+0x2d0/0x390 scmi_create_protocol_devices+0x74/0xf8 scmi_device_request_notifier+0x1f8/0x2a8 notifier_call_chain+0x110/0x3b0 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xb0 scmi_driver_register+0x350/0x7f0 0xffff80000a3b3038 do_one_initcall+0x12c/0x730 do_init_module+0x1dc/0x640 load_module+0x4b20/0x5b70 init_module_from_file+0xec/0x158
$ ./scripts/faddr2line ./vmlinux device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_add+0x954/0x12d0: kmalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:901 (inlined by) kzalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:1037 (inlined by) device_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3510 (inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3561
Balance device refcount by issuing a put_device() on devices found via device_find_child().(CVE-2025-37905)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()
A NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a QCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).
[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)
[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth] [ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80
The issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump packet is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly forwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on success). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or btusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it to hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.
Later, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump queue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by: 1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno on failure, consistent with kernel conventions. 2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL and event packets for better structure and readability.
This ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding double handling and preventing NULL pointer access.(CVE-2025-37918)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds stream writes by validating *pos
ksmbd_vfs_stream_write() did not validate whether the write offset (pos) was within the bounds of the existing stream data length (v_len). If pos was greater than or equal to v_len, this could lead to an out-of-bounds memory write.
This patch adds a check to ensure *pos is less than v_len before proceeding. If the condition fails, -EINVAL is returned.(CVE-2025-37947)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: displayport: Fix deadlock
This patch introduces the ucsi_con_mutex_lock / ucsi_con_mutex_unlock functions to the UCSI driver. ucsi_con_mutex_lock ensures the connector mutex is only locked if a connection is established and the partner pointer is valid. This resolves a deadlock scenario where ucsi_displayport_remove_partner holds con->mutex waiting for dp_altmode_work to complete while dp_altmode_work attempts to acquire it.(CVE-2025-37967)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Refactor remove call with idxd_cleanup() helper
The idxd_cleanup() helper cleans up perfmon, interrupts, internals and so on. Refactor remove call with the idxd_cleanup() helper to avoid code duplication. Note, this also fixes the missing put_device() for idxd groups, enginces and wqs.(CVE-2025-38014)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Annotate FDB data races
The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2].
Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE().
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit
write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
[2] #!/bin/bash
set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan
ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q &(CVE-2025-38037)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Set dma_mask for ffa devices
Set dma_mask for FFA devices, otherwise DMA allocation using the device pointer lead to following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:597 dma_alloc_attrs+0xe0/0x124(CVE-2025-38043)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent
There is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may access the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the following KASAN warning.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x640 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8 RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000 </TASK>
Allocated by task 408: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0 mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0 cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs] allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs] kthread+0x394/0x720 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 342979: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50 kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500 cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000 which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588 The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ==================================================================
POC is available in the link [1].
The problem triggering process is as follows:
Process 1 Process 2
---truncated---(CVE-2025-38051)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: break and reset virtio devices on device_shutdown()
Hongyu reported a hang on kexec in a VM. QEMU reported invalid memory accesses during the hang.
Invalid read at addr 0x102877002, size 2, region '(null)', reason: rejected
Invalid write at addr 0x102877A44, size 2, region '(null)', reason: rejected
...
It was traced down to virtio-console. Kexec works fine if virtio-console is not in use.
The issue is that virtio-console continues to write to the MMIO even after underlying virtio-pci device is reset.
Additionally, Eric noticed that IOMMUs are reset before devices, if devices are not reset on shutdown they continue to poke at guest memory and get errors from the IOMMU. Some devices get wedged then.
The problem can be solved by breaking all virtio devices on virtio bus shutdown, then resetting them.(CVE-2025-38064)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: CPPC: Fix NULL pointer dereference when nosmp is used
With nosmp in cmdline, other CPUs are not brought up, leaving their cpc_desc_ptr NULL. CPU0's iteration via for_each_possible_cpu() dereferences these NULL pointers, causing panic.
Panic backtrace:
[ 0.401123] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000b8 ... [ 0.403255] [<ffffffff809a5818>] cppc_allow_fast_switch+0x6a/0xd4 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init!
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: add missing NULL check for gve_alloc_pending_packet() in TX DQO
gve_alloc_pending_packet() can return NULL, but gve_tx_add_skb_dqo() did not check for this case before dereferencing the returned pointer.
Add a missing NULL check to prevent a potential NULL pointer dereference when allocation fails.
This improves robustness in low-memory scenarios.(CVE-2025-38122)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: Fix napi rx poll issue
When driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might have been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect operation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in polling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0 ? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] ? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170 t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] net_rx_action+0x103/0x470 irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90 </IRQ>(CVE-2025-38123)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: prevent deactivate active config while enabling the config
While enable active config via cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config(), active config could be deactivated via configfs' sysfs interface. This could make UAF issue in below scenario:
CPU0 CPU1 (sysfs enable) load module cscfg_load_config_sets() activate config. // sysfs (sys_active_cnt == 1) ... cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config() lock(csdev->cscfg_csdev_lock) // here load config activate by CPU1 unlock(csdev->cscfg_csdev_lock)
deactivate config // sysfs
(sys_activec_cnt == 0)
cscfg_unload_config_sets()
unload module
// access to config_desc which freed // while unloading module. cscfg_csdev_enable_config
To address this, use cscfg_config_desc's active_cnt as a reference count which will be holded when - activate the config. - enable the activated config. and put the module reference when config_active_cnt == 0.(CVE-2025-38131)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping
Fix memory leak when running one-step timestamping. When running one-step sync timestamping, the HW is configured to insert the TX time into the frame, so there is no reason to keep the skb anymore. As in this case the HW will never generate an interrupt to say that the frame was timestamped, then the frame will never released. Fix this by freeing the frame in case of one-step timestamping.(CVE-2025-38148)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error flow upon firmware failure for RQ destruction
Upon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the last resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned regardless of the failure.
Now properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.
In order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the object again, which results in the following kernel trace: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE) CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 sp : ffff80008b81b7e0 x29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00 x23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78 x11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff x5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600 Call trace: refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib] ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs] __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs] __fput+0xd8/0x2f0 __fput_sync+0x50/0x70 __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8(CVE-2025-38161)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()
Before calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the 'channel' value is checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8). This seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register (PTP_INT_STS) specifications.
However, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp->extts[] with only LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index:
lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...)
{
...
/* Update Local timestamp */
extts = &ptp->extts[channel];
extts->ts.tv_sec = sec;
...
}
To avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO inputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8.
Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace.(CVE-2025-38183)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period
Gerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet, and this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.
We want to make sure ctl->perturb_period * HZ will not overflow and is positive.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value tc -s -d qd sh dev lo qdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0(CVE-2025-38193)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary
Syzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault injection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn't check return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any error propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls jffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated node.
kernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592 Call Trace: <TASK> jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline] jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874 jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388 jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197 jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362 jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301 generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856 __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973 generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950 splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Fix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs before calling jffs2_sum_write_data.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-38194)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem, swap: fix softlockup with mTHP swapin
Following softlockup can be easily reproduced on my test machine with:
echo always > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hugepages-64kB/enabled swapon /dev/zram0 # zram0 is a 48G swap device mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test echo 1G > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/memory.max echo $BASHPID > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.procs while true; do dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/test.img bs=1M count=5120 cat /tmp/test.img > /dev/null rm /tmp/test.img done
Then after a while: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 763s! [cat:5787] Modules linked in: zram virtiofs CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5787 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G L 6.15.0.orig-gf3021d9246bc-dirty #118 PREEMPT(voluntary)· Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:mpol_shared_policy_lookup+0xd/0x70 Code: e9 b8 b4 ff ff 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 1f 48 85 db 74 41 4c 8d 67 08 48 89 fb 48 89 f5 4c 89 e7 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002b1fc28 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 00000000001c20ca RBX: 0000000000724e1e RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffff888118e214c8 RSI: 0000000000057d42 RDI: ffff888118e21518 RBP: 000000000002bec8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000bf4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00000000001c20ca R14: 00000000001c20ca R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03f995c740(0000) GS:ffff88a07ad9a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f03f98f1000 CR3: 0000000144626004 CR4: 0000000000770eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> shmem_alloc_folio+0x31/0xc0 shmem_swapin_folio+0x309/0xcf0 ? filemap_get_entry+0x117/0x1e0 ? xas_load+0xd/0xb0 ? filemap_get_entry+0x101/0x1e0 shmem_get_folio_gfp+0x2ed/0x5b0 shmem_file_read_iter+0x7f/0x2e0 vfs_read+0x252/0x330 ksys_read+0x68/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f03f9a46991 Code: 00 48 8b 15 81 14 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8 20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 97 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec RSP: 002b:00007fff3c52bd28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007f03f9a46991 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f03f98ba000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff3c52bd50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f03f9b9a380 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 R13: 00007f03f98ba000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK>
The reason is simple, readahead brought some order 0 folio in swap cache, and the swapin mTHP folio being allocated is in conflict with it, so swapcache_prepare fails and causes shmem_swap_alloc_folio to return -EEXIST, and shmem simply retries again and again causing this loop.
Fix it by applying a similar fix for anon mTHP swapin.
The performance change is very slight, time of swapin 10g zero folios with shmem (test for 12 times): Before: 2.47s After: 2.48s
[(CVE-2025-38241)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/group_cpus: fix NULL pointer dereference from group_cpus_evenly()
While testing null_blk with configfs, echo 0 > poll_queues will trigger following panic:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 920 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.15.0-02023-gadbdb95c8696-dirty #1238 PREEMPT(undef) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__bitmap_or+0x48/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> __group_cpus_evenly+0x822/0x8c0 group_cpus_evenly+0x2d9/0x490 blk_mq_map_queues+0x1e/0x110 null_map_queues+0xc9/0x170 [null_blk] blk_mq_update_queue_map+0xdb/0x160 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x22b/0x560 nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk] nullb_device_poll_queues_store+0xa4/0x130 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0x109/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x26e/0x6f0 ksys_write+0x79/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x45c4/0x45f0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Root cause is that numgrps is set to 0, and ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kcalloc(), and later ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be deferenced.
Fix the problem by checking numgrps first in group_cpus_evenly(), and return NULL directly if numgrps is zero.
[(CVE-2025-38255)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data
The len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot be used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA.(CVE-2025-38304)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Verify content returned by parse_int_array()
The first element of the returned array stores its length. If it is 0, any manipulation beyond the element at index 0 ends with null-ptr-deref.(CVE-2025-38307)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: Log an error when close_all_cached_dirs fails
Under low-memory conditions, close_all_cached_dirs() can't move the dentries to a separate list to dput() them once the locks are dropped. This will result in a "Dentry still in use" error, so add an error message that makes it clear this is what happened:
[ 495.281119] CIFS: VFS: \otters.example.com\share Out of memory while dropping dentries [ 495.281595] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 495.281887] BUG: Dentry ffff888115531138{i=78,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs] [ 495.282391] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2329 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xc8/0xf0
Also, bail out of looping through all tcons as soon as a single allocation fails, since we're already in trouble, and kmalloc() attempts for subseqeuent tcons are likely to fail just like the first one did.(CVE-2025-38321)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
ACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows: [ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10 [ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.361873] Call Trace: [ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and “Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-parse_ext” cache were leaked using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows: [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.372000] Call Trace: [ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b [ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.392000] Call Trace: [ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x3 ---truncated---(CVE-2025-38344)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
maple_tree: fix MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag in mas_preallocate()
Temporarily clear the preallocation flag when explicitly requesting allocations. Pre-existing allocations are already counted against the request through mas_node_count_gfp(), but the allocations will not happen if the MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag is set. This flag is meant to avoid re-allocating in bulk allocation mode, and to detect issues with preallocation calculations.
The MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag should also always be set on zero allocations so that detection of underflow allocations will print a WARN_ON() during consumption.
User visible effect of this flaw is a WARN_ON() followed by a null pointer dereference when subsequent requests for larger number of nodes is ignored, such as the vma merge retry in mmap_region() caused by drivers altering the vma flags (which happens in v6.6, at least)(CVE-2025-38364)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport(); add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600 Call Trace: vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40 __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100 __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38461)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU
vsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload. transport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.
Introduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential null-ptr-deref.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90 Call Trace: __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720 vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0 Call Trace: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38462)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto
The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:
crypt_message() // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);
// Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
// Free creq while async operation is still in progress
kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);
Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.
This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.
The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.
Fix by restoring the async crypto handling: - DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking - aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification - crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion
This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.(CVE-2025-38488)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.(CVE-2025-38499)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation
We have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between subflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to trigger.
The solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition 'socket state prevent any additional subflow creation' protected by the fallback lock.
The socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending an MP_FAIL option.
The field 'allow_infinite_fallback' is now always touched under the relevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write.(CVE-2025-38552)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use aead_request_free to match aead_request_alloc
Use aead_request_free() instead of kfree() to properly free memory allocated by aead_request_alloc(). This ensures sensitive crypto data is zeroed before being freed.(CVE-2025-38575)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM / devfreq: Check governor before using governor->name
Commit 96ffcdf239de ("PM / devfreq: Remove redundant governor_name from struct devfreq") removes governor_name and uses governor->name to replace it. But devfreq->governor may be NULL and directly using devfreq->governor->name may cause null pointer exception. Move the check of governor to before using governor->name.(CVE-2025-38609)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump
There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table(): if (res < 0) { nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct; ...
While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last. If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented. This 2nd increment is never undone.
This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.
This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.
This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop. It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.
One fix would to change this to: if (res < 0) { if (ct != last) nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place. We can just store a cookie value instead.
A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table, it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.(CVE-2025-38721)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference
The qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error, but qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error pointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers to NULL.(CVE-2025-39676)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.(CVE-2025-39682)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this.(CVE-2025-39702)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: samsung: Fix UBSAN panic in samsung_clk_init()
With UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I'm hitting the below panic due to
dereferencing ctx->clk_data.hws before setting
ctx->clk_data.num = nr_clks. Move that up to fix the crash.
UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP <snip> Call trace: samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P) samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L) samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0 exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64 __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60 ...(CVE-2025-39728)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: Prevent file descriptor table allocations exceeding INT_MAX
When sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816 as set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near the limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed INT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288
This happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the requested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is not flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.
Specifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a process calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate: - File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes - Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB - Total allocation size: > 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)
Reproducer: 1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816: # echo 1073741816 > /proc/sys/fs/nr_open
- Run a program that uses a high file descriptor: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/resource.h>
int main() { struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824}; setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim); dup2(2, 1073741880); // Triggers the warning return 0; }
- Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027
systemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the maximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory control groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits since memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked that:
- The kernel's allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum size regardless of memcg accounting
- Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can inadvertently trigger massive allocations
- The resulting allocations (>8GB) are impractical and will always fail
systemd's algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value until the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open being set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file descriptors.
While processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal operation, certain selftests (like tools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file descriptor limits can trigger this issue.
Fix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested allocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to fail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the impractical >8GB memory allocation request.(CVE-2025-39756)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: Forbid IPv6 TSO with extensions on devices with only IPV6_CSUM
When performing Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) on an IPv6 packet that contains extension headers, the kernel incorrectly requests checksum offload if the egress device only advertises NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM feature, which has a strict contract: it supports checksum offload only for plain TCP or UDP over IPv6 and explicitly does not support packets with extension headers. The current GSO logic violates this contract by failing to disable the feature for packets with extension headers, such as those used in GREoIPv6 tunnels.
This violation results in the device being asked to perform an operation
it cannot support, leading to a skb_warn_bad_offload warning and a collapse
of network throughput. While device TSO/USO is correctly bypassed in favor
of software GSO for these packets, the GSO stack must be explicitly told not
to request checksum offload.
Mask NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, NETIF_F_TSO6 and NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4 in gso_features_check if the IPv6 header contains extension headers to compute checksum in software.
The exception is a BIG TCP extension, which, as stated in commit 68e068cabd2c6c53 ("net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets"): "The feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO. The header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump, and not transmitted by physical devices."
kernel log output (truncated): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5273 at net/core/dev.c:3535 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x81/0x140 ... Call Trace: <TASK> skb_checksum_help+0x12a/0x1f0 validate_xmit_skb+0x1a3/0x2d0 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4f/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a2/0x380 __dev_xmit_skb+0x242/0x670 __dev_queue_xmit+0x3fc/0x7f0 ip6_finish_output2+0x25e/0x5d0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_tnl_xmit+0x608/0xc00 [ip6_tunnel] ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x1c0/0x390 [ip6_gre] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x63/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d0/0x7f0 ip6_finish_output2+0x214/0x5d0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0 inet6_csk_xmit+0xeb/0x150 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x555/0xa80 tcp_write_xmit+0x32a/0xe90 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x437/0x1110 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 ... skb linear: 00000000: e4 3d 1a 7d ec 30 e4 3d 1a 7e 5d 90 86 dd 60 0e skb linear: 00000010: 00 0a 1b 34 3c 40 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 11 2f 00 04 01 04 01 01 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000040: 86 dd 60 0e 00 0a 1b 00 06 40 20 23 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 23 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 bf 96 14 51 13 f9 skb linear: 00000070: ae 27 a0 a8 2b e3 80 18 00 40 5b 6f 00 00 01 01 skb linear: 00000080: 08 0a 42 d4 50 d5 4b 70 f8 1a(CVE-2025-39770)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: initialize more fields in sctp_v6_from_sk()
syzbot found that sin6_scope_id was not properly initialized, leading to undefined behavior.
Clear sin6_scope_id and sin6_flowinfo.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649 __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649 sctp_inet6_cmp_addr+0x4f2/0x510 net/sctp/ipv6.c:983 sctp_bind_addr_conflict+0x22a/0x3b0 net/sctp/bind_addr.c:390 sctp_get_port_local+0x21eb/0x2440 net/sctp/socket.c:8452 sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline] sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x710/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline] __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930 x64_sys_call+0x271d/0x3e20 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:51 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable addr.i.i created at: sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8515 [inline] sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x650/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline] __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930(CVE-2025-39812)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix buffer free/clear order in deferred receive path
Fix a use-after-free window by correcting the buffer release sequence in the deferred receive path. The code freed the RQ buffer first and only then cleared the context pointer under the lock. Concurrent paths (e.g., ABTS and the repost path) also inspect and release the same pointer under the lock, so the old order could lead to double-free/UAF.
Note that the repost path already uses the correct pattern: detach the pointer under the lock, then free it after dropping the lock. The deferred path should do the same.(CVE-2025-39841)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm
When send a broadcast packet to a tap device, which was added to a bridge, br_nf_local_in() is called to confirm the conntrack. If another conntrack with the same hash value is added to the hash table, which can be triggered by a normal packet to a non-bridge device, the below warning may happen.
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 96 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:632 br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 96 Comm: tap_send Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200 Call Trace: <TASK> nf_hook_slow+0x3e/0xf0 br_pass_frame_up+0x103/0x180 br_handle_frame_finish+0x2de/0x5b0 br_nf_hook_thresh+0xc0/0x120 br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x168/0x3a0 br_nf_pre_routing+0x237/0x5e0 br_handle_frame+0x1ec/0x3c0 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x225/0x1210 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x37/0xa0 netif_receive_skb+0x36/0x160 tun_get_user+0xa54/0x10c0 tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0 vfs_write+0x305/0x410 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To solve the hash conflict, nf_ct_resolve_clash() try to merge the conntracks, and update skb->_nfct. However, br_nf_local_in() still use the old ct from local variable 'nfct' after confirm(), which leads to this warning.
If confirm() does not insert the conntrack entry and return NF_DROP, the warning may also occur. There is no need to reserve the WARN_ON_ONCE, just remove it.(CVE-2025-39894)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer
Since commit 7d5e9737efda ("net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from device property") rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly uninitialized "const char *type_name;" local variable.
On x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a "BCM4752" or "LNV4752" acpi_device, the rfkill->type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id:
rfkill->type = (unsigned)id->driver_data;
and there is no "type" property so device_property_read_string() will fail and leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash.
rfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash by initializing type_name to NULL.
Note likely sofar this has not been caught because:
- Not many x86 machines actually have a "BCM4752"/"LNV4752" acpi_device
- The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored(CVE-2025-39937)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().
syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]
syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before the TFO socket completes 3WHS:
- accept()
- connect(AF_UNSPEC)
- connect() to another destination
As of accept(), sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.
Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk, the retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not retransmitted.
Let's call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().
[0]: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017 RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400 RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8 R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540 R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372) timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135) tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035) __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1)) tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096) handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35)) </IRQ>(CVE-2025-39955)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group
The kernel forbids the creation of non-FDB nexthop groups with FDB nexthops:
# ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.1 fdb # ip nexthop add id 2 group 1 Error: Non FDB nexthop group cannot have fdb nexthops.
And vice versa:
# ip nexthop add id 3 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 4 group 3 fdb Error: FDB nexthop group can only have fdb nexthops.
However, as long as no routes are pointing to a non-FDB nexthop group, the kernel allows changing the type of a nexthop from FDB to non-FDB and vice versa:
# ip nexthop add id 5 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 6 group 5 # ip nexthop replace id 5 via 192.0.2.2 fdb # echo $? 0
This configuration is invalid and can result in a NPD [1] since FDB nexthops are not associated with a nexthop device:
# ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 6 # ping 198.51.100.1
Fix by preventing nexthop FDB status change while the nexthop is in a group:
# ip nexthop add id 7 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 8 group 7 # ip nexthop replace id 7 via 192.0.2.2 fdb Error: Cannot change nexthop FDB status while in a group.
[1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0 [...] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 367 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6-virtme-gb65678cacc03 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_lookup_good_nhc+0x1e/0x80 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> fib_table_lookup+0x541/0x650 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2ea/0x970 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x55/0x80 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x250/0x330 udp_connect+0x2b/0x60 __sys_connect+0x9c/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-39980)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup
On the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp before connections with valid cp->app pointers are flushed, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by introducing a global exiting_module flag, set to true in
ip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In
__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns
cleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to
__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections
are flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp
immediately.(CVE-2025-40018)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm->debug.qm_diff_regs
When the initialization of qm->debug.acc_diff_reg fails, the probe process does not exit. However, after qm->debug.qm_diff_regs is freed, it is not set to NULL. This can lead to a double free when the remove process attempts to free it again. Therefore, qm->debug.qm_diff_regs should be set to NULL after it is freed.(CVE-2025-40062)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr
Syzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program:
0: r0 = 0
1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60)
2: exit
which triggers:
verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)
This is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an implicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this padding isn't rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later fails to convert the access.
This patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of bpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access.
I checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and didn't find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled) padding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.(CVE-2025-40078)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/qm - request reserved interrupt for virtual function
The device interrupt vector 3 is an error interrupt for physical function and a reserved interrupt for virtual function. However, the driver has not registered the reserved interrupt for virtual function. When allocating interrupts, the number of interrupts is allocated based on powers of two, which includes this interrupt. When the system enables GICv4 and the virtual function passthrough to the virtual machine, releasing the interrupt in the driver triggers a warning.
The WARNING report is: WARNING: CPU: 62 PID: 14889 at arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c:852 its_free_ite+0x94/0xb4
Therefore, register a reserved interrupt for VF and set the IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag to avoid that warning.(CVE-2025-40136)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid NULL dereference when chunk data buffer is missing
chunk->skb pointer is dereferenced in the if-block where it's supposed to be NULL only.
chunk->skb can only be NULL if chunk->head_skb is not. Check for frag_list instead and do it just before replacing chunk->skb. We're sure that otherwise chunk->skb is non-NULL because of outer if() condition.(CVE-2025-40240)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields
The validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong. It runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the same function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the push_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different memory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in case of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible.
There is also confusion in the code between the 'masked' flag, that says that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both the value and the mask, and the 'is_mask' that says that the value we're parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to write into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during validation, while validate_nsh() doesn't allocate any memory for it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch] Call Trace: <TASK> validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch] validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch] __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch] ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220 genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 _syssendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0 _sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0 __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The third issue with this process is that while trying to convert the non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles the size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn't have any nested attributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling them in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed during the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during the flow dump.
In the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are either validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone manages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely not do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are mixed up.
Fixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing most of the validation code.
Given that and the fact that this functionality never worked since introduction, let's just remove it altogether. It's better to re-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying to fix it in stable releases.(CVE-2025-40254)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_mon_reinit_self().
syzbot reported use-after-free of tipc_net(net)->monitors[] in tipc_mon_reinit_self(). [0]
The array is protected by RTNL, but tipc_mon_reinit_self() iterates over it without RTNL.
tipc_mon_reinit_self() is called from tipc_net_finalize(), which is always under RTNL except for tipc_net_finalize_work().
Let's hold RTNL in tipc_net_finalize_work().
[0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88805eae1030 by task kworker/0:7/5989
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5989 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __kasan_check_byte+0x2a/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:568 kasan_check_byte include/linux/kasan.h:399 [inline] lock_acquire+0x8d/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5842 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 rtlock_slowlock kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1894 [inline] rwbase_rtmutex_lock_state kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:160 [inline] rwbase_write_lock+0xd3/0x7e0 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244 rt_write_lock+0x76/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:243 write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_rt.h:99 [inline] tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x79/0x430 net/tipc/monitor.c:718 tipc_net_finalize+0x115/0x190 net/tipc/net.c:140 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x439/0x7d0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>
Allocated by task 6089: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1a8/0x320 mm/slub.c:4407 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] tipc_mon_create+0xc3/0x4d0 net/tipc/monitor.c:657 tipc_enable_bearer net/tipc/bearer.c:357 [inline] __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0xe16/0x13f0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1047 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:371 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3bc/0x5f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:393 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:-1 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x83c/0xbe0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1321 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x215/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x60e/0x790 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x846/0xa10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346 netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729 _syssendmsg+0x508/0x820 net/socket.c:2614 _sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/ ---truncated---(CVE-2025-40280)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent possible shift-out-of-bounds in sctp_transport_update_rto
syzbot reported a possible shift-out-of-bounds [1]
Blamed commit added rto_alpha_max and rto_beta_max set to 1000.
It is unclear if some sctp users are setting very large rto_alpha and/or rto_beta.
In order to prevent user regression, perform the test at run time.
Also add READ_ONCE() annotations as sysctl values can change under us.
[1]
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sctp/transport.c:509:41 shift exponent 64 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16704 Comm: syz.2.2320 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:233 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x27f/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:494 sctp_transport_update_rto.cold+0x1c/0x34b net/sctp/transport.c:509 sctp_check_transmitted+0x11c4/0x1c30 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1502 sctp_outq_sack+0x4ef/0x1b20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1338 sctp_cmd_process_sack net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:840 [inline] sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1372 inline
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write
For the following path not holding the sock lock,
sctp_diag_dump() -> sctp_for_each_endpoint() -> sctp_ep_dump()
make sure not to exceed bounds in case the address list has grown between buffer allocation (time-of-check) and write (time-of-use).(CVE-2025-40331)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: replace BUG_ON with bounds check for map->max_osd
OSD indexes come from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks are added to validate these against map->max_osd.
idryomov: drop BUG_ON in ceph_get_primary_affinity(), minor cosmetic edits
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds writes in handle_auth_session_key()
The len field originates from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks have been added to prevent potential out-of-bounds writes when decrypting the connection secret or processing service tickets.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()
The wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client receiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is received. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install a new map immediately after freeing the old one
kfree(monc->monmap);
monc->monmap = monmap;
ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc->osdmap);
osdc->osdmap = newmap;
under client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock respectively, but because neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it's possible for client->monc.monmap->epoch and client->osdc.osdmap->epoch arms in
client->monc.monmap && client->monc.monmap->epoch &&
client->osdc.osdmap && client->osdc.osdmap->epoch;
condition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be reproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290
ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13305:
ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130
ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0
ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190
create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0
ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 9475:
kfree+0x212/0x290
handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0
ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590
mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0
ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760
ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650
process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0
process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90
worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0
kthread+0x2ec/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Rewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While at it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be exceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than once) and access client->auth_err under client->monc.mutex to match how it's set in finish_auth().
monmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before accessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side
The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU") and not clear if it had purpose since then.
Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g. commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync") introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before it. It's better to do the locking so that even if these run concurrently no UAF is possible.
Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.
syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:
[Task hdev->workqueue] [Task 2]
hci_disconnect_all_sync
l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)
hci_conn_get(hcon)
hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)
hci_dev_lock
hci_dev_lock
hci_conn_del(hcon)
v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock
hci_conn_put(hcon)
conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF)(CVE-2025-68304)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA.
This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match.
Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0
Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match.(CVE-2025-68740)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix invalid prog->stats access when update_effective_progs fails
Syzkaller triggers an invalid memory access issue following fault injection in update_effective_progs. The issue can be described as follows:
__cgroup_bpf_detach update_effective_progs compute_effective_progs bpf_prog_array_alloc <-- fault inject purge_effective_progs / change to dummy_bpf_prog / array->items[index] = &dummy_bpf_prog.prog
---softirq start--- __do_softirq ... __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb __bpf_prog_run_save_cb bpf_prog_run stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->stats) / invalid memory access / flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(&stats->syncp) ---softirq end---
static_branch_dec(&cgroup_bpf_enabled_key[atype])
The reason is that fault injection caused update_effective_progs to fail and then changed the original prog into dummy_bpf_prog.prog in purge_effective_progs. Then a softirq came, and accessing the members of dummy_bpf_prog.prog in the softirq triggers invalid mem access.
To fix it, skip updating stats when stats is NULL.(CVE-2025-68742)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query
The ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls: ETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and ETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.
If the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device reconfiguration), userspace's buffer allocation will be incorrect, potentially leading to buffer overflow.
Drivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some drivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making this scenario possible.
Some drivers try to handle this internally: - bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not equal to the driver's stats count. - micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.
However, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value returned from get_sset_count(), hence won't solve the issue described here.
Change ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(), ethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch between userspace's size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer overflow. The returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that nothing has been returned.
This could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool, depending on when the size change is detected: 1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings(): # ethtool -S eth2 no stats available
- When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.
Both cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call should succeed.
Other than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no output/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting incorrect/shifted stats. I also considered returning an error instead of a "silent" response, but that seems more destructive towards userspace apps.
Notes: - This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more predictable behavior.
-
RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.
-
Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications which might not fill it. The added code checks that it's not zero, to prevent any regressions.(CVE-2025-68795)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: xattr: fix null pointer deref in ext4_raw_inode()
If ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED), iloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all() lacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference in ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-68820)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: using the num_tqps in the vf driver to apply for resources
Currently, hdev->htqp is allocated using hdev->num_tqps, and kinfo->tqp is allocated using kinfo->num_tqps. However, kinfo->num_tqps is set to min(new_tqps, hdev->num_tqps); Therefore, kinfo->num_tqps may be smaller than hdev->num_tqps, which causes some hdev->htqp[i] to remain uninitialized in hclgevf_knic_setup().
Thus, this patch allocates hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp using hdev->num_tqps, ensuring that the lengths of hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp are consistent and that all elements are properly initialized.(CVE-2025-71064)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset
qfq_class->leaf_qdisc->q.qlen > 0 does not imply that the class
itself is active.
Two qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens when:
-
one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and
-
another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get() / qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function tc_new_tfilter.
When packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared leaf_qdisc->q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ qdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters qfq_reset() with its own q->q.qlen == 0, but its class's leaf qdisc->q.qlen > 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate an inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg:
[ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0 [ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE [ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0
Code starting with the faulting instruction
0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.910391] Call Trace: [ 0.910527] <TASK> [ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485) [ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076) [ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447) [ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) [ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861) [ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) [ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) [ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706) [ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af ---truncated---(CVE-2026-22976)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2
problem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at xdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp().
According to commit ec94670fcb3b ("bpf: Support specifying ingress via xdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN"), the refcount obtained by xdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md().
Therefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by commit 1c1949982524 ("bpf: introduce frags support to bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md().(CVE-2026-22994)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()
Wang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery waiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling nfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state recovery being needed.
It seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback of the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an asynchronous commit.(CVE-2026-23053)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: implement mremap in uacce_vm_ops to return -EPERM
The current uacce_vm_ops does not support the mremap operation of vm_operations_struct. Implement .mremap to return -EPERM to remind users.
The reason we need to explicitly disable mremap is that when the driver does not implement .mremap, it uses the default mremap method. This could lead to a risk scenario:
An application might first mmap address p1, then mremap to p2, followed by munmap(p1), and finally munmap(p2). Since the default mremap copies the original vma's vm_private_data (i.e., q) to the new vma, both munmap operations would trigger vma_close, causing q->qfr to be freed twice(qfr will be set to null here, so repeated release is ok).(CVE-2026-23056)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: ensure safe queue release with state management
Directly calling put_queue carries risks since it cannot
guarantee that resources of uacce_queue have been fully released
beforehand. So adding a stop_queue operation for the
UACCE_CMD_PUT_Q command and leaving the put_queue operation to
the final resource release ensures safety.
Queue states are defined as follows:
- UACCE_Q_ZOMBIE: Initial state
- UACCE_Q_INIT: After opening uacce
- UACCE_Q_STARTED: After start is issued via ioctl
When executing poweroff -f in virt while accelerator are still
working, uacce_fops_release and uacce_remove may execute
concurrently. This can cause uacce_put_queue within
uacce_fops_release to access a NULL ops pointer. Therefore, add
state checks to prevent accessing freed pointers.(CVE-2026-23063)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering without touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure
regcache_maple_write() allocates a new block ('entry') to merge adjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp(). When mas_store_gfp() fails, the new 'entry' remains allocated and is never freed, leaking memory.
Free 'entry' on the failure path; on success continue freeing the replaced neighbor blocks ('lower', 'upper').(CVE-2026-23260)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface.
This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation.
The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces.
Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race
Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running it with only preemption disabled.
This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like the BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: observe an RCU grace period in macvlan_common_newlink() error path
valis reported that a race condition still happens after my prior patch.
macvlan_common_newlink() might have made @dev visible before detecting an error, and its caller will directly call free_netdev(dev).
We must respect an RCU period, either in macvlan or the core networking stack.
After adding a temporary mdelay(1000) in macvlan_forward_source_one() to open the race window, valis repro was:
ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source
(ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 &) ; sleep 0.5 ; ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 PING 1.2.3.4 (1.2.3.4): 56 data bytes RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888016bb89c0 by task e/175
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 175 Comm: e Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #33 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) ? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) ? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) ? tasklet_init (kernel/softirq.c:983) macvlan_handle_frame (drivers/net/macvlan.c:501)
Allocated by task 169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25 mm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79) __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:419) __kvmalloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5657 mm/slub.c:7140) alloc_netdev_mqs (net/core/dev.c:12012) rtnl_create_link (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3648) rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3830 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)
Freed by task 169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25 mm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287) kfree (mm/slub.c:6674 mm/slub.c:6882) rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3845 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)(CVE-2026-23273)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0
bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting it.(CVE-2026-31447)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request
It is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a specific report's feature request using a completely different report ID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty side-effects such as OOB writes.
Add a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the one that was requested. If it doesn't, omit reporting the raw event and return early.(CVE-2026-43047)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()
The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution.
The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report.
Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <(CVE-2026-43048)
In the Linux kernel, there is a potential out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the ceph_handle_auth_reply() function of the libceph component. When processing messages of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY, the value of the payload_len field is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value, which causes the pointer address to be decremented and subsequently accessed because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation. The vulnerability is fixed by changing the data type of payload_len to u32 and introducing additional sanity checks.(CVE-2026-43407)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.0.12.138.oe2403"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MMWe currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn ttrue.So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-referenceNULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.This fixes the report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194Code: ...RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400Call Trace: \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt; kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()](CVE-2024-56611)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully\n\nAlexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a\nRISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596\n pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2\n\nRISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement\nthe legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.\n\nThat warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent\ndomain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X,\nwhich has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only\nvalid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply\nreturn -ENOTSUPP.\n\nLoongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support\nwithout implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations\nwhich return an error, so the problem was papered over.\n\nCorrect pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add\nthe missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.(CVE-2024-56760)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: fix nfs_release_folio() to not deadlock via kcompactd writeback\n\nAdd PF_KCOMPACTD flag and current_is_kcompactd() helper to check for it so\nnfs_release_folio() can skip calling nfs_wb_folio() from kcompactd.\n\nOtherwise NFS can deadlock waiting for kcompactd enduced writeback which\nrecurses back to NFS (which triggers writeback to NFSD via NFS loopback\nmount on the same host, NFSD blocks waiting for XFS\u0026apos;s call to\n__filemap_get_folio):\n\n6070.550357] INFO: task kcompactd0:58 blocked for more than 4435 seconds.\n\n{---\n[58] \u0026quot;kcompactd0\u0026quot;\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] folio_wait_bit+0xe8/0x200\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] folio_wait_writeback+0x2b/0x80\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] nfs_wb_folio+0x80/0x1b0 [nfs]\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] nfs_release_folio+0x68/0x130 [nfs]\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x362/0x840\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages_batch+0x43d/0xb90\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages_sync+0x9a/0x240\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages+0x93c/0x9f0\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] compact_zone+0x8e2/0x1030\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] compact_node+0xdb/0x120\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] kcompactd+0x121/0x2e0\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] kthread+0xcf/0x100\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n---}\n\n[(CVE-2025-21908)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio\n\nCommit b15c87263a69 (\u0026quot;hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to\nbe offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make\noffline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and\ntry_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before\ncalling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.\n\nWarning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:\n\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400!\n Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41\n Tainted: [W]=WARN\n Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c\n lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c\n Call trace:\n try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P)\n try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)\n rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8\n rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58\n try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90\n unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8\n do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568\n offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670\n memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374\n memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78\n device_offline+0xa4/0xd0\n state_store+0x8c/0xf0\n dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c\n sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8\n vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc\n ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8\n __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28\n invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0\n do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28\n el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc\n el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c\n Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000)\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---(CVE-2025-21931)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check\n\nWhen removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is\ntriggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the\noffloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns\nfalse if one of PF is unloaded. In such case,\nmlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of\nthe alive PF, and the flush is skipped.\n\nBesides, the bridge fdb entry\u0026apos;s lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge\nevent handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be\nignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted,\nand the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.\n\nTo make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue\nkeeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge\nnotifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond\nnetdev which is already destroyed.\n\nTo fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in\ncommit 15f8f168952f (\u0026quot;net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding\nbond to bridge\u0026quot;), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes\ninvalid state after initialization.\n\n Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core]\n RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]\n Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 \u0026lt;4c\u0026gt; 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7\n RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297\n RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff\n RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0\n RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60\n R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000\n FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n PKRU: 55555554\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60\n ? die+0x38/0x60\n ? do_trap+0x10b/0x120\n ? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0\n ? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50\n ? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30\n ? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]\n ? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390\n notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0\n atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20\n mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core]\n process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390\n worker_thread+0x106/0x250\n ? bh_worker+0x110/0x110\n kthread+0xb7/0xe0\n ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-21970)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: Prevent creation of classes with TC_H_ROOT\n\nThe function qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() uses TC_H_ROOT as a termination\ncondition when traversing up the qdisc tree to update parent backlog\ncounters. However, if a class is created with classid TC_H_ROOT, the\ntraversal terminates prematurely at this class instead of reaching the\nactual root qdisc, causing parent statistics to be incorrectly maintained.\nIn case of DRR, this could lead to a crash as reported by Mingi Cho.\n\nPrevent the creation of any Qdisc class with classid TC_H_ROOT\n(0xFFFFFFFF) across all qdisc types, as suggested by Jamal.(CVE-2025-21971)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched: address a potential NULL pointer dereference in the GRED scheduler.\n\nIf kzalloc in gred_init returns a NULL pointer, the code follows the\nerror handling path, invoking gred_destroy. This, in turn, calls\ngred_offload, where memset could receive a NULL pointer as input,\npotentially leading to a kernel crash.\n\nWhen table-\u0026gt;opt is NULL in gred_init(), gred_change_table_def()\nis not called yet, so it is not necessary to call -\u0026gt;ndo_setup_tc()\nin gred_offload().(CVE-2025-21980)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset\n\nFix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by\nadding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while\nconfiguring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases:\n- as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and\n- as part of reset handling\n\nHowever, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory\nallocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated\nresources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:\n\n[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak\nunreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192):\n comm \u0026quot;kworker/0:0\u0026quot;, pid 8, jiffies 4296833052\n hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n backtrace (crc 0):\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff991ec485\u0026gt;] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc0a6e06a\u0026gt;] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09f1027\u0026gt;] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09f244b\u0026gt;] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09c2131\u0026gt;] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09c64af\u0026gt;] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff994fbcd3\u0026gt;] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f07103\u0026gt;] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f0b6d9\u0026gt;] process_one_work+0x179/0x390\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f0c1e9\u0026gt;] worker_thread+0x239/0x340\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f14abc\u0026gt;] kthread+0xcc/0x100\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98e45a6d\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98e083ba\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n ...(CVE-2025-21981)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: switchdev: Convert blocking notification chain to a raw one\n\nA blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the\nintegrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when\nadding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading\nwhen traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.\n\nIn case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive\nnotifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired\ntwice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].\n\nSpecifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a\nSWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications\nabout deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().\n\nFix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification\nchain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect\nthe chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain.\nEvents are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in\ncall_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in\nthe future.\n\nMaintain the \u0026quot;blocking\u0026quot; prefix as events are always emitted from process\ncontext and listeners are allowed to block.\n\n[1]:\nWARNING: possible recursive locking detected\n6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted\n--------------------------------------------\nip/52731 is trying to acquire lock:\nffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nbut task is already holding lock:\nffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nother info that might help us debug this:\nPossible unsafe locking scenario:\nCPU0\n----\nlock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);\nlock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);\n\n*** DEADLOCK ***\nMay be due to missing lock nesting notation\n3 locks held by ip/52731:\n #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0\n #1: ffffffff8731f628 (\u0026amp;net-\u0026gt;rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0\n #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nstack backtrace:\n...\n? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10\n? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10\n? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10\nblocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\nswitchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0\n? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10\n? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0\n? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340\nswitchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0\nswitchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340\nbr_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge]\nbr_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge]\nnotifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440\nblocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0\nswitchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0\n...(CVE-2025-21986)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/sched: Fix fence reference count leak\n\nThe last_scheduled fence leaks when an entity is being killed and adding\nthe cleanup callback fails.\n\nDecrement the reference count of prev when dma_fence_add_callback()\nfails, ensuring proper balance.\n\n[phasta: add git tag info for stable kernel](CVE-2025-21995)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/qaic: Fix integer overflow in qaic_validate_req()\n\nThese are u64 variables that come from the user via\nqaic_attach_slice_bo_ioctl(). Use check_add_overflow() to ensure that\nthe math doesn\u0026apos;t have an integer wrapping bug.(CVE-2025-22001)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nregulator: dummy: force synchronous probing\n\nSometimes I get a NULL pointer dereference at boot time in kobject_get()\nwith the following call stack:\n\nanatop_regulator_probe()\n devm_regulator_register()\n regulator_register()\n regulator_resolve_supply()\n kobject_get()\n\nBy placing some extra BUG_ON() statements I could verify that this is\nraised because probing of the \u0026apos;dummy\u0026apos; regulator driver is not completed\n(\u0026apos;dummy_regulator_rdev\u0026apos; is still NULL).\n\nIn the JTAG debugger I can see that dummy_regulator_probe() and\nanatop_regulator_probe() can be run by different kernel threads\n(kworker/u4:*). I haven\u0026apos;t further investigated whether this can be\nchanged or if there are other possibilities to force synchronization\nbetween these two probe routines. On the other hand I don\u0026apos;t expect much\nboot time penalty by probing the \u0026apos;dummy\u0026apos; regulator synchronously.(CVE-2025-22009)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nspufs: fix a leak in spufs_create_context()\n\nLeak fixes back in 2008 missed one case - if we are trying to set affinity\nand spufs_mkdir() fails, we need to drop the reference to neighbor.(CVE-2025-22071)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRevert \u0026quot;smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod\u0026quot;\n\nThis reverts commit e9f2517a3e18a54a3943c098d2226b245d488801.\n\nCommit e9f2517a3e18 (\u0026quot;smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after\nrmmod\u0026quot;) is intended to fix a null-ptr-deref in LOCKDEP, which is\nmentioned as CVE-2024-54680, but is actually did not fix anything;\nThe issue can be reproduced on top of it. [0]\n\nAlso, it reverted the change by commit ef7134c7fc48 (\u0026quot;smb: client:\nFix use-after-free of network namespace.\u0026quot;) and introduced a real\nissue by reviving the kernel TCP socket.\n\nWhen a reconnect happens for a CIFS connection, the socket state\ntransitions to FIN_WAIT_1. Then, inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync()\nin tcp_close() stops all timers for the socket.\n\nIf an incoming FIN packet is lost, the socket will stay at FIN_WAIT_1\nforever, and such sockets could be leaked up to net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans.\n\nUsually, FIN can be retransmitted by the peer, but if the peer aborts\nthe connection, the issue comes into reality.\n\nI warned about this privately by pointing out the exact report [1],\nbut the bogus fix was finally merged.\n\nSo, we should not stop the timers to finally kill the connection on\nour side in that case, meaning we must not use a kernel socket for\nTCP whose sk-\u0026gt;sk_net_refcnt is 0.\n\nThe kernel socket does not have a reference to its netns to make it\npossible to tear down netns without cleaning up every resource in it.\n\nFor example, tunnel devices use a UDP socket internally, but we can\ndestroy netns without removing such devices and let it complete\nduring exit. Otherwise, netns would be leaked when the last application\ndied.\n\nHowever, this is problematic for TCP sockets because TCP has timers to\nclose the connection gracefully even after the socket is close()d. The\nlifetime of the socket and its netns is different from the lifetime of\nthe underlying connection.\n\nIf the socket user does not maintain the netns lifetime, the timer could\nbe fired after the socket is close()d and its netns is freed up, resulting\nin use-after-free.\n\nActually, we have seen so many similar issues and converted such sockets\nto have a reference to netns.\n\nThat\u0026apos;s why I converted the CIFS client socket to have a reference to\nnetns (sk-\u0026gt;sk_net_refcnt == 1), which is somehow mentioned as out-of-scope\nof CIFS and technically wrong in e9f2517a3e18, but **is in-scope and right\nfix**.\n\nRegarding the LOCKDEP issue, we can prevent the module unload by\nbumping the module refcount when switching the LOCKDDEP key in\nsock_lock_init_class_and_name(). [2]\n\nFor a while, let\u0026apos;s revert the bogus fix.\n\nNote that now we can use sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for the socket\nconversion, but I\u0026apos;ll do so later separately to make backport easy.(CVE-2025-22077)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwatch_queue: fix pipe accounting mismatch\n\nCurrently, watch_queue_set_size() modifies the pipe buffers charged to\nuser-\u0026gt;pipe_bufs without updating the pipe-\u0026gt;nr_accounted on the pipe\nitself, due to the if (!pipe_has_watch_queue()) test in\npipe_resize_ring(). This means that when the pipe is ultimately freed,\nwe decrement user-\u0026gt;pipe_bufs by something other than what than we had\ncharged to it, potentially leading to an underflow. This in turn can\ncause subsequent too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() tests to fail with -EPERM.\n\nTo remedy this, explicitly account for the pipe usage in\nwatch_queue_set_size() to match the number set via account_pipe_buffers()\n\n(It\u0026apos;s unclear why watch_queue_set_size() does not update nr_accounted;\nit may be due to intentional overprovisioning in watch_queue_set_size()?)(CVE-2025-23138)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access\n\nThere is a possibility that init_codecs is invoked multiple times during\nmanipulated payload from video firmware. In such case, if codecs_count\ncan get incremented to value more than MAX_CODEC_NUM, there can be OOB\naccess. Reset the count so that it always starts from beginning.(CVE-2025-23157)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njfs: add sanity check for agwidth in dbMount\n\nThe width in dmapctl of the AG is zero, it trigger a divide error when\ncalculating the control page level in dbAllocAG.\n\nTo avoid this issue, add a check for agwidth in dbAllocAG.(CVE-2025-37740)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/mediatek: Fix NULL pointer deference in mtk_iommu_device_group\n\nCurrently, mtk_iommu calls during probe iommu_device_register before\nthe hw_list from driver data is initialized. Since iommu probing issue\nfix, it leads to NULL pointer dereference in mtk_iommu_device_group when\nhw_list is accessed with list_first_entry (not null safe).\n\nSo, change the call order to ensure iommu_device_register is called\nafter the driver data are initialized.(CVE-2025-37748)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37766)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37768)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37770)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37771)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: Fix dangling pointer in krb_authenticate\n\nkrb_authenticate frees sess-\u0026gt;user and does not set the pointer\nto NULL. It calls ksmbd_krb5_authenticate to reinitialise\nsess-\u0026gt;user but that function may return without doing so. If\nthat happens then smb2_sess_setup, which calls krb_authenticate,\nwill be accessing free\u0026apos;d memory when it later uses sess-\u0026gt;user.(CVE-2025-37778)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: Intel: avs: Fix null-ptr-deref in avs_component_probe()\n\ndevm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently,\navs_component_probe() does not check for this case, which results in a\nNULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37793)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsound/virtio: Fix cancel_sync warnings on uninitialized work_structs\n\nBetty reported hitting the following warning:\n\n[ 8.709131][ T221] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 221 at kernel/workqueue.c:4182\n...\n[ 8.713282][ T221] Call trace:\n[ 8.713365][ T221] __flush_work+0x8d0/0x914\n[ 8.713468][ T221] __cancel_work_sync+0xac/0xfc\n[ 8.713570][ T221] cancel_work_sync+0x24/0x34\n[ 8.713667][ T221] virtsnd_remove+0xa8/0xf8 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276]\n[ 8.713868][ T221] virtsnd_probe+0x48c/0x664 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276]\n[ 8.714035][ T221] virtio_dev_probe+0x28c/0x390\n[ 8.714139][ T221] really_probe+0x1bc/0x4c8\n...\n\nIt seems we\u0026apos;re hitting the error path in virtsnd_probe(), which\ntriggers a virtsnd_remove() which iterates over the substreams\ncalling cancel_work_sync() on the elapsed_period work_struct.\n\nLooking at the code, from earlier in:\nvirtsnd_probe()-\u0026gt;virtsnd_build_devs()-\u0026gt;virtsnd_pcm_parse_cfg()\n\nWe set snd-\u0026gt;nsubstreams, allocate the snd-\u0026gt;substreams, and if\nwe then hit an error on the info allocation or something in\nvirtsnd_ctl_query_info() fails, we will exit without having\ninitialized the elapsed_period work_struct.\n\nWhen that error path unwinds we then call virtsnd_remove()\nwhich as long as the substreams array is allocated, will iterate\nthrough calling cancel_work_sync() on the uninitialized work\nstruct hitting this warning.\n\nTakashi Iwai suggested this fix, which initializes the substreams\nstructure right after allocation, so that if we hit the error\npaths we avoid trying to cleanup uninitialized data.\n\nNote: I have not yet managed to reproduce the issue myself, so\nthis patch has had limited testing.\n\nFeedback or thoughts would be appreciated!(CVE-2025-37805)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmisc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Fix Kernel panic during IRQ handler registration\n\nResolve kernel panic while accessing IRQ handler associated with the\ngenerated IRQ. This is done by acquiring the spinlock and storing the\ncurrent interrupt state before handling the interrupt request using\ngeneric_handle_irq.\n\nA previous fix patch was submitted where \u0026apos;generic_handle_irq\u0026apos; was\nreplaced with \u0026apos;handle_nested_irq\u0026apos;. However, this change also causes\nthe kernel panic where after determining which GPIO triggered the\ninterrupt and attempting to call handle_nested_irq with the mapped\nIRQ number, leads to a failure in locating the registered handler.(CVE-2025-37815)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncpufreq: apple-soc: Fix null-ptr-deref in apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate()\n\ncpufreq_cpu_get_raw() can return NULL when the target CPU is not present\nin the policy-\u0026gt;cpus mask. apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate() does not check\nfor this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37831)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncifs: avoid NULL pointer dereference in dbg call\n\ncifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so\nmove call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37844)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdkfd: debugfs hang_hws skip GPU with MES\n\ndebugfs hang_hws is used by GPU reset test with HWS, for MES this crash\nthe kernel with NULL pointer access because dqm-\u0026gt;packet_mgr is not setup\nfor MES path.\n\nSkip GPU with MES for now, MES hang_hws debugfs interface will be\nsupported later.(CVE-2025-37853)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: aspeed: Add NULL pointer check in ast_vhub_init_dev()\n\nThe variable d-\u0026gt;name, returned by devm_kasprintf(), could be NULL.\nA pointer check is added to prevent potential NULL pointer dereference.\nThis is similar to the fix in commit 3027e7b15b02\n(\u0026quot;ice: Fix some null pointer dereference issues in ice_ptp.c\u0026quot;).\n\nThis issue is found by our static analysis tool(CVE-2025-37881)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value\n\nThis reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 (\u0026quot;ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in\nsnd_soc_put_volsw() by +min\u0026quot;), and makes some additional related\nupdates.\n\nThere are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum\nregister value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The\npatch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register\none. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as\nsnd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However,\neven then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a\ncontrol value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to\nalso do so in commit fb9ad24485087 (\u0026quot;ASoC: ops: add correct range\ncheck for limiting volume\u0026quot;). That patch however, missed updating\nsnd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing\nsnd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more\nsense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is\nappropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the\ninternal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use\nthis interpretation of platform_max.\n\nFinally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to\nhopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.(CVE-2025-37889)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: arm_scmi: Balance device refcount when destroying devices\n\nUsing device_find_child() to lookup the proper SCMI device to destroy\ncauses an unbalance in device refcount, since device_find_child() calls an\nimplicit get_device(): this, in turns, inhibits the call of the provided\nrelease methods upon devices destruction.\n\nAs a consequence, one of the structures that is not freed properly upon\ndestruction is the internal struct device_private dev-\u0026gt;p populated by the\ndrivers subsystem core.\n\nKMemleak detects this situation since loading/unloding some SCMI driver\ncauses related devices to be created/destroyed without calling any\ndevice_release method.\n\nunreferenced object 0xffff00000f583800 (size 512):\n comm \u0026quot;insmod\u0026quot;, pid 227, jiffies 4294912190\n hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........\n ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 60 36 1d 8a 00 80 ff ff ........`6......\n backtrace (crc 114e2eed):\n kmemleak_alloc+0xbc/0xd8\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2dc/0x398\n device_add+0x954/0x12d0\n device_register+0x28/0x40\n __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x1bc/0x380\n scmi_device_create+0x2d0/0x390\n scmi_create_protocol_devices+0x74/0xf8\n scmi_device_request_notifier+0x1f8/0x2a8\n notifier_call_chain+0x110/0x3b0\n blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xb0\n scmi_driver_register+0x350/0x7f0\n 0xffff80000a3b3038\n do_one_initcall+0x12c/0x730\n do_init_module+0x1dc/0x640\n load_module+0x4b20/0x5b70\n init_module_from_file+0xec/0x158\n\n$ ./scripts/faddr2line ./vmlinux device_add+0x954/0x12d0\ndevice_add+0x954/0x12d0:\nkmalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:901\n(inlined by) kzalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:1037\n(inlined by) device_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3510\n(inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3561\n\nBalance device refcount by issuing a put_device() on devices found via\ndevice_find_child().(CVE-2025-37905)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()\n\nA NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a\nQCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).\n\n[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)\n\n[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008\n[ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth]\n[ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80\n\nThe issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump\npacket is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly\nforwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on\nsuccess). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or\nbtusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it\nto hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.\n\nLater, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump\nqueue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFix this by:\n1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno\n on failure, consistent with kernel conventions.\n2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL\n and event packets for better structure and readability.\n\nThis ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding\ndouble handling and preventing NULL pointer access.(CVE-2025-37918)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds stream writes by validating *pos\n\nksmbd_vfs_stream_write() did not validate whether the write offset\n(*pos) was within the bounds of the existing stream data length (v_len).\nIf *pos was greater than or equal to v_len, this could lead to an\nout-of-bounds memory write.\n\nThis patch adds a check to ensure *pos is less than v_len before\nproceeding. If the condition fails, -EINVAL is returned.(CVE-2025-37947)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: ucsi: displayport: Fix deadlock\n\nThis patch introduces the ucsi_con_mutex_lock / ucsi_con_mutex_unlock\nfunctions to the UCSI driver. ucsi_con_mutex_lock ensures the connector\nmutex is only locked if a connection is established and the partner pointer\nis valid. This resolves a deadlock scenario where\nucsi_displayport_remove_partner holds con-\u0026gt;mutex waiting for\ndp_altmode_work to complete while dp_altmode_work attempts to acquire it.(CVE-2025-37967)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: idxd: Refactor remove call with idxd_cleanup() helper\n\nThe idxd_cleanup() helper cleans up perfmon, interrupts, internals and\nso on. Refactor remove call with the idxd_cleanup() helper to avoid code\nduplication. Note, this also fixes the missing put_device() for idxd\ngroups, enginces and wqs.(CVE-2025-38014)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: Annotate FDB data races\n\nThe \u0026apos;used\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;updated\u0026apos; fields in the FDB entry structure can be\naccessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as\n[1]. Can be reproduced using [2].\n\nSuppress these reports by annotating these accesses using\nREAD_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE().\n\n[1]\nBUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit\n\nwrite to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0:\n vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650\n packet_xmit+0x100/0x150\n packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0\n __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90\n x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00\n do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nread to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2:\n vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650\n packet_xmit+0x100/0x150\n packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0\n __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90\n x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00\n do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nvalue changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -\u0026gt; 0x00000000fffbac6f\n\nReported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:\nCPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014\n\n[2]\n #!/bin/bash\n\n set +H\n echo whitelist \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan\n echo !vxlan_xmit \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan\n\n ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1\n bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1\n taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q \u0026amp;\n taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q \u0026amp;(CVE-2025-38037)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: arm_ffa: Set dma_mask for ffa devices\n\nSet dma_mask for FFA devices, otherwise DMA allocation using the device pointer\nlead to following warning:\n\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:597 dma_alloc_attrs+0xe0/0x124(CVE-2025-38043)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent\n\nThere is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may\naccess the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the\nfollowing KASAN warning.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975\n\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full)\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70\n print_report+0xce/0x640\n kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0\n cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]\n cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs]\n iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520\n __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9\n Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89\n f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01\n f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8\n RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003\n RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88\n R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n Allocated by task 408:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0\n mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0\n cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs]\n allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs]\n cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs]\n kthread+0x394/0x720\n ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n Freed by task 342979:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50\n kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500\n cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs]\n cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs]\n iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520\n __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000\n which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588\n The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of\n freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)\n\n The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8\n head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0\n anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)\n page_type: f5(slab)\n raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001\n raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000\n head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001\n head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000\n head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff\n head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008\n page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\n Memory state around the buggy address:\n ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n \u0026gt;ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ^\n ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ==================================================================\n\nPOC is available in the link [1].\n\nThe problem triggering process is as follows:\n\nProcess 1 Process 2\n-----------------------------------\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-38051)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio: break and reset virtio devices on device_shutdown()\n\nHongyu reported a hang on kexec in a VM. QEMU reported invalid memory\naccesses during the hang.\n\n\tInvalid read at addr 0x102877002, size 2, region \u0026apos;(null)\u0026apos;, reason: rejected\n\tInvalid write at addr 0x102877A44, size 2, region \u0026apos;(null)\u0026apos;, reason: rejected\n\t...\n\nIt was traced down to virtio-console. Kexec works fine if virtio-console\nis not in use.\n\nThe issue is that virtio-console continues to write to the MMIO even after\nunderlying virtio-pci device is reset.\n\nAdditionally, Eric noticed that IOMMUs are reset before devices, if\ndevices are not reset on shutdown they continue to poke at guest memory\nand get errors from the IOMMU. Some devices get wedged then.\n\nThe problem can be solved by breaking all virtio devices on virtio\nbus shutdown, then resetting them.(CVE-2025-38064)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: CPPC: Fix NULL pointer dereference when nosmp is used\n\nWith nosmp in cmdline, other CPUs are not brought up, leaving\ntheir cpc_desc_ptr NULL. CPU0\u0026apos;s iteration via for_each_possible_cpu()\ndereferences these NULL pointers, causing panic.\n\nPanic backtrace:\n\n[ 0.401123] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000b8\n...\n[ 0.403255] [\u0026lt;ffffffff809a5818\u0026gt;] cppc_allow_fast_switch+0x6a/0xd4\n...\nKernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init!\n\n[ rjw: New subject ](CVE-2025-38113)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngve: add missing NULL check for gve_alloc_pending_packet() in TX DQO\n\ngve_alloc_pending_packet() can return NULL, but gve_tx_add_skb_dqo()\ndid not check for this case before dereferencing the returned pointer.\n\nAdd a missing NULL check to prevent a potential NULL pointer\ndereference when allocation fails.\n\nThis improves robustness in low-memory scenarios.(CVE-2025-38122)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: wwan: t7xx: Fix napi rx poll issue\n\nWhen driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might\nhave been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect\noperation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in\npolling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic.\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1\nOops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\nRIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0\n ? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0\n ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n ? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n ? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620\n napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170\n t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n net_rx_action+0x103/0x470\n irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-38123)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncoresight: prevent deactivate active config while enabling the config\n\nWhile enable active config via cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config(),\nactive config could be deactivated via configfs\u0026apos; sysfs interface.\nThis could make UAF issue in below scenario:\n\nCPU0 CPU1\n(sysfs enable) load module\n cscfg_load_config_sets()\n activate config. // sysfs\n (sys_active_cnt == 1)\n...\ncscfg_csdev_enable_active_config()\nlock(csdev-\u0026gt;cscfg_csdev_lock)\n// here load config activate by CPU1\nunlock(csdev-\u0026gt;cscfg_csdev_lock)\n\n deactivate config // sysfs\n (sys_activec_cnt == 0)\n cscfg_unload_config_sets()\n unload module\n\n// access to config_desc which freed\n// while unloading module.\ncscfg_csdev_enable_config\n\nTo address this, use cscfg_config_desc\u0026apos;s active_cnt as a reference count\n which will be holded when\n - activate the config.\n - enable the activated config.\nand put the module reference when config_active_cnt == 0.(CVE-2025-38131)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping\n\nFix memory leak when running one-step timestamping. When running\none-step sync timestamping, the HW is configured to insert the TX time\ninto the frame, so there is no reason to keep the skb anymore. As in\nthis case the HW will never generate an interrupt to say that the frame\nwas timestamped, then the frame will never released.\nFix this by freeing the frame in case of one-step timestamping.(CVE-2025-38148)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/mlx5: Fix error flow upon firmware failure for RQ destruction\n\nUpon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the\nlast resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned\nregardless of the failure.\n\nNow properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.\n\nIn order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the\nobject again, which results in the following kernel trace:\nrefcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nModules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE)\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1\nTainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\nHardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\npstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nlr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nsp : ffff80008b81b7e0\nx29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001\nx26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00\nx23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000\nx20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006\nx17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f\nx14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78\nx11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90\nx8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff\nx5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000\nx2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600\nCall trace:\n refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\n mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib]\n ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core]\n uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs]\n destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs]\n uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs]\n __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs]\n uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs]\n ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs]\n __fput+0xd8/0x2f0\n __fput_sync+0x50/0x70\n __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90\n invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0\n do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8\n el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8(CVE-2025-38161)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()\n\nBefore calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the \u0026apos;channel\u0026apos; value\nis checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8).\nThis seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register\n(PTP_INT_STS) specifications.\n\nHowever, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp-\u0026gt;extts[] with\nonly LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index:\n\n lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...)\n {\n ...\n /* Update Local timestamp */\n extts = \u0026amp;ptp-\u0026gt;extts[channel];\n extts-\u0026gt;ts.tv_sec = sec;\n ...\n }\n\nTo avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO\ninputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8.\n\nDetected using the static analysis tool - Svace.(CVE-2025-38183)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period\n\nGerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet,\nand this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.\n\nWe want to make sure ctl-\u0026gt;perturb_period * HZ will not overflow\nand is positive.\n\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error\nError: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error\nError: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value\ntc -s -d qd sh dev lo\nqdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec\n Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)\n backlog 0b 0p requeues 0(CVE-2025-38193)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary\n\nSyzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault\ninjection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn\u0026apos;t\ncheck return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any\nerror propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls\njffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated\nnode.\n\nkernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592!\ninvalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI\nCPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline]\n jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874\n jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388\n jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197\n jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362\n jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301\n generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856\n __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973\n generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline]\n do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735\n do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861\n vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902\n iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685\n do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]\n direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950\n splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896\n do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002\n do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255\n __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\n\nFix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs\nbefore calling jffs2_sum_write_data.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-38194)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/shmem, swap: fix softlockup with mTHP swapin\n\nFollowing softlockup can be easily reproduced on my test machine with:\n\necho always \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hugepages-64kB/enabled\nswapon /dev/zram0 # zram0 is a 48G swap device\nmkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test\necho 1G \u0026gt; /sys/fs/cgroup/test/memory.max\necho $BASHPID \u0026gt; /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.procs\nwhile true; do\n dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/test.img bs=1M count=5120\n cat /tmp/test.img \u0026gt; /dev/null\n rm /tmp/test.img\ndone\n\nThen after a while:\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 763s! [cat:5787]\nModules linked in: zram virtiofs\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5787 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G L 6.15.0.orig-gf3021d9246bc-dirty #118 PREEMPT(voluntary)\u00b7\nTainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP\nHardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\nRIP: 0010:mpol_shared_policy_lookup+0xd/0x70\nCode: e9 b8 b4 ff ff 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 8b 1f 48 85 db 74 41 4c 8d 67 08 48 89 fb 48 89 f5 4c 89 e7 e8\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90002b1fc28 EFLAGS: 00000202\nRAX: 00000000001c20ca RBX: 0000000000724e1e RCX: 0000000000000001\nRDX: ffff888118e214c8 RSI: 0000000000057d42 RDI: ffff888118e21518\nRBP: 000000000002bec8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000bf4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001\nR13: 00000000001c20ca R14: 00000000001c20ca R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 00007f03f995c740(0000) GS:ffff88a07ad9a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f03f98f1000 CR3: 0000000144626004 CR4: 0000000000770eb0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n shmem_alloc_folio+0x31/0xc0\n shmem_swapin_folio+0x309/0xcf0\n ? filemap_get_entry+0x117/0x1e0\n ? xas_load+0xd/0xb0\n ? filemap_get_entry+0x101/0x1e0\n shmem_get_folio_gfp+0x2ed/0x5b0\n shmem_file_read_iter+0x7f/0x2e0\n vfs_read+0x252/0x330\n ksys_read+0x68/0xf0\n do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f03f9a46991\nCode: 00 48 8b 15 81 14 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8 20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 97 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec\nRSP: 002b:00007fff3c52bd28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007f03f9a46991\nRDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f03f98ba000 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007fff3c52bd50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f03f9b9a380\nR10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000\nR13: 00007f03f98ba000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nThe reason is simple, readahead brought some order 0 folio in swap cache,\nand the swapin mTHP folio being allocated is in conflict with it, so\nswapcache_prepare fails and causes shmem_swap_alloc_folio to return\n-EEXIST, and shmem simply retries again and again causing this loop.\n\nFix it by applying a similar fix for anon mTHP swapin.\n\nThe performance change is very slight, time of swapin 10g zero folios\nwith shmem (test for 12 times):\nBefore: 2.47s\nAfter: 2.48s\n\n[(CVE-2025-38241)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlib/group_cpus: fix NULL pointer dereference from group_cpus_evenly()\n\nWhile testing null_blk with configfs, echo 0 \u0026gt; poll_queues will trigger\nfollowing panic:\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\nCPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 920 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.15.0-02023-gadbdb95c8696-dirty #1238 PREEMPT(undef)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:__bitmap_or+0x48/0x70\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __group_cpus_evenly+0x822/0x8c0\n group_cpus_evenly+0x2d9/0x490\n blk_mq_map_queues+0x1e/0x110\n null_map_queues+0xc9/0x170 [null_blk]\n blk_mq_update_queue_map+0xdb/0x160\n blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x22b/0x560\n nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]\n nullb_device_poll_queues_store+0xa4/0x130 [null_blk]\n configfs_write_iter+0x109/0x1d0\n vfs_write+0x26e/0x6f0\n ksys_write+0x79/0x180\n __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30\n x64_sys_call+0x45c4/0x45f0\n do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x240\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nRoot cause is that numgrps is set to 0, and ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from\nkcalloc(), and later ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be deferenced.\n\nFix the problem by checking numgrps first in group_cpus_evenly(), and\nreturn NULL directly if numgrps is zero.\n\n[(CVE-2025-38255)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data\n\nThe len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot\nbe used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA.(CVE-2025-38304)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: Intel: avs: Verify content returned by parse_int_array()\n\nThe first element of the returned array stores its length. If it is 0,\nany manipulation beyond the element at index 0 ends with null-ptr-deref.(CVE-2025-38307)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: Log an error when close_all_cached_dirs fails\n\nUnder low-memory conditions, close_all_cached_dirs() can\u0026apos;t move the\ndentries to a separate list to dput() them once the locks are dropped.\nThis will result in a \u0026quot;Dentry still in use\u0026quot; error, so add an error\nmessage that makes it clear this is what happened:\n\n[ 495.281119] CIFS: VFS: \\\\otters.example.com\\share Out of memory while dropping dentries\n[ 495.281595] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 495.281887] BUG: Dentry ffff888115531138{i=78,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs]\n[ 495.282391] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2329 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xc8/0xf0\n\nAlso, bail out of looping through all tcons as soon as a single\nallocation fails, since we\u0026apos;re already in trouble, and kmalloc() attempts\nfor subseqeuent tcons are likely to fail just like the first one did.(CVE-2025-38321)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPICA: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks\n\nACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5\n\nI\u0026apos;m Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of\nSouth Korea.\n\nI have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI\nearly abort cases.\n\nBoot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:\n[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)\n[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter\n[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)\n[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10\n[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.361873] Call Trace:\n[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f\n[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80\n[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0\n[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a\n[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0\n[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100\n[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30\n\nI analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that \u201cAcpi-State\u201d cache and\n\u201cAcpi-Parse\u201d cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same\nslab cache size.\n\nI finally found \u201cAcpi-Parse\u201d cache and \u201cAcpi-parse_ext\u201d cache were leaked\nusing SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.\n\nReal ACPI cache leak point is as follows:\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)\n[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)\n[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter\n[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)\n[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8\n[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.372000] Call Trace:\n[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f\n[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80\n[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0\n[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a\n[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0\n[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100\n[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30\n[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8\n[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.392000] Call Trace:\n[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x3\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-38344)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmaple_tree: fix MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag in mas_preallocate()\n\nTemporarily clear the preallocation flag when explicitly requesting\nallocations. Pre-existing allocations are already counted against the\nrequest through mas_node_count_gfp(), but the allocations will not happen\nif the MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag is set. This flag is meant to avoid\nre-allocating in bulk allocation mode, and to detect issues with\npreallocation calculations.\n\nThe MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag should also always be set on zero allocations\nso that detection of underflow allocations will print a WARN_ON() during\nconsumption.\n\nUser visible effect of this flaw is a WARN_ON() followed by a null pointer\ndereference when subsequent requests for larger number of nodes is\nignored, such as the vma merge retry in mmap_region() caused by drivers\naltering the vma flags (which happens in v6.6, at least)(CVE-2025-38364)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU\n\nTransport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport\nfrom becoming a stale pointer.\n\nThis also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();\nadd a lockdep assert.\n\nBUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN\nRIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600\nCall Trace:\n vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40\n __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100\n __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38461)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU\n\nvsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload.\ntransport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.\n\nIntroduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential\nnull-ptr-deref.\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90\nCall Trace:\n __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720\n vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0\nCall Trace:\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38462)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto\n\nThe CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from\ncrypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous.\nHowever, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause\nuse-after-free crashes:\n\n crypt_message()\n // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req\n creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., \u0026amp;req);\n\n // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately\n rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);\n\n // Free creq while async operation is still in progress\n kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);\n\nHardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for\nperformance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS,\nthe operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(),\nthe function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes\nwhen the driver later accesses the freed memory.\n\nThis results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto\ndriver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel\ncrashes with NULL pointer dereferences.\n\nThe issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn\u0026apos;t\nguarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in\nthe mask, async implementations can be selected.\n\nFix by restoring the async crypto handling:\n- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking\n- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification\n- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion\n\nThis ensures the request buffer isn\u0026apos;t freed until the crypto operation\ncompletes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the\nCVE-2024-50047 fix.(CVE-2025-38488)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns\n\nWhat we want is to verify there is that clone won\u0026apos;t expose something\nhidden by a mount we wouldn\u0026apos;t be able to undo. \u0026quot;Wouldn\u0026apos;t be able to undo\u0026quot;\nmay be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from\nlacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.\n\nclone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.\n\nThere\u0026apos;s a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various\nuserns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve\ndifferent purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,\nbut not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.(CVE-2025-38499)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation\n\nWe have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between\nsubflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to\ntrigger.\n\nThe solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition\n\u0026apos;socket state prevent any additional subflow creation\u0026apos; protected by the\nfallback lock.\n\nThe socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending\nan MP_FAIL option.\n\nThe field \u0026apos;allow_infinite_fallback\u0026apos; is now always touched under the\nrelevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write.(CVE-2025-38552)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: use aead_request_free to match aead_request_alloc\n\nUse aead_request_free() instead of kfree() to properly free memory\nallocated by aead_request_alloc(). This ensures sensitive crypto data\nis zeroed before being freed.(CVE-2025-38575)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPM / devfreq: Check governor before using governor-\u0026gt;name\n\nCommit 96ffcdf239de (\u0026quot;PM / devfreq: Remove redundant governor_name from\nstruct devfreq\u0026quot;) removes governor_name and uses governor-\u0026gt;name to replace\nit. But devfreq-\u0026gt;governor may be NULL and directly using\ndevfreq-\u0026gt;governor-\u0026gt;name may cause null pointer exception. Move the check of\ngovernor to before using governor-\u0026gt;name.(CVE-2025-38609)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump\n\nThere is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():\n if (res \u0026lt; 0) {\n nf_conntrack_get(\u0026amp;ct-\u0026gt;ct_general); // HERE\n cb-\u0026gt;args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;\n ...\n\nWhile its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.\nIf this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.\nThis 2nd increment is never undone.\n\nThis prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn\nkeeps prevents cnet-\u0026gt;count from dropping back to 0.\n\nThis will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as\nnf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.\n\nThis can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.\nIt takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before\nI see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.\n\nOne fix would to change this to:\n if (res \u0026lt; 0) {\n\t\tif (ct != last)\n\t nf_conntrack_get(\u0026amp;ct-\u0026gt;ct_general);\n\nBut this reference counting isn\u0026apos;t needed in the first place.\nWe can just store a cookie value instead.\n\nA followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,\nit looks to me as if this has the same problem and like\nctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a \u0026apos;skip hint\u0026apos;, not the actual\nobject so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.(CVE-2025-38721)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference\n\nThe qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error,\nbut qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error\npointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers\nto NULL.(CVE-2025-39676)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list\n\nEach recvmsg() call must process either\n - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)\n - one non-DATA record\n\nIf the next record has different type than what has already been\nprocessed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record\nhas already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where\nwe don\u0026apos;t know type until decryption) we queue the pending record\nto the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.\n\nQueuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,\nsince in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,\nand we don\u0026apos;t have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext\nskb for access to metadata like length).\n\nOnly data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing\nloop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and\nthen find out that the record type has changed. The corner case\nwe missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it\u0026apos;s\nzero length.(CVE-2025-39682)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time\n\nTo prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time.\nUse the appropriate helper function for this.(CVE-2025-39702)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: samsung: Fix UBSAN panic in samsung_clk_init()\n\nWith UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I\u0026apos;m hitting the below panic due to\ndereferencing `ctx-\u0026gt;clk_data.hws` before setting\n`ctx-\u0026gt;clk_data.num = nr_clks`. Move that up to fix the crash.\n\n UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n \u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n Call trace:\n samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P)\n samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L)\n samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0\n exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64\n __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60\n ...(CVE-2025-39728)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: Prevent file descriptor table allocations exceeding INT_MAX\n\nWhen sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816\nas set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near\nthe limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed\nINT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288\n\nThis happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the\nrequested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is\nnot flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.\n\nSpecifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a\nprocess calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate:\n- File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes\n- Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB\n- Total allocation size: \u0026gt; 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)\n\nReproducer:\n1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816:\n # echo 1073741816 \u0026gt; /proc/sys/fs/nr_open\n\n2. Run a program that uses a high file descriptor:\n #include \u0026lt;unistd.h\u0026gt;\n #include \u0026lt;sys/resource.h\u0026gt;\n\n int main() {\n struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824};\n setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, \u0026amp;rlim);\n dup2(2, 1073741880); // Triggers the warning\n return 0;\n }\n\n3. Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027\n\nsystemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the\nmaximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory\ncontrol groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits\nsince memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked\nthat:\n\n1. The kernel\u0026apos;s allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum\n size regardless of memcg accounting\n2. Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can\n inadvertently trigger massive allocations\n3. The resulting allocations (\u0026gt;8GB) are impractical and will always fail\n\nsystemd\u0026apos;s algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value\nuntil the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open\nbeing set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file\ndescriptors.\n\nWhile processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal\noperation, certain selftests (like\ntools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file\ndescriptor limits can trigger this issue.\n\nFix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested\nallocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to\nfail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the\nimpractical \u0026gt;8GB memory allocation request.(CVE-2025-39756)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gso: Forbid IPv6 TSO with extensions on devices with only IPV6_CSUM\n\nWhen performing Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) on an IPv6 packet that\ncontains extension headers, the kernel incorrectly requests checksum offload\nif the egress device only advertises NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM feature, which has\na strict contract: it supports checksum offload only for plain TCP or UDP\nover IPv6 and explicitly does not support packets with extension headers.\nThe current GSO logic violates this contract by failing to disable the feature\nfor packets with extension headers, such as those used in GREoIPv6 tunnels.\n\nThis violation results in the device being asked to perform an operation\nit cannot support, leading to a `skb_warn_bad_offload` warning and a collapse\nof network throughput. While device TSO/USO is correctly bypassed in favor\nof software GSO for these packets, the GSO stack must be explicitly told not\nto request checksum offload.\n\nMask NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, NETIF_F_TSO6 and NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4\nin gso_features_check if the IPv6 header contains extension headers to compute\nchecksum in software.\n\nThe exception is a BIG TCP extension, which, as stated in commit\n68e068cabd2c6c53 (\u0026quot;net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets\u0026quot;):\n\u0026quot;The feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO.\nThe header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump,\nand not transmitted by physical devices.\u0026quot;\n\nkernel log output (truncated):\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5273 at net/core/dev.c:3535 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x81/0x140\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n skb_checksum_help+0x12a/0x1f0\n validate_xmit_skb+0x1a3/0x2d0\n validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4f/0x80\n sch_direct_xmit+0x1a2/0x380\n __dev_xmit_skb+0x242/0x670\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x3fc/0x7f0\n ip6_finish_output2+0x25e/0x5d0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_tnl_xmit+0x608/0xc00 [ip6_tunnel]\n ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x1c0/0x390 [ip6_gre]\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x63/0x1c0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d0/0x7f0\n ip6_finish_output2+0x214/0x5d0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0\n inet6_csk_xmit+0xeb/0x150\n __tcp_transmit_skb+0x555/0xa80\n tcp_write_xmit+0x32a/0xe90\n tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x437/0x1110\n tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50\n...\nskb linear: 00000000: e4 3d 1a 7d ec 30 e4 3d 1a 7e 5d 90 86 dd 60 0e\nskb linear: 00000010: 00 0a 1b 34 3c 40 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 11 2f 00 04 01 04 01 01 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000040: 86 dd 60 0e 00 0a 1b 00 06 40 20 23 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 23 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 bf 96 14 51 13 f9\nskb linear: 00000070: ae 27 a0 a8 2b e3 80 18 00 40 5b 6f 00 00 01 01\nskb linear: 00000080: 08 0a 42 d4 50 d5 4b 70 f8 1a(CVE-2025-39770)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: initialize more fields in sctp_v6_from_sk()\n\nsyzbot found that sin6_scope_id was not properly initialized,\nleading to undefined behavior.\n\nClear sin6_scope_id and sin6_flowinfo.\n\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649\n __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649\n sctp_inet6_cmp_addr+0x4f2/0x510 net/sctp/ipv6.c:983\n sctp_bind_addr_conflict+0x22a/0x3b0 net/sctp/bind_addr.c:390\n sctp_get_port_local+0x21eb/0x2440 net/sctp/socket.c:8452\n sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]\n sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline]\n sctp_inet_listen+0x710/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636\n __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline]\n __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline]\n __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline]\n __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline]\n __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930\n x64_sys_call+0x271d/0x3e20 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:51\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nLocal variable addr.i.i created at:\n sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8515 [inline]\n sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline]\n sctp_inet_listen+0x650/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636\n __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline]\n __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline]\n __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline]\n __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline]\n __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930(CVE-2025-39812)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: lpfc: Fix buffer free/clear order in deferred receive path\n\nFix a use-after-free window by correcting the buffer release sequence in\nthe deferred receive path. The code freed the RQ buffer first and only\nthen cleared the context pointer under the lock. Concurrent paths (e.g.,\nABTS and the repost path) also inspect and release the same pointer under\nthe lock, so the old order could lead to double-free/UAF.\n\nNote that the repost path already uses the correct pattern: detach the\npointer under the lock, then free it after dropping the lock. The\ndeferred path should do the same.(CVE-2025-39841)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm\n\nWhen send a broadcast packet to a tap device, which was added to a bridge,\nbr_nf_local_in() is called to confirm the conntrack. If another conntrack\nwith the same hash value is added to the hash table, which can be\ntriggered by a normal packet to a non-bridge device, the below warning\nmay happen.\n\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 96 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:632 br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 96 Comm: tap_send Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n nf_hook_slow+0x3e/0xf0\n br_pass_frame_up+0x103/0x180\n br_handle_frame_finish+0x2de/0x5b0\n br_nf_hook_thresh+0xc0/0x120\n br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x168/0x3a0\n br_nf_pre_routing+0x237/0x5e0\n br_handle_frame+0x1ec/0x3c0\n __netif_receive_skb_core+0x225/0x1210\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x37/0xa0\n netif_receive_skb+0x36/0x160\n tun_get_user+0xa54/0x10c0\n tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0\n vfs_write+0x305/0x410\n ksys_write+0x60/0xd0\n do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nTo solve the hash conflict, nf_ct_resolve_clash() try to merge the\nconntracks, and update skb-\u0026gt;_nfct. However, br_nf_local_in() still use the\nold ct from local variable \u0026apos;nfct\u0026apos; after confirm(), which leads to this\nwarning.\n\nIf confirm() does not insert the conntrack entry and return NF_DROP, the\nwarning may also occur. There is no need to reserve the WARN_ON_ONCE, just\nremove it.(CVE-2025-39894)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer\n\nSince commit 7d5e9737efda (\u0026quot;net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from\ndevice property\u0026quot;) rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly\nuninitialized \u0026quot;const char *type_name;\u0026quot; local variable.\n\nOn x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a \u0026quot;BCM4752\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;LNV4752\u0026quot;\nacpi_device, the rfkill-\u0026gt;type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id:\n\n rfkill-\u0026gt;type = (unsigned)id-\u0026gt;driver_data;\n\nand there is no \u0026quot;type\u0026quot; property so device_property_read_string() will fail\nand leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash.\n\nrfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash\nby initializing type_name to NULL.\n\nNote likely sofar this has not been caught because:\n\n1. Not many x86 machines actually have a \u0026quot;BCM4752\u0026quot;/\u0026quot;LNV4752\u0026quot; acpi_device\n2. The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored(CVE-2025-39937)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().\n\nsyzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk\nin the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]\n\nsyzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before\nthe TFO socket completes 3WHS:\n\n 1. accept()\n 2. connect(AF_UNSPEC)\n 3. connect() to another destination\n\nAs of accept(), sk-\u0026gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes\nit to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.\n\nSince tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk, the\nretransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not\nretransmitted.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().\n\n[0]:\nWARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))\nCode: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017\nRDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400\nRBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8\nR10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540\nR13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738)\n call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747)\n __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372)\n timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135)\n tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035)\n __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1))\n tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096)\n handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580)\n irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696)\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35))\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-39955)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group\n\nThe kernel forbids the creation of non-FDB nexthop groups with FDB\nnexthops:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.1 fdb\n # ip nexthop add id 2 group 1\n Error: Non FDB nexthop group cannot have fdb nexthops.\n\nAnd vice versa:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 3 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 4 group 3 fdb\n Error: FDB nexthop group can only have fdb nexthops.\n\nHowever, as long as no routes are pointing to a non-FDB nexthop group,\nthe kernel allows changing the type of a nexthop from FDB to non-FDB and\nvice versa:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 5 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 6 group 5\n # ip nexthop replace id 5 via 192.0.2.2 fdb\n # echo $?\n 0\n\nThis configuration is invalid and can result in a NPD [1] since FDB\nnexthops are not associated with a nexthop device:\n\n # ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 6\n # ping 198.51.100.1\n\nFix by preventing nexthop FDB status change while the nexthop is in a\ngroup:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 7 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 8 group 7\n # ip nexthop replace id 7 via 192.0.2.2 fdb\n Error: Cannot change nexthop FDB status while in a group.\n\n[1]\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0\n[...]\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP\nCPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 367 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6-virtme-gb65678cacc03 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:fib_lookup_good_nhc+0x1e/0x80\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n fib_table_lookup+0x541/0x650\n ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2ea/0x970\n ip_route_output_key_hash+0x55/0x80\n __ip4_datagram_connect+0x250/0x330\n udp_connect+0x2b/0x60\n __sys_connect+0x9c/0xd0\n __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20\n do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x2a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-39980)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup\n\nOn the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp\nbefore connections with valid cp-\u0026gt;app pointers are flushed, leading to a\nuse-after-free.\n\nFix this by introducing a global `exiting_module` flag, set to true in\nip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In\n__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns\ncleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to\n__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections\nare flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp\nimmediately.(CVE-2025-40018)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs\n\nWhen the initialization of qm-\u0026gt;debug.acc_diff_reg fails,\nthe probe process does not exit. However, after qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs is\nfreed, it is not set to NULL. This can lead to a double free when the\nremove process attempts to free it again. Therefore, qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs\nshould be set to NULL after it is freed.(CVE-2025-40062)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr\n\nSyzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program:\n\n 0: r0 = 0\n 1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60)\n 2: exit\n\nwhich triggers:\n\n verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)\n\nThis is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an\nimplicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this\npadding isn\u0026apos;t rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later\nfails to convert the access.\n\nThis patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of\nbpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access.\n\nI checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and\ndidn\u0026apos;t find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled)\npadding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.(CVE-2025-40078)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: hisilicon/qm - request reserved interrupt for virtual function\n\nThe device interrupt vector 3 is an error interrupt for\nphysical function and a reserved interrupt for virtual function.\nHowever, the driver has not registered the reserved interrupt for\nvirtual function. When allocating interrupts, the number of interrupts\nis allocated based on powers of two, which includes this interrupt.\nWhen the system enables GICv4 and the virtual function passthrough\nto the virtual machine, releasing the interrupt in the driver\ntriggers a warning.\n\nThe WARNING report is:\nWARNING: CPU: 62 PID: 14889 at arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c:852 its_free_ite+0x94/0xb4\n\nTherefore, register a reserved interrupt for VF and set the\nIRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag to avoid that warning.(CVE-2025-40136)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: avoid NULL dereference when chunk data buffer is missing\n\nchunk-\u0026gt;skb pointer is dereferenced in the if-block where it\u0026apos;s supposed\nto be NULL only.\n\nchunk-\u0026gt;skb can only be NULL if chunk-\u0026gt;head_skb is not. Check for frag_list\ninstead and do it just before replacing chunk-\u0026gt;skb. We\u0026apos;re sure that\notherwise chunk-\u0026gt;skb is non-NULL because of outer if() condition.(CVE-2025-40240)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields\n\nThe validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong.\nIt runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the\nsame function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the\npush_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different\nmemory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in\ncase of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible.\n\nThere is also confusion in the code between the \u0026apos;masked\u0026apos; flag, that\nsays that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both\nthe value and the mask, and the \u0026apos;is_mask\u0026apos; that says that the value\nwe\u0026apos;re parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to\nwrite into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during\nvalidation, while validate_nsh() doesn\u0026apos;t allocate any memory for it:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch]\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch]\n validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch]\n __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch]\n ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch]\n ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch]\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130\n genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220\n genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100\n genl_rcv+0x24/0x40\n netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0\n netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0\n __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0\n do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe third issue with this process is that while trying to convert\nthe non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles\nthe size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn\u0026apos;t have any nested\nattributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling\nthem in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed\nduring the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during\nthe flow dump.\n\nIn the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are\neither validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone\nmanages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely\nnot do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are\nmixed up.\n\nFixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing\nmost of the validation code.\n\nGiven that and the fact that this functionality never worked since\nintroduction, let\u0026apos;s just remove it altogether. It\u0026apos;s better to\nre-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying\nto fix it in stable releases.(CVE-2025-40254)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_mon_reinit_self().\n\nsyzbot reported use-after-free of tipc_net(net)-\u0026gt;monitors[]\nin tipc_mon_reinit_self(). [0]\n\nThe array is protected by RTNL, but tipc_mon_reinit_self()\niterates over it without RTNL.\n\ntipc_mon_reinit_self() is called from tipc_net_finalize(),\nwhich is always under RTNL except for tipc_net_finalize_work().\n\nLet\u0026apos;s hold RTNL in tipc_net_finalize_work().\n\n[0]:\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff88805eae1030 by task kworker/0:7/5989\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5989 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025\nWorkqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482\n kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595\n __kasan_check_byte+0x2a/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:568\n kasan_check_byte include/linux/kasan.h:399 [inline]\n lock_acquire+0x8d/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5842\n __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]\n _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162\n rtlock_slowlock kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1894 [inline]\n rwbase_rtmutex_lock_state kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:160 [inline]\n rwbase_write_lock+0xd3/0x7e0 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244\n rt_write_lock+0x76/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:243\n write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_rt.h:99 [inline]\n tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x79/0x430 net/tipc/monitor.c:718\n tipc_net_finalize+0x115/0x190 net/tipc/net.c:140\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3319\n worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400\n kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463\n ret_from_fork+0x439/0x7d0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nAllocated by task 6089:\n kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]\n kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68\n poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline]\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405\n kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1a8/0x320 mm/slub.c:4407\n kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]\n kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]\n tipc_mon_create+0xc3/0x4d0 net/tipc/monitor.c:657\n tipc_enable_bearer net/tipc/bearer.c:357 [inline]\n __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0xe16/0x13f0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1047\n __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:371 [inline]\n tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3bc/0x5f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:393\n tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:-1 [inline]\n tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x83c/0xbe0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1321\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x215/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115\n genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]\n genl_rcv_msg+0x60e/0x790 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552\n genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x846/0xa10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346\n netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x508/0x820 net/socket.c:2614\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668\n __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline]\n __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x260 net/socket.c:2703\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-40280)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: prevent possible shift-out-of-bounds in sctp_transport_update_rto\n\nsyzbot reported a possible shift-out-of-bounds [1]\n\nBlamed commit added rto_alpha_max and rto_beta_max set to 1000.\n\nIt is unclear if some sctp users are setting very large rto_alpha\nand/or rto_beta.\n\nIn order to prevent user regression, perform the test at run time.\n\nAlso add READ_ONCE() annotations as sysctl values can change under us.\n\n[1]\n\nUBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sctp/transport.c:509:41\nshift exponent 64 is too large for 32-bit type \u0026apos;unsigned int\u0026apos;\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16704 Comm: syz.2.2320 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:233 [inline]\n __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x27f/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:494\n sctp_transport_update_rto.cold+0x1c/0x34b net/sctp/transport.c:509\n sctp_check_transmitted+0x11c4/0x1c30 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1502\n sctp_outq_sack+0x4ef/0x1b20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1338\n sctp_cmd_process_sack net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:840 [inline]\n sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1372 [inline](CVE-2025-40281)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write\n\nFor the following path not holding the sock lock,\n\n sctp_diag_dump() -\u0026gt; sctp_for_each_endpoint() -\u0026gt; sctp_ep_dump()\n\nmake sure not to exceed bounds in case the address list has grown\nbetween buffer allocation (time-of-check) and write (time-of-use).(CVE-2025-40331)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: replace BUG_ON with bounds check for map-\u0026gt;max_osd\n\nOSD indexes come from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks are\nadded to validate these against map-\u0026gt;max_osd.\n\n[ idryomov: drop BUG_ON in ceph_get_primary_affinity(), minor cosmetic\n edits ](CVE-2025-68283)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds writes in handle_auth_session_key()\n\nThe len field originates from untrusted network packets. Boundary\nchecks have been added to prevent potential out-of-bounds writes when\ndecrypting the connection secret or processing service tickets.\n\n[ idryomov: changelog ](CVE-2025-68284)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()\n\nThe wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client\nreceiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is\nreceived. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install\na new map immediately after freeing the old one\n\n kfree(monc-\u0026gt;monmap);\n monc-\u0026gt;monmap = monmap;\n\n ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap);\n osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap = newmap;\n\nunder client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock respectively, but\nbecause neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it\u0026apos;s possible for\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch and client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch arms in\n\n client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch;\n\ncondition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be\nreproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266\n ...\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290\n ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680\n vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n Allocated by task 13305:\n ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130\n ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0\n ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190\n create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0\n ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680\n vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n Freed by task 9475:\n kfree+0x212/0x290\n handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0\n ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590\n mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0\n ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0\n ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760\n ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650\n process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0\n process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90\n worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0\n kthread+0x2ec/0x300\n ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nRewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While\nat it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be\nexceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than\nonce) and access client-\u0026gt;auth_err under client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex to match\nhow it\u0026apos;s set in finish_auth().\n\nmonmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before\naccessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side\n\nThe hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn\u0026apos;t\nensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking\nappears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU\ncommit bf4c63252490b (\u0026quot;Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU\u0026quot;)\nand not clear if it had purpose since then.\n\nCurrently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere\nthan the ordered hdev-\u0026gt;workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.\ncommit 5af1f84ed13a (\u0026quot;Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync\u0026quot;)\nintroduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before\nit. It\u0026apos;s better to do the locking so that even if these run\nconcurrently no UAF is possible.\n\nMove the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to\nprotocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section\nto cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.\n\nsyzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:\n\n [Task hdev-\u0026gt;workqueue] [Task 2]\n hci_disconnect_all_sync\n l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)\n hci_conn_get(hcon)\n hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)\n hci_dev_lock\n hci_dev_lock\n hci_conn_del(hcon)\n v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock\n hci_conn_put(hcon)\n conn = hcon-\u0026gt;l2cap_data (UAF)(CVE-2025-68304)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()\n\nIn ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to\nthe rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; check\nand sets \u0026apos;result = true\u0026apos;. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing\nextra files to be measured by IMA.\n\nThis issue can be reproduced in the following scenario:\nAfter unloading the SELinux policy module via \u0026apos;semodule -d\u0026apos;, if an IMA\nmeasurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated,\nin ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the \u0026apos;if (rc == -ESTALE \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n!rule_reinitialized)\u0026apos; block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In\nima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule\nbecomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ENOENT. This bypasses the \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; check and results in a false match.\n\nCall trace:\n selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8\n security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0\n ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0\n ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8\n ima_get_action+0x48/0x60\n process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98\n ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8\n security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78\n search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318\n exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8\n bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130\n do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258\n __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0\n do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n el0_svc+0x44/0x200\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0\n\nFix this by changing \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; to \u0026apos;if (rc \u0026lt;= 0)\u0026apos; to ensure that error\ncodes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a\nsuccessful match.(CVE-2025-68740)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix invalid prog-\u0026gt;stats access when update_effective_progs fails\n\nSyzkaller triggers an invalid memory access issue following fault\ninjection in update_effective_progs. The issue can be described as\nfollows:\n\n__cgroup_bpf_detach\n update_effective_progs\n compute_effective_progs\n bpf_prog_array_alloc \u0026lt;-- fault inject\n purge_effective_progs\n /* change to dummy_bpf_prog */\n array-\u0026gt;items[index] = \u0026amp;dummy_bpf_prog.prog\n\n---softirq start---\n__do_softirq\n ...\n __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb\n __bpf_prog_run_save_cb\n bpf_prog_run\n stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog-\u0026gt;stats)\n /* invalid memory access */\n flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(\u0026amp;stats-\u0026gt;syncp)\n---softirq end---\n\n static_branch_dec(\u0026amp;cgroup_bpf_enabled_key[atype])\n\nThe reason is that fault injection caused update_effective_progs to fail\nand then changed the original prog into dummy_bpf_prog.prog in\npurge_effective_progs. Then a softirq came, and accessing the members of\ndummy_bpf_prog.prog in the softirq triggers invalid mem access.\n\nTo fix it, skip updating stats when stats is NULL.(CVE-2025-68742)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query\n\nThe ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls:\nETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and\nETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.\n\nIf the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device\nreconfiguration), userspace\u0026apos;s buffer allocation will be incorrect,\npotentially leading to buffer overflow.\n\nDrivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some\ndrivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making\nthis scenario possible.\n\nSome drivers try to handle this internally:\n- bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not\n equal to the driver\u0026apos;s stats count.\n- micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond\n stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.\n\nHowever, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value\nreturned from get_sset_count(), hence won\u0026apos;t solve the issue described\nhere.\n\nChange ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(),\nethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch\nbetween userspace\u0026apos;s size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer\noverflow.\nThe returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that\nnothing has been returned.\n\nThis could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool,\ndepending on when the size change is detected:\n1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings():\n # ethtool -S eth2\n no stats available\n\n2. When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.\n\nBoth cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call\nshould succeed.\n\nOther than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no\noutput/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting\nincorrect/shifted stats.\nI also considered returning an error instead of a \u0026quot;silent\u0026quot; response, but\nthat seems more destructive towards userspace apps.\n\nNotes:\n- This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure\n that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more\n predictable behavior.\n\n- RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between\n the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.\n\n- Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that\n these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications\n which might not fill it. The added code checks that it\u0026apos;s not zero,\n to prevent any regressions.(CVE-2025-68795)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: xattr: fix null pointer deref in ext4_raw_inode()\n\nIf ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED),\niloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()\nlacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference\nin ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-68820)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: hns3: using the num_tqps in the vf driver to apply for resources\n\nCurrently, hdev-\u0026gt;htqp is allocated using hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps, and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp\nis allocated using kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps. However, kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps is set to\nmin(new_tqps, hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps); Therefore, kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps may be smaller\nthan hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps, which causes some hdev-\u0026gt;htqp[i] to remain\nuninitialized in hclgevf_knic_setup().\n\nThus, this patch allocates hdev-\u0026gt;htqp and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp using hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps,\nensuring that the lengths of hdev-\u0026gt;htqp and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp are consistent\nand that all elements are properly initialized.(CVE-2025-71064)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset\n\n`qfq_class-\u0026gt;leaf_qdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen \u0026gt; 0` does not imply that the class\nitself is active.\n\nTwo qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens\nwhen:\n\n1. one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and\n\n2. another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get()\n/ qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function\ntc_new_tfilter.\n\nWhen packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared\nleaf_qdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ\nqdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters\nqfq_reset() with its own q-\u0026gt;q.qlen == 0, but its class\u0026apos;s leaf\nqdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen \u0026gt; 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate\nan inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg:\n\n[ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n[ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n[ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0\n[ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE\n[ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2))\n[ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0\n\nCode starting with the faulting instruction\n===========================================\n 0:\t0f 84 4d 01 00 00 \tje 0x153\n 6:\t48 89 70 18 \tmov %rsi,0x18(%rax)\n a:\t8b 4b 10 \tmov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx\n d:\t48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff \tmov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx\n 14:\t48 8b 78 08 \tmov 0x8(%rax),%rdi\n 18:\t48 d3 e2 \tshl %cl,%rdx\n 1b:\t48 21 f2 \tand %rsi,%rdx\n 1e:\t48 2b 13 \tsub (%rbx),%rdx\n 21:\t48 8b 30 \tmov (%rax),%rsi\n 24:\t48 d3 ea \tshr %cl,%rdx\n 27:\t8b 4b 18 \tmov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx\n\t...\n[ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000\n[ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880\n[ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0\n[ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 0.910391] Call Trace:\n[ 0.910527] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485)\n[ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)\n[ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076)\n[ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447)\n[ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\n[ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861)\n[ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\n[ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\n[ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706)\n[ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af\n---truncated---(CVE-2026-22976)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()\n\nsyzbot is reporting\n\n unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2\n\nproblem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at\nxdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp().\n\nAccording to commit ec94670fcb3b (\u0026quot;bpf: Support specifying ingress via\nxdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN\u0026quot;), the refcount obtained by\nxdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md().\n\nTherefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by\ncommit 1c1949982524 (\u0026quot;bpf: introduce frags support to\nbpf_prog_test_run_xdp()\u0026quot;) forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md().(CVE-2026-22994)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()\n\nWang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery\nwaiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling\nnfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state\nrecovery being needed.\n\nIt seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback\nof the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an\nasynchronous commit.(CVE-2026-23053)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nuacce: implement mremap in uacce_vm_ops to return -EPERM\n\nThe current uacce_vm_ops does not support the mremap operation of\nvm_operations_struct. Implement .mremap to return -EPERM to remind\nusers.\n\nThe reason we need to explicitly disable mremap is that when the\ndriver does not implement .mremap, it uses the default mremap\nmethod. This could lead to a risk scenario:\n\nAn application might first mmap address p1, then mremap to p2,\nfollowed by munmap(p1), and finally munmap(p2). Since the default\nmremap copies the original vma\u0026apos;s vm_private_data (i.e., q) to the\nnew vma, both munmap operations would trigger vma_close, causing\nq-\u0026gt;qfr to be freed twice(qfr will be set to null here, so repeated\nrelease is ok).(CVE-2026-23056)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nuacce: ensure safe queue release with state management\n\nDirectly calling `put_queue` carries risks since it cannot\nguarantee that resources of `uacce_queue` have been fully released\nbeforehand. So adding a `stop_queue` operation for the\nUACCE_CMD_PUT_Q command and leaving the `put_queue` operation to\nthe final resource release ensures safety.\n\nQueue states are defined as follows:\n- UACCE_Q_ZOMBIE: Initial state\n- UACCE_Q_INIT: After opening `uacce`\n- UACCE_Q_STARTED: After `start` is issued via `ioctl`\n\nWhen executing `poweroff -f` in virt while accelerator are still\nworking, `uacce_fops_release` and `uacce_remove` may execute\nconcurrently. This can cause `uacce_put_queue` within\n`uacce_fops_release` to access a NULL `ops` pointer. Therefore, add\nstate checks to prevent accessing freed pointers.(CVE-2026-23063)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen\n\ndvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the\nDVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which\nreinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.\n\nSince dmxdev-\u0026gt;dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the\nsame DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries\nfrom io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers\nwhile the list head is reset to {self, self}.\n\nThe waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly\ninitialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to\nreset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.\n\nReplace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct\nassignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which\nproperly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering\nwithout touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nregmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure\n\nregcache_maple_write() allocates a new block (\u0026apos;entry\u0026apos;) to merge\nadjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp().\nWhen mas_store_gfp() fails, the new \u0026apos;entry\u0026apos; remains allocated and\nis never freed, leaking memory.\n\nFree \u0026apos;entry\u0026apos; on the failure path; on success continue freeing the\nreplaced neighbor blocks (\u0026apos;lower\u0026apos;, \u0026apos;upper\u0026apos;).(CVE-2026-23260)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management\n\nAn unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by\nopening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by\npassing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the\nprivileged process to write to the interface.\n\nThis does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do\nthe write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is\nachieved full policy management is possible and all the possible\nimplications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or\ntarget applications by denying all execution, by-passing the\nunprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for\na local privilege escalation.\n\nThe policy management interface can not have its permissions simply\nchanged from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able\nto load policy to different policy namespaces.\n\nInstead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that\nare a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already\ndone via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate\naccess to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race\n\nMake sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all\npossible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running\nit with only preemption disabled.\n\nThis opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go\nand free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like\nthe BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmacvlan: observe an RCU grace period in macvlan_common_newlink() error path\n\nvalis reported that a race condition still happens after my prior patch.\n\nmacvlan_common_newlink() might have made @dev visible before\ndetecting an error, and its caller will directly call free_netdev(dev).\n\nWe must respect an RCU period, either in macvlan or the core networking\nstack.\n\nAfter adding a temporary mdelay(1000) in macvlan_forward_source_one()\nto open the race window, valis repro was:\n\nip link add p1 type veth peer p2\nip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1\nip link set up dev p1\nip link set up dev p2\nip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source\n\n(ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add\n00:00:00:00:00:20 \u0026amp;) ; sleep 0.5 ; ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4\nPING 1.2.3.4 (1.2.3.4): 56 data bytes\nRTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source\n(drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888016bb89c0 by task e/175\n\nCPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 175 Comm: e Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #33 NONE\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n\u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\ndump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)\nprint_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nkasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)\n? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nmacvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\n? tasklet_init (kernel/softirq.c:983)\nmacvlan_handle_frame (drivers/net/macvlan.c:501)\n\nAllocated by task 169:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\nkasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25\nmm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79)\n__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:419)\n__kvmalloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5657\nmm/slub.c:7140)\nalloc_netdev_mqs (net/core/dev.c:12012)\nrtnl_create_link (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3648)\nrtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3830 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957\nnet/core/rtnetlink.c:4072)\nrtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\nnetlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\nnetlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\nnetlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)\n__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)\n__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)\n\nFreed by task 169:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\nkasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25\nmm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79)\nkasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587)\n__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287)\nkfree (mm/slub.c:6674 mm/slub.c:6882)\nrtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3845 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957\nnet/core/rtnetlink.c:4072)\nrtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\nnetlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\nnetlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\nnetlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)\n__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)\n__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)(CVE-2026-23273)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0\n\nbigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting\nit.(CVE-2026-31447)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request\n\nIt is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a\nspecific report\u0026apos;s feature request using a completely different report\nID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty\nside-effects such as OOB writes.\n\nAdd a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the\none that was requested. If it doesn\u0026apos;t, omit reporting the raw event and\nreturn early.(CVE-2026-43047)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()\n\nThe memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of\nclearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming\ndata string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have\npreviously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in\nthe subsequent thread of execution.\n\nThe current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the\nmemset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not\nlarge enough to fill the associated report.\n\nSuggested-by Benjamin Tissoires \u0026lt;(CVE-2026-43048)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, there is a potential out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the ceph_handle_auth_reply() function of the libceph component. When processing messages of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY, the value of the payload_len field is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value, which causes the pointer address to be decremented and subsequently accessed because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation. The vulnerability is fixed by changing the data type of payload_len to u32 and introducing additional sanity checks.(CVE-2026-43407)",
"id": "OESA-2026-2417",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:11:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-22T11:11:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2417"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56611"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56760"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21908"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21931"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21970"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21971"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21980"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21981"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21986"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21995"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22001"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22009"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22071"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22077"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23138"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23157"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37740"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37748"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37766"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37768"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37770"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37771"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37778"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37793"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37805"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37815"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37831"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37844"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37853"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37881"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37889"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37905"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37918"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37947"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37967"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38014"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38037"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38043"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38051"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38064"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38113"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38122"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38123"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38131"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38148"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38161"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38183"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38193"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38194"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38241"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38255"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38304"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38307"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38321"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38344"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38364"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38461"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38462"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38488"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38499"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38552"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38575"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38609"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38721"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39676"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39702"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39728"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39756"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39770"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39812"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39841"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39894"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39937"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39955"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39980"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40018"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40062"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40078"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40136"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40240"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40254"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40280"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40281"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40331"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68283"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68284"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68285"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68304"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68740"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68742"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68795"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68820"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71064"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22976"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22994"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23053"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23056"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23063"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23253"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23260"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23268"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23271"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23273"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31447"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43047"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43048"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43407"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-56611",
"CVE-2024-56760",
"CVE-2025-21908",
"CVE-2025-21931",
"CVE-2025-21970",
"CVE-2025-21971",
"CVE-2025-21980",
"CVE-2025-21981",
"CVE-2025-21986",
"CVE-2025-21995",
"CVE-2025-22001",
"CVE-2025-22009",
"CVE-2025-22071",
"CVE-2025-22077",
"CVE-2025-23138",
"CVE-2025-23157",
"CVE-2025-37740",
"CVE-2025-37748",
"CVE-2025-37766",
"CVE-2025-37768",
"CVE-2025-37770",
"CVE-2025-37771",
"CVE-2025-37778",
"CVE-2025-37793",
"CVE-2025-37805",
"CVE-2025-37815",
"CVE-2025-37831",
"CVE-2025-37844",
"CVE-2025-37853",
"CVE-2025-37881",
"CVE-2025-37889",
"CVE-2025-37905",
"CVE-2025-37918",
"CVE-2025-37947",
"CVE-2025-37967",
"CVE-2025-38014",
"CVE-2025-38037",
"CVE-2025-38043",
"CVE-2025-38051",
"CVE-2025-38064",
"CVE-2025-38113",
"CVE-2025-38122",
"CVE-2025-38123",
"CVE-2025-38131",
"CVE-2025-38148",
"CVE-2025-38161",
"CVE-2025-38183",
"CVE-2025-38193",
"CVE-2025-38194",
"CVE-2025-38241",
"CVE-2025-38255",
"CVE-2025-38304",
"CVE-2025-38307",
"CVE-2025-38321",
"CVE-2025-38344",
"CVE-2025-38364",
"CVE-2025-38461",
"CVE-2025-38462",
"CVE-2025-38488",
"CVE-2025-38499",
"CVE-2025-38552",
"CVE-2025-38575",
"CVE-2025-38609",
"CVE-2025-38721",
"CVE-2025-39676",
"CVE-2025-39682",
"CVE-2025-39702",
"CVE-2025-39728",
"CVE-2025-39756",
"CVE-2025-39770",
"CVE-2025-39812",
"CVE-2025-39841",
"CVE-2025-39894",
"CVE-2025-39937",
"CVE-2025-39955",
"CVE-2025-39980",
"CVE-2025-40018",
"CVE-2025-40062",
"CVE-2025-40078",
"CVE-2025-40136",
"CVE-2025-40240",
"CVE-2025-40254",
"CVE-2025-40280",
"CVE-2025-40281",
"CVE-2025-40331",
"CVE-2025-68283",
"CVE-2025-68284",
"CVE-2025-68285",
"CVE-2025-68304",
"CVE-2025-68740",
"CVE-2025-68742",
"CVE-2025-68795",
"CVE-2025-68820",
"CVE-2025-71064",
"CVE-2026-22976",
"CVE-2026-22994",
"CVE-2026-23053",
"CVE-2026-23056",
"CVE-2026-23063",
"CVE-2026-23253",
"CVE-2026-23260",
"CVE-2026-23268",
"CVE-2026-23271",
"CVE-2026-23273",
"CVE-2026-31447",
"CVE-2026-43047",
"CVE-2026-43048",
"CVE-2026-43407"
]
}
OESA-2026-2418 (CVE-2024-56611)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-05-22 11:11 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:11 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MMWe currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn ttrue.So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-referenceNULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.This fixes the report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194Code: ...RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400Call Trace: <TASK> kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7fakpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully
Alexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a RISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2
RISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement the legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.
That warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent domain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X, which has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only valid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply return -ENOTSUPP.
Loongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support without implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations which return an error, so the problem was papered over.
Correct pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add the missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.(CVE-2024-56760)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: fix nfs_release_folio() to not deadlock via kcompactd writeback
Add PF_KCOMPACTD flag and current_is_kcompactd() helper to check for it so nfs_release_folio() can skip calling nfs_wb_folio() from kcompactd.
Otherwise NFS can deadlock waiting for kcompactd enduced writeback which recurses back to NFS (which triggers writeback to NFSD via NFS loopback mount on the same host, NFSD blocks waiting for XFS's call to __filemap_get_folio):
6070.550357] INFO: task kcompactd0:58 blocked for more than 4435 seconds.
{--- [58] "kcompactd0" [<0>] folio_wait_bit+0xe8/0x200 [<0>] folio_wait_writeback+0x2b/0x80 [<0>] nfs_wb_folio+0x80/0x1b0 [nfs] [<0>] nfs_release_folio+0x68/0x130 [nfs] [<0>] split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x362/0x840 [<0>] migrate_pages_batch+0x43d/0xb90 [<0>] migrate_pages_sync+0x9a/0x240 [<0>] migrate_pages+0x93c/0x9f0 [<0>] compact_zone+0x8e2/0x1030 [<0>] compact_node+0xdb/0x120 [<0>] kcompactd+0x121/0x2e0 [<0>] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [<0>] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 [<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 ---}
[(CVE-2025-21908)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
Commit b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.
Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:
------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c Call trace: try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P) try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L) rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8 rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58 try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90 unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8 do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568 offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670 memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374 memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78 device_offline+0xa4/0xd0 state_store+0x8c/0xf0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---(CVE-2025-21931)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check
When removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is triggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the offloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns false if one of PF is unloaded. In such case, mlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of the alive PF, and the flush is skipped.
Besides, the bridge fdb entry's lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge event handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be ignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted, and the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.
To make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue keeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge notifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond netdev which is already destroyed.
To fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in commit 15f8f168952f ("net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding bond to bridge"), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes invalid state after initialization.
Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 <4c> 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0 RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60 ? die+0x38/0x60 ? do_trap+0x10b/0x120 ? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0 ? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50 ? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30 ? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge] ? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390 notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core] mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core] process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390 worker_thread+0x106/0x250 ? bh_worker+0x110/0x110 kthread+0xb7/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK>(CVE-2025-21970)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: Prevent creation of classes with TC_H_ROOT
The function qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() uses TC_H_ROOT as a termination condition when traversing up the qdisc tree to update parent backlog counters. However, if a class is created with classid TC_H_ROOT, the traversal terminates prematurely at this class instead of reaching the actual root qdisc, causing parent statistics to be incorrectly maintained. In case of DRR, this could lead to a crash as reported by Mingi Cho.
Prevent the creation of any Qdisc class with classid TC_H_ROOT (0xFFFFFFFF) across all qdisc types, as suggested by Jamal.(CVE-2025-21971)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched: address a potential NULL pointer dereference in the GRED scheduler.
If kzalloc in gred_init returns a NULL pointer, the code follows the error handling path, invoking gred_destroy. This, in turn, calls gred_offload, where memset could receive a NULL pointer as input, potentially leading to a kernel crash.
When table->opt is NULL in gred_init(), gred_change_table_def() is not called yet, so it is not necessary to call ->ndo_setup_tc() in gred_offload().(CVE-2025-21980)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset
Fix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by adding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while configuring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases: - as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and - as part of reset handling
However, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory allocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated resources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:
[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192): comm "kworker/0:0", pid 8, jiffies 4296833052 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 0): [<ffffffff991ec485>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340 [<ffffffffc0a6e06a>] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice] [<ffffffffc09f1027>] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice] [<ffffffffc09f244b>] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice] [<ffffffffc09c2131>] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice] [<ffffffffc09c64af>] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice] [<ffffffff994fbcd3>] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0 [<ffffffff98f07103>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffff98f0b6d9>] process_one_work+0x179/0x390 [<ffffffff98f0c1e9>] worker_thread+0x239/0x340 [<ffffffff98f14abc>] kthread+0xcc/0x100 [<ffffffff98e45a6d>] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [<ffffffff98e083ba>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 ...(CVE-2025-21981)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: switchdev: Convert blocking notification chain to a raw one
A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.
In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].
Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().
Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain. Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in the future.
Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process context and listeners are allowed to block.
[1]: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted
ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
but task is already holding lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);
*** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by ip/52731: #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0 #1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0 #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
stack backtrace: ... ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340 switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0 switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340 br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge] br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge] notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0 switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0 ...(CVE-2025-21986)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sched: Fix fence reference count leak
The last_scheduled fence leaks when an entity is being killed and adding the cleanup callback fails.
Decrement the reference count of prev when dma_fence_add_callback() fails, ensuring proper balance.
phasta: add git tag info for stable kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Fix integer overflow in qaic_validate_req()
These are u64 variables that come from the user via qaic_attach_slice_bo_ioctl(). Use check_add_overflow() to ensure that the math doesn't have an integer wrapping bug.(CVE-2025-22001)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: dummy: force synchronous probing
Sometimes I get a NULL pointer dereference at boot time in kobject_get() with the following call stack:
anatop_regulator_probe() devm_regulator_register() regulator_register() regulator_resolve_supply() kobject_get()
By placing some extra BUG_ON() statements I could verify that this is raised because probing of the 'dummy' regulator driver is not completed ('dummy_regulator_rdev' is still NULL).
In the JTAG debugger I can see that dummy_regulator_probe() and anatop_regulator_probe() can be run by different kernel threads (kworker/u4:*). I haven't further investigated whether this can be changed or if there are other possibilities to force synchronization between these two probe routines. On the other hand I don't expect much boot time penalty by probing the 'dummy' regulator synchronously.(CVE-2025-22009)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spufs: fix a leak in spufs_create_context()
Leak fixes back in 2008 missed one case - if we are trying to set affinity and spufs_mkdir() fails, we need to drop the reference to neighbor.(CVE-2025-22071)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod"
This reverts commit e9f2517a3e18a54a3943c098d2226b245d488801.
Commit e9f2517a3e18 ("smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod") is intended to fix a null-ptr-deref in LOCKDEP, which is mentioned as CVE-2024-54680, but is actually did not fix anything; The issue can be reproduced on top of it. [0]
Also, it reverted the change by commit ef7134c7fc48 ("smb: client: Fix use-after-free of network namespace.") and introduced a real issue by reviving the kernel TCP socket.
When a reconnect happens for a CIFS connection, the socket state transitions to FIN_WAIT_1. Then, inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() in tcp_close() stops all timers for the socket.
If an incoming FIN packet is lost, the socket will stay at FIN_WAIT_1 forever, and such sockets could be leaked up to net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans.
Usually, FIN can be retransmitted by the peer, but if the peer aborts the connection, the issue comes into reality.
I warned about this privately by pointing out the exact report [1], but the bogus fix was finally merged.
So, we should not stop the timers to finally kill the connection on our side in that case, meaning we must not use a kernel socket for TCP whose sk->sk_net_refcnt is 0.
The kernel socket does not have a reference to its netns to make it possible to tear down netns without cleaning up every resource in it.
For example, tunnel devices use a UDP socket internally, but we can destroy netns without removing such devices and let it complete during exit. Otherwise, netns would be leaked when the last application died.
However, this is problematic for TCP sockets because TCP has timers to close the connection gracefully even after the socket is close()d. The lifetime of the socket and its netns is different from the lifetime of the underlying connection.
If the socket user does not maintain the netns lifetime, the timer could be fired after the socket is close()d and its netns is freed up, resulting in use-after-free.
Actually, we have seen so many similar issues and converted such sockets to have a reference to netns.
That's why I converted the CIFS client socket to have a reference to netns (sk->sk_net_refcnt == 1), which is somehow mentioned as out-of-scope of CIFS and technically wrong in e9f2517a3e18, but is in-scope and right fix.
Regarding the LOCKDEP issue, we can prevent the module unload by bumping the module refcount when switching the LOCKDDEP key in sock_lock_init_class_and_name(). [2]
For a while, let's revert the bogus fix.
Note that now we can use sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for the socket conversion, but I'll do so later separately to make backport easy.(CVE-2025-22077)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: fix pipe accounting mismatch
Currently, watch_queue_set_size() modifies the pipe buffers charged to user->pipe_bufs without updating the pipe->nr_accounted on the pipe itself, due to the if (!pipe_has_watch_queue()) test in pipe_resize_ring(). This means that when the pipe is ultimately freed, we decrement user->pipe_bufs by something other than what than we had charged to it, potentially leading to an underflow. This in turn can cause subsequent too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() tests to fail with -EPERM.
To remedy this, explicitly account for the pipe usage in watch_queue_set_size() to match the number set via account_pipe_buffers()
(It's unclear why watch_queue_set_size() does not update nr_accounted; it may be due to intentional overprovisioning in watch_queue_set_size()?)(CVE-2025-23138)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access
There is a possibility that init_codecs is invoked multiple times during manipulated payload from video firmware. In such case, if codecs_count can get incremented to value more than MAX_CODEC_NUM, there can be OOB access. Reset the count so that it always starts from beginning.(CVE-2025-23157)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: add sanity check for agwidth in dbMount
The width in dmapctl of the AG is zero, it trigger a divide error when calculating the control page level in dbAllocAG.
To avoid this issue, add a check for agwidth in dbAllocAG.(CVE-2025-37740)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/mediatek: Fix NULL pointer deference in mtk_iommu_device_group
Currently, mtk_iommu calls during probe iommu_device_register before the hw_list from driver data is initialized. Since iommu probing issue fix, it leads to NULL pointer dereference in mtk_iommu_device_group when hw_list is accessed with list_first_entry (not null safe).
So, change the call order to ensure iommu_device_register is called after the driver data are initialized.(CVE-2025-37748)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37766)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37768)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37770)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero
The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37771)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix dangling pointer in krb_authenticate
krb_authenticate frees sess->user and does not set the pointer to NULL. It calls ksmbd_krb5_authenticate to reinitialise sess->user but that function may return without doing so. If that happens then smb2_sess_setup, which calls krb_authenticate, will be accessing free'd memory when it later uses sess->user.(CVE-2025-37778)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Fix null-ptr-deref in avs_component_probe()
devm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently, avs_component_probe() does not check for this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37793)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sound/virtio: Fix cancel_sync warnings on uninitialized work_structs
Betty reported hitting the following warning:
[ 8.709131][ T221] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 221 at kernel/workqueue.c:4182 ... [ 8.713282][ T221] Call trace: [ 8.713365][ T221] __flush_work+0x8d0/0x914 [ 8.713468][ T221] __cancel_work_sync+0xac/0xfc [ 8.713570][ T221] cancel_work_sync+0x24/0x34 [ 8.713667][ T221] virtsnd_remove+0xa8/0xf8 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276] [ 8.713868][ T221] virtsnd_probe+0x48c/0x664 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276] [ 8.714035][ T221] virtio_dev_probe+0x28c/0x390 [ 8.714139][ T221] really_probe+0x1bc/0x4c8 ...
It seems we're hitting the error path in virtsnd_probe(), which triggers a virtsnd_remove() which iterates over the substreams calling cancel_work_sync() on the elapsed_period work_struct.
Looking at the code, from earlier in: virtsnd_probe()->virtsnd_build_devs()->virtsnd_pcm_parse_cfg()
We set snd->nsubstreams, allocate the snd->substreams, and if we then hit an error on the info allocation or something in virtsnd_ctl_query_info() fails, we will exit without having initialized the elapsed_period work_struct.
When that error path unwinds we then call virtsnd_remove() which as long as the substreams array is allocated, will iterate through calling cancel_work_sync() on the uninitialized work struct hitting this warning.
Takashi Iwai suggested this fix, which initializes the substreams structure right after allocation, so that if we hit the error paths we avoid trying to cleanup uninitialized data.
Note: I have not yet managed to reproduce the issue myself, so this patch has had limited testing.
Feedback or thoughts would be appreciated!(CVE-2025-37805)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Fix Kernel panic during IRQ handler registration
Resolve kernel panic while accessing IRQ handler associated with the generated IRQ. This is done by acquiring the spinlock and storing the current interrupt state before handling the interrupt request using generic_handle_irq.
A previous fix patch was submitted where 'generic_handle_irq' was replaced with 'handle_nested_irq'. However, this change also causes the kernel panic where after determining which GPIO triggered the interrupt and attempting to call handle_nested_irq with the mapped IRQ number, leads to a failure in locating the registered handler.(CVE-2025-37815)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: apple-soc: Fix null-ptr-deref in apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate()
cpufreq_cpu_get_raw() can return NULL when the target CPU is not present in the policy->cpus mask. apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate() does not check for this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37831)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: avoid NULL pointer dereference in dbg call
cifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so move call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37844)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: debugfs hang_hws skip GPU with MES
debugfs hang_hws is used by GPU reset test with HWS, for MES this crash the kernel with NULL pointer access because dqm->packet_mgr is not setup for MES path.
Skip GPU with MES for now, MES hang_hws debugfs interface will be supported later.(CVE-2025-37853)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: aspeed: Add NULL pointer check in ast_vhub_init_dev()
The variable d->name, returned by devm_kasprintf(), could be NULL. A pointer check is added to prevent potential NULL pointer dereference. This is similar to the fix in commit 3027e7b15b02 ("ice: Fix some null pointer dereference issues in ice_ptp.c").
This issue is found by our static analysis tool(CVE-2025-37881)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value
This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates.
There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use this interpretation of platform_max.
Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.(CVE-2025-37889)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Balance device refcount when destroying devices
Using device_find_child() to lookup the proper SCMI device to destroy causes an unbalance in device refcount, since device_find_child() calls an implicit get_device(): this, in turns, inhibits the call of the provided release methods upon devices destruction.
As a consequence, one of the structures that is not freed properly upon destruction is the internal struct device_private dev->p populated by the drivers subsystem core.
KMemleak detects this situation since loading/unloding some SCMI driver causes related devices to be created/destroyed without calling any device_release method.
unreferenced object 0xffff00000f583800 (size 512): comm "insmod", pid 227, jiffies 4294912190 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N.......... ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 60 36 1d 8a 00 80 ff ff ........`6...... backtrace (crc 114e2eed): kmemleak_alloc+0xbc/0xd8 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2dc/0x398 device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_register+0x28/0x40 __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x1bc/0x380 scmi_device_create+0x2d0/0x390 scmi_create_protocol_devices+0x74/0xf8 scmi_device_request_notifier+0x1f8/0x2a8 notifier_call_chain+0x110/0x3b0 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xb0 scmi_driver_register+0x350/0x7f0 0xffff80000a3b3038 do_one_initcall+0x12c/0x730 do_init_module+0x1dc/0x640 load_module+0x4b20/0x5b70 init_module_from_file+0xec/0x158
$ ./scripts/faddr2line ./vmlinux device_add+0x954/0x12d0 device_add+0x954/0x12d0: kmalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:901 (inlined by) kzalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:1037 (inlined by) device_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3510 (inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3561
Balance device refcount by issuing a put_device() on devices found via device_find_child().(CVE-2025-37905)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()
A NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a QCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).
[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)
[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth] [ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80
The issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump packet is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly forwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on success). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or btusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it to hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.
Later, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump queue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by: 1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno on failure, consistent with kernel conventions. 2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL and event packets for better structure and readability.
This ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding double handling and preventing NULL pointer access.(CVE-2025-37918)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds stream writes by validating *pos
ksmbd_vfs_stream_write() did not validate whether the write offset (pos) was within the bounds of the existing stream data length (v_len). If pos was greater than or equal to v_len, this could lead to an out-of-bounds memory write.
This patch adds a check to ensure *pos is less than v_len before proceeding. If the condition fails, -EINVAL is returned.(CVE-2025-37947)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: displayport: Fix deadlock
This patch introduces the ucsi_con_mutex_lock / ucsi_con_mutex_unlock functions to the UCSI driver. ucsi_con_mutex_lock ensures the connector mutex is only locked if a connection is established and the partner pointer is valid. This resolves a deadlock scenario where ucsi_displayport_remove_partner holds con->mutex waiting for dp_altmode_work to complete while dp_altmode_work attempts to acquire it.(CVE-2025-37967)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Refactor remove call with idxd_cleanup() helper
The idxd_cleanup() helper cleans up perfmon, interrupts, internals and so on. Refactor remove call with the idxd_cleanup() helper to avoid code duplication. Note, this also fixes the missing put_device() for idxd groups, enginces and wqs.(CVE-2025-38014)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Annotate FDB data races
The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2].
Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE().
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit
write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
[2] #!/bin/bash
set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan
ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q &(CVE-2025-38037)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Set dma_mask for ffa devices
Set dma_mask for FFA devices, otherwise DMA allocation using the device pointer lead to following warning:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:597 dma_alloc_attrs+0xe0/0x124(CVE-2025-38043)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent
There is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may access the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the following KASAN warning.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x640 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8 RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000 </TASK>
Allocated by task 408: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0 mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0 cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs] allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs] kthread+0x394/0x720 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 342979: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50 kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500 cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000 which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588 The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ==================================================================
POC is available in the link [1].
The problem triggering process is as follows:
Process 1 Process 2
---truncated---(CVE-2025-38051)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: break and reset virtio devices on device_shutdown()
Hongyu reported a hang on kexec in a VM. QEMU reported invalid memory accesses during the hang.
Invalid read at addr 0x102877002, size 2, region '(null)', reason: rejected
Invalid write at addr 0x102877A44, size 2, region '(null)', reason: rejected
...
It was traced down to virtio-console. Kexec works fine if virtio-console is not in use.
The issue is that virtio-console continues to write to the MMIO even after underlying virtio-pci device is reset.
Additionally, Eric noticed that IOMMUs are reset before devices, if devices are not reset on shutdown they continue to poke at guest memory and get errors from the IOMMU. Some devices get wedged then.
The problem can be solved by breaking all virtio devices on virtio bus shutdown, then resetting them.(CVE-2025-38064)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: CPPC: Fix NULL pointer dereference when nosmp is used
With nosmp in cmdline, other CPUs are not brought up, leaving their cpc_desc_ptr NULL. CPU0's iteration via for_each_possible_cpu() dereferences these NULL pointers, causing panic.
Panic backtrace:
[ 0.401123] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000b8 ... [ 0.403255] [<ffffffff809a5818>] cppc_allow_fast_switch+0x6a/0xd4 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init!
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: add missing NULL check for gve_alloc_pending_packet() in TX DQO
gve_alloc_pending_packet() can return NULL, but gve_tx_add_skb_dqo() did not check for this case before dereferencing the returned pointer.
Add a missing NULL check to prevent a potential NULL pointer dereference when allocation fails.
This improves robustness in low-memory scenarios.(CVE-2025-38122)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: Fix napi rx poll issue
When driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might have been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect operation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in polling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0 ? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] ? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170 t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] net_rx_action+0x103/0x470 irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90 </IRQ>(CVE-2025-38123)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: prevent deactivate active config while enabling the config
While enable active config via cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config(), active config could be deactivated via configfs' sysfs interface. This could make UAF issue in below scenario:
CPU0 CPU1 (sysfs enable) load module cscfg_load_config_sets() activate config. // sysfs (sys_active_cnt == 1) ... cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config() lock(csdev->cscfg_csdev_lock) // here load config activate by CPU1 unlock(csdev->cscfg_csdev_lock)
deactivate config // sysfs
(sys_activec_cnt == 0)
cscfg_unload_config_sets()
unload module
// access to config_desc which freed // while unloading module. cscfg_csdev_enable_config
To address this, use cscfg_config_desc's active_cnt as a reference count which will be holded when - activate the config. - enable the activated config. and put the module reference when config_active_cnt == 0.(CVE-2025-38131)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping
Fix memory leak when running one-step timestamping. When running one-step sync timestamping, the HW is configured to insert the TX time into the frame, so there is no reason to keep the skb anymore. As in this case the HW will never generate an interrupt to say that the frame was timestamped, then the frame will never released. Fix this by freeing the frame in case of one-step timestamping.(CVE-2025-38148)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error flow upon firmware failure for RQ destruction
Upon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the last resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned regardless of the failure.
Now properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.
In order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the object again, which results in the following kernel trace: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE) CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 sp : ffff80008b81b7e0 x29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00 x23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78 x11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff x5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600 Call trace: refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib] ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs] __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs] __fput+0xd8/0x2f0 __fput_sync+0x50/0x70 __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8(CVE-2025-38161)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()
Before calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the 'channel' value is checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8). This seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register (PTP_INT_STS) specifications.
However, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp->extts[] with only LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index:
lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...)
{
...
/* Update Local timestamp */
extts = &ptp->extts[channel];
extts->ts.tv_sec = sec;
...
}
To avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO inputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8.
Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace.(CVE-2025-38183)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period
Gerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet, and this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.
We want to make sure ctl->perturb_period * HZ will not overflow and is positive.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value tc -s -d qd sh dev lo qdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0(CVE-2025-38193)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary
Syzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault injection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn't check return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any error propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls jffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated node.
kernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592 Call Trace: <TASK> jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline] jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874 jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388 jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197 jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362 jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301 generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856 __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973 generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950 splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Fix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs before calling jffs2_sum_write_data.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-38194)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem, swap: fix softlockup with mTHP swapin
Following softlockup can be easily reproduced on my test machine with:
echo always > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hugepages-64kB/enabled swapon /dev/zram0 # zram0 is a 48G swap device mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test echo 1G > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/memory.max echo $BASHPID > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.procs while true; do dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/test.img bs=1M count=5120 cat /tmp/test.img > /dev/null rm /tmp/test.img done
Then after a while: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 763s! [cat:5787] Modules linked in: zram virtiofs CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5787 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G L 6.15.0.orig-gf3021d9246bc-dirty #118 PREEMPT(voluntary)· Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:mpol_shared_policy_lookup+0xd/0x70 Code: e9 b8 b4 ff ff 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 1f 48 85 db 74 41 4c 8d 67 08 48 89 fb 48 89 f5 4c 89 e7 e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002b1fc28 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 00000000001c20ca RBX: 0000000000724e1e RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffff888118e214c8 RSI: 0000000000057d42 RDI: ffff888118e21518 RBP: 000000000002bec8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000bf4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00000000001c20ca R14: 00000000001c20ca R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03f995c740(0000) GS:ffff88a07ad9a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f03f98f1000 CR3: 0000000144626004 CR4: 0000000000770eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> shmem_alloc_folio+0x31/0xc0 shmem_swapin_folio+0x309/0xcf0 ? filemap_get_entry+0x117/0x1e0 ? xas_load+0xd/0xb0 ? filemap_get_entry+0x101/0x1e0 shmem_get_folio_gfp+0x2ed/0x5b0 shmem_file_read_iter+0x7f/0x2e0 vfs_read+0x252/0x330 ksys_read+0x68/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f03f9a46991 Code: 00 48 8b 15 81 14 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8 20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 97 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec RSP: 002b:00007fff3c52bd28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007f03f9a46991 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f03f98ba000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff3c52bd50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f03f9b9a380 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 R13: 00007f03f98ba000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK>
The reason is simple, readahead brought some order 0 folio in swap cache, and the swapin mTHP folio being allocated is in conflict with it, so swapcache_prepare fails and causes shmem_swap_alloc_folio to return -EEXIST, and shmem simply retries again and again causing this loop.
Fix it by applying a similar fix for anon mTHP swapin.
The performance change is very slight, time of swapin 10g zero folios with shmem (test for 12 times): Before: 2.47s After: 2.48s
[(CVE-2025-38241)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/group_cpus: fix NULL pointer dereference from group_cpus_evenly()
While testing null_blk with configfs, echo 0 > poll_queues will trigger following panic:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 920 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.15.0-02023-gadbdb95c8696-dirty #1238 PREEMPT(undef) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__bitmap_or+0x48/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> __group_cpus_evenly+0x822/0x8c0 group_cpus_evenly+0x2d9/0x490 blk_mq_map_queues+0x1e/0x110 null_map_queues+0xc9/0x170 [null_blk] blk_mq_update_queue_map+0xdb/0x160 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x22b/0x560 nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk] nullb_device_poll_queues_store+0xa4/0x130 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0x109/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x26e/0x6f0 ksys_write+0x79/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x45c4/0x45f0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Root cause is that numgrps is set to 0, and ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kcalloc(), and later ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be deferenced.
Fix the problem by checking numgrps first in group_cpus_evenly(), and return NULL directly if numgrps is zero.
[(CVE-2025-38255)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data
The len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot be used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA.(CVE-2025-38304)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Verify content returned by parse_int_array()
The first element of the returned array stores its length. If it is 0, any manipulation beyond the element at index 0 ends with null-ptr-deref.(CVE-2025-38307)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: Log an error when close_all_cached_dirs fails
Under low-memory conditions, close_all_cached_dirs() can't move the dentries to a separate list to dput() them once the locks are dropped. This will result in a "Dentry still in use" error, so add an error message that makes it clear this is what happened:
[ 495.281119] CIFS: VFS: \otters.example.com\share Out of memory while dropping dentries [ 495.281595] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 495.281887] BUG: Dentry ffff888115531138{i=78,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs] [ 495.282391] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2329 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xc8/0xf0
Also, bail out of looping through all tcons as soon as a single allocation fails, since we're already in trouble, and kmalloc() attempts for subseqeuent tcons are likely to fail just like the first one did.(CVE-2025-38321)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
ACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows: [ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10 [ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.361873] Call Trace: [ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and “Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-parse_ext” cache were leaked using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows: [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.372000] Call Trace: [ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b [ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.392000] Call Trace: [ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x3 ---truncated---(CVE-2025-38344)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
maple_tree: fix MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag in mas_preallocate()
Temporarily clear the preallocation flag when explicitly requesting allocations. Pre-existing allocations are already counted against the request through mas_node_count_gfp(), but the allocations will not happen if the MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag is set. This flag is meant to avoid re-allocating in bulk allocation mode, and to detect issues with preallocation calculations.
The MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag should also always be set on zero allocations so that detection of underflow allocations will print a WARN_ON() during consumption.
User visible effect of this flaw is a WARN_ON() followed by a null pointer dereference when subsequent requests for larger number of nodes is ignored, such as the vma merge retry in mmap_region() caused by drivers altering the vma flags (which happens in v6.6, at least)(CVE-2025-38364)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport(); add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600 Call Trace: vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40 __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100 __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38461)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU
vsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload. transport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.
Introduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential null-ptr-deref.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90 Call Trace: __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720 vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0 Call Trace: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38462)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto
The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous. However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause use-after-free crashes:
crypt_message() // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);
// Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
// Free creq while async operation is still in progress
kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);
Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS, the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(), the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes when the driver later accesses the freed memory.
This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.
The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask, async implementations can be selected.
Fix by restoring the async crypto handling: - DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking - aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification - crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion
This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the CVE-2024-50047 fix.(CVE-2025-38488)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.(CVE-2025-38499)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation
We have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between subflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to trigger.
The solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition 'socket state prevent any additional subflow creation' protected by the fallback lock.
The socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending an MP_FAIL option.
The field 'allow_infinite_fallback' is now always touched under the relevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write.(CVE-2025-38552)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use aead_request_free to match aead_request_alloc
Use aead_request_free() instead of kfree() to properly free memory allocated by aead_request_alloc(). This ensures sensitive crypto data is zeroed before being freed.(CVE-2025-38575)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM / devfreq: Check governor before using governor->name
Commit 96ffcdf239de ("PM / devfreq: Remove redundant governor_name from struct devfreq") removes governor_name and uses governor->name to replace it. But devfreq->governor may be NULL and directly using devfreq->governor->name may cause null pointer exception. Move the check of governor to before using governor->name.(CVE-2025-38609)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump
There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table(): if (res < 0) { nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct; ...
While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last. If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented. This 2nd increment is never undone.
This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.
This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.
This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop. It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.
One fix would to change this to: if (res < 0) { if (ct != last) nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place. We can just store a cookie value instead.
A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table, it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.(CVE-2025-38721)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference
The qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error, but qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error pointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers to NULL.(CVE-2025-39676)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.(CVE-2025-39682)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this.(CVE-2025-39702)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: samsung: Fix UBSAN panic in samsung_clk_init()
With UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I'm hitting the below panic due to
dereferencing ctx->clk_data.hws before setting
ctx->clk_data.num = nr_clks. Move that up to fix the crash.
UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP <snip> Call trace: samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P) samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L) samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0 exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64 __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60 ...(CVE-2025-39728)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: Prevent file descriptor table allocations exceeding INT_MAX
When sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816 as set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near the limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed INT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288
This happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the requested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is not flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.
Specifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a process calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate: - File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes - Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB - Total allocation size: > 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)
Reproducer: 1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816: # echo 1073741816 > /proc/sys/fs/nr_open
- Run a program that uses a high file descriptor: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/resource.h>
int main() { struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824}; setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim); dup2(2, 1073741880); // Triggers the warning return 0; }
- Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027
systemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the maximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory control groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits since memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked that:
- The kernel's allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum size regardless of memcg accounting
- Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can inadvertently trigger massive allocations
- The resulting allocations (>8GB) are impractical and will always fail
systemd's algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value until the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open being set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file descriptors.
While processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal operation, certain selftests (like tools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file descriptor limits can trigger this issue.
Fix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested allocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to fail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the impractical >8GB memory allocation request.(CVE-2025-39756)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: Forbid IPv6 TSO with extensions on devices with only IPV6_CSUM
When performing Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) on an IPv6 packet that contains extension headers, the kernel incorrectly requests checksum offload if the egress device only advertises NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM feature, which has a strict contract: it supports checksum offload only for plain TCP or UDP over IPv6 and explicitly does not support packets with extension headers. The current GSO logic violates this contract by failing to disable the feature for packets with extension headers, such as those used in GREoIPv6 tunnels.
This violation results in the device being asked to perform an operation
it cannot support, leading to a skb_warn_bad_offload warning and a collapse
of network throughput. While device TSO/USO is correctly bypassed in favor
of software GSO for these packets, the GSO stack must be explicitly told not
to request checksum offload.
Mask NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, NETIF_F_TSO6 and NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4 in gso_features_check if the IPv6 header contains extension headers to compute checksum in software.
The exception is a BIG TCP extension, which, as stated in commit 68e068cabd2c6c53 ("net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets"): "The feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO. The header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump, and not transmitted by physical devices."
kernel log output (truncated): WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5273 at net/core/dev.c:3535 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x81/0x140 ... Call Trace: <TASK> skb_checksum_help+0x12a/0x1f0 validate_xmit_skb+0x1a3/0x2d0 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4f/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a2/0x380 __dev_xmit_skb+0x242/0x670 __dev_queue_xmit+0x3fc/0x7f0 ip6_finish_output2+0x25e/0x5d0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_tnl_xmit+0x608/0xc00 [ip6_tunnel] ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x1c0/0x390 [ip6_gre] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x63/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d0/0x7f0 ip6_finish_output2+0x214/0x5d0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0 ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0 ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0 inet6_csk_xmit+0xeb/0x150 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x555/0xa80 tcp_write_xmit+0x32a/0xe90 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x437/0x1110 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 ... skb linear: 00000000: e4 3d 1a 7d ec 30 e4 3d 1a 7e 5d 90 86 dd 60 0e skb linear: 00000010: 00 0a 1b 34 3c 40 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 11 2f 00 04 01 04 01 01 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000040: 86 dd 60 0e 00 0a 1b 00 06 40 20 23 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 23 00 00 00 00 skb linear: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 bf 96 14 51 13 f9 skb linear: 00000070: ae 27 a0 a8 2b e3 80 18 00 40 5b 6f 00 00 01 01 skb linear: 00000080: 08 0a 42 d4 50 d5 4b 70 f8 1a(CVE-2025-39770)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: initialize more fields in sctp_v6_from_sk()
syzbot found that sin6_scope_id was not properly initialized, leading to undefined behavior.
Clear sin6_scope_id and sin6_flowinfo.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649 __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649 sctp_inet6_cmp_addr+0x4f2/0x510 net/sctp/ipv6.c:983 sctp_bind_addr_conflict+0x22a/0x3b0 net/sctp/bind_addr.c:390 sctp_get_port_local+0x21eb/0x2440 net/sctp/socket.c:8452 sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline] sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x710/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline] __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930 x64_sys_call+0x271d/0x3e20 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:51 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable addr.i.i created at: sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8515 [inline] sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline] sctp_inet_listen+0x650/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636 __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline] __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline] __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline] __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930(CVE-2025-39812)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix buffer free/clear order in deferred receive path
Fix a use-after-free window by correcting the buffer release sequence in the deferred receive path. The code freed the RQ buffer first and only then cleared the context pointer under the lock. Concurrent paths (e.g., ABTS and the repost path) also inspect and release the same pointer under the lock, so the old order could lead to double-free/UAF.
Note that the repost path already uses the correct pattern: detach the pointer under the lock, then free it after dropping the lock. The deferred path should do the same.(CVE-2025-39841)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm
When send a broadcast packet to a tap device, which was added to a bridge, br_nf_local_in() is called to confirm the conntrack. If another conntrack with the same hash value is added to the hash table, which can be triggered by a normal packet to a non-bridge device, the below warning may happen.
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 96 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:632 br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 96 Comm: tap_send Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200 Call Trace: <TASK> nf_hook_slow+0x3e/0xf0 br_pass_frame_up+0x103/0x180 br_handle_frame_finish+0x2de/0x5b0 br_nf_hook_thresh+0xc0/0x120 br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x168/0x3a0 br_nf_pre_routing+0x237/0x5e0 br_handle_frame+0x1ec/0x3c0 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x225/0x1210 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x37/0xa0 netif_receive_skb+0x36/0x160 tun_get_user+0xa54/0x10c0 tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0 vfs_write+0x305/0x410 ksys_write+0x60/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To solve the hash conflict, nf_ct_resolve_clash() try to merge the conntracks, and update skb->_nfct. However, br_nf_local_in() still use the old ct from local variable 'nfct' after confirm(), which leads to this warning.
If confirm() does not insert the conntrack entry and return NF_DROP, the warning may also occur. There is no need to reserve the WARN_ON_ONCE, just remove it.(CVE-2025-39894)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer
Since commit 7d5e9737efda ("net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from device property") rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly uninitialized "const char *type_name;" local variable.
On x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a "BCM4752" or "LNV4752" acpi_device, the rfkill->type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id:
rfkill->type = (unsigned)id->driver_data;
and there is no "type" property so device_property_read_string() will fail and leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash.
rfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash by initializing type_name to NULL.
Note likely sofar this has not been caught because:
- Not many x86 machines actually have a "BCM4752"/"LNV4752" acpi_device
- The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored(CVE-2025-39937)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().
syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]
syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before the TFO socket completes 3WHS:
- accept()
- connect(AF_UNSPEC)
- connect() to another destination
As of accept(), sk->sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.
Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk, the retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not retransmitted.
Let's call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().
[0]: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7)) Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017 RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400 RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8 R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540 R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372) timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135) tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035) __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1)) tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096) handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35)) </IRQ>(CVE-2025-39955)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group
The kernel forbids the creation of non-FDB nexthop groups with FDB nexthops:
# ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.1 fdb # ip nexthop add id 2 group 1 Error: Non FDB nexthop group cannot have fdb nexthops.
And vice versa:
# ip nexthop add id 3 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 4 group 3 fdb Error: FDB nexthop group can only have fdb nexthops.
However, as long as no routes are pointing to a non-FDB nexthop group, the kernel allows changing the type of a nexthop from FDB to non-FDB and vice versa:
# ip nexthop add id 5 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 6 group 5 # ip nexthop replace id 5 via 192.0.2.2 fdb # echo $? 0
This configuration is invalid and can result in a NPD [1] since FDB nexthops are not associated with a nexthop device:
# ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 6 # ping 198.51.100.1
Fix by preventing nexthop FDB status change while the nexthop is in a group:
# ip nexthop add id 7 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 # ip nexthop add id 8 group 7 # ip nexthop replace id 7 via 192.0.2.2 fdb Error: Cannot change nexthop FDB status while in a group.
[1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0 [...] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 367 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6-virtme-gb65678cacc03 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_lookup_good_nhc+0x1e/0x80 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> fib_table_lookup+0x541/0x650 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2ea/0x970 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x55/0x80 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x250/0x330 udp_connect+0x2b/0x60 __sys_connect+0x9c/0xd0 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-39980)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup
On the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp before connections with valid cp->app pointers are flushed, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by introducing a global exiting_module flag, set to true in
ip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In
__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns
cleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to
__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections
are flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp
immediately.(CVE-2025-40018)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm->debug.qm_diff_regs
When the initialization of qm->debug.acc_diff_reg fails, the probe process does not exit. However, after qm->debug.qm_diff_regs is freed, it is not set to NULL. This can lead to a double free when the remove process attempts to free it again. Therefore, qm->debug.qm_diff_regs should be set to NULL after it is freed.(CVE-2025-40062)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr
Syzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program:
0: r0 = 0
1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60)
2: exit
which triggers:
verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)
This is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an implicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this padding isn't rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later fails to convert the access.
This patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of bpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access.
I checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and didn't find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled) padding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.(CVE-2025-40078)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/qm - request reserved interrupt for virtual function
The device interrupt vector 3 is an error interrupt for physical function and a reserved interrupt for virtual function. However, the driver has not registered the reserved interrupt for virtual function. When allocating interrupts, the number of interrupts is allocated based on powers of two, which includes this interrupt. When the system enables GICv4 and the virtual function passthrough to the virtual machine, releasing the interrupt in the driver triggers a warning.
The WARNING report is: WARNING: CPU: 62 PID: 14889 at arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c:852 its_free_ite+0x94/0xb4
Therefore, register a reserved interrupt for VF and set the IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag to avoid that warning.(CVE-2025-40136)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid NULL dereference when chunk data buffer is missing
chunk->skb pointer is dereferenced in the if-block where it's supposed to be NULL only.
chunk->skb can only be NULL if chunk->head_skb is not. Check for frag_list instead and do it just before replacing chunk->skb. We're sure that otherwise chunk->skb is non-NULL because of outer if() condition.(CVE-2025-40240)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields
The validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong. It runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the same function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the push_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different memory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in case of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible.
There is also confusion in the code between the 'masked' flag, that says that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both the value and the mask, and the 'is_mask' that says that the value we're parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to write into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during validation, while validate_nsh() doesn't allocate any memory for it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch] Call Trace: <TASK> validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch] validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch] __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch] ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220 genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 _syssendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0 _sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0 __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The third issue with this process is that while trying to convert the non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles the size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn't have any nested attributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling them in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed during the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during the flow dump.
In the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are either validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone manages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely not do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are mixed up.
Fixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing most of the validation code.
Given that and the fact that this functionality never worked since introduction, let's just remove it altogether. It's better to re-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying to fix it in stable releases.(CVE-2025-40254)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_mon_reinit_self().
syzbot reported use-after-free of tipc_net(net)->monitors[] in tipc_mon_reinit_self(). [0]
The array is protected by RTNL, but tipc_mon_reinit_self() iterates over it without RTNL.
tipc_mon_reinit_self() is called from tipc_net_finalize(), which is always under RTNL except for tipc_net_finalize_work().
Let's hold RTNL in tipc_net_finalize_work().
[0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88805eae1030 by task kworker/0:7/5989
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5989 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __kasan_check_byte+0x2a/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:568 kasan_check_byte include/linux/kasan.h:399 [inline] lock_acquire+0x8d/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5842 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 rtlock_slowlock kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1894 [inline] rwbase_rtmutex_lock_state kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:160 [inline] rwbase_write_lock+0xd3/0x7e0 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244 rt_write_lock+0x76/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:243 write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_rt.h:99 [inline] tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x79/0x430 net/tipc/monitor.c:718 tipc_net_finalize+0x115/0x190 net/tipc/net.c:140 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3319 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x439/0x7d0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>
Allocated by task 6089: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1a8/0x320 mm/slub.c:4407 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] tipc_mon_create+0xc3/0x4d0 net/tipc/monitor.c:657 tipc_enable_bearer net/tipc/bearer.c:357 [inline] __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0xe16/0x13f0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1047 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:371 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3bc/0x5f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:393 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:-1 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x83c/0xbe0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1321 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x215/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x60e/0x790 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x846/0xa10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346 netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729 _syssendmsg+0x508/0x820 net/socket.c:2614 _sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/ ---truncated---(CVE-2025-40280)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent possible shift-out-of-bounds in sctp_transport_update_rto
syzbot reported a possible shift-out-of-bounds [1]
Blamed commit added rto_alpha_max and rto_beta_max set to 1000.
It is unclear if some sctp users are setting very large rto_alpha and/or rto_beta.
In order to prevent user regression, perform the test at run time.
Also add READ_ONCE() annotations as sysctl values can change under us.
[1]
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sctp/transport.c:509:41 shift exponent 64 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16704 Comm: syz.2.2320 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:233 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x27f/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:494 sctp_transport_update_rto.cold+0x1c/0x34b net/sctp/transport.c:509 sctp_check_transmitted+0x11c4/0x1c30 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1502 sctp_outq_sack+0x4ef/0x1b20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1338 sctp_cmd_process_sack net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:840 [inline] sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1372 inline
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write
For the following path not holding the sock lock,
sctp_diag_dump() -> sctp_for_each_endpoint() -> sctp_ep_dump()
make sure not to exceed bounds in case the address list has grown between buffer allocation (time-of-check) and write (time-of-use).(CVE-2025-40331)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: replace BUG_ON with bounds check for map->max_osd
OSD indexes come from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks are added to validate these against map->max_osd.
idryomov: drop BUG_ON in ceph_get_primary_affinity(), minor cosmetic edits
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds writes in handle_auth_session_key()
The len field originates from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks have been added to prevent potential out-of-bounds writes when decrypting the connection secret or processing service tickets.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()
The wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client receiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is received. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install a new map immediately after freeing the old one
kfree(monc->monmap);
monc->monmap = monmap;
ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc->osdmap);
osdc->osdmap = newmap;
under client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock respectively, but because neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it's possible for client->monc.monmap->epoch and client->osdc.osdmap->epoch arms in
client->monc.monmap && client->monc.monmap->epoch &&
client->osdc.osdmap && client->osdc.osdmap->epoch;
condition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be reproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290
ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Allocated by task 13305:
ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130
ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0
ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190
create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0
ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 9475:
kfree+0x212/0x290
handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0
ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590
mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0
ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760
ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650
process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0
process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90
worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0
kthread+0x2ec/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Rewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While at it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be exceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than once) and access client->auth_err under client->monc.mutex to match how it's set in finish_auth().
monmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before accessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side
The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU") and not clear if it had purpose since then.
Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g. commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync") introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before it. It's better to do the locking so that even if these run concurrently no UAF is possible.
Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.
syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:
[Task hdev->workqueue] [Task 2]
hci_disconnect_all_sync
l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)
hci_conn_get(hcon)
hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)
hci_dev_lock
hci_dev_lock
hci_conn_del(hcon)
v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock
hci_conn_put(hcon)
conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF)(CVE-2025-68304)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA.
This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match.
Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0
Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match.(CVE-2025-68740)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix invalid prog->stats access when update_effective_progs fails
Syzkaller triggers an invalid memory access issue following fault injection in update_effective_progs. The issue can be described as follows:
__cgroup_bpf_detach update_effective_progs compute_effective_progs bpf_prog_array_alloc <-- fault inject purge_effective_progs / change to dummy_bpf_prog / array->items[index] = &dummy_bpf_prog.prog
---softirq start--- __do_softirq ... __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb __bpf_prog_run_save_cb bpf_prog_run stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->stats) / invalid memory access / flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(&stats->syncp) ---softirq end---
static_branch_dec(&cgroup_bpf_enabled_key[atype])
The reason is that fault injection caused update_effective_progs to fail and then changed the original prog into dummy_bpf_prog.prog in purge_effective_progs. Then a softirq came, and accessing the members of dummy_bpf_prog.prog in the softirq triggers invalid mem access.
To fix it, skip updating stats when stats is NULL.(CVE-2025-68742)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query
The ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls: ETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and ETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.
If the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device reconfiguration), userspace's buffer allocation will be incorrect, potentially leading to buffer overflow.
Drivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some drivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making this scenario possible.
Some drivers try to handle this internally: - bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not equal to the driver's stats count. - micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.
However, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value returned from get_sset_count(), hence won't solve the issue described here.
Change ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(), ethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch between userspace's size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer overflow. The returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that nothing has been returned.
This could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool, depending on when the size change is detected: 1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings(): # ethtool -S eth2 no stats available
- When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.
Both cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call should succeed.
Other than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no output/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting incorrect/shifted stats. I also considered returning an error instead of a "silent" response, but that seems more destructive towards userspace apps.
Notes: - This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more predictable behavior.
-
RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.
-
Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications which might not fill it. The added code checks that it's not zero, to prevent any regressions.(CVE-2025-68795)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: xattr: fix null pointer deref in ext4_raw_inode()
If ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED), iloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all() lacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference in ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-68820)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: using the num_tqps in the vf driver to apply for resources
Currently, hdev->htqp is allocated using hdev->num_tqps, and kinfo->tqp is allocated using kinfo->num_tqps. However, kinfo->num_tqps is set to min(new_tqps, hdev->num_tqps); Therefore, kinfo->num_tqps may be smaller than hdev->num_tqps, which causes some hdev->htqp[i] to remain uninitialized in hclgevf_knic_setup().
Thus, this patch allocates hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp using hdev->num_tqps, ensuring that the lengths of hdev->htqp and kinfo->tqp are consistent and that all elements are properly initialized.(CVE-2025-71064)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset
qfq_class->leaf_qdisc->q.qlen > 0 does not imply that the class
itself is active.
Two qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens when:
-
one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and
-
another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get() / qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function tc_new_tfilter.
When packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared leaf_qdisc->q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ qdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters qfq_reset() with its own q->q.qlen == 0, but its class's leaf qdisc->q.qlen > 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate an inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg:
[ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0 [ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE [ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0
Code starting with the faulting instruction
0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.910391] Call Trace: [ 0.910527] <TASK> [ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485) [ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076) [ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447) [ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) [ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861) [ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) [ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) [ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706) [ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af ---truncated---(CVE-2026-22976)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2
problem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at xdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp().
According to commit ec94670fcb3b ("bpf: Support specifying ingress via xdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN"), the refcount obtained by xdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md().
Therefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by commit 1c1949982524 ("bpf: introduce frags support to bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md().(CVE-2026-22994)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()
Wang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery waiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling nfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state recovery being needed.
It seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback of the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an asynchronous commit.(CVE-2026-23053)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering without touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure
regcache_maple_write() allocates a new block ('entry') to merge adjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp(). When mas_store_gfp() fails, the new 'entry' remains allocated and is never freed, leaking memory.
Free 'entry' on the failure path; on success continue freeing the replaced neighbor blocks ('lower', 'upper').(CVE-2026-23260)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface.
This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation.
The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces.
Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race
Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running it with only preemption disabled.
This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like the BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: observe an RCU grace period in macvlan_common_newlink() error path
valis reported that a race condition still happens after my prior patch.
macvlan_common_newlink() might have made @dev visible before detecting an error, and its caller will directly call free_netdev(dev).
We must respect an RCU period, either in macvlan or the core networking stack.
After adding a temporary mdelay(1000) in macvlan_forward_source_one() to open the race window, valis repro was:
ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source
(ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 &) ; sleep 0.5 ; ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 PING 1.2.3.4 (1.2.3.4): 56 data bytes RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888016bb89c0 by task e/175
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 175 Comm: e Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #33 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) ? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) ? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444) ? tasklet_init (kernel/softirq.c:983) macvlan_handle_frame (drivers/net/macvlan.c:501)
Allocated by task 169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25 mm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79) __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:419) __kvmalloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5657 mm/slub.c:7140) alloc_netdev_mqs (net/core/dev.c:12012) rtnl_create_link (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3648) rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3830 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)
Freed by task 169: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25 mm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287) kfree (mm/slub.c:6674 mm/slub.c:6882) rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3845 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)(CVE-2026-23273)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()
In flush_write_buffer, &p->frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called (in reverse order), according to the call trace:
down_read __configfs_open_file do_dentry_open vfs_open do_open path_openat do_filp_open file_open_name filp_open target_core_item_dbroot_store flush_write_buffer configfs_write_iter
target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug report shows:
db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot
indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner and a possibility of recursive locking.
Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path() instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix compatible.(CVE-2026-23292)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Fix refcount leak for tagset_refcnt
This leak will cause a hang when tearing down the SCSI host. For example, iscsid hangs with the following call trace:
[130120.652718] scsi_alloc_sdev: Allocation failure during SCSI scanning, some SCSI devices might not be configured
PID: 2528 TASK: ffff9d0408974e00 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "iscsid" #0 [ffffb5b9c134b9e0] __schedule at ffffffff860657d4 #1 [ffffb5b9c134ba28] schedule at ffffffff86065c6f #2 [ffffb5b9c134ba40] schedule_timeout at ffffffff86069fb0 #3 [ffffb5b9c134bab0] __wait_for_common at ffffffff8606674f #4 [ffffb5b9c134bb10] scsi_remove_host at ffffffff85bfe84b #5 [ffffb5b9c134bb30] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy at ffffffffc03031c4 [iscsi_tcp] #6 [ffffb5b9c134bb48] iscsi_if_recv_msg at ffffffffc0292692 [scsi_transport_iscsi] #7 [ffffb5b9c134bb98] iscsi_if_rx at ffffffffc02929c2 [scsi_transport_iscsi] #8 [ffffb5b9c134bbf0] netlink_unicast at ffffffff85e551d6 #9 [ffffb5b9c134bc38] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffff85e554ef(CVE-2026-23296)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix preempt count leak in napi poll tracepoint
Using get_cpu() in the tracepoint assignment causes an obvious preempt count leak because nothing invokes put_cpu() to undo it:
softirq: huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX with preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000101?
This clearly has seen a lot of testing in the last 3+ years...
Use smp_processor_id() instead.(CVE-2026-23313)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Return the correct value in vmw_translate_ptr functions
Before the referenced fixes these functions used a lookup function that returned a pointer. This was changed to another lookup function that returned an error code with the pointer becoming an out parameter.
The error path when the lookup failed was not changed to reflect this change and the code continued to return the PTR_ERR of the now uninitialized pointer. This could cause the vmw_translate_ptr functions to return success when they actually failed causing further uninitialized and OOB accesses.(CVE-2026-23317)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim
The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'.
Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch.
To fix this: Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero.
Testing: I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger:
static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link link) { / ... */ if (!shim_link->trampoline) return;
- msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); }
Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report. After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations.(CVE-2026-23319)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory
efi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late().
There are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for memory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with memblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area().
More acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y efi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the memory map is complete.
Benjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of RAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM.
If the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is still uninitialized, they won't be actually freed because memblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips uninitialized pages.
Using free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because __free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might end up in uninitialized part of the memory map.
Delaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic because in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates efi.memmap without any synchronization and that's undesirable late in boot when there is concurrency.
More robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services memory.
Split efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services() collects ranges that should be freed into an array then efi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete.(CVE-2026-23352)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap
get_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their indices into an array without checking bounds.
Also the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is MAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack, but that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could be larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a stack-out-of-bounds write.
Add a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue. When there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the redirect.
To reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with an XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS. Then send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path.(CVE-2026-23359)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix admin queue leak on controller reset
When nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() is called during a controller reset, a previous admin queue may still exist. Release it properly before allocating a new one to avoid orphaning the old queue.
This fixes a regression introduced by commit 03b3bcd319b3 ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime").(CVE-2026-23360)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blktrace: fix __this_cpu_read/write in preemptible context
tracing_record_cmdline() internally uses __this_cpu_read() and __this_cpu_write() on the per-CPU variable trace_cmdline_save, and trace_save_cmdline() explicitly asserts preemption is disabled via lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(). These operations are only safe when preemption is off, as they were designed to be called from the scheduler context (probe_wakeup_sched_switch() / probe_wakeup()).
__blk_add_trace() was calling tracing_record_cmdline(current) early in the blk_tracer path, before ring buffer reservation, from process context where preemption is fully enabled. This triggers the following using blktests/blktrace/002:
blktrace/002 (blktrace ftrace corruption with sysfs trace) [failed] runtime 0.367s ... 0.437s something found in dmesg: [ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33 [ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created [ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516 [ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full) [ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST [ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 81.362881] Call Trace: [ 81.362884] <TASK> [ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0 ... (See '/mnt/sda/blktests/results/nodev/blktrace/002.dmesg' for the entire message)
[ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33 [ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created [ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516 [ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full) [ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST [ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 81.362881] Call Trace: [ 81.362884] <TASK> [ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0 [ 81.362895] check_preemption_disabled+0xce/0xe0 [ 81.362902] tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362923] __blk_add_trace+0x307/0x5d0 [ 81.362934] ? lock_acquire+0xe0/0x300 [ 81.362940] ? iov_iter_extract_pages+0x101/0xa30 [ 81.362959] blk_add_trace_bio+0x106/0x1e0 [ 81.362968] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x24b/0x3a0 [ 81.362979] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x260 [ 81.362988] submit_bio_wait+0x56/0x90 [ 81.363009] __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x16c/0x250 [ 81.363026] ? __pfx_submit_bio_wait_endio+0x10/0x10 [ 81.363038] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x73/0xa0 [ 81.363051] blkdev_read_iter+0xc1/0x140 [ 81.363059] vfs_read+0x20b/0x330 [ 81.363083] ksys_read+0x67/0xe0 [ 81.363090] do_syscall_64+0xbf/0xf00 [ 81.363102] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 81.363106] RIP: 0033:0x7f281906029d [ 81.363111] Code: 31 c0 e9 c6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 66 63 0a 00 e8 59 ff 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d 41 33 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec [ 81.363113] RSP: 002b:00007ffca127dd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 81.363120] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f281906029d [ 81.363122] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0000559f8bfae000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 81.363123] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000002863a10a81 R09: 00007f281915f000 [ 81.363124] R10: 00007f2818f77b60 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559f8bfae000 [ 81.363126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000a [ 81.363142] </TASK>
The same BUG fires from blk_add_trace_plug(), blk_add_trace_unplug(), and blk_add_trace_rq() paths as well.
The purpose of tracin ---truncated---(CVE-2026-23374)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing
struct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT allocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT buffer.
Because the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g., ending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails to ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.
This leads to two issues: 1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the structure. 2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT'd code executes ldr. On arm64, 64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read, causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.
Fix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes (sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of the JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math in build_plt() to correctly align the target field.(CVE-2026-23383)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: check metadata block offset is within range
Syzkaller reports a "general protection fault in squashfs_copy_data"
This is ultimately caused by a corrupted index look-up table, which produces a negative metadata block offset.
This is subsequently passed to squashfs_copy_data (via squashfs_read_metadata) where the negative offset causes an out of bounds access.
The fix is to check that the offset is within range in squashfs_read_metadata. This will trap this and other cases.(CVE-2026-23388)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0
bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting it.(CVE-2026-31447)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request
It is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a specific report's feature request using a completely different report ID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty side-effects such as OOB writes.
Add a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the one that was requested. If it doesn't, omit reporting the raw event and return early.(CVE-2026-43047)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()
The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution.
The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report.
Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <(CVE-2026-43048)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: close crash window in attr dabtree inactivation
When inactivating an inode with node-format extended attributes, xfs_attr3_node_inactive() invalidates all child leaf/node blocks via xfs_trans_binval(), but intentionally does not remove the corresponding entries from their parent node blocks. The implicit assumption is that xfs_attr_inactive() will truncate the entire attr fork to zero extents afterwards, so log recovery will never reach the root node and follow those stale pointers.
However, if a log shutdown occurs after the leaf/node block cancellations commit but before the attr bmap truncation commits, this assumption breaks. Recovery replays the attr bmap intact (the inode still has attr fork extents), but suppresses replay of all cancelled leaf/node blocks, maybe leaving them as stale data on disk. On the next mount, xlog_recover_process_iunlinks() retries inactivation and attempts to read the root node via the attr bmap. If the root node was not replayed, reading the unreplayed root block triggers a metadata verification failure immediately; if it was replayed, following its child pointers to unreplayed child blocks triggers the same failure:
XFS (pmem0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_da3_node_read_verify+0x53/0x220, xfs_da3_node block 0x78 XFS (pmem0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (pmem0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ XFS (pmem0): metadata I/O error in "xfs_da_read_buf+0x104/0x190" at daddr 0x78 len 8 error 117
Fix this in two places:
In xfs_attr3_node_inactive(), after calling xfs_trans_binval() on a child block, immediately remove the entry that references it from the parent node in the same transaction. This eliminates the window where the parent holds a pointer to a cancelled block. Once all children are removed, the now-empty root node is converted to a leaf block within the same transaction. This node-to-leaf conversion is necessary for crash safety. If the system shutdown after the empty node is written to the log but before the second-phase bmap truncation commits, log recovery will attempt to verify the root block on disk. xfs_da3_node_verify() does not permit a node block with count == 0; such a block will fail verification and trigger a metadata corruption shutdown. on the other hand, leaf blocks are allowed to have this transient state.
In xfs_attr_inactive(), split the attr fork truncation into two explicit phases. First, truncate all extents beyond the root block (the child extents whose parent references have already been removed above). Second, invalidate the root block and truncate the attr bmap to zero in a single transaction. The two operations in the second phase must be atomic: as long as the attr bmap has any non-zero length, recovery can follow it to the root block, so the root block invalidation must commit together with the bmap-to-zero truncation.(CVE-2026-43053)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "PCI/IOV: Add PCI rescan-remove locking when enabling/disabling SR-IOV"
This reverts commit 05703271c3cd ("PCI/IOV: Add PCI rescan-remove locking when enabling/disabling SR-IOV"), which causes a deadlock by recursively taking pci_rescan_remove_lock when sriov_del_vfs() is called as part of pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device(). For example with the following sequence of commands:
$ echo <NUM> > /sys/bus/pci/devices/<pf>/sriov_numvfs $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/<pf>/remove
A trimmed trace of the deadlock on a mlx5 device is as below:
zsh/5715 is trying to acquire lock: 000002597926ef50 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sriov_disable+0x34/0x140
but task is already holding lock: 000002597926ef50 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x80 ... Call Trace: [<00000259778c4f90>] dump_stack_lvl+0xc0/0x110 [<00000259779c844e>] print_deadlock_bug+0x31e/0x330 [<00000259779c1908>] __lock_acquire+0x16c8/0x32f0 [<00000259779bffac>] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x350 [<00000259789643a6>] __mutex_lock_common+0xe6/0x1520 [<000002597896413c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x50 [<00000259784a07e4>] sriov_disable+0x34/0x140 [<00000258f7d6dd80>] mlx5_sriov_disable+0x50/0x80 [mlx5_core] [<00000258f7d5745e>] remove_one+0x5e/0xf0 [mlx5_core] [<00000259784857fc>] pci_device_remove+0x3c/0xa0 [<000002597851012e>] device_release_driver_internal+0x18e/0x280 [<000002597847ae22>] pci_stop_bus_device+0x82/0xa0 [<000002597847afce>] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x5e/0x80 [<00000259784972c2>] remove_store+0x72/0x90 [<0000025977e6661a>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15a/0x200 [<0000025977d7241c>] vfs_write+0x24c/0x300 [<0000025977d72696>] ksys_write+0x86/0x110 [<000002597895b61c>] __do_syscall+0x14c/0x400 [<000002597896e0ee>] system_call+0x6e/0x90
This alone is not a complete fix as it restores the issue the cited commit tried to solve. A new fix will be provided as a follow on.(CVE-2026-43147)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: Add support for TSV110 Spectre-BHB mitigation
The TSV110 processor is vulnerable to the Spectre-BHB (Branch History Buffer) attack, which can be exploited to leak information through branch prediction side channels. This commit adds the MIDR of TSV110 to the list for software mitigation.(CVE-2026-43261)
In the Linux kernel, the kexec_load_purgatory() function derives image->start by locating e_entry inside an SHF_EXECINSTR section. If the purgatory object contains multiple executable sections with overlapping sh_addr, the entrypoint check can match more than once and trigger a WARN. Derive the entry section from the purgatory_start symbol when present and compute image->start from its final placement. Keep the existing e_entry fallback for purgatories that do not expose the symbol.(CVE-2026-43289)
In the Linux kernel, there is a potential out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the ceph_handle_auth_reply() function of the libceph component. When processing messages of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY, the value of the payload_len field is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value, which causes the pointer address to be decremented and subsequently accessed because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation. The vulnerability is fixed by changing the data type of payload_len to u32 and introducing additional sanity checks.(CVE-2026-43407)
In the Linux kernel, when an alias is found through d_splice_alias in the nfs3_proc_create function, if the alias happens to be a directory dentry, the system does not return any error but simply forgets about this alias, leaving the original dentry to be added as negative. This later causes a system crash in nfs_atomic_open_v23/finish_open since a negative dentry is supplied to do_dentry_open. This issue was observed running lustre-racer, where directories and files are created/removed concurrently with the same name and O_EXCL is not used to open files.(CVE-2026-43470)
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.1.12.150.oe2403sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MMWe currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn ttrue.So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-referenceNULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.This fixes the report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194Code: ...RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400Call Trace: \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt; kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()](CVE-2024-56611)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully\n\nAlexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a\nRISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596\n pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2\n\nRISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement\nthe legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.\n\nThat warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent\ndomain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X,\nwhich has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only\nvalid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply\nreturn -ENOTSUPP.\n\nLoongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support\nwithout implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations\nwhich return an error, so the problem was papered over.\n\nCorrect pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add\nthe missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.(CVE-2024-56760)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: fix nfs_release_folio() to not deadlock via kcompactd writeback\n\nAdd PF_KCOMPACTD flag and current_is_kcompactd() helper to check for it so\nnfs_release_folio() can skip calling nfs_wb_folio() from kcompactd.\n\nOtherwise NFS can deadlock waiting for kcompactd enduced writeback which\nrecurses back to NFS (which triggers writeback to NFSD via NFS loopback\nmount on the same host, NFSD blocks waiting for XFS\u0026apos;s call to\n__filemap_get_folio):\n\n6070.550357] INFO: task kcompactd0:58 blocked for more than 4435 seconds.\n\n{---\n[58] \u0026quot;kcompactd0\u0026quot;\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] folio_wait_bit+0xe8/0x200\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] folio_wait_writeback+0x2b/0x80\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] nfs_wb_folio+0x80/0x1b0 [nfs]\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] nfs_release_folio+0x68/0x130 [nfs]\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x362/0x840\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages_batch+0x43d/0xb90\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages_sync+0x9a/0x240\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] migrate_pages+0x93c/0x9f0\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] compact_zone+0x8e2/0x1030\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] compact_node+0xdb/0x120\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] kcompactd+0x121/0x2e0\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] kthread+0xcf/0x100\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40\n[\u0026lt;0\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n---}\n\n[(CVE-2025-21908)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio\n\nCommit b15c87263a69 (\u0026quot;hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to\nbe offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make\noffline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and\ntry_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before\ncalling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.\n\nWarning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap:\n\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400!\n Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41\n Tainted: [W]=WARN\n Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c\n lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c\n Call trace:\n try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P)\n try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)\n rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8\n rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58\n try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90\n unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8\n do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568\n offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670\n memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374\n memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78\n device_offline+0xa4/0xd0\n state_store+0x8c/0xf0\n dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c\n sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8\n vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc\n ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8\n __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28\n invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0\n do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28\n el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc\n el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c\n Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000)\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---(CVE-2025-21931)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5: Bridge, fix the crash caused by LAG state check\n\nWhen removing LAG device from bridge, NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER event is\ntriggered. Driver finds the lower devices (PFs) to flush all the\noffloaded entries. And mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb is checked, it returns\nfalse if one of PF is unloaded. In such case,\nmlx5_esw_bridge_lag_rep_get() and its caller return NULL, instead of\nthe alive PF, and the flush is skipped.\n\nBesides, the bridge fdb entry\u0026apos;s lastuse is updated in mlx5 bridge\nevent handler. But this SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE event can be\nignored in this case because the upper interface for bond is deleted,\nand the entry will never be aged because lastuse is never updated.\n\nTo make things worse, as the entry is alive, mlx5 bridge workqueue\nkeeps sending that event, which is then handled by kernel bridge\nnotifier. It causes the following crash when accessing the passed bond\nnetdev which is already destroyed.\n\nTo fix this issue, remove such checks. LAG state is already checked in\ncommit 15f8f168952f (\u0026quot;net/mlx5: Bridge, verify LAG state when adding\nbond to bridge\u0026quot;), driver still need to skip offload if LAG becomes\ninvalid state after initialization.\n\n Oops: stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 23695 Comm: kworker/u40:3 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0_mlnx #1\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n Workqueue: mlx5_bridge_wq mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work [mlx5_core]\n RIP: 0010:br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]\n Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 02 48 f7 00 00 02 00 00 74 69 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08 48 8b a8 08 01 00 00 48 85 ed 74 4a 48 83 fe 02 48 89 d3 \u0026lt;4c\u0026gt; 8b 65 00 74 23 76 49 48 83 fe 05 74 7e 48 83 fe 06 75 2f 0f b7\n RSP: 0018:ffffc900092cfda0 EFLAGS: 00010297\n RAX: ffff888123bfe000 RBX: ffffc900092cfe08 RCX: 00000000ffffffff\n RDX: ffffc900092cfe08 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0c585f0\n RBP: 6669746f6e690a30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888123ae92c8\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff888123ae9c60\n R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc900092cfe08 R15: 0000000000000000\n FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 00007f15914c8734 CR3: 0000000002830005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n PKRU: 55555554\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60\n ? die+0x38/0x60\n ? do_trap+0x10b/0x120\n ? do_error_trap+0x64/0xa0\n ? exc_stack_segment+0x33/0x50\n ? asm_exc_stack_segment+0x22/0x30\n ? br_switchdev_event+0x2c/0x110 [bridge]\n ? sched_balance_newidle.isra.149+0x248/0x390\n notifier_call_chain+0x4b/0xa0\n atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20\n mlx5_esw_bridge_update+0xec/0x170 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x19/0x40 [mlx5_core]\n process_scheduled_works+0x81/0x390\n worker_thread+0x106/0x250\n ? bh_worker+0x110/0x110\n kthread+0xb7/0xe0\n ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-21970)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: Prevent creation of classes with TC_H_ROOT\n\nThe function qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() uses TC_H_ROOT as a termination\ncondition when traversing up the qdisc tree to update parent backlog\ncounters. However, if a class is created with classid TC_H_ROOT, the\ntraversal terminates prematurely at this class instead of reaching the\nactual root qdisc, causing parent statistics to be incorrectly maintained.\nIn case of DRR, this could lead to a crash as reported by Mingi Cho.\n\nPrevent the creation of any Qdisc class with classid TC_H_ROOT\n(0xFFFFFFFF) across all qdisc types, as suggested by Jamal.(CVE-2025-21971)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched: address a potential NULL pointer dereference in the GRED scheduler.\n\nIf kzalloc in gred_init returns a NULL pointer, the code follows the\nerror handling path, invoking gred_destroy. This, in turn, calls\ngred_offload, where memset could receive a NULL pointer as input,\npotentially leading to a kernel crash.\n\nWhen table-\u0026gt;opt is NULL in gred_init(), gred_change_table_def()\nis not called yet, so it is not necessary to call -\u0026gt;ndo_setup_tc()\nin gred_offload().(CVE-2025-21980)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix memory leak in aRFS after reset\n\nFix aRFS (accelerated Receive Flow Steering) structures memory leak by\nadding a checker to verify if aRFS memory is already allocated while\nconfiguring VSI. aRFS objects are allocated in two cases:\n- as part of VSI initialization (at probe), and\n- as part of reset handling\n\nHowever, VSI reconfiguration executed during reset involves memory\nallocation one more time, without prior releasing already allocated\nresources. This led to the memory leak with the following signature:\n\n[root@os-delivery ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak\nunreferenced object 0xff3c1ca7252e6000 (size 8192):\n comm \u0026quot;kworker/0:0\u0026quot;, pid 8, jiffies 4296833052\n hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n backtrace (crc 0):\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff991ec485\u0026gt;] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x275/0x340\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc0a6e06a\u0026gt;] ice_init_arfs+0x3a/0xe0 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09f1027\u0026gt;] ice_vsi_cfg_def+0x607/0x850 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09f244b\u0026gt;] ice_vsi_setup+0x5b/0x130 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09c2131\u0026gt;] ice_init+0x1c1/0x460 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffffc09c64af\u0026gt;] ice_probe+0x2af/0x520 [ice]\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff994fbcd3\u0026gt;] local_pci_probe+0x43/0xa0\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f07103\u0026gt;] work_for_cpu_fn+0x13/0x20\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f0b6d9\u0026gt;] process_one_work+0x179/0x390\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f0c1e9\u0026gt;] worker_thread+0x239/0x340\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98f14abc\u0026gt;] kthread+0xcc/0x100\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98e45a6d\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n [\u0026lt;ffffffff98e083ba\u0026gt;] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n ...(CVE-2025-21981)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: switchdev: Convert blocking notification chain to a raw one\n\nA blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the\nintegrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when\nadding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading\nwhen traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.\n\nIn case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive\nnotifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired\ntwice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].\n\nSpecifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a\nSWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications\nabout deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().\n\nFix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification\nchain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect\nthe chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain.\nEvents are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in\ncall_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in\nthe future.\n\nMaintain the \u0026quot;blocking\u0026quot; prefix as events are always emitted from process\ncontext and listeners are allowed to block.\n\n[1]:\nWARNING: possible recursive locking detected\n6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted\n--------------------------------------------\nip/52731 is trying to acquire lock:\nffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nbut task is already holding lock:\nffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nother info that might help us debug this:\nPossible unsafe locking scenario:\nCPU0\n----\nlock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);\nlock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);\n\n*** DEADLOCK ***\nMay be due to missing lock nesting notation\n3 locks held by ip/52731:\n #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0\n #1: ffffffff8731f628 (\u0026amp;net-\u0026gt;rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0\n #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\n\nstack backtrace:\n...\n? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10\n? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10\n? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10\nblocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0\nswitchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0\n? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10\n? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0\n? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340\nswitchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0\nswitchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340\nbr_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge]\nbr_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge]\nnotifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440\nblocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0\nswitchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0\n...(CVE-2025-21986)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/sched: Fix fence reference count leak\n\nThe last_scheduled fence leaks when an entity is being killed and adding\nthe cleanup callback fails.\n\nDecrement the reference count of prev when dma_fence_add_callback()\nfails, ensuring proper balance.\n\n[phasta: add git tag info for stable kernel](CVE-2025-21995)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/qaic: Fix integer overflow in qaic_validate_req()\n\nThese are u64 variables that come from the user via\nqaic_attach_slice_bo_ioctl(). Use check_add_overflow() to ensure that\nthe math doesn\u0026apos;t have an integer wrapping bug.(CVE-2025-22001)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nregulator: dummy: force synchronous probing\n\nSometimes I get a NULL pointer dereference at boot time in kobject_get()\nwith the following call stack:\n\nanatop_regulator_probe()\n devm_regulator_register()\n regulator_register()\n regulator_resolve_supply()\n kobject_get()\n\nBy placing some extra BUG_ON() statements I could verify that this is\nraised because probing of the \u0026apos;dummy\u0026apos; regulator driver is not completed\n(\u0026apos;dummy_regulator_rdev\u0026apos; is still NULL).\n\nIn the JTAG debugger I can see that dummy_regulator_probe() and\nanatop_regulator_probe() can be run by different kernel threads\n(kworker/u4:*). I haven\u0026apos;t further investigated whether this can be\nchanged or if there are other possibilities to force synchronization\nbetween these two probe routines. On the other hand I don\u0026apos;t expect much\nboot time penalty by probing the \u0026apos;dummy\u0026apos; regulator synchronously.(CVE-2025-22009)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nspufs: fix a leak in spufs_create_context()\n\nLeak fixes back in 2008 missed one case - if we are trying to set affinity\nand spufs_mkdir() fails, we need to drop the reference to neighbor.(CVE-2025-22071)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRevert \u0026quot;smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after rmmod\u0026quot;\n\nThis reverts commit e9f2517a3e18a54a3943c098d2226b245d488801.\n\nCommit e9f2517a3e18 (\u0026quot;smb: client: fix TCP timers deadlock after\nrmmod\u0026quot;) is intended to fix a null-ptr-deref in LOCKDEP, which is\nmentioned as CVE-2024-54680, but is actually did not fix anything;\nThe issue can be reproduced on top of it. [0]\n\nAlso, it reverted the change by commit ef7134c7fc48 (\u0026quot;smb: client:\nFix use-after-free of network namespace.\u0026quot;) and introduced a real\nissue by reviving the kernel TCP socket.\n\nWhen a reconnect happens for a CIFS connection, the socket state\ntransitions to FIN_WAIT_1. Then, inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync()\nin tcp_close() stops all timers for the socket.\n\nIf an incoming FIN packet is lost, the socket will stay at FIN_WAIT_1\nforever, and such sockets could be leaked up to net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans.\n\nUsually, FIN can be retransmitted by the peer, but if the peer aborts\nthe connection, the issue comes into reality.\n\nI warned about this privately by pointing out the exact report [1],\nbut the bogus fix was finally merged.\n\nSo, we should not stop the timers to finally kill the connection on\nour side in that case, meaning we must not use a kernel socket for\nTCP whose sk-\u0026gt;sk_net_refcnt is 0.\n\nThe kernel socket does not have a reference to its netns to make it\npossible to tear down netns without cleaning up every resource in it.\n\nFor example, tunnel devices use a UDP socket internally, but we can\ndestroy netns without removing such devices and let it complete\nduring exit. Otherwise, netns would be leaked when the last application\ndied.\n\nHowever, this is problematic for TCP sockets because TCP has timers to\nclose the connection gracefully even after the socket is close()d. The\nlifetime of the socket and its netns is different from the lifetime of\nthe underlying connection.\n\nIf the socket user does not maintain the netns lifetime, the timer could\nbe fired after the socket is close()d and its netns is freed up, resulting\nin use-after-free.\n\nActually, we have seen so many similar issues and converted such sockets\nto have a reference to netns.\n\nThat\u0026apos;s why I converted the CIFS client socket to have a reference to\nnetns (sk-\u0026gt;sk_net_refcnt == 1), which is somehow mentioned as out-of-scope\nof CIFS and technically wrong in e9f2517a3e18, but **is in-scope and right\nfix**.\n\nRegarding the LOCKDEP issue, we can prevent the module unload by\nbumping the module refcount when switching the LOCKDDEP key in\nsock_lock_init_class_and_name(). [2]\n\nFor a while, let\u0026apos;s revert the bogus fix.\n\nNote that now we can use sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() for the socket\nconversion, but I\u0026apos;ll do so later separately to make backport easy.(CVE-2025-22077)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwatch_queue: fix pipe accounting mismatch\n\nCurrently, watch_queue_set_size() modifies the pipe buffers charged to\nuser-\u0026gt;pipe_bufs without updating the pipe-\u0026gt;nr_accounted on the pipe\nitself, due to the if (!pipe_has_watch_queue()) test in\npipe_resize_ring(). This means that when the pipe is ultimately freed,\nwe decrement user-\u0026gt;pipe_bufs by something other than what than we had\ncharged to it, potentially leading to an underflow. This in turn can\ncause subsequent too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() tests to fail with -EPERM.\n\nTo remedy this, explicitly account for the pipe usage in\nwatch_queue_set_size() to match the number set via account_pipe_buffers()\n\n(It\u0026apos;s unclear why watch_queue_set_size() does not update nr_accounted;\nit may be due to intentional overprovisioning in watch_queue_set_size()?)(CVE-2025-23138)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: venus: hfi_parser: add check to avoid out of bound access\n\nThere is a possibility that init_codecs is invoked multiple times during\nmanipulated payload from video firmware. In such case, if codecs_count\ncan get incremented to value more than MAX_CODEC_NUM, there can be OOB\naccess. Reset the count so that it always starts from beginning.(CVE-2025-23157)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njfs: add sanity check for agwidth in dbMount\n\nThe width in dmapctl of the AG is zero, it trigger a divide error when\ncalculating the control page level in dbAllocAG.\n\nTo avoid this issue, add a check for agwidth in dbAllocAG.(CVE-2025-37740)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/mediatek: Fix NULL pointer deference in mtk_iommu_device_group\n\nCurrently, mtk_iommu calls during probe iommu_device_register before\nthe hw_list from driver data is initialized. Since iommu probing issue\nfix, it leads to NULL pointer dereference in mtk_iommu_device_group when\nhw_list is accessed with list_first_entry (not null safe).\n\nSo, change the call order to ensure iommu_device_register is called\nafter the driver data are initialized.(CVE-2025-37748)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37766)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37768)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37770)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/pm: Prevent division by zero\n\nThe user can set any speed value.\nIf speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37771)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: Fix dangling pointer in krb_authenticate\n\nkrb_authenticate frees sess-\u0026gt;user and does not set the pointer\nto NULL. It calls ksmbd_krb5_authenticate to reinitialise\nsess-\u0026gt;user but that function may return without doing so. If\nthat happens then smb2_sess_setup, which calls krb_authenticate,\nwill be accessing free\u0026apos;d memory when it later uses sess-\u0026gt;user.(CVE-2025-37778)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: Intel: avs: Fix null-ptr-deref in avs_component_probe()\n\ndevm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently,\navs_component_probe() does not check for this case, which results in a\nNULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37793)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsound/virtio: Fix cancel_sync warnings on uninitialized work_structs\n\nBetty reported hitting the following warning:\n\n[ 8.709131][ T221] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 221 at kernel/workqueue.c:4182\n...\n[ 8.713282][ T221] Call trace:\n[ 8.713365][ T221] __flush_work+0x8d0/0x914\n[ 8.713468][ T221] __cancel_work_sync+0xac/0xfc\n[ 8.713570][ T221] cancel_work_sync+0x24/0x34\n[ 8.713667][ T221] virtsnd_remove+0xa8/0xf8 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276]\n[ 8.713868][ T221] virtsnd_probe+0x48c/0x664 [virtio_snd ab15f34d0dd772f6d11327e08a81d46dc9c36276]\n[ 8.714035][ T221] virtio_dev_probe+0x28c/0x390\n[ 8.714139][ T221] really_probe+0x1bc/0x4c8\n...\n\nIt seems we\u0026apos;re hitting the error path in virtsnd_probe(), which\ntriggers a virtsnd_remove() which iterates over the substreams\ncalling cancel_work_sync() on the elapsed_period work_struct.\n\nLooking at the code, from earlier in:\nvirtsnd_probe()-\u0026gt;virtsnd_build_devs()-\u0026gt;virtsnd_pcm_parse_cfg()\n\nWe set snd-\u0026gt;nsubstreams, allocate the snd-\u0026gt;substreams, and if\nwe then hit an error on the info allocation or something in\nvirtsnd_ctl_query_info() fails, we will exit without having\ninitialized the elapsed_period work_struct.\n\nWhen that error path unwinds we then call virtsnd_remove()\nwhich as long as the substreams array is allocated, will iterate\nthrough calling cancel_work_sync() on the uninitialized work\nstruct hitting this warning.\n\nTakashi Iwai suggested this fix, which initializes the substreams\nstructure right after allocation, so that if we hit the error\npaths we avoid trying to cleanup uninitialized data.\n\nNote: I have not yet managed to reproduce the issue myself, so\nthis patch has had limited testing.\n\nFeedback or thoughts would be appreciated!(CVE-2025-37805)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmisc: microchip: pci1xxxx: Fix Kernel panic during IRQ handler registration\n\nResolve kernel panic while accessing IRQ handler associated with the\ngenerated IRQ. This is done by acquiring the spinlock and storing the\ncurrent interrupt state before handling the interrupt request using\ngeneric_handle_irq.\n\nA previous fix patch was submitted where \u0026apos;generic_handle_irq\u0026apos; was\nreplaced with \u0026apos;handle_nested_irq\u0026apos;. However, this change also causes\nthe kernel panic where after determining which GPIO triggered the\ninterrupt and attempting to call handle_nested_irq with the mapped\nIRQ number, leads to a failure in locating the registered handler.(CVE-2025-37815)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncpufreq: apple-soc: Fix null-ptr-deref in apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate()\n\ncpufreq_cpu_get_raw() can return NULL when the target CPU is not present\nin the policy-\u0026gt;cpus mask. apple_soc_cpufreq_get_rate() does not check\nfor this case, which results in a NULL pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-37831)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncifs: avoid NULL pointer dereference in dbg call\n\ncifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so\nmove call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-37844)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdkfd: debugfs hang_hws skip GPU with MES\n\ndebugfs hang_hws is used by GPU reset test with HWS, for MES this crash\nthe kernel with NULL pointer access because dqm-\u0026gt;packet_mgr is not setup\nfor MES path.\n\nSkip GPU with MES for now, MES hang_hws debugfs interface will be\nsupported later.(CVE-2025-37853)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: aspeed: Add NULL pointer check in ast_vhub_init_dev()\n\nThe variable d-\u0026gt;name, returned by devm_kasprintf(), could be NULL.\nA pointer check is added to prevent potential NULL pointer dereference.\nThis is similar to the fix in commit 3027e7b15b02\n(\u0026quot;ice: Fix some null pointer dereference issues in ice_ptp.c\u0026quot;).\n\nThis issue is found by our static analysis tool(CVE-2025-37881)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value\n\nThis reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 (\u0026quot;ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in\nsnd_soc_put_volsw() by +min\u0026quot;), and makes some additional related\nupdates.\n\nThere are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum\nregister value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The\npatch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register\none. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as\nsnd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However,\neven then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a\ncontrol value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to\nalso do so in commit fb9ad24485087 (\u0026quot;ASoC: ops: add correct range\ncheck for limiting volume\u0026quot;). That patch however, missed updating\nsnd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing\nsnd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more\nsense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is\nappropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the\ninternal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use\nthis interpretation of platform_max.\n\nFinally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to\nhopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.(CVE-2025-37889)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: arm_scmi: Balance device refcount when destroying devices\n\nUsing device_find_child() to lookup the proper SCMI device to destroy\ncauses an unbalance in device refcount, since device_find_child() calls an\nimplicit get_device(): this, in turns, inhibits the call of the provided\nrelease methods upon devices destruction.\n\nAs a consequence, one of the structures that is not freed properly upon\ndestruction is the internal struct device_private dev-\u0026gt;p populated by the\ndrivers subsystem core.\n\nKMemleak detects this situation since loading/unloding some SCMI driver\ncauses related devices to be created/destroyed without calling any\ndevice_release method.\n\nunreferenced object 0xffff00000f583800 (size 512):\n comm \u0026quot;insmod\u0026quot;, pid 227, jiffies 4294912190\n hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........\n ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 60 36 1d 8a 00 80 ff ff ........`6......\n backtrace (crc 114e2eed):\n kmemleak_alloc+0xbc/0xd8\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2dc/0x398\n device_add+0x954/0x12d0\n device_register+0x28/0x40\n __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x1bc/0x380\n scmi_device_create+0x2d0/0x390\n scmi_create_protocol_devices+0x74/0xf8\n scmi_device_request_notifier+0x1f8/0x2a8\n notifier_call_chain+0x110/0x3b0\n blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xb0\n scmi_driver_register+0x350/0x7f0\n 0xffff80000a3b3038\n do_one_initcall+0x12c/0x730\n do_init_module+0x1dc/0x640\n load_module+0x4b20/0x5b70\n init_module_from_file+0xec/0x158\n\n$ ./scripts/faddr2line ./vmlinux device_add+0x954/0x12d0\ndevice_add+0x954/0x12d0:\nkmalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:901\n(inlined by) kzalloc_noprof at include/linux/slab.h:1037\n(inlined by) device_private_init at drivers/base/core.c:3510\n(inlined by) device_add at drivers/base/core.c:3561\n\nBalance device refcount by issuing a put_device() on devices found via\ndevice_find_child().(CVE-2025-37905)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btusb: avoid NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()\n\nA NULL pointer dereference can occur in skb_dequeue() when processing a\nQCA firmware crash dump on WCN7851 (0489:e0f3).\n\n[ 93.672166] Bluetooth: hci0: ACL memdump size(589824)\n\n[ 93.672475] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008\n[ 93.672517] Workqueue: hci0 hci_devcd_rx [bluetooth]\n[ 93.672598] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x50/0x80\n\nThe issue stems from handle_dump_pkt_qca() returning 0 even when a dump\npacket is successfully processed. This is because it incorrectly\nforwards the return value of hci_devcd_init() (which returns 0 on\nsuccess). As a result, the caller (btusb_recv_acl_qca() or\nbtusb_recv_evt_qca()) assumes the packet was not handled and passes it\nto hci_recv_frame(), leading to premature kfree() of the skb.\n\nLater, hci_devcd_rx() attempts to dequeue the same skb from the dump\nqueue, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFix this by:\n1. Making handle_dump_pkt_qca() return 0 on success and negative errno\n on failure, consistent with kernel conventions.\n2. Splitting dump packet detection into separate functions for ACL\n and event packets for better structure and readability.\n\nThis ensures dump packets are properly identified and consumed, avoiding\ndouble handling and preventing NULL pointer access.(CVE-2025-37918)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds stream writes by validating *pos\n\nksmbd_vfs_stream_write() did not validate whether the write offset\n(*pos) was within the bounds of the existing stream data length (v_len).\nIf *pos was greater than or equal to v_len, this could lead to an\nout-of-bounds memory write.\n\nThis patch adds a check to ensure *pos is less than v_len before\nproceeding. If the condition fails, -EINVAL is returned.(CVE-2025-37947)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: ucsi: displayport: Fix deadlock\n\nThis patch introduces the ucsi_con_mutex_lock / ucsi_con_mutex_unlock\nfunctions to the UCSI driver. ucsi_con_mutex_lock ensures the connector\nmutex is only locked if a connection is established and the partner pointer\nis valid. This resolves a deadlock scenario where\nucsi_displayport_remove_partner holds con-\u0026gt;mutex waiting for\ndp_altmode_work to complete while dp_altmode_work attempts to acquire it.(CVE-2025-37967)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: idxd: Refactor remove call with idxd_cleanup() helper\n\nThe idxd_cleanup() helper cleans up perfmon, interrupts, internals and\nso on. Refactor remove call with the idxd_cleanup() helper to avoid code\nduplication. Note, this also fixes the missing put_device() for idxd\ngroups, enginces and wqs.(CVE-2025-38014)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: Annotate FDB data races\n\nThe \u0026apos;used\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;updated\u0026apos; fields in the FDB entry structure can be\naccessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as\n[1]. Can be reproduced using [2].\n\nSuppress these reports by annotating these accesses using\nREAD_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE().\n\n[1]\nBUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit\n\nwrite to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0:\n vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650\n packet_xmit+0x100/0x150\n packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0\n __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90\n x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00\n do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nread to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2:\n vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650\n packet_xmit+0x100/0x150\n packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0\n __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90\n x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00\n do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nvalue changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -\u0026gt; 0x00000000fffbac6f\n\nReported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:\nCPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014\n\n[2]\n #!/bin/bash\n\n set +H\n echo whitelist \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan\n echo !vxlan_xmit \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan\n\n ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1\n bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1\n taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q \u0026amp;\n taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q \u0026amp;(CVE-2025-38037)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: arm_ffa: Set dma_mask for ffa devices\n\nSet dma_mask for FFA devices, otherwise DMA allocation using the device pointer\nlead to following warning:\n\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:597 dma_alloc_attrs+0xe0/0x124(CVE-2025-38043)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent\n\nThere is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may\naccess the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the\nfollowing KASAN warning.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975\n\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full)\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70\n print_report+0xce/0x640\n kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0\n cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]\n cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs]\n iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520\n __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9\n Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89\n f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01\n f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8\n RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003\n RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88\n R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n Allocated by task 408:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0\n mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0\n cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs]\n allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs]\n cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs]\n kthread+0x394/0x720\n ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n Freed by task 342979:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50\n kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500\n cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs]\n cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs]\n iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520\n __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000\n which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588\n The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of\n freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)\n\n The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8\n head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0\n anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)\n page_type: f5(slab)\n raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001\n raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000\n head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001\n head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000\n head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff\n head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008\n page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\n Memory state around the buggy address:\n ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n \u0026gt;ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ^\n ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n ==================================================================\n\nPOC is available in the link [1].\n\nThe problem triggering process is as follows:\n\nProcess 1 Process 2\n-----------------------------------\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-38051)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio: break and reset virtio devices on device_shutdown()\n\nHongyu reported a hang on kexec in a VM. QEMU reported invalid memory\naccesses during the hang.\n\n\tInvalid read at addr 0x102877002, size 2, region \u0026apos;(null)\u0026apos;, reason: rejected\n\tInvalid write at addr 0x102877A44, size 2, region \u0026apos;(null)\u0026apos;, reason: rejected\n\t...\n\nIt was traced down to virtio-console. Kexec works fine if virtio-console\nis not in use.\n\nThe issue is that virtio-console continues to write to the MMIO even after\nunderlying virtio-pci device is reset.\n\nAdditionally, Eric noticed that IOMMUs are reset before devices, if\ndevices are not reset on shutdown they continue to poke at guest memory\nand get errors from the IOMMU. Some devices get wedged then.\n\nThe problem can be solved by breaking all virtio devices on virtio\nbus shutdown, then resetting them.(CVE-2025-38064)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: CPPC: Fix NULL pointer dereference when nosmp is used\n\nWith nosmp in cmdline, other CPUs are not brought up, leaving\ntheir cpc_desc_ptr NULL. CPU0\u0026apos;s iteration via for_each_possible_cpu()\ndereferences these NULL pointers, causing panic.\n\nPanic backtrace:\n\n[ 0.401123] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000b8\n...\n[ 0.403255] [\u0026lt;ffffffff809a5818\u0026gt;] cppc_allow_fast_switch+0x6a/0xd4\n...\nKernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init!\n\n[ rjw: New subject ](CVE-2025-38113)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngve: add missing NULL check for gve_alloc_pending_packet() in TX DQO\n\ngve_alloc_pending_packet() can return NULL, but gve_tx_add_skb_dqo()\ndid not check for this case before dereferencing the returned pointer.\n\nAdd a missing NULL check to prevent a potential NULL pointer\ndereference when allocation fails.\n\nThis improves robustness in low-memory scenarios.(CVE-2025-38122)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: wwan: t7xx: Fix napi rx poll issue\n\nWhen driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might\nhave been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect\noperation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in\npolling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic.\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1\nOops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\nRIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0\n ? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0\n ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n ? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n ? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620\n napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170\n t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]\n net_rx_action+0x103/0x470\n irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-38123)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncoresight: prevent deactivate active config while enabling the config\n\nWhile enable active config via cscfg_csdev_enable_active_config(),\nactive config could be deactivated via configfs\u0026apos; sysfs interface.\nThis could make UAF issue in below scenario:\n\nCPU0 CPU1\n(sysfs enable) load module\n cscfg_load_config_sets()\n activate config. // sysfs\n (sys_active_cnt == 1)\n...\ncscfg_csdev_enable_active_config()\nlock(csdev-\u0026gt;cscfg_csdev_lock)\n// here load config activate by CPU1\nunlock(csdev-\u0026gt;cscfg_csdev_lock)\n\n deactivate config // sysfs\n (sys_activec_cnt == 0)\n cscfg_unload_config_sets()\n unload module\n\n// access to config_desc which freed\n// while unloading module.\ncscfg_csdev_enable_config\n\nTo address this, use cscfg_config_desc\u0026apos;s active_cnt as a reference count\n which will be holded when\n - activate the config.\n - enable the activated config.\nand put the module reference when config_active_cnt == 0.(CVE-2025-38131)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: phy: mscc: Fix memory leak when using one step timestamping\n\nFix memory leak when running one-step timestamping. When running\none-step sync timestamping, the HW is configured to insert the TX time\ninto the frame, so there is no reason to keep the skb anymore. As in\nthis case the HW will never generate an interrupt to say that the frame\nwas timestamped, then the frame will never released.\nFix this by freeing the frame in case of one-step timestamping.(CVE-2025-38148)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/mlx5: Fix error flow upon firmware failure for RQ destruction\n\nUpon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the\nlast resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned\nregardless of the failure.\n\nNow properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.\n\nIn order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the\nobject again, which results in the following kernel trace:\nrefcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nModules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE)\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1\nTainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\nHardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\npstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nlr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\nsp : ffff80008b81b7e0\nx29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001\nx26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00\nx23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000\nx20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006\nx17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f\nx14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78\nx11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90\nx8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff\nx5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000\nx2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600\nCall trace:\n refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148\n mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib]\n mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib]\n ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core]\n uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs]\n destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs]\n uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs]\n __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs]\n uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs]\n ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs]\n __fput+0xd8/0x2f0\n __fput_sync+0x50/0x70\n __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90\n invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0\n do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8\n el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8(CVE-2025-38161)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()\n\nBefore calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the \u0026apos;channel\u0026apos; value\nis checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8).\nThis seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register\n(PTP_INT_STS) specifications.\n\nHowever, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp-\u0026gt;extts[] with\nonly LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index:\n\n lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...)\n {\n ...\n /* Update Local timestamp */\n extts = \u0026amp;ptp-\u0026gt;extts[channel];\n extts-\u0026gt;ts.tv_sec = sec;\n ...\n }\n\nTo avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO\ninputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8.\n\nDetected using the static analysis tool - Svace.(CVE-2025-38183)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period\n\nGerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet,\nand this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.\n\nWe want to make sure ctl-\u0026gt;perturb_period * HZ will not overflow\nand is positive.\n\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error\nError: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error\nError: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.\n\ntc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value\ntc -s -d qd sh dev lo\nqdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec\n Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)\n backlog 0b 0p requeues 0(CVE-2025-38193)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary\n\nSyzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault\ninjection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn\u0026apos;t\ncheck return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any\nerror propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls\njffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated\nnode.\n\nkernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592!\ninvalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI\nCPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline]\n jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874\n jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388\n jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197\n jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362\n jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301\n generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856\n __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973\n generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline]\n do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735\n do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861\n vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902\n iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685\n do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]\n direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950\n splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896\n do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002\n do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255\n __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\n\nFix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs\nbefore calling jffs2_sum_write_data.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-38194)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/shmem, swap: fix softlockup with mTHP swapin\n\nFollowing softlockup can be easily reproduced on my test machine with:\n\necho always \u0026gt; /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hugepages-64kB/enabled\nswapon /dev/zram0 # zram0 is a 48G swap device\nmkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test\necho 1G \u0026gt; /sys/fs/cgroup/test/memory.max\necho $BASHPID \u0026gt; /sys/fs/cgroup/test/cgroup.procs\nwhile true; do\n dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/test.img bs=1M count=5120\n cat /tmp/test.img \u0026gt; /dev/null\n rm /tmp/test.img\ndone\n\nThen after a while:\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 763s! [cat:5787]\nModules linked in: zram virtiofs\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5787 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G L 6.15.0.orig-gf3021d9246bc-dirty #118 PREEMPT(voluntary)\u00b7\nTainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP\nHardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\nRIP: 0010:mpol_shared_policy_lookup+0xd/0x70\nCode: e9 b8 b4 ff ff 31 c0 c3 cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 8b 1f 48 85 db 74 41 4c 8d 67 08 48 89 fb 48 89 f5 4c 89 e7 e8\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90002b1fc28 EFLAGS: 00000202\nRAX: 00000000001c20ca RBX: 0000000000724e1e RCX: 0000000000000001\nRDX: ffff888118e214c8 RSI: 0000000000057d42 RDI: ffff888118e21518\nRBP: 000000000002bec8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000bf4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001\nR13: 00000000001c20ca R14: 00000000001c20ca R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 00007f03f995c740(0000) GS:ffff88a07ad9a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f03f98f1000 CR3: 0000000144626004 CR4: 0000000000770eb0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n shmem_alloc_folio+0x31/0xc0\n shmem_swapin_folio+0x309/0xcf0\n ? filemap_get_entry+0x117/0x1e0\n ? xas_load+0xd/0xb0\n ? filemap_get_entry+0x101/0x1e0\n shmem_get_folio_gfp+0x2ed/0x5b0\n shmem_file_read_iter+0x7f/0x2e0\n vfs_read+0x252/0x330\n ksys_read+0x68/0xf0\n do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f03f9a46991\nCode: 00 48 8b 15 81 14 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8 20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 97 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec\nRSP: 002b:00007fff3c52bd28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007f03f9a46991\nRDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f03f98ba000 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007fff3c52bd50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f03f9b9a380\nR10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000\nR13: 00007f03f98ba000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nThe reason is simple, readahead brought some order 0 folio in swap cache,\nand the swapin mTHP folio being allocated is in conflict with it, so\nswapcache_prepare fails and causes shmem_swap_alloc_folio to return\n-EEXIST, and shmem simply retries again and again causing this loop.\n\nFix it by applying a similar fix for anon mTHP swapin.\n\nThe performance change is very slight, time of swapin 10g zero folios\nwith shmem (test for 12 times):\nBefore: 2.47s\nAfter: 2.48s\n\n[(CVE-2025-38241)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlib/group_cpus: fix NULL pointer dereference from group_cpus_evenly()\n\nWhile testing null_blk with configfs, echo 0 \u0026gt; poll_queues will trigger\nfollowing panic:\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\nCPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 920 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.15.0-02023-gadbdb95c8696-dirty #1238 PREEMPT(undef)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:__bitmap_or+0x48/0x70\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __group_cpus_evenly+0x822/0x8c0\n group_cpus_evenly+0x2d9/0x490\n blk_mq_map_queues+0x1e/0x110\n null_map_queues+0xc9/0x170 [null_blk]\n blk_mq_update_queue_map+0xdb/0x160\n blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x22b/0x560\n nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]\n nullb_device_poll_queues_store+0xa4/0x130 [null_blk]\n configfs_write_iter+0x109/0x1d0\n vfs_write+0x26e/0x6f0\n ksys_write+0x79/0x180\n __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30\n x64_sys_call+0x45c4/0x45f0\n do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x240\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nRoot cause is that numgrps is set to 0, and ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from\nkcalloc(), and later ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be deferenced.\n\nFix the problem by checking numgrps first in group_cpus_evenly(), and\nreturn NULL directly if numgrps is zero.\n\n[(CVE-2025-38255)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: Fix NULL pointer deference on eir_get_service_data\n\nThe len parameter is considered optional so it can be NULL so it cannot\nbe used for skipping to next entry of EIR_SERVICE_DATA.(CVE-2025-38304)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: Intel: avs: Verify content returned by parse_int_array()\n\nThe first element of the returned array stores its length. If it is 0,\nany manipulation beyond the element at index 0 ends with null-ptr-deref.(CVE-2025-38307)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: Log an error when close_all_cached_dirs fails\n\nUnder low-memory conditions, close_all_cached_dirs() can\u0026apos;t move the\ndentries to a separate list to dput() them once the locks are dropped.\nThis will result in a \u0026quot;Dentry still in use\u0026quot; error, so add an error\nmessage that makes it clear this is what happened:\n\n[ 495.281119] CIFS: VFS: \\\\otters.example.com\\share Out of memory while dropping dentries\n[ 495.281595] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 495.281887] BUG: Dentry ffff888115531138{i=78,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs]\n[ 495.282391] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2329 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xc8/0xf0\n\nAlso, bail out of looping through all tcons as soon as a single\nallocation fails, since we\u0026apos;re already in trouble, and kmalloc() attempts\nfor subseqeuent tcons are likely to fail just like the first one did.(CVE-2025-38321)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPICA: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks\n\nACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5\n\nI\u0026apos;m Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of\nSouth Korea.\n\nI have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI\nearly abort cases.\n\nBoot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:\n[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)\n[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)\n[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter\n[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)\n[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10\n[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.361873] Call Trace:\n[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f\n[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80\n[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f\n[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0\n[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a\n[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0\n[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100\n[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30\n\nI analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that \u201cAcpi-State\u201d cache and\n\u201cAcpi-Parse\u201d cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same\nslab cache size.\n\nI finally found \u201cAcpi-Parse\u201d cache and \u201cAcpi-parse_ext\u201d cache were leaked\nusing SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.\n\nReal ACPI cache leak point is as follows:\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)\n[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)\n[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)\n[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter\n[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)\n[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8\n[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.372000] Call Trace:\n[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f\n[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80\n[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f\n[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0\n[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a\n[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0\n[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100\n[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30\n[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects\n[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W\n4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8\n[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS\nvirtual_box 12/01/2006\n[ 0.392000] Call Trace:\n[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81\n[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14\n[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x3\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-38344)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmaple_tree: fix MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag in mas_preallocate()\n\nTemporarily clear the preallocation flag when explicitly requesting\nallocations. Pre-existing allocations are already counted against the\nrequest through mas_node_count_gfp(), but the allocations will not happen\nif the MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag is set. This flag is meant to avoid\nre-allocating in bulk allocation mode, and to detect issues with\npreallocation calculations.\n\nThe MA_STATE_PREALLOC flag should also always be set on zero allocations\nso that detection of underflow allocations will print a WARN_ON() during\nconsumption.\n\nUser visible effect of this flaw is a WARN_ON() followed by a null pointer\ndereference when subsequent requests for larger number of nodes is\nignored, such as the vma merge retry in mmap_region() caused by drivers\naltering the vma flags (which happens in v6.6, at least)(CVE-2025-38364)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU\n\nTransport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport\nfrom becoming a stale pointer.\n\nThis also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();\nadd a lockdep assert.\n\nBUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN\nRIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600\nCall Trace:\n vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40\n __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100\n __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38461)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU\n\nvsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload.\ntransport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.\n\nIntroduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential\nnull-ptr-deref.\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90\nCall Trace:\n __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720\n vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0\nCall Trace:\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-38462)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto\n\nThe CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from\ncrypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous.\nHowever, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause\nuse-after-free crashes:\n\n crypt_message()\n // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req\n creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., \u0026amp;req);\n\n // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately\n rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);\n\n // Free creq while async operation is still in progress\n kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);\n\nHardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for\nperformance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS,\nthe operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(),\nthe function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes\nwhen the driver later accesses the freed memory.\n\nThis results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto\ndriver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel\ncrashes with NULL pointer dereferences.\n\nThe issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn\u0026apos;t\nguarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in\nthe mask, async implementations can be selected.\n\nFix by restoring the async crypto handling:\n- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking\n- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification\n- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion\n\nThis ensures the request buffer isn\u0026apos;t freed until the crypto operation\ncompletes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the\nCVE-2024-50047 fix.(CVE-2025-38488)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns\n\nWhat we want is to verify there is that clone won\u0026apos;t expose something\nhidden by a mount we wouldn\u0026apos;t be able to undo. \u0026quot;Wouldn\u0026apos;t be able to undo\u0026quot;\nmay be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from\nlacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.\n\nclone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.\n\nThere\u0026apos;s a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various\nuserns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve\ndifferent purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,\nbut not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.(CVE-2025-38499)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation\n\nWe have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between\nsubflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to\ntrigger.\n\nThe solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition\n\u0026apos;socket state prevent any additional subflow creation\u0026apos; protected by the\nfallback lock.\n\nThe socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending\nan MP_FAIL option.\n\nThe field \u0026apos;allow_infinite_fallback\u0026apos; is now always touched under the\nrelevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write.(CVE-2025-38552)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: use aead_request_free to match aead_request_alloc\n\nUse aead_request_free() instead of kfree() to properly free memory\nallocated by aead_request_alloc(). This ensures sensitive crypto data\nis zeroed before being freed.(CVE-2025-38575)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPM / devfreq: Check governor before using governor-\u0026gt;name\n\nCommit 96ffcdf239de (\u0026quot;PM / devfreq: Remove redundant governor_name from\nstruct devfreq\u0026quot;) removes governor_name and uses governor-\u0026gt;name to replace\nit. But devfreq-\u0026gt;governor may be NULL and directly using\ndevfreq-\u0026gt;governor-\u0026gt;name may cause null pointer exception. Move the check of\ngovernor to before using governor-\u0026gt;name.(CVE-2025-38609)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump\n\nThere is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():\n if (res \u0026lt; 0) {\n nf_conntrack_get(\u0026amp;ct-\u0026gt;ct_general); // HERE\n cb-\u0026gt;args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;\n ...\n\nWhile its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.\nIf this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.\nThis 2nd increment is never undone.\n\nThis prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn\nkeeps prevents cnet-\u0026gt;count from dropping back to 0.\n\nThis will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as\nnf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.\n\nThis can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.\nIt takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before\nI see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.\n\nOne fix would to change this to:\n if (res \u0026lt; 0) {\n\t\tif (ct != last)\n\t nf_conntrack_get(\u0026amp;ct-\u0026gt;ct_general);\n\nBut this reference counting isn\u0026apos;t needed in the first place.\nWe can just store a cookie value instead.\n\nA followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,\nit looks to me as if this has the same problem and like\nctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a \u0026apos;skip hint\u0026apos;, not the actual\nobject so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.(CVE-2025-38721)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference\n\nThe qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error,\nbut qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error\npointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers\nto NULL.(CVE-2025-39676)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list\n\nEach recvmsg() call must process either\n - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)\n - one non-DATA record\n\nIf the next record has different type than what has already been\nprocessed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record\nhas already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where\nwe don\u0026apos;t know type until decryption) we queue the pending record\nto the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.\n\nQueuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,\nsince in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,\nand we don\u0026apos;t have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext\nskb for access to metadata like length).\n\nOnly data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing\nloop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and\nthen find out that the record type has changed. The corner case\nwe missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it\u0026apos;s\nzero length.(CVE-2025-39682)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time\n\nTo prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time.\nUse the appropriate helper function for this.(CVE-2025-39702)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: samsung: Fix UBSAN panic in samsung_clk_init()\n\nWith UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I\u0026apos;m hitting the below panic due to\ndereferencing `ctx-\u0026gt;clk_data.hws` before setting\n`ctx-\u0026gt;clk_data.num = nr_clks`. Move that up to fix the crash.\n\n UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n \u0026lt;snip\u0026gt;\n Call trace:\n samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P)\n samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L)\n samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0\n exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64\n __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60\n ...(CVE-2025-39728)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: Prevent file descriptor table allocations exceeding INT_MAX\n\nWhen sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816\nas set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near\nthe limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed\nINT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288\n\nThis happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the\nrequested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is\nnot flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.\n\nSpecifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a\nprocess calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate:\n- File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes\n- Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB\n- Total allocation size: \u0026gt; 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)\n\nReproducer:\n1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816:\n # echo 1073741816 \u0026gt; /proc/sys/fs/nr_open\n\n2. Run a program that uses a high file descriptor:\n #include \u0026lt;unistd.h\u0026gt;\n #include \u0026lt;sys/resource.h\u0026gt;\n\n int main() {\n struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824};\n setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, \u0026amp;rlim);\n dup2(2, 1073741880); // Triggers the warning\n return 0;\n }\n\n3. Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027\n\nsystemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the\nmaximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory\ncontrol groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits\nsince memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked\nthat:\n\n1. The kernel\u0026apos;s allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum\n size regardless of memcg accounting\n2. Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can\n inadvertently trigger massive allocations\n3. The resulting allocations (\u0026gt;8GB) are impractical and will always fail\n\nsystemd\u0026apos;s algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value\nuntil the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open\nbeing set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file\ndescriptors.\n\nWhile processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal\noperation, certain selftests (like\ntools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file\ndescriptor limits can trigger this issue.\n\nFix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested\nallocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to\nfail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the\nimpractical \u0026gt;8GB memory allocation request.(CVE-2025-39756)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gso: Forbid IPv6 TSO with extensions on devices with only IPV6_CSUM\n\nWhen performing Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) on an IPv6 packet that\ncontains extension headers, the kernel incorrectly requests checksum offload\nif the egress device only advertises NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM feature, which has\na strict contract: it supports checksum offload only for plain TCP or UDP\nover IPv6 and explicitly does not support packets with extension headers.\nThe current GSO logic violates this contract by failing to disable the feature\nfor packets with extension headers, such as those used in GREoIPv6 tunnels.\n\nThis violation results in the device being asked to perform an operation\nit cannot support, leading to a `skb_warn_bad_offload` warning and a collapse\nof network throughput. While device TSO/USO is correctly bypassed in favor\nof software GSO for these packets, the GSO stack must be explicitly told not\nto request checksum offload.\n\nMask NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, NETIF_F_TSO6 and NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4\nin gso_features_check if the IPv6 header contains extension headers to compute\nchecksum in software.\n\nThe exception is a BIG TCP extension, which, as stated in commit\n68e068cabd2c6c53 (\u0026quot;net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets\u0026quot;):\n\u0026quot;The feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO.\nThe header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump,\nand not transmitted by physical devices.\u0026quot;\n\nkernel log output (truncated):\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5273 at net/core/dev.c:3535 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x81/0x140\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n skb_checksum_help+0x12a/0x1f0\n validate_xmit_skb+0x1a3/0x2d0\n validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4f/0x80\n sch_direct_xmit+0x1a2/0x380\n __dev_xmit_skb+0x242/0x670\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x3fc/0x7f0\n ip6_finish_output2+0x25e/0x5d0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_tnl_xmit+0x608/0xc00 [ip6_tunnel]\n ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x1c0/0x390 [ip6_gre]\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x63/0x1c0\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d0/0x7f0\n ip6_finish_output2+0x214/0x5d0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0\n ip6_finish_output+0x1fc/0x3f0\n ip6_xmit+0x2ca/0x6f0\n inet6_csk_xmit+0xeb/0x150\n __tcp_transmit_skb+0x555/0xa80\n tcp_write_xmit+0x32a/0xe90\n tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x437/0x1110\n tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50\n...\nskb linear: 00000000: e4 3d 1a 7d ec 30 e4 3d 1a 7e 5d 90 86 dd 60 0e\nskb linear: 00000010: 00 0a 1b 34 3c 40 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 11 2f 00 04 01 04 01 01 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000040: 86 dd 60 0e 00 0a 1b 00 06 40 20 23 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 20 23 00 00 00 00\nskb linear: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 bf 96 14 51 13 f9\nskb linear: 00000070: ae 27 a0 a8 2b e3 80 18 00 40 5b 6f 00 00 01 01\nskb linear: 00000080: 08 0a 42 d4 50 d5 4b 70 f8 1a(CVE-2025-39770)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: initialize more fields in sctp_v6_from_sk()\n\nsyzbot found that sin6_scope_id was not properly initialized,\nleading to undefined behavior.\n\nClear sin6_scope_id and sin6_flowinfo.\n\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649\n __sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x887/0x8c0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:649\n sctp_inet6_cmp_addr+0x4f2/0x510 net/sctp/ipv6.c:983\n sctp_bind_addr_conflict+0x22a/0x3b0 net/sctp/bind_addr.c:390\n sctp_get_port_local+0x21eb/0x2440 net/sctp/socket.c:8452\n sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8523 [inline]\n sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline]\n sctp_inet_listen+0x710/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636\n __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline]\n __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline]\n __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline]\n __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline]\n __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930\n x64_sys_call+0x271d/0x3e20 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:51\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nLocal variable addr.i.i created at:\n sctp_get_port net/sctp/socket.c:8515 [inline]\n sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8567 [inline]\n sctp_inet_listen+0x650/0xfd0 net/sctp/socket.c:8636\n __sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1912 [inline]\n __sys_listen net/socket.c:1927 [inline]\n __do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1932 [inline]\n __se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1930 [inline]\n __x64_sys_listen+0x343/0x4c0 net/socket.c:1930(CVE-2025-39812)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: lpfc: Fix buffer free/clear order in deferred receive path\n\nFix a use-after-free window by correcting the buffer release sequence in\nthe deferred receive path. The code freed the RQ buffer first and only\nthen cleared the context pointer under the lock. Concurrent paths (e.g.,\nABTS and the repost path) also inspect and release the same pointer under\nthe lock, so the old order could lead to double-free/UAF.\n\nNote that the repost path already uses the correct pattern: detach the\npointer under the lock, then free it after dropping the lock. The\ndeferred path should do the same.(CVE-2025-39841)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm\n\nWhen send a broadcast packet to a tap device, which was added to a bridge,\nbr_nf_local_in() is called to confirm the conntrack. If another conntrack\nwith the same hash value is added to the hash table, which can be\ntriggered by a normal packet to a non-bridge device, the below warning\nmay happen.\n\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 96 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:632 br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 96 Comm: tap_send Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-dirty #44 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x168/0x200\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n nf_hook_slow+0x3e/0xf0\n br_pass_frame_up+0x103/0x180\n br_handle_frame_finish+0x2de/0x5b0\n br_nf_hook_thresh+0xc0/0x120\n br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x168/0x3a0\n br_nf_pre_routing+0x237/0x5e0\n br_handle_frame+0x1ec/0x3c0\n __netif_receive_skb_core+0x225/0x1210\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x37/0xa0\n netif_receive_skb+0x36/0x160\n tun_get_user+0xa54/0x10c0\n tun_chr_write_iter+0x65/0xb0\n vfs_write+0x305/0x410\n ksys_write+0x60/0xd0\n do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nTo solve the hash conflict, nf_ct_resolve_clash() try to merge the\nconntracks, and update skb-\u0026gt;_nfct. However, br_nf_local_in() still use the\nold ct from local variable \u0026apos;nfct\u0026apos; after confirm(), which leads to this\nwarning.\n\nIf confirm() does not insert the conntrack entry and return NF_DROP, the\nwarning may also occur. There is no need to reserve the WARN_ON_ONCE, just\nremove it.(CVE-2025-39894)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer\n\nSince commit 7d5e9737efda (\u0026quot;net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from\ndevice property\u0026quot;) rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly\nuninitialized \u0026quot;const char *type_name;\u0026quot; local variable.\n\nOn x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a \u0026quot;BCM4752\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;LNV4752\u0026quot;\nacpi_device, the rfkill-\u0026gt;type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id:\n\n rfkill-\u0026gt;type = (unsigned)id-\u0026gt;driver_data;\n\nand there is no \u0026quot;type\u0026quot; property so device_property_read_string() will fail\nand leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash.\n\nrfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash\nby initializing type_name to NULL.\n\nNote likely sofar this has not been caught because:\n\n1. Not many x86 machines actually have a \u0026quot;BCM4752\u0026quot;/\u0026quot;LNV4752\u0026quot; acpi_device\n2. The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored(CVE-2025-39937)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().\n\nsyzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk\nin the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]\n\nsyzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before\nthe TFO socket completes 3WHS:\n\n 1. accept()\n 2. connect(AF_UNSPEC)\n 3. connect() to another destination\n\nAs of accept(), sk-\u0026gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes\nit to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.\n\nSince tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)-\u0026gt;fastopen_rsk, the\nretransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not\nretransmitted.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().\n\n[0]:\nWARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))\nCode: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017\nRDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400\nRBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8\nR10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540\nR13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738)\n call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747)\n __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372)\n timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135)\n tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035)\n __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1))\n tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096)\n handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580)\n irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696)\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35))\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;(CVE-2025-39955)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group\n\nThe kernel forbids the creation of non-FDB nexthop groups with FDB\nnexthops:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.1 fdb\n # ip nexthop add id 2 group 1\n Error: Non FDB nexthop group cannot have fdb nexthops.\n\nAnd vice versa:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 3 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 4 group 3 fdb\n Error: FDB nexthop group can only have fdb nexthops.\n\nHowever, as long as no routes are pointing to a non-FDB nexthop group,\nthe kernel allows changing the type of a nexthop from FDB to non-FDB and\nvice versa:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 5 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 6 group 5\n # ip nexthop replace id 5 via 192.0.2.2 fdb\n # echo $?\n 0\n\nThis configuration is invalid and can result in a NPD [1] since FDB\nnexthops are not associated with a nexthop device:\n\n # ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 6\n # ping 198.51.100.1\n\nFix by preventing nexthop FDB status change while the nexthop is in a\ngroup:\n\n # ip nexthop add id 7 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1\n # ip nexthop add id 8 group 7\n # ip nexthop replace id 7 via 192.0.2.2 fdb\n Error: Cannot change nexthop FDB status while in a group.\n\n[1]\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0\n[...]\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP\nCPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 367 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc6-virtme-gb65678cacc03 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:fib_lookup_good_nhc+0x1e/0x80\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n fib_table_lookup+0x541/0x650\n ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2ea/0x970\n ip_route_output_key_hash+0x55/0x80\n __ip4_datagram_connect+0x250/0x330\n udp_connect+0x2b/0x60\n __sys_connect+0x9c/0xd0\n __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20\n do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x2a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53(CVE-2025-39980)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup\n\nOn the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp\nbefore connections with valid cp-\u0026gt;app pointers are flushed, leading to a\nuse-after-free.\n\nFix this by introducing a global `exiting_module` flag, set to true in\nip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In\n__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns\ncleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to\n__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections\nare flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp\nimmediately.(CVE-2025-40018)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs\n\nWhen the initialization of qm-\u0026gt;debug.acc_diff_reg fails,\nthe probe process does not exit. However, after qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs is\nfreed, it is not set to NULL. This can lead to a double free when the\nremove process attempts to free it again. Therefore, qm-\u0026gt;debug.qm_diff_regs\nshould be set to NULL after it is freed.(CVE-2025-40062)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr\n\nSyzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program:\n\n 0: r0 = 0\n 1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60)\n 2: exit\n\nwhich triggers:\n\n verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)\n\nThis is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an\nimplicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this\npadding isn\u0026apos;t rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later\nfails to convert the access.\n\nThis patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of\nbpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access.\n\nI checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and\ndidn\u0026apos;t find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled)\npadding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.(CVE-2025-40078)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: hisilicon/qm - request reserved interrupt for virtual function\n\nThe device interrupt vector 3 is an error interrupt for\nphysical function and a reserved interrupt for virtual function.\nHowever, the driver has not registered the reserved interrupt for\nvirtual function. When allocating interrupts, the number of interrupts\nis allocated based on powers of two, which includes this interrupt.\nWhen the system enables GICv4 and the virtual function passthrough\nto the virtual machine, releasing the interrupt in the driver\ntriggers a warning.\n\nThe WARNING report is:\nWARNING: CPU: 62 PID: 14889 at arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-its.c:852 its_free_ite+0x94/0xb4\n\nTherefore, register a reserved interrupt for VF and set the\nIRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag to avoid that warning.(CVE-2025-40136)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: avoid NULL dereference when chunk data buffer is missing\n\nchunk-\u0026gt;skb pointer is dereferenced in the if-block where it\u0026apos;s supposed\nto be NULL only.\n\nchunk-\u0026gt;skb can only be NULL if chunk-\u0026gt;head_skb is not. Check for frag_list\ninstead and do it just before replacing chunk-\u0026gt;skb. We\u0026apos;re sure that\notherwise chunk-\u0026gt;skb is non-NULL because of outer if() condition.(CVE-2025-40240)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields\n\nThe validation of the set(nsh(...)) action is completely wrong.\nIt runs through the nsh_key_put_from_nlattr() function that is the\nsame function that validates NSH keys for the flow match and the\npush_nsh() action. However, the set(nsh(...)) has a very different\nmemory layout. Nested attributes in there are doubled in size in\ncase of the masked set(). That makes proper validation impossible.\n\nThere is also confusion in the code between the \u0026apos;masked\u0026apos; flag, that\nsays that the nested attributes are doubled in size containing both\nthe value and the mask, and the \u0026apos;is_mask\u0026apos; that says that the value\nwe\u0026apos;re parsing is the mask. This is causing kernel crash on trying to\nwrite into mask part of the match with SW_FLOW_KEY_PUT() during\nvalidation, while validate_nsh() doesn\u0026apos;t allocate any memory for it:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 1c2383067 P4D 1c2383067 PUD 20b703067 PMD 0\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 8 UID: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #107 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n RIP: 0010:nsh_key_put_from_nlattr+0x19d/0x610 [openvswitch]\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n validate_nsh+0x60/0x90 [openvswitch]\n validate_set.constprop.0+0x270/0x3c0 [openvswitch]\n __ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x477/0x860 [openvswitch]\n ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x8d/0x100 [openvswitch]\n ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x1cc/0x310 [openvswitch]\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdb/0x130\n genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220\n genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100\n genl_rcv+0x24/0x40\n netlink_unicast+0x280/0x3b0\n netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x36b/0x3a0\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0\n __sys_sendmsg+0x6d/0xd0\n do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe third issue with this process is that while trying to convert\nthe non-masked set into masked one, validate_set() copies and doubles\nthe size of the OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH as if it didn\u0026apos;t have any nested\nattributes. It should be copying each nested attribute and doubling\nthem in size independently. And the process must be properly reversed\nduring the conversion back from masked to a non-masked variant during\nthe flow dump.\n\nIn the end, the only two outcomes of trying to use this action are\neither validation failure or a kernel crash. And if somehow someone\nmanages to install a flow with such an action, it will most definitely\nnot do what it is supposed to, since all the keys and the masks are\nmixed up.\n\nFixing all the issues is a complex task as it requires re-writing\nmost of the validation code.\n\nGiven that and the fact that this functionality never worked since\nintroduction, let\u0026apos;s just remove it altogether. It\u0026apos;s better to\nre-introduce it later with a proper implementation instead of trying\nto fix it in stable releases.(CVE-2025-40254)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_mon_reinit_self().\n\nsyzbot reported use-after-free of tipc_net(net)-\u0026gt;monitors[]\nin tipc_mon_reinit_self(). [0]\n\nThe array is protected by RTNL, but tipc_mon_reinit_self()\niterates over it without RTNL.\n\ntipc_mon_reinit_self() is called from tipc_net_finalize(),\nwhich is always under RTNL except for tipc_net_finalize_work().\n\nLet\u0026apos;s hold RTNL in tipc_net_finalize_work().\n\n[0]:\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff88805eae1030 by task kworker/0:7/5989\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5989 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025\nWorkqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482\n kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595\n __kasan_check_byte+0x2a/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:568\n kasan_check_byte include/linux/kasan.h:399 [inline]\n lock_acquire+0x8d/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5842\n __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]\n _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa7/0xf0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162\n rtlock_slowlock kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1894 [inline]\n rwbase_rtmutex_lock_state kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:160 [inline]\n rwbase_write_lock+0xd3/0x7e0 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244\n rt_write_lock+0x76/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:243\n write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_rt.h:99 [inline]\n tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x79/0x430 net/tipc/monitor.c:718\n tipc_net_finalize+0x115/0x190 net/tipc/net.c:140\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3319\n worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400\n kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463\n ret_from_fork+0x439/0x7d0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nAllocated by task 6089:\n kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]\n kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68\n poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:388 [inline]\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:405\n kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1a8/0x320 mm/slub.c:4407\n kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]\n kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]\n tipc_mon_create+0xc3/0x4d0 net/tipc/monitor.c:657\n tipc_enable_bearer net/tipc/bearer.c:357 [inline]\n __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0xe16/0x13f0 net/tipc/bearer.c:1047\n __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:371 [inline]\n tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3bc/0x5f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:393\n tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:-1 [inline]\n tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x83c/0xbe0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1321\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x215/0x300 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115\n genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]\n genl_rcv_msg+0x60e/0x790 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552\n genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x846/0xa10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346\n netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:729\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x508/0x820 net/socket.c:2614\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668\n __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline]\n __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1a1/0x260 net/socket.c:2703\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-40280)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: prevent possible shift-out-of-bounds in sctp_transport_update_rto\n\nsyzbot reported a possible shift-out-of-bounds [1]\n\nBlamed commit added rto_alpha_max and rto_beta_max set to 1000.\n\nIt is unclear if some sctp users are setting very large rto_alpha\nand/or rto_beta.\n\nIn order to prevent user regression, perform the test at run time.\n\nAlso add READ_ONCE() annotations as sysctl values can change under us.\n\n[1]\n\nUBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sctp/transport.c:509:41\nshift exponent 64 is too large for 32-bit type \u0026apos;unsigned int\u0026apos;\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16704 Comm: syz.2.2320 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x16c/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:233 [inline]\n __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x27f/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:494\n sctp_transport_update_rto.cold+0x1c/0x34b net/sctp/transport.c:509\n sctp_check_transmitted+0x11c4/0x1c30 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1502\n sctp_outq_sack+0x4ef/0x1b20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1338\n sctp_cmd_process_sack net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:840 [inline]\n sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1372 [inline](CVE-2025-40281)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write\n\nFor the following path not holding the sock lock,\n\n sctp_diag_dump() -\u0026gt; sctp_for_each_endpoint() -\u0026gt; sctp_ep_dump()\n\nmake sure not to exceed bounds in case the address list has grown\nbetween buffer allocation (time-of-check) and write (time-of-use).(CVE-2025-40331)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: replace BUG_ON with bounds check for map-\u0026gt;max_osd\n\nOSD indexes come from untrusted network packets. Boundary checks are\nadded to validate these against map-\u0026gt;max_osd.\n\n[ idryomov: drop BUG_ON in ceph_get_primary_affinity(), minor cosmetic\n edits ](CVE-2025-68283)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds writes in handle_auth_session_key()\n\nThe len field originates from untrusted network packets. Boundary\nchecks have been added to prevent potential out-of-bounds writes when\ndecrypting the connection secret or processing service tickets.\n\n[ idryomov: changelog ](CVE-2025-68284)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()\n\nThe wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client\nreceiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is\nreceived. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install\na new map immediately after freeing the old one\n\n kfree(monc-\u0026gt;monmap);\n monc-\u0026gt;monmap = monmap;\n\n ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap);\n osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap = newmap;\n\nunder client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock respectively, but\nbecause neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it\u0026apos;s possible for\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch and client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch arms in\n\n client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch;\n\ncondition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be\nreproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266\n ...\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290\n ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680\n vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n Allocated by task 13305:\n ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130\n ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0\n ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190\n create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0\n ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680\n vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n Freed by task 9475:\n kfree+0x212/0x290\n handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0\n ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590\n mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0\n ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0\n ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760\n ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650\n process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0\n process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90\n worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0\n kthread+0x2ec/0x300\n ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nRewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While\nat it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be\nexceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than\nonce) and access client-\u0026gt;auth_err under client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex to match\nhow it\u0026apos;s set in finish_auth().\n\nmonmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before\naccessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side\n\nThe hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn\u0026apos;t\nensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking\nappears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU\ncommit bf4c63252490b (\u0026quot;Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU\u0026quot;)\nand not clear if it had purpose since then.\n\nCurrently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere\nthan the ordered hdev-\u0026gt;workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.\ncommit 5af1f84ed13a (\u0026quot;Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync\u0026quot;)\nintroduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before\nit. It\u0026apos;s better to do the locking so that even if these run\nconcurrently no UAF is possible.\n\nMove the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to\nprotocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section\nto cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.\n\nsyzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:\n\n [Task hdev-\u0026gt;workqueue] [Task 2]\n hci_disconnect_all_sync\n l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)\n hci_conn_get(hcon)\n hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)\n hci_dev_lock\n hci_dev_lock\n hci_conn_del(hcon)\n v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock\n hci_conn_put(hcon)\n conn = hcon-\u0026gt;l2cap_data (UAF)(CVE-2025-68304)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()\n\nIn ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to\nthe rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; check\nand sets \u0026apos;result = true\u0026apos;. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing\nextra files to be measured by IMA.\n\nThis issue can be reproduced in the following scenario:\nAfter unloading the SELinux policy module via \u0026apos;semodule -d\u0026apos;, if an IMA\nmeasurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated,\nin ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the \u0026apos;if (rc == -ESTALE \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n!rule_reinitialized)\u0026apos; block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In\nima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule\nbecomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns\n-ENOENT. This bypasses the \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; check and results in a false match.\n\nCall trace:\n selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8\n security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0\n ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0\n ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8\n ima_get_action+0x48/0x60\n process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98\n ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8\n security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78\n search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318\n exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8\n bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130\n do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258\n __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0\n do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n el0_svc+0x44/0x200\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0\n\nFix this by changing \u0026apos;if (!rc)\u0026apos; to \u0026apos;if (rc \u0026lt;= 0)\u0026apos; to ensure that error\ncodes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a\nsuccessful match.(CVE-2025-68740)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix invalid prog-\u0026gt;stats access when update_effective_progs fails\n\nSyzkaller triggers an invalid memory access issue following fault\ninjection in update_effective_progs. The issue can be described as\nfollows:\n\n__cgroup_bpf_detach\n update_effective_progs\n compute_effective_progs\n bpf_prog_array_alloc \u0026lt;-- fault inject\n purge_effective_progs\n /* change to dummy_bpf_prog */\n array-\u0026gt;items[index] = \u0026amp;dummy_bpf_prog.prog\n\n---softirq start---\n__do_softirq\n ...\n __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb\n __bpf_prog_run_save_cb\n bpf_prog_run\n stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog-\u0026gt;stats)\n /* invalid memory access */\n flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(\u0026amp;stats-\u0026gt;syncp)\n---softirq end---\n\n static_branch_dec(\u0026amp;cgroup_bpf_enabled_key[atype])\n\nThe reason is that fault injection caused update_effective_progs to fail\nand then changed the original prog into dummy_bpf_prog.prog in\npurge_effective_progs. Then a softirq came, and accessing the members of\ndummy_bpf_prog.prog in the softirq triggers invalid mem access.\n\nTo fix it, skip updating stats when stats is NULL.(CVE-2025-68742)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query\n\nThe ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls:\nETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and\nETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.\n\nIf the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device\nreconfiguration), userspace\u0026apos;s buffer allocation will be incorrect,\npotentially leading to buffer overflow.\n\nDrivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some\ndrivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making\nthis scenario possible.\n\nSome drivers try to handle this internally:\n- bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not\n equal to the driver\u0026apos;s stats count.\n- micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond\n stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.\n\nHowever, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value\nreturned from get_sset_count(), hence won\u0026apos;t solve the issue described\nhere.\n\nChange ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(),\nethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch\nbetween userspace\u0026apos;s size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer\noverflow.\nThe returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that\nnothing has been returned.\n\nThis could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool,\ndepending on when the size change is detected:\n1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings():\n # ethtool -S eth2\n no stats available\n\n2. When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.\n\nBoth cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call\nshould succeed.\n\nOther than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no\noutput/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting\nincorrect/shifted stats.\nI also considered returning an error instead of a \u0026quot;silent\u0026quot; response, but\nthat seems more destructive towards userspace apps.\n\nNotes:\n- This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure\n that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more\n predictable behavior.\n\n- RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between\n the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.\n\n- Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that\n these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications\n which might not fill it. The added code checks that it\u0026apos;s not zero,\n to prevent any regressions.(CVE-2025-68795)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: xattr: fix null pointer deref in ext4_raw_inode()\n\nIf ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED),\niloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()\nlacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference\nin ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2025-68820)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: hns3: using the num_tqps in the vf driver to apply for resources\n\nCurrently, hdev-\u0026gt;htqp is allocated using hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps, and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp\nis allocated using kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps. However, kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps is set to\nmin(new_tqps, hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps); Therefore, kinfo-\u0026gt;num_tqps may be smaller\nthan hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps, which causes some hdev-\u0026gt;htqp[i] to remain\nuninitialized in hclgevf_knic_setup().\n\nThus, this patch allocates hdev-\u0026gt;htqp and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp using hdev-\u0026gt;num_tqps,\nensuring that the lengths of hdev-\u0026gt;htqp and kinfo-\u0026gt;tqp are consistent\nand that all elements are properly initialized.(CVE-2025-71064)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset\n\n`qfq_class-\u0026gt;leaf_qdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen \u0026gt; 0` does not imply that the class\nitself is active.\n\nTwo qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens\nwhen:\n\n1. one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and\n\n2. another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get()\n/ qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function\ntc_new_tfilter.\n\nWhen packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared\nleaf_qdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ\nqdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters\nqfq_reset() with its own q-\u0026gt;q.qlen == 0, but its class\u0026apos;s leaf\nqdisc-\u0026gt;q.qlen \u0026gt; 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate\nan inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg:\n\n[ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n[ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n[ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0\n[ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE\n[ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2))\n[ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0\n\nCode starting with the faulting instruction\n===========================================\n 0:\t0f 84 4d 01 00 00 \tje 0x153\n 6:\t48 89 70 18 \tmov %rsi,0x18(%rax)\n a:\t8b 4b 10 \tmov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx\n d:\t48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff \tmov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx\n 14:\t48 8b 78 08 \tmov 0x8(%rax),%rdi\n 18:\t48 d3 e2 \tshl %cl,%rdx\n 1b:\t48 21 f2 \tand %rsi,%rdx\n 1e:\t48 2b 13 \tsub (%rbx),%rdx\n 21:\t48 8b 30 \tmov (%rax),%rsi\n 24:\t48 d3 ea \tshr %cl,%rdx\n 27:\t8b 4b 18 \tmov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx\n\t...\n[ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000\n[ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880\n[ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0\n[ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 0.910391] Call Trace:\n[ 0.910527] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485)\n[ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036)\n[ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076)\n[ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447)\n[ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\n[ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861)\n[ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\n[ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\n[ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706)\n[ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af\n---truncated---(CVE-2026-22976)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()\n\nsyzbot is reporting\n\n unregister_netdevice: waiting for sit0 to become free. Usage count = 2\n\nproblem. A debug printk() patch found that a refcount is obtained at\nxdp_convert_md_to_buff() from bpf_prog_test_run_xdp().\n\nAccording to commit ec94670fcb3b (\u0026quot;bpf: Support specifying ingress via\nxdp_md context in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN\u0026quot;), the refcount obtained by\nxdp_convert_md_to_buff() will be released by xdp_convert_buff_to_md().\n\nTherefore, we can consider that the error handling path introduced by\ncommit 1c1949982524 (\u0026quot;bpf: introduce frags support to\nbpf_prog_test_run_xdp()\u0026quot;) forgot to call xdp_convert_buff_to_md().(CVE-2026-22994)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio()\n\nWang Zhaolong reports a deadlock involving NFSv4.1 state recovery\nwaiting on kthreadd, which is attempting to reclaim memory by calling\nnfs_release_folio(). The latter cannot make progress due to state\nrecovery being needed.\n\nIt seems that the only safe thing to do here is to kick off a writeback\nof the folio, without waiting for completion, or else kicking off an\nasynchronous commit.(CVE-2026-23053)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen\n\ndvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the\nDVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which\nreinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.\n\nSince dmxdev-\u0026gt;dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the\nsame DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries\nfrom io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers\nwhile the list head is reset to {self, self}.\n\nThe waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly\ninitialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to\nreset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.\n\nReplace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct\nassignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which\nproperly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering\nwithout touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nregmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure\n\nregcache_maple_write() allocates a new block (\u0026apos;entry\u0026apos;) to merge\nadjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp().\nWhen mas_store_gfp() fails, the new \u0026apos;entry\u0026apos; remains allocated and\nis never freed, leaking memory.\n\nFree \u0026apos;entry\u0026apos; on the failure path; on success continue freeing the\nreplaced neighbor blocks (\u0026apos;lower\u0026apos;, \u0026apos;upper\u0026apos;).(CVE-2026-23260)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management\n\nAn unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by\nopening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by\npassing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the\nprivileged process to write to the interface.\n\nThis does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do\nthe write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is\nachieved full policy management is possible and all the possible\nimplications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or\ntarget applications by denying all execution, by-passing the\nunprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for\na local privilege escalation.\n\nThe policy management interface can not have its permissions simply\nchanged from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able\nto load policy to different policy namespaces.\n\nInstead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that\nare a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already\ndone via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate\naccess to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race\n\nMake sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all\npossible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running\nit with only preemption disabled.\n\nThis opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go\nand free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like\nthe BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmacvlan: observe an RCU grace period in macvlan_common_newlink() error path\n\nvalis reported that a race condition still happens after my prior patch.\n\nmacvlan_common_newlink() might have made @dev visible before\ndetecting an error, and its caller will directly call free_netdev(dev).\n\nWe must respect an RCU period, either in macvlan or the core networking\nstack.\n\nAfter adding a temporary mdelay(1000) in macvlan_forward_source_one()\nto open the race window, valis repro was:\n\nip link add p1 type veth peer p2\nip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1\nip link set up dev p1\nip link set up dev p2\nip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source\n\n(ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add\n00:00:00:00:00:20 \u0026amp;) ; sleep 0.5 ; ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4\nPING 1.2.3.4 (1.2.3.4): 56 data bytes\nRTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source\n(drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888016bb89c0 by task e/175\n\nCPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 175 Comm: e Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #33 NONE\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n\u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\ndump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)\nprint_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nkasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)\n? macvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\nmacvlan_forward_source (drivers/net/macvlan.c:408 drivers/net/macvlan.c:444)\n? tasklet_init (kernel/softirq.c:983)\nmacvlan_handle_frame (drivers/net/macvlan.c:501)\n\nAllocated by task 169:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\nkasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25\nmm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79)\n__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:419)\n__kvmalloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:263 mm/slub.c:5657\nmm/slub.c:7140)\nalloc_netdev_mqs (net/core/dev.c:12012)\nrtnl_create_link (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3648)\nrtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3830 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957\nnet/core/rtnetlink.c:4072)\nrtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\nnetlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\nnetlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\nnetlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)\n__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)\n__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)\n\nFreed by task 169:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58)\nkasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:25\nmm/kasan/common.c:70 mm/kasan/common.c:79)\nkasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587)\n__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287)\nkfree (mm/slub.c:6674 mm/slub.c:6882)\nrtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3845 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3957\nnet/core/rtnetlink.c:4072)\nrtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958)\nnetlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)\nnetlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)\nnetlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)\n__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:727 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)\n__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131)(CVE-2026-23273)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()\n\nIn flush_write_buffer, \u0026amp;p-\u0026gt;frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store\nfunction is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This\nfunction called filp_open(), following which these functions were called\n(in reverse order), according to the call trace:\n\n down_read\n __configfs_open_file\n do_dentry_open\n vfs_open\n do_open\n path_openat\n do_filp_open\n file_open_name\n filp_open\n target_core_item_dbroot_store\n flush_write_buffer\n configfs_write_iter\n\ntarget_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by\ntrying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug\nreport shows:\n\ndb_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot\n\nindicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it\nis currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore\nof the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in\nflush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner\nand a possibility of recursive locking.\n\nFix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path()\ninstead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific\nfunction __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix\ncompatible.(CVE-2026-23292)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: core: Fix refcount leak for tagset_refcnt\n\nThis leak will cause a hang when tearing down the SCSI host. For example,\niscsid hangs with the following call trace:\n\n[130120.652718] scsi_alloc_sdev: Allocation failure during SCSI scanning, some SCSI devices might not be configured\n\nPID: 2528 TASK: ffff9d0408974e00 CPU: 3 COMMAND: \u0026quot;iscsid\u0026quot;\n #0 [ffffb5b9c134b9e0] __schedule at ffffffff860657d4\n #1 [ffffb5b9c134ba28] schedule at ffffffff86065c6f\n #2 [ffffb5b9c134ba40] schedule_timeout at ffffffff86069fb0\n #3 [ffffb5b9c134bab0] __wait_for_common at ffffffff8606674f\n #4 [ffffb5b9c134bb10] scsi_remove_host at ffffffff85bfe84b\n #5 [ffffb5b9c134bb30] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy at ffffffffc03031c4 [iscsi_tcp]\n #6 [ffffb5b9c134bb48] iscsi_if_recv_msg at ffffffffc0292692 [scsi_transport_iscsi]\n #7 [ffffb5b9c134bb98] iscsi_if_rx at ffffffffc02929c2 [scsi_transport_iscsi]\n #8 [ffffb5b9c134bbf0] netlink_unicast at ffffffff85e551d6\n #9 [ffffb5b9c134bc38] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffff85e554ef(CVE-2026-23296)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni40e: Fix preempt count leak in napi poll tracepoint\n\nUsing get_cpu() in the tracepoint assignment causes an obvious preempt\ncount leak because nothing invokes put_cpu() to undo it:\n\n softirq: huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX with preempt_count 00000100, exited with 00000101?\n\nThis clearly has seen a lot of testing in the last 3+ years...\n\nUse smp_processor_id() instead.(CVE-2026-23313)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: Return the correct value in vmw_translate_ptr functions\n\nBefore the referenced fixes these functions used a lookup function that\nreturned a pointer. This was changed to another lookup function that\nreturned an error code with the pointer becoming an out parameter.\n\nThe error path when the lookup failed was not changed to reflect this\nchange and the code continued to return the PTR_ERR of the now\nuninitialized pointer. This could cause the vmw_translate_ptr functions\nto return success when they actually failed causing further uninitialized\nand OOB accesses.(CVE-2026-23317)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\n\nThe root cause of this bug is that when \u0026apos;bpf_link_put\u0026apos; reduces the\nrefcount of \u0026apos;shim_link-\u0026gt;link.link\u0026apos; to zero, the resource is considered\nreleased but may still be referenced via \u0026apos;tr-\u0026gt;progs_hlist\u0026apos; in\n\u0026apos;cgroup_shim_find\u0026apos;. The actual cleanup of \u0026apos;tr-\u0026gt;progs_hlist\u0026apos; in\n\u0026apos;bpf_shim_tramp_link_release\u0026apos; is deferred. During this window, another\nprocess can cause a use-after-free via \u0026apos;bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\u0026apos;.\n\nBased on Martin KaFai Lau\u0026apos;s suggestions, I have created a simple patch.\n\nTo fix this:\n Add an atomic non-zero check in \u0026apos;bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\u0026apos;.\n Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero.\n\nTesting:\n I verified the fix by adding a delay in\n \u0026apos;bpf_shim_tramp_link_release\u0026apos; to make the bug easier to trigger:\n\nstatic void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)\n{\n\t/* ... */\n\tif (!shim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline)\n\t\treturn;\n\n+\tmsleep(100);\n\tWARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(\u0026amp;shim_link-\u0026gt;link,\n\t\tshim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline, NULL));\n\tbpf_trampoline_put(shim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline);\n}\n\nBefore the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%)\nwith a call trace similar to KaiyanM\u0026apos;s report.\nAfter the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of\niterations.(CVE-2026-23319)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory\n\nefi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE\nand EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late().\n\nThere are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for\nmemory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with\nmemblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area().\n\nMore acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y\nefi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the\nmemory map is complete.\n\nBenjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of\nRAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM.\n\nIf the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is\nstill uninitialized, they won\u0026apos;t be actually freed because\nmemblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips\nuninitialized pages.\n\nUsing free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because\n__free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might\nend up in uninitialized part of the memory map.\n\nDelaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic\nbecause in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates\nefi.memmap without any synchronization and that\u0026apos;s undesirable late in\nboot when there is concurrency.\n\nMore robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services\nmemory.\n\nSplit efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services()\ncollects ranges that should be freed into an array then\nefi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete.(CVE-2026-23352)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap\n\nget_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their\nindices into an array without checking bounds.\n\nAlso the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is\nMAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack,\nbut that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could\nbe larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a\nstack-out-of-bounds write.\n\nAdd a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue.\nWhen there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the\nredirect.\n\nTo reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with\nan XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS.\nThen send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path.(CVE-2026-23359)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: fix admin queue leak on controller reset\n\nWhen nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() is called during a controller reset,\na previous admin queue may still exist. Release it properly before\nallocating a new one to avoid orphaning the old queue.\n\nThis fixes a regression introduced by commit 03b3bcd319b3 (\u0026quot;nvme: fix\nadmin request_queue lifetime\u0026quot;).(CVE-2026-23360)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblktrace: fix __this_cpu_read/write in preemptible context\n\ntracing_record_cmdline() internally uses __this_cpu_read() and\n__this_cpu_write() on the per-CPU variable trace_cmdline_save, and\ntrace_save_cmdline() explicitly asserts preemption is disabled via\nlockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(). These operations are only safe\nwhen preemption is off, as they were designed to be called from the\nscheduler context (probe_wakeup_sched_switch() / probe_wakeup()).\n\n__blk_add_trace() was calling tracing_record_cmdline(current) early in\nthe blk_tracer path, before ring buffer reservation, from process\ncontext where preemption is fully enabled. This triggers the following\nusing blktests/blktrace/002:\n\nblktrace/002 (blktrace ftrace corruption with sysfs trace) [failed]\n runtime 0.367s ... 0.437s\n something found in dmesg:\n [ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33\n [ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created\n [ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516\n [ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40\n [ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full)\n [ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST\n [ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n [ 81.362881] Call Trace:\n [ 81.362884] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n [ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0\n ...\n (See \u0026apos;/mnt/sda/blktests/results/nodev/blktrace/002.dmesg\u0026apos; for the entire message)\n\n[ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33\n[ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created\n[ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516\n[ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40\n[ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full)\n[ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST\n[ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[ 81.362881] Call Trace:\n[ 81.362884] \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0\n[ 81.362895] check_preemption_disabled+0xce/0xe0\n[ 81.362902] tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40\n[ 81.362923] __blk_add_trace+0x307/0x5d0\n[ 81.362934] ? lock_acquire+0xe0/0x300\n[ 81.362940] ? iov_iter_extract_pages+0x101/0xa30\n[ 81.362959] blk_add_trace_bio+0x106/0x1e0\n[ 81.362968] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x24b/0x3a0\n[ 81.362979] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x260\n[ 81.362988] submit_bio_wait+0x56/0x90\n[ 81.363009] __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x16c/0x250\n[ 81.363026] ? __pfx_submit_bio_wait_endio+0x10/0x10\n[ 81.363038] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x73/0xa0\n[ 81.363051] blkdev_read_iter+0xc1/0x140\n[ 81.363059] vfs_read+0x20b/0x330\n[ 81.363083] ksys_read+0x67/0xe0\n[ 81.363090] do_syscall_64+0xbf/0xf00\n[ 81.363102] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n[ 81.363106] RIP: 0033:0x7f281906029d\n[ 81.363111] Code: 31 c0 e9 c6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 66 63 0a 00 e8 59 ff 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d 41 33 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec\n[ 81.363113] RSP: 002b:00007ffca127dd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000\n[ 81.363120] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f281906029d\n[ 81.363122] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0000559f8bfae000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 81.363123] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000002863a10a81 R09: 00007f281915f000\n[ 81.363124] R10: 00007f2818f77b60 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559f8bfae000\n[ 81.363126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000a\n[ 81.363142] \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nThe same BUG fires from blk_add_trace_plug(), blk_add_trace_unplug(),\nand blk_add_trace_rq() paths as well.\n\nThe purpose of tracin\n---truncated---(CVE-2026-23374)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing\n\nstruct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT\nallocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT\nbuffer.\n\nBecause the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g.,\nending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails\nto ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.\n\nThis leads to two issues:\n1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the\n structure.\n2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in\n bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT\u0026apos;d code executes ldr. On arm64,\n 64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if\n they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read,\n causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.\n\nFix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes\n(sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of\nthe JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math\nin build_plt() to correctly align the target field.(CVE-2026-23383)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSquashfs: check metadata block offset is within range\n\nSyzkaller reports a \u0026quot;general protection fault in squashfs_copy_data\u0026quot;\n\nThis is ultimately caused by a corrupted index look-up table, which\nproduces a negative metadata block offset.\n\nThis is subsequently passed to squashfs_copy_data (via\nsquashfs_read_metadata) where the negative offset causes an out of bounds\naccess.\n\nThe fix is to check that the offset is within range in\nsquashfs_read_metadata. This will trap this and other cases.(CVE-2026-23388)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0\n\nbigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting\nit.(CVE-2026-31447)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request\n\nIt is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a\nspecific report\u0026apos;s feature request using a completely different report\nID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty\nside-effects such as OOB writes.\n\nAdd a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the\none that was requested. If it doesn\u0026apos;t, omit reporting the raw event and\nreturn early.(CVE-2026-43047)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()\n\nThe memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of\nclearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming\ndata string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have\npreviously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in\nthe subsequent thread of execution.\n\nThe current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the\nmemset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not\nlarge enough to fill the associated report.\n\nSuggested-by Benjamin Tissoires \u0026lt;(CVE-2026-43048)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: close crash window in attr dabtree inactivation\n\nWhen inactivating an inode with node-format extended attributes,\nxfs_attr3_node_inactive() invalidates all child leaf/node blocks via\nxfs_trans_binval(), but intentionally does not remove the corresponding\nentries from their parent node blocks. The implicit assumption is that\nxfs_attr_inactive() will truncate the entire attr fork to zero extents\nafterwards, so log recovery will never reach the root node and follow\nthose stale pointers.\n\nHowever, if a log shutdown occurs after the leaf/node block cancellations\ncommit but before the attr bmap truncation commits, this assumption\nbreaks. Recovery replays the attr bmap intact (the inode still has\nattr fork extents), but suppresses replay of all cancelled leaf/node\nblocks, maybe leaving them as stale data on disk. On the next mount,\nxlog_recover_process_iunlinks() retries inactivation and attempts to\nread the root node via the attr bmap. If the root node was not replayed,\nreading the unreplayed root block triggers a metadata verification\nfailure immediately; if it was replayed, following its child pointers\nto unreplayed child blocks triggers the same failure:\n\n XFS (pmem0): Metadata corruption detected at\n xfs_da3_node_read_verify+0x53/0x220, xfs_da3_node block 0x78\n XFS (pmem0): Unmount and run xfs_repair\n XFS (pmem0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:\n 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n XFS (pmem0): metadata I/O error in \u0026quot;xfs_da_read_buf+0x104/0x190\u0026quot; at daddr 0x78 len 8 error 117\n\nFix this in two places:\n\nIn xfs_attr3_node_inactive(), after calling xfs_trans_binval() on a\nchild block, immediately remove the entry that references it from the\nparent node in the same transaction. This eliminates the window where\nthe parent holds a pointer to a cancelled block. Once all children are\nremoved, the now-empty root node is converted to a leaf block within the\nsame transaction. This node-to-leaf conversion is necessary for crash\nsafety. If the system shutdown after the empty node is written to the\nlog but before the second-phase bmap truncation commits, log recovery\nwill attempt to verify the root block on disk. xfs_da3_node_verify()\ndoes not permit a node block with count == 0; such a block will fail\nverification and trigger a metadata corruption shutdown. on the other\nhand, leaf blocks are allowed to have this transient state.\n\nIn xfs_attr_inactive(), split the attr fork truncation into two explicit\nphases. First, truncate all extents beyond the root block (the child\nextents whose parent references have already been removed above).\nSecond, invalidate the root block and truncate the attr bmap to zero in\na single transaction. The two operations in the second phase must be\natomic: as long as the attr bmap has any non-zero length, recovery can\nfollow it to the root block, so the root block invalidation must commit\ntogether with the bmap-to-zero truncation.(CVE-2026-43053)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRevert \u0026quot;PCI/IOV: Add PCI rescan-remove locking when enabling/disabling SR-IOV\u0026quot;\n\nThis reverts commit 05703271c3cd (\u0026quot;PCI/IOV: Add PCI rescan-remove locking\nwhen enabling/disabling SR-IOV\u0026quot;), which causes a deadlock by recursively\ntaking pci_rescan_remove_lock when sriov_del_vfs() is called as part of\npci_stop_and_remove_bus_device(). For example with the following sequence\nof commands:\n\n $ echo \u0026lt;NUM\u0026gt; \u0026gt; /sys/bus/pci/devices/\u0026lt;pf\u0026gt;/sriov_numvfs\n $ echo 1 \u0026gt; /sys/bus/pci/devices/\u0026lt;pf\u0026gt;/remove\n\nA trimmed trace of the deadlock on a mlx5 device is as below:\n\n zsh/5715 is trying to acquire lock:\n 000002597926ef50 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sriov_disable+0x34/0x140\n\n but task is already holding lock:\n 000002597926ef50 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x24/0x80\n ...\n Call Trace:\n [\u0026lt;00000259778c4f90\u0026gt;] dump_stack_lvl+0xc0/0x110\n [\u0026lt;00000259779c844e\u0026gt;] print_deadlock_bug+0x31e/0x330\n [\u0026lt;00000259779c1908\u0026gt;] __lock_acquire+0x16c8/0x32f0\n [\u0026lt;00000259779bffac\u0026gt;] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x350\n [\u0026lt;00000259789643a6\u0026gt;] __mutex_lock_common+0xe6/0x1520\n [\u0026lt;000002597896413c\u0026gt;] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x50\n [\u0026lt;00000259784a07e4\u0026gt;] sriov_disable+0x34/0x140\n [\u0026lt;00000258f7d6dd80\u0026gt;] mlx5_sriov_disable+0x50/0x80 [mlx5_core]\n [\u0026lt;00000258f7d5745e\u0026gt;] remove_one+0x5e/0xf0 [mlx5_core]\n [\u0026lt;00000259784857fc\u0026gt;] pci_device_remove+0x3c/0xa0\n [\u0026lt;000002597851012e\u0026gt;] device_release_driver_internal+0x18e/0x280\n [\u0026lt;000002597847ae22\u0026gt;] pci_stop_bus_device+0x82/0xa0\n [\u0026lt;000002597847afce\u0026gt;] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x5e/0x80\n [\u0026lt;00000259784972c2\u0026gt;] remove_store+0x72/0x90\n [\u0026lt;0000025977e6661a\u0026gt;] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15a/0x200\n [\u0026lt;0000025977d7241c\u0026gt;] vfs_write+0x24c/0x300\n [\u0026lt;0000025977d72696\u0026gt;] ksys_write+0x86/0x110\n [\u0026lt;000002597895b61c\u0026gt;] __do_syscall+0x14c/0x400\n [\u0026lt;000002597896e0ee\u0026gt;] system_call+0x6e/0x90\n\nThis alone is not a complete fix as it restores the issue the cited commit\ntried to solve. A new fix will be provided as a follow on.(CVE-2026-43147)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: Add support for TSV110 Spectre-BHB mitigation\n\nThe TSV110 processor is vulnerable to the Spectre-BHB (Branch History\nBuffer) attack, which can be exploited to leak information through\nbranch prediction side channels. This commit adds the MIDR of TSV110\nto the list for software mitigation.(CVE-2026-43261)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the kexec_load_purgatory() function derives image-\u0026gt;start by locating e_entry inside an SHF_EXECINSTR section. If the purgatory object contains multiple executable sections with overlapping sh_addr, the entrypoint check can match more than once and trigger a WARN. Derive the entry section from the purgatory_start symbol when present and compute image-\u0026gt;start from its final placement. Keep the existing e_entry fallback for purgatories that do not expose the symbol.(CVE-2026-43289)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, there is a potential out-of-bounds access vulnerability in the ceph_handle_auth_reply() function of the libceph component. When processing messages of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY, the value of the payload_len field is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value, which causes the pointer address to be decremented and subsequently accessed because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation. The vulnerability is fixed by changing the data type of payload_len to u32 and introducing additional sanity checks.(CVE-2026-43407)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, when an alias is found through d_splice_alias in the nfs3_proc_create function, if the alias happens to be a directory dentry, the system does not return any error but simply forgets about this alias, leaving the original dentry to be added as negative. This later causes a system crash in nfs_atomic_open_v23/finish_open since a negative dentry is supplied to do_dentry_open. This issue was observed running lustre-racer, where directories and files are created/removed concurrently with the same name and O_EXCL is not used to open files.(CVE-2026-43470)",
"id": "OESA-2026-2418",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:11:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-22T11:11:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2418"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56611"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56760"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21908"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21931"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21970"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21971"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21980"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21981"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21986"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21995"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22001"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22009"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22071"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22077"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23138"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23157"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37740"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37748"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37766"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37768"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37770"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37771"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37778"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37793"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37805"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37815"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37831"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37844"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37853"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37881"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37889"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37905"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37918"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37947"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37967"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38014"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38037"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38043"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38051"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38064"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38113"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38122"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38123"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38131"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38148"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38161"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38183"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38193"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38194"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38241"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38255"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38304"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38307"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38321"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38344"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38364"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38461"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38462"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38488"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38499"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38552"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38575"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38609"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38721"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39676"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39702"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39728"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39756"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39770"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39812"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39841"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39894"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39937"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39955"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39980"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40018"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40062"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40078"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40136"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40240"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40254"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40280"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40281"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40331"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68283"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68284"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68285"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68304"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68740"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68742"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68795"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68820"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71064"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22976"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22994"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23053"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23253"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23260"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23268"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23271"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23273"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23292"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23296"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23313"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23317"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23319"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23352"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23359"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23360"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23374"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23383"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23388"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31447"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43047"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43048"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43053"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43147"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43261"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43289"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43407"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43470"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-56611",
"CVE-2024-56760",
"CVE-2025-21908",
"CVE-2025-21931",
"CVE-2025-21970",
"CVE-2025-21971",
"CVE-2025-21980",
"CVE-2025-21981",
"CVE-2025-21986",
"CVE-2025-21995",
"CVE-2025-22001",
"CVE-2025-22009",
"CVE-2025-22071",
"CVE-2025-22077",
"CVE-2025-23138",
"CVE-2025-23157",
"CVE-2025-37740",
"CVE-2025-37748",
"CVE-2025-37766",
"CVE-2025-37768",
"CVE-2025-37770",
"CVE-2025-37771",
"CVE-2025-37778",
"CVE-2025-37793",
"CVE-2025-37805",
"CVE-2025-37815",
"CVE-2025-37831",
"CVE-2025-37844",
"CVE-2025-37853",
"CVE-2025-37881",
"CVE-2025-37889",
"CVE-2025-37905",
"CVE-2025-37918",
"CVE-2025-37947",
"CVE-2025-37967",
"CVE-2025-38014",
"CVE-2025-38037",
"CVE-2025-38043",
"CVE-2025-38051",
"CVE-2025-38064",
"CVE-2025-38113",
"CVE-2025-38122",
"CVE-2025-38123",
"CVE-2025-38131",
"CVE-2025-38148",
"CVE-2025-38161",
"CVE-2025-38183",
"CVE-2025-38193",
"CVE-2025-38194",
"CVE-2025-38241",
"CVE-2025-38255",
"CVE-2025-38304",
"CVE-2025-38307",
"CVE-2025-38321",
"CVE-2025-38344",
"CVE-2025-38364",
"CVE-2025-38461",
"CVE-2025-38462",
"CVE-2025-38488",
"CVE-2025-38499",
"CVE-2025-38552",
"CVE-2025-38575",
"CVE-2025-38609",
"CVE-2025-38721",
"CVE-2025-39676",
"CVE-2025-39682",
"CVE-2025-39702",
"CVE-2025-39728",
"CVE-2025-39756",
"CVE-2025-39770",
"CVE-2025-39812",
"CVE-2025-39841",
"CVE-2025-39894",
"CVE-2025-39937",
"CVE-2025-39955",
"CVE-2025-39980",
"CVE-2025-40018",
"CVE-2025-40062",
"CVE-2025-40078",
"CVE-2025-40136",
"CVE-2025-40240",
"CVE-2025-40254",
"CVE-2025-40280",
"CVE-2025-40281",
"CVE-2025-40331",
"CVE-2025-68283",
"CVE-2025-68284",
"CVE-2025-68285",
"CVE-2025-68304",
"CVE-2025-68740",
"CVE-2025-68742",
"CVE-2025-68795",
"CVE-2025-68820",
"CVE-2025-71064",
"CVE-2026-22976",
"CVE-2026-22994",
"CVE-2026-23053",
"CVE-2026-23253",
"CVE-2026-23260",
"CVE-2026-23268",
"CVE-2026-23271",
"CVE-2026-23273",
"CVE-2026-23292",
"CVE-2026-23296",
"CVE-2026-23313",
"CVE-2026-23317",
"CVE-2026-23319",
"CVE-2026-23352",
"CVE-2026-23359",
"CVE-2026-23360",
"CVE-2026-23374",
"CVE-2026-23383",
"CVE-2026-23388",
"CVE-2026-31447",
"CVE-2026-43047",
"CVE-2026-43048",
"CVE-2026-43053",
"CVE-2026-43147",
"CVE-2026-43261",
"CVE-2026-43289",
"CVE-2026-43407",
"CVE-2026-43470"
]
}
OESA-2026-3704 (CVE-2025-71112)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-05 15:04 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:04 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: add VLAN id validation before using
Currently, the VLAN id may be used without validation when receive a VLAN configuration mailbox from VF. The length of vlan_del_fail_bmap is BITS_TO_LONGS(VLAN_N_VID). It may cause out-of-bounds memory access once the VLAN id is bigger than or equal to VLAN_N_VID.
Therefore, VLAN id needs to be checked to ensure it is within the range of VLAN_N_VID.(CVE-2025-71112)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()
strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:
strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-71123)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list().
Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer.
KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80(CVE-2026-23243)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()
nvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to calculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper limit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K).
A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that results in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER.
To fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc().
This bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/(CVE-2026-23244)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering without touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface.
This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation.
The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces.
Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race
Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running it with only preemption disabled.
This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like the BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Return the correct value in vmw_translate_ptr functions
Before the referenced fixes these functions used a lookup function that returned a pointer. This was changed to another lookup function that returned an error code with the pointer becoming an out parameter.
The error path when the lookup failed was not changed to reflect this change and the code continued to return the PTR_ERR of the now uninitialized pointer. This could cause the vmw_translate_ptr functions to return success when they actually failed causing further uninitialized and OOB accesses.(CVE-2026-23317)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim
The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'.
Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch.
To fix this: Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero.
Testing: I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger:
static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link link) { / ... */ if (!shim_link->trampoline) return;
- msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); }
Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report. After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations.(CVE-2026-23319)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap
get_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their indices into an array without checking bounds.
Also the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is MAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack, but that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could be larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a stack-out-of-bounds write.
Add a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue. When there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the redirect.
To reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with an XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS. Then send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path.(CVE-2026-23359)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing
struct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT allocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT buffer.
Because the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g., ending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails to ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.
This leads to two issues: 1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the structure. 2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT'd code executes ldr. On arm64, 64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read, causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.
Fix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes (sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of the JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math in build_plt() to correctly align the target field.(CVE-2026-23383)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: check metadata block offset is within range
Syzkaller reports a "general protection fault in squashfs_copy_data"
This is ultimately caused by a corrupted index look-up table, which produces a negative metadata block offset.
This is subsequently passed to squashfs_copy_data (via squashfs_read_metadata) where the negative offset causes an out of bounds access.
The fix is to check that the offset is within range in squashfs_read_metadata. This will trap this and other cases.(CVE-2026-23388)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl
When page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original loop wasn't updated so it may try to reassign one more page than necessary.
Add the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen.
Also update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset argument.(CVE-2026-43078)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests
AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can update that shared state before the original request has fully completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling.
Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket state.(CVE-2026-46028)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Clear rel_deadline when initializing forked entities
A yield-triggered crash can happen when a newly forked sched_entity enters the fair class with se->rel_deadline unexpectedly set.
The failing sequence is:
- A task is forked while se->rel_deadline is still set.
- __sched_fork() initializes vruntime, vlag and other sched_entity state, but does not clear rel_deadline.
- On the first enqueue, enqueue_entity() calls place_entity().
- Because se->rel_deadline is set, place_entity() treats se->deadline as a relative deadline and converts it to an absolute deadline by adding the current vruntime.
- However, the forked entity's deadline is not a valid inherited relative deadline for this new scheduling instance, so the conversion produces an abnormally large deadline.
- If the task later calls sched_yield(), yield_task_fair() advances se->vruntime to se->deadline.
- The inflated vruntime is then used by the following enqueue path, where the vruntime-derived key can overflow when multiplied by the entity weight.
- This corrupts cfs_rq->sum_w_vruntime, breaks EEVDF eligibility calculation, and can eventually make all entities appear ineligible. pick_next_entity() may then return NULL unexpectedly, leading to a later NULL dereference.
A captured trace shows the effect clearly. Before yield, the entity's vruntime was around:
9834017729983308
After yield_task_fair() executed:
se->vruntime = se->deadline
the vruntime jumped to:
19668035460670230
and the deadline was later advanced further to:
19668035463470230
This shows that the deadline had already become abnormally large before yield_task_fair() copied it into vruntime.
rel_deadline is only meaningful when se->deadline really carries a relative deadline that still needs to be placed against vruntime. A freshly forked sched_entity should not inherit or retain this state. Clear se->rel_deadline in __sched_fork(), together with the other sched_entity runtime state, so that the first enqueue does not interpret the new entity's deadline as a stale relative deadline.(CVE-2026-52980)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - prevent req used-after-free for sec
During packet transmission, if the system is under heavy load, the hardware might complete processing the packet and free the request memory (req) before the transmission function finishes. If the software subsequently accesses this req, a use-after-free error will occur. The qp_ctx memory exists throughout the packet sending process, so replace the req with the qp_ctx.(CVE-2026-53055)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO buffer before it is used.(CVE-2026-53246)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails
dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port() and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the 8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a use-after-free hazard.
Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path.(CVE-2026-53384)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()
When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(), the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds, pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(), which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the tracepoint accesses lo's fields.
Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).(CVE-2026-63800)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms
The sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership state. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the entry through writable BPF ctx->data. This protects entries backed by pages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file page-cache pages.
Several sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact msg->sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can make an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy bit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable ctx->data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache.
Keep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are transferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit when an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed. This covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(), sk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail entry created during TLS open-record splitting.(CVE-2026-63830)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses, passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256 (digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5 (digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=', so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1 base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size, DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is added at the call site to document this.(CVE-2026-63886)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf
iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check the remaining buffer capacity:
*length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
*length += 1;
output_buf = textbuf + *length;
The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the input Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte "a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(). 2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.
The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer, and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1; both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR / ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning, so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same shape.)(CVE-2026-63887)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()
Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):
1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).
text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
...
rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
}
...
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);
iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.
Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().
2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop.
On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:
kfree(text_in);
return 0;
cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does
kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);
cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.
On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??
showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist.
Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.
Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected.(CVE-2026-63888)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32
An adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS frame to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in the generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network path; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as a compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a fabric that permits source spoofing.
The Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop counter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound pname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker. A pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop condition true indefinitely.
Factor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter to u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the descriptor body before iterating.(CVE-2026-63889)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout.
Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line.(CVE-2026-63891)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint.
Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.(CVE-2026-63898)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller size.(CVE-2026-63899)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints
Add the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid out-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious device report smaller buffers than expected.(CVE-2026-63901)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate
The ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head() before esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The head-side gate currently checks skb->data_len and tailen separately, but the tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined post-trailer skb->data_len.
Reject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a page. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while the destination sg still spans the combined skb->data_len.
Restore this combined-length page gate for both IPv4 and IPv6.(CVE-2026-63912)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().
ip netns add ns1 ip netns add ns2 ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7 ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2 ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9 ip netns del ns2 ip netns del ns1 [ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!
Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns.
vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry. cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.(CVE-2026-63917)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection
Transport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb->cb and uses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid until the deferred callback runs.
Take a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop it after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing path does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down.
This keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime handling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net().(CVE-2026-63919)
In the Linux kernel, ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read.(CVE-2026-63920)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().
After patch 1/2 in this series, vti6_update() unlinks and relinks the tunnel through t->net. vti6_siocdevprivate() still uses dev_net(dev) for the collision lookup. For a tunnel moved through IFLA_NET_NS_FD, dev_net(dev) is the new netns, not t->net.
SIOCCHGTUNNEL on a migrated tunnel then runs:
net = dev_net(dev) / migrated netns / t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, false) / misses target in t->net / ... t = netdev_priv(dev) vti6_update(t, &p1, false) / mutates t->net's hash /
A caller in the migrated netns picks params that match a tunnel in the creation netns. The lookup in dev_net(dev) finds nothing. vti6_update() prepends the migrated tunnel at the head of the creation netns hash bucket for those params. Later lookups in the creation netns resolve to the migrated device. xfrm receive delivers the matched packets through a device the caller controls.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.
Switch the SIOCCHGTUNNEL path on a non fallback device to use t->net for the lookup. The lookup now matches the netns vti6_update() operates on.
Also add ns_capable(self->net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) before the lookup. The check at the top of the case is against dev_net(dev)->user_ns, which after migration is the attacker's netns. A caller there can pick params absent from self->net, the lookup returns NULL, t becomes self, and vti6_update() inserts the device into the creation netns hash. The new check requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the creation netns user_ns too.
SIOCADDTUNNEL and SIOCCHGTUNNEL on the fallback device keep dev_net(dev), which equals init_net there.(CVE-2026-63921)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()
ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers. Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up.(CVE-2026-63924)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data
When bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist entry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right fragment.
The right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with
start, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a
non-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split
layout inconsistent.
Advance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta,
start - offset, which matches the length removed from the front of the
original entry.(CVE-2026-63926)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the hardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.(CVE-2026-63928)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync
hci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn->conn_timeout after releasing both rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was obtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev->conn_hash.list and is not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can free the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a use-after-free read.
The cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because hci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL:
hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL);
While hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn:
hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL);
Since NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never matches, and the pending work item is not cancelled.
Fix this by saving conn->conn_timeout into a local variable while the locks are still held, so the stale conn pointer is never dereferenced after unlock.
This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 035c25007c9e ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on le_read_features_complete") which addressed the identical pattern in a different function.
This vulnerability was identified using 0sec.ai, an open-source automated security auditing platform (https://github.com/0sec-labs).(CVE-2026-63944)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: serialize iso_sock_clear_timer with socket lock
iso_sock_close() calls iso_sock_clear_timer() before acquiring lock_sock(sk).
iso_sock_clear_timer() reads iso_pi(sk)->conn twice without the socket lock held:
if (!iso_pi(sk)->conn)
return;
cancel_delayed_work(&iso_pi(sk)->conn->timeout_work);
Concurrently, iso_conn_del() executes under lock_sock(sk) and calls iso_chan_del(), which sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL and may result in the final reference to the connection being dropped:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
iso_sock_clear_timer()
if (conn != NULL) ... lock_sock(sk)
iso_chan_del()
iso_pi(sk)->conn = NULL
cancel_delayed_work(conn) /* NULL deref or UAF */
iso_pi(sk)->conn is not stable across the unlock window, causing a NULL pointer dereference or use-after-free.
Serialize iso_sock_clear_timer() with the socket lock by moving it inside lock_sock()/release_sock(), matching the pattern used in iso_conn_del() and all other call sites.(CVE-2026-63945)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame
iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill() can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and sock_queue_rcv_skb().
Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded.(CVE-2026-63946)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE
When SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the implied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not have any writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply SEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings.
This breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an attacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still be modified arbitrarily.
Fix this by adding the implied seals before the call for mapping_deny_writable() is done.(CVE-2026-63952)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size.(CVE-2026-63956)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_select_path()
Found while auditing the same pattern Sashiko reported in rt6_fill_node() [1]. Apply the same fix as commit f8d8ce1b515a ("ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()").
Writers holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(&first->fib6_siblings) without waiting for RCU readers; first->fib6_siblings.next then still points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never reaches &first->fib6_siblings as its terminator. fib6_purge_rt() always WRITE_ONCE()s first->fib6_nsiblings to 0 before list_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev(CVE-2026-63968)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().
Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept.(CVE-2026-63971)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close
Since hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we should also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts while the hdev workqueue is being drained.(CVE-2026-63974)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel asynchronously.(CVE-2026-63975)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp, l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent responses with the recycled ident value.
A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to match and destroy the already-established channel via l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).
Clear chan->ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident).(CVE-2026-63976)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8, but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing __u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127 segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment.(CVE-2026-63984)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM (fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len, but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len. The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has always enforced both bounds:
if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len) return -EINVAL;
This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW. Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(), mirroring the ioctl.
Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback() uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc.(CVE-2026-63985)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp()
In some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while skb transport header is not set.
This triggers an out-of-bound access, because (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U is 65535.
Access the icmp header based on IPv4 network header, after making sure icmp->type is present in skb linear part.
Note that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine.(CVE-2026-63992)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head.
Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF.
Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c and drivers/net/geneve.c.
Found by Sashiko.(CVE-2026-63993)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed.(CVE-2026-63994)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()
ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports too soon.
Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports.(CVE-2026-64002)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues
While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future. The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI devices once the recovery state is cleared.
However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing the removal process of the device to hang.
scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called.(CVE-2026-64003)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup
Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find() in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.
The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling uses a different model.
Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking that the assoc_array was designed for.(CVE-2026-64015)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx
sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and defers to psock->saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present, avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser's ownership of the receive queue (commit e91de6afa81c, "bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types with ktls").
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard. When a socket is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready as rx_ctx->saved_data_ready. On data arrival:
tls_data_ready -> tls_strp_data_ready -> tls_rx_msg_ready -> saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() -> tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink() without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.
tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() >= full_len (stale), calls tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and returns with rx_ctx->strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned (potentially freed) skb. tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that frag_list: use-after-free.
Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context is present, call psock->saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue untouched. TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the record normally through tls_sw_recvmsg().(CVE-2026-64025)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port
When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each port and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The reverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled.
When global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all the bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each port. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled.
The above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts (per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1 # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0 # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1
This is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below. Prior to this commit, when removing a bridge port, br_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context and the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when flushing VLANs.
After this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the per-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled. If both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed, the per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the bridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port multicast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled.
[1] ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927) WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> __debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116) kfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565) kobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689) rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47)) </IRQ>(CVE-2026-64032)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG. Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link. This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links, meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for its chaining if end = 0, which avoids the chain-after-chain.(CVE-2026-64046)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring
When an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end < sg.start), tls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head using sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for this:
struct sk_msg_sg { [...] / The extra two elements: * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes * partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the * chaining; * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message. / struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
The current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:
sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
msg_pl->sg.data);
This places the chain pointer at
sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. = &data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 = data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] = data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]
instead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a "race" of the commit under Fixes landing close to commit 031097d9e079 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down")
Convert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested by Sabrina).(CVE-2026-64047)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT, non-HARD irq_work runs in per-CPU kthreads via run_irq_workd(), so irq_work_sync() uses rcuwait() to wait for BUSY==0.
After irq_work_single() clears BUSY via atomic_cmpxchg(), it still dereferences @work for irq_work_is_hard() and rcuwait_wake_up().
An irq_work_sync() caller on another CPU that enters after BUSY is cleared can observe BUSY==0 immediately, return, and free the work before those accesses complete — causing a use-after-free.
Fix this by wrapping run_irq_workd() in guard(rcu)() so that the entire irq_work_single() execution is within an RCU read-side critical section. Then add synchronize_rcu() in irq_work_sync() after rcuwait_wait_event() to ensure the caller waits for the RCU grace period before returning, preventing premature frees.(CVE-2026-64073)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: eb_tables: close module init race
sashiko reports for unrelated patch: Does the core ebtables initialization in ebtables.c suffer from a similar race? Once nf_register_sockopt() completes, the sockopts are exposed globally.
sockopt has to be registered last, just like in ip/ip6/arptables.(CVE-2026-64076)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: move to two-stage removal scheme
Like previous patches for x_tables, follow same pattern in ebtables. We can't reuse xt helpers: ebt_table struct layout is incompatible.
table->ops assignment is now done while still holding the ebt mutex to make sure we never expose partially-filled table struct.(CVE-2026-64077)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix negative tt_buff_len
batadv_orig_node::tt_buff_len was declared as s16, but the field is never intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.
In batadv_send_other_tt_response(), tt_buff_len is temporarily widened to s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All remaining bits are kept uninitialized.
Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign extension is performed in batadv_send_other_tt_response().(CVE-2026-64088)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix negative last_changeset_len
batadv_piv_tt::last_changeset_len len was declared as s16, but the field is never intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.
In batadv_send_my_tt_response(), last_changeset_len is temporarily widened to s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All remaining bits are kept uninitialized.
Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign extension is performed in batadv_send_my_tt_response().(CVE-2026-64089)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: bla: avoid double decrement of bla.num_requests
The bla.num_requests is increased when no request_sent was in progress. And it is decremented in various places (announcement was received, backbone is purged, periodic work). But the check if the request_sent is actually set to a specific state and the atomic_dec/_inc are not safe because they are not atomic (TOCTOU) and multiple such code portions can run concurrently.
At the same time, it is necessary to modify request_sent (state) and bla.num_requests atomically. Otherwise batadv_bla_send_request() might set request_sent to 1 and is interrupted. batadv_handle_announce() can then set request_sent back to 0 and decrement num_requests before batadv_bla_send_request() incremented it.
The two operations must therefore be locked. And since state (request_sent) and wait_periods are only accessed inside this lock, they can be converted to simpler datatypes. And to avoid that the bla.num_requests is touched by a parallel running context with a valid backbone_gw reference after batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw() ran, a third state "stopped" is required to correctly signal that a backbone_gw is in the state of being cleaned up.(CVE-2026-64095)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating
[Why&How] The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries. However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image, causing an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the loop in both functions.
(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: use uninterruptible resv lock for plane updates
virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and virtio_gpu_resource_flush() lock the framebuffer BO's dma_resv via virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() and ignore its return value. The function can fail with -EINTR from dma_resv_lock_interruptible() (signal during lock wait) or with -ENOMEM from dma_resv_reserve_fences() (fence slot allocation), leaving the resv lock not held. The queue path then walks the object array and calls dma_resv_add_fence(), which requires the lock held; with lockdep enabled this trips dma_resv_assert_held():
WARNING: drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:296 at dma_resv_add_fence+0x71e/0x840 Call Trace: virtio_gpu_array_add_fence virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail commit_tail drm_atomic_helper_commit drm_atomic_commit drm_atomic_helper_update_plane __setplane_atomic drm_mode_cursor_universal drm_mode_cursor_common drm_mode_cursor_ioctl drm_ioctl __x64_sys_ioctl
Beyond the WARN, mutating the dma_resv fence list without the lock races with concurrent readers/writers and can corrupt the list.
Both call sites run inside the .atomic_update plane callback, which DRM atomic helpers do not allow to fail (by the time it runs, the commit has been signed off to userspace and there is no clean rollback path). Moving the lock acquisition to .prepare_fb was rejected because the broader lock scope deadlocks against other BO locking paths in the same atomic commit.
Introduce virtio_gpu_lock_one_resv_uninterruptible() that uses dma_resv_lock() instead of dma_resv_lock_interruptible(). This eliminates the -EINTR failure mode -- the realistic syzbot trigger -- without extending the lock hold across the commit. The helper locks a single BO and rejects nents > 1 with -EINVAL; both fix sites lock exactly one BO.
Use it from virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and virtio_gpu_resource_flush(); check the return value to handle the remaining -ENOMEM case from dma_resv_reserve_fences() by freeing the objs and skipping the plane update for that frame. The framebuffer BOs touched here are not shared with other contexts and lock contention is expected to be brief, so the loss of signal-interruptibility is acceptable.
Other callers of virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() (the ioctl paths) continue to use the interruptible variant.
The bug was reported by syzbot, triggered via fault injection (fail_nth) on the DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR path, which forces the -ENOMEM branch in dma_resv_reserve_fences().(CVE-2026-64098)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Reject restored DTE with out-of-range num_eventid_bits
Userspace can restore an ITS Device Table Entry whose Size field encodes more EventID bits than the virtual ITS supports. The live MAPD path rejects that state, but vgic_its_restore_dte() accepts it and stores the out-of-range value in dev->num_eventid_bits.
Reject restored DTEs with num_eventid_bits > VITS_TYPER_IDBITS before allocating the device. This mirrors the MAPD check and prevents the restored state from reaching vgic_its_restore_itt(), where the unchecked value can be converted into an oversized scan_its_table() range.(CVE-2026-64106)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()
unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without
holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and
freed.
This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix
peeking with an offset larger than data in queue").
The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison
tail != last can be false even if last semantically refers to an
already-freed SKB while tail is a new SKB allocated at the same address;
which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new
data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and
a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a
real problem.
But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream
af_unix sockets"), tail is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in
the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,
and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in
two threads:
static int socks[2];
void test_setup(void) {
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0);
int peekoff = 1;
setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));
}
void test_thread1(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);
}
void test_thread2(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0);
shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);
}
when racing like this:
thread1 thread2
unix_stream_read_generic
mutex_lock(&u->iolock)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
mutex_unlock(&u->iolock)
unix_stream_read_generic
unix_state_lock(sk)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
unix_state_unlock(sk)
unix_stream_data_wait
unix_state_lock(sk)
tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]
`tail != last`: false
`tail`: true
`tail->len != last_len` ***UAF***
Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow, which can no longer happen.
Kuniyuki explained:
> When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage > support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last > skb in the receiver's queue. > > That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed > while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait(). > > However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and > commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use > MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added > to a new skb.
That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5.(CVE-2026-64109)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap
Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed: for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork is benign under normal operation.
A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():
if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) {
dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
}
It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.
When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync() (i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things. One of the possible failure modes then is a violated
rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format));
in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from rbd_post_acquire_action().
Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock().(CVE-2026-64112)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning
ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq() prunes frames whose source MAC matches the VF's own address (VEPA multicast workaround) by freeing the skb and continuing to the next descriptor:
dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
continue;
The skb pointer is declared outside the while loop and persists across iterations. Because the continue skips the "skb = NULL" reset at the bottom of the loop, the next iteration enters the "else if (skb)" path and calls ixgbevf_add_rx_frag() on the freed skb, dereferencing skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags - a use-after-free in NAPI softirq context.
The sibling driver iavf already handles this correctly by nulling the pointer before continuing. Apply the same pattern here.
I do not have ixgbevf hardware; the bug was found by static analysis (scan_drop_continue_loops.py + semgrep drop_continue_in_loop, multi-tool corroboration with the highest score in the scan). The UAF was confirmed under KASAN by loading a test module that reproduces the exact code pattern (alloc skb, kfree_skb, then read skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ixgbevf_uaf_test_init+0x100/0x1000 Read of size 8 at addr 000000006163ae78 by task insmod/30 freed 208-byte region [000000006163adc0, 000000006163ae90)
QEMU emulates igb (82576) but not ixgbe (82599), and the igbvf VF driver does not include the VEPA source pruning path, so a full end-to-end reproduction with emulated hardware was not possible.(CVE-2026-64113)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length:
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
/* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */
}
It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.
An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path.
Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.
Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it.
Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl.
Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev.
Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel.(CVE-2026-64114)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qed: fix double free in qed_cxt_tables_alloc()
If one of the later PF or VF CID bitmap allocations fails, qed_cid_map_alloc() jumps to cid_map_fail and frees the previously allocated CID bitmaps before returning an error. qed_cxt_tables_alloc() then calls qed_cxt_mngr_free(), which invokes qed_cid_map_free() again.
Fix this by setting each CID bitmap pointer to NULL after bitmap_free() to avoid double free.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc3.
Runtime reproduction was not attempted because exercising the failing allocation path requires device-specific setup.(CVE-2026-64118)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate Add Extended Advertising Data length
MGMT_OP_ADD_EXT_ADV_DATA is registered as a variable-length command, with MGMT_ADD_EXT_ADV_DATA_SIZE as the fixed header size. The handler then uses cp->adv_data_len and cp->scan_rsp_len to validate and copy cp->data, but it never checks that those bytes are part of the mgmt command payload.
A short command can therefore make add_ext_adv_data() pass an out-of-bounds pointer into tlv_data_is_valid(). If the bytes beyond the command buffer are addressable, they can also be copied into the advertising instance as scan response data, where the caller can read them back via MGMT_OP_GET_ADV_INSTANCE. The trigger requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial user namespace; KASAN reports an 8-byte slab-out-of-bounds read.
Reject commands whose length does not match the fixed header plus both advertising data lengths before parsing cp->data.(CVE-2026-64126)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: protect tc_count increment in smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked()
Commit 96c4af418586 ("cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields") refactored cifs code to change cifs_tcp_ses_lock for tc_lock around tc_count changes.
There was missing lock around tc_count increment inside smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked().(CVE-2026-64136)
In the Linux kernel, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the i2c-stub driver. The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() function (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c) uses data->block[0] as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer. A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* devices can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer, resulting in a stack out-of-bounds access. This vulnerability affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability.(CVE-2026-64191)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)(CVE-2026-64219)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure
otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later, otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in its corresponding error path.
Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up partially initialized pool state.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc3.
Runtime validation was not performed because reproducing this path requires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware.(CVE-2026-64222)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use
Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds reads.(CVE-2026-64237)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks
When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS, without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of 4096.
Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802
CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 print_report+0xcb/0x5d0 kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0 kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm] kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf </TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1) raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed in mask.
sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC
POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode.
nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid, which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics. POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES.
Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local check matches the access the server would have enforced.(CVE-2026-64298)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching
String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.
regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds() from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.
Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob() so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.(CVE-2026-64299)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths
The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p, q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt() allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each component with:
memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len)
When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory corruption.
Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each of the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path instead of writing out of bounds.(CVE-2026-64304)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock
The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock.
A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or a use-after-free.
Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry() iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(), adf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(), adf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier().
The lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up() and adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no event_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in the reverse order.(CVE-2026-64305)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG
drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the output buffer uninitialized. Fix it.(CVE-2026-64306)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback
pcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before trying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns -EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly.
That fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise an asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the request was never enrolled in padata.
Restore the original request callback and callback data before calling the child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a direct AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged.(CVE-2026-64312)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication
The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.
The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists from lower-bit overflow.
When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers. It seems the check got lost in translation.
Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry from the lower addition.(CVE-2026-64313)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record
get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.
A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255 bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.
ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media - desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.
Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink() fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk.(CVE-2026-64317)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(data) + 2hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.(CVE-2026-64319)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page
nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check:
u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */
...
if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */
...
alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);
The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.
The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer.
Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.(CVE-2026-64320)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size().(CVE-2026-64322)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode.(CVE-2026-64323)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array.
A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite.
No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic.
Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array.(CVE-2026-64324)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap
Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last destination.
For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data, while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds access during frame return.
Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast support aligned between native and generic XDP.(CVE-2026-64355)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags
mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(), mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by BITS_PER_LONG.
As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts() runs
for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++)
clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags);
with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received).
The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID multitouch device; no local privileges are required.
Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots, and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two "mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts).
Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned long on 32-bit.(CVE-2026-64364)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT
RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead.
Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task.
This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow.
The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again.
The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT.
If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it.
A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed.
When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU.
As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled.(CVE-2026-64374)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()
When a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered:
================================================================== VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695! CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1 pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 Call trace: generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 kill_block_super+0x20/0x48 ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130 deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140 __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 task_work_run+0x78/0xe0 do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240 ==================================================================
The root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between inode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent wb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue:
CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight) inode_prepare_wbs_switch -> passes SB_ACTIVE check __iget(inode) generic_shutdown_super sb->s_flags &= ~SB_ACTIVE cgroup_writeback_umount(sb) smp_mb() atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight) rcu_barrier() -> no pending RCU callbacks flush_workqueue(isw_wq) -> nothing queued, returns evict_inodes(sb) -> Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref. sop->put_super(sb) / destroys percpu counters / -> VFS: Busy inodes after unmount! wb_queue_isw() queue_work(isw_wq, ...) / later in work function / inode_switch_wbs_work_fn process_inode_switch_wbs iput() -> evict percpu_counter_dec() // UAF!
Fix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in inode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from inode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is no sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing rcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the SB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue() is called.
The existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can be backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that still queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current mainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")) and is removed in a follow-up patch.(CVE-2026-64378)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: mask server-provided mode to 07777 in modefromsid
When modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided sub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to 07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path.(CVE-2026-64379)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing
posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely.(CVE-2026-64380)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64382)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_flush() replay
SMB2_flush() keeps its response buffer bookkeeping across replay attempts. If a replayable flush response is received and the retry then fails before cifs_send_recv() stores a replacement response, flush_exit will free the stale response pointer a second time.
Reinitialize resp_buftype and rsp_iov at the top of the replay loop so cleanup only acts on response state produced by the current attempt. This fixes a double-free without changing replay handling for successful requests.(CVE-2026-64383)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix change notify replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_notify_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64384)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_ioctl() replay
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_ioctl_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64385)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64386)
In the Linux kernel, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the SMB client. smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]"). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, causing the subsequent decoder to read past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server, affecting both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders.(CVE-2026-64448)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64).
A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng.
Concrete impact is inside the guest:
-
Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.
-
Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.
KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)
Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport.
With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.(CVE-2026-64456)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown
cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work.
Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid.
Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown.(CVE-2026-64481)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race
iio_event_getfd() creates the event file descriptor with
anon_inode_getfd(), which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous
file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the
caller.
The IIO code resets the event FIFO after anon_inode_getfd() has returned,
but before IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL has copied the fd number to userspace.
But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess
the newly allocated fd number and issue a read() on it as soon as the fd
has been installed.
This means the kfifo_to_user() in iio_event_chrdev_read() can run in
parallel with the kfifo_reset_out() in iio_event_getfd().
The kfifo documentation says that kfifo_reset_out() is only safe when it
is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader.
Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as
kfifo_reset().
If that happens, kfifo_to_user() can advance the FIFO out index based
on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the out
index to the current in index. That can leave the FIFO with an out
index past the in index. A later read() can then see an underflowed
FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This
can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to
userspace.
Move the FIFO reset before anon_inode_getfd(). At that point the event fd is
marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot
access it while the FIFO is reset.(CVE-2026-64496)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs
Open vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len field is u16. Commit a1e64addf3ff ("net: openvswitch: remove misbehaving actions length check") allowed the total sw_flow_actions stream to grow beyond 64 KiB, which is valid, but also removed the last guard preventing a generated nested action attribute from exceeding U16_MAX.
An oversized generated container can thus be closed with a truncated nla_len. A later dump or teardown then walks a structurally different stream than the one that was validated. In particular, an oversized nested CLONE/CT action may cause subsequent bytes in the generated stream to be interpreted as independent actions.
Keep the larger total-action-stream behavior, but make nested action close reject generated containers that do not fit in nla_len, and return the error through all callers. For recursive SAMPLE, CLONE, DEC_TTL, and CHECK_PKT_LEN builders, trim resource-owning action-list tails in reverse construction order before discarding failed wrappers, so resources copied into the rejected tails are released before the wrappers are removed.
Most failed outer wrappers are discarded by truncating actions_len after child resources have been released. CHECK_PKT_LEN also trims its parent after branch resources are gone. SET/TUNNEL close failures unwind their known tun_dst ownership directly, and SET_TO_MASKED has no external ownership and truncates on close failure.(CVE-2026-64531)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec\n\nperf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling\nperf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from\nthe context with DETACH_EXIT only.\n\nThis can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group\nleader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group\nwas active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the\nremoved leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid\ngroup leader on the PMU context active lists.\n\nA later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the\nstill-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can\nthen add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU\ncontext active list.\n\nWith DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in\nmerge_sched_in().\n\nFix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an\nevent. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while\nensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves\nthe context.(CVE-2026-64556)
In the Linux kernel, a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability exists caused by a non-leader exec() race condition in posix-cpu-timers. When sys_timer_delete() observes the old leader, while de_thread() executes switch_leader() and releases the old leader, a race condition occurs. Specifically, posix_cpu_timer_del() in sys_timer_delete() obtains the old leader via pid_task(), while de_thread() is executing release_task(old_leader) and setting old_leader->sighand = NULL. When lock_task_sighand() returns NULL, sys_timer_delete() frees the posix timer object. However, if the timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal (a TGID targeted timer is inherited on exec()), run_posix_cpu_timers() or other timerqueue add/delete operations will access the freed object's timerqueue node, resulting in a use-after-free. This issue similarly affects posix_cpu_timer_set() and posix_cpu_timer_rearm(). The history of this vulnerability goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers implementation.(CVE-2026-64560)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86: Check for invalid/obsolete root after making MMU pages available\n\nCheck for a \"stale\" page fault, i.e. for an invalid and/or obsolete root, after making MMU pages available for the shadow MMU. If reclaiming shadow pages zaps an in-use root, i.e. marks it invalid, then KVM will attempt to map memory into an invalid root. On its own, populating an invalid root is \"fine\", but because child shadow pages inherit their parent's role, any children created during the map/fetch will be created as invalid pages, thus violating KVM's invariant that invalid pages are never on the list of active MMU pages.\n\nNote, the underlying flaw has existed since KVM first started tracking invalid roots in 2008 (commit 2e53d63acba7, \"KVM: MMU: ignore zapped root pagetables\"), but the true badness only came along in 2020 (Linux 5.9) with the invariant that invalid shadow pages can't be on the list of active pages.\n\nNote #2, inheriting role.invalid when creating child shadow pages is also far from ideal; that flaw will be addressed separately.(CVE-2026-64561)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_close() replay
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_close_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64597)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation. __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may reallocate skb->head, causing the previously obtained IP header pointer to become a dangling pointer, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability.(CVE-2026-68476)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix more places with wrong ipv6 transport offsets
Sashiko reports for more incorrect IPv6 transport offsets.
The app code for TCP was assuming IPv4 network header even after the ipvsh argument was provided. This can cause problems with apps over IPv6. As for the only official app in the kernel tree (FTP) this problem is harmless because we use Netfilter to mangle the FTP ports and we do not adjust the TCP seq numbers.
Also, provide correct offset of the ICMPV6 header in ip_vs_out_icmp_v6() for correct checksum checks when the IPv6 packet has extension headers.(CVE-2026-68477)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup
set_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the IPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped extension headers and found the real transport header.
This makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP packets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an 8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by sctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the SCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves from NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established timeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters incorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not completed.
Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for the SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without extension headers this preserves the existing offset.(CVE-2026-72021)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations
In net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table builds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV, LLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which sets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern nl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via NL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Any local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve the "802.15.4 MAC" family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev that has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw 16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied verbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply. Recovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality and authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates and encrypts frames.
Impact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte AES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has an administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY dump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family.
Introduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but setting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump entries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the modern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged readers by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and NL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry "can be retrieved by unprivileged users" annotations).(CVE-2026-72049)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72052)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipip: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ipip_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate ipip_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72053)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72054)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sit: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ipip6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate ipip6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed. sit was the one tunnel type not covered by the recent series that added this check to the other changelink() handlers.(CVE-2026-72061)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: macsec: fix use-after-free of metadata_dst on RX SC delete
When an offloaded MACsec RX SC is deleted, macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() freed the per-SC metadata_dst with metadata_dst_free(), which kfree()s the object unconditionally and ignores the dst reference count. The RX datapath in mlx5e_macsec_offload_handle_rx_skb() looks up the SC under rcu_read_lock() via xa_load(), takes a reference with dst_hold() and attaches the dst to the skb with skb_dst_set(). A reader that already obtained the rx_sc pointer can race with the delete path and operate on freed memory.
Fix the owner side by dropping the reference with dst_release() instead of freeing unconditionally, and convert the RX datapath to dst_hold_safe() so a reader racing the SC delete cannot attach a dst whose last reference was just dropped; only attach it when a reference was actually taken.
mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsc() also published sc_xarray_element via xa_alloc() before rx_sc->md_dst was allocated and initialised, so a datapath reader that looked the SC up by fs_id could observe rx_sc with md_dst still NULL or, on weakly-ordered architectures, a non-NULL md_dst pointer whose contents were not yet visible. NULL-check the xa_load() result and md_dst on the datapath, and reorder add_rxsc() so the xa_alloc() publish happens only after md_dst is fully initialised; the xarray RCU publish then pairs with the rcu_read_lock()/xa_load() in the datapath.
Note: macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() also kfree()s rx_sc->sc_xarray_element without an RCU grace period while the same datapath reads it under rcu_read_lock(); that is a separate pre-existing issue left to a follow-up patch.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).(CVE-2026-72072)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-log: fix a bitset_size overflow on 32bit machines
Commit c20e36b7631d ("dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to region_count overflow") made sure that region_count could fit in an unsigned int. But the bitmap memory isn't allocated based on region_count. It uses bitset_size (a size_t variable). The first step of calculating bitset_size is to set it to region_count, rounded up to a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG. If region_size is less than BITS_PER_LONG smaller than UINT_MAX, it will get rounded up to 2^32. On a 32bit architecture, this will make bitset_size wrap around to 0 and fail, despite region_count being valid.
Since bitset_size gets divided by 8, it can hold any valid region_count. It just needs a special case to handle the rollover. If it is 0, the value rolled over, and bitset size should be set to the number of bytes needed to hold 2^32 bits.(CVE-2026-72105)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it
Currently, copy_process() can bail out to free_task() before p->bpf_storage has been initialized, with this call graph (shown here for the !CONFIG_MEMCG case):
copy_process dup_task_struct arch_dup_task_struct [copies the entire task_struct, including ->bpf_storage member] [RLIMIT_NPROC check fails] delayed_free_task free_task bpf_task_storage_free rcu_dereference(task->bpf_storage) bpf_local_storage_destroy
In this case, the nascent task's ->bpf_storage member that bpf_local_storage_destroy() operates on is a plain copy of the parent's ->bpf_storage pointer, not a real initialized pointer. This leads to badness (kernel hangs, UAF).
This is reachable as long as the process calling fork() has been inserted into a task storage map.(CVE-2026-72110)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset
nvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset into the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any offset with off + len <= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes the data begins in the first inline page:
sg->offset = off;
sg->length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
When a port is configured with inline_data_size > PAGE_SIZE (settable up to max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size] makes "PAGE_SIZE - off" underflow, so sg->length is set to ~4 GiB and the block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len) also ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len) span crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist.
Map the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page offset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from page_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at inline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL identity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the persistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and nvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in free_large_kmalloc()).(CVE-2026-72129)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: Make the TPM character devices non-seekable
The TPM character devices expose a sequential command/response interface, but their open handlers leave FMODE_PREAD and FMODE_PWRITE enabled.
After a command leaves a response pending, pread(fd, buf, 16, 0x1400) passes 0x1400 as off to tpm_common_read(). The transfer length is bounded by response_length, but the offset is used unchecked when forming data_buffer + off. A sufficiently large offset therefore causes an out-of-bounds heap read through copy_to_user() and, if the copy succeeds, an out-of-bounds zero-write through the following memset().
Positional I/O does not provide coherent semantics for this interface. An arbitrary pread offset cannot represent how much of a response has been consumed sequentially. The write callback always stores a command at the start of data_buffer, while pwrite() does not update file->f_pos and can leave the sequential read cursor stale.
Call nonseekable_open() from both open handlers. This removes FMODE_PREAD and FMODE_PWRITE, causing positional reads and writes to fail with -ESPIPE before reaching the TPM callbacks, and explicitly marks the files non-seekable. Normal read() and write() continue to use the existing sequential f_pos cursor, leaving the response state machine unchanged.
Tested on Linux 6.12 with KASAN and a swtpm TPM2 device:
- sequential partial reads returned the complete response
- pread() and preadv() with offset 0x1400 returned -ESPIPE
- pwrite() and pwritev() with offset zero returned -ESPIPE
- the pending response remained intact after the rejected operations
- a subsequent normal command/response cycle completed normally
- no KASAN report was produced.(CVE-2026-72135)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: xfrm_interface: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
xfrmi_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the interface link netns xi->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in xi->net can rewrite an interface that lives in xi->net.
Gate xfrmi_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top, before any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72136)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count. tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as a page fragment. A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1 fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()->frags[] and corrupts memory after the shared info.(CVE-2026-72157)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mm_init: fix uninitialized struct pages for ZONE_DEVICE. If DAX memory is hotplugged into an unoccupied subsection of an early section, section_activate() reuses the unoptimized boot memmap. However, compound_nr_pages() still assumes that vmemmap optimization is in effect and initializes only the reduced number of struct pages. As a result, the remaining tail struct pages are left uninitialized, which can later lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. Fix this by treating early sections as unoptimized when calculating how many struct pages to initialize.(CVE-2026-72172)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Bound-check xdr_buf_to_bvec() stores before writing
xdr_buf_to_bvec() writes a bio_vec into the caller's array before testing whether that slot is in range, and the head branch performs the store with no check at all. When the caller's budget is exactly used up, the next store lands one element past the end of the array. The overflow label returns count - 1, which masks the surplus store but cannot undo it.
rq_bvec, the array passed by nfsd_vfs_write(), is allocated to exactly rq_maxpages entries with no slack. The OOB store can land in adjacent slab memory; the bv_len and bv_offset fields written there are derived from client-supplied RPC payload sizes.
Move the in-range check ahead of the store in the head, page-loop, and tail branches. With the check at the top of each sequence, count is incremented only after a successful store, so the overflow label can return count directly.(CVE-2026-72217)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: wait for in-flight TLS handshake callback when cancel loses race
When wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() in svc_tcp_handshake() returns 0 (timeout) or -ERESTARTSYS (signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() then returns false, handshake_complete() has won the cancellation race: it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and is about to invoke svc_tcp_handshake_done(), but the callback's side effects on xpt_flags and on svsk->sk_handshake_done have not yet committed.
The current code reads xpt_flags immediately to decide whether the session succeeded. Two races result.
If the callback has executed set_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION) but not yet clear_bit(XPT_HANDSHAKE), svc_tcp_handshake() sees a session, enqueues the transport, and returns. svc_xprt_received() then clears XPT_BUSY, a worker thread picks the transport up, the dispatcher in svc_handle_xprt() observes XPT_HANDSHAKE still set, and xpo_handshake is invoked a second time. That svc_tcp_handshake() calls init_completion(&svsk->sk_handshake_done) while the original callback concurrently calls complete_all() on it, corrupting the embedded swait_queue.
If the callback has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but not yet entered svc_tcp_handshake_done(), svc_tcp_handshake() reads XPT_TLS_SESSION as clear and tears the connection down even though the handshake is about to succeed.
Wait for the callback to commit before inspecting xpt_flags. The completion is guaranteed to fire because handshake_complete() invokes svc_tcp_handshake_done() unconditionally once it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED.(CVE-2026-72221)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback
svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of().
Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt() calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking svsk->sk_handshake_done.
The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry.
Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509() so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all().
cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: retrieve ethhdr after potential skb realloc on RX
pskb_may_pull() in batadv_interface_rx() could reallocate the buffer behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be reassigned to avoid an use-after-free.
This was done correctly for the VLAN header but missed for the ethernet header which is later used for the TT and AP isolation handling.(CVE-2026-72235)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Move kvm_io_bus_get_dev() locking responsibilities to callers
kvm_io_bus_get_dev() returns a device that is only matched by the address, and nothing else. This can cause a lifetime issue if the matched device is not the expected type, as by the time the caller can introspect the object, it might be gone (the srcu lock having been dropped).
Given that there is only a single user of this helper, the simplest option is to move the locking responsibility to the caller, which can keep the srcu lock held for as long as it wants.
Note that this aligns with other kvm_io_bus*() helpers, which already require the srcu lock to be held by the callers.(CVE-2026-72282)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check. smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer, leading to an out-of-bounds read.(CVE-2026-72310)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm era: fix NULL pointer dereference in metadata_open()
metadata_open() returns NULL when kzalloc_obj() fails, but the caller era_ctr() only checks IS_ERR(md). Since IS_ERR(NULL) returns false, the NULL pointer is treated as a valid result and later assigned to era->md, leading to a NULL pointer dereference when the metadata is accessed.
Fix this by returning ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on allocation failure, consistent with dm-cache-metadata.c, dm-thin-metadata.c, and dm-clone-metadata.c which all use ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) for the same pattern.(CVE-2026-72316)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker
The TLS connect path has a use-after-free: nothing pins the upper rpc_clnt across the delayed connect_worker. xs_connect() stores task->tk_client in sock_xprt::clnt as a raw pointer and queues the worker; for TLS-secured transports that worker is xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), which reads several fields out of the saved pointer (cl_timeout, cl_program, cl_prog, cl_vers, cl_cred, cl_stats) to construct the args for the inner handshake rpc_clnt.
The xprt does not reference the rpc_clnt; the rpc_clnt references the xprt. xs_destroy() does cancel the connect_worker, but it runs only when the xprt's refcount drops to zero, which cannot happen until the rpc_clnt releases its cl_xprt reference in rpc_free_client_work(). When a TLS handshake fails fatally (for example, an mTLS mount whose client cert does not match the server), the connecting task is woken with -EACCES and exits, the mount caller invokes rpc_shutdown_client(), and the upper rpc_clnt is freed before the queued connect_worker fires. xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket() then dereferences the freed clnt, producing the refcount_t underflow Michael Nemanov reported.
Take a reference on the upper rpc_clnt in xs_connect() for TLS transports via a new rpc_hold_client() helper, and drop it in the connect_worker's exit path with rpc_release_client(). The xprt_lock_connect() / xprt_unlock_connect() pairing already serialises xs_connect() with xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), so the take and release are balanced one-for-one.
The non-TLS connect worker (xs_tcp_setup_socket) never reads sock_xprt::clnt, so leave that path alone and avoid the clnt-holds-xprt-holds-clnt cycle that would otherwise prevent xprt destruction.(CVE-2026-72317)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: validate DFS referral string offsets
parse_dfs_referrals() validates that the response header and referral array fit in the received buffer, but each referral also contains string offsets supplied by the server.
Those offsets are used to compute the DfsPath and NetworkAddress string pointers without checking whether they still point inside the response buffer. A malformed referral can therefore make the computed pointer exceed the end of the buffer. The resulting negative max_len is then passed to cifs_strndup_from_utf16(), and the non-Unicode path forwards it to kstrndup() as a size_t, allowing strnlen() to read out of bounds.
Validate each string offset before deriving the string pointer.(CVE-2026-72318)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: ensure inner headers in ICMP errors are in headroom
Sashiko points out that after stripping the outer headers with pskb_pull() we should ensure the inner IP headers in ICMP errors from tunnels are present in the skb headroom for functions like ipv4_update_pmtu(), icmp_send() and IP_VS_DBG().
Also, add more checks for the length of the inner headers.(CVE-2026-72319)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_read_sock()
A peer may send a zero-length TLS application_data record; TLS 1.3 explicitly permits these as a traffic-analysis countermeasure (RFC 8446, Section 5.1). After decryption such a record has full_len == 0. tls_sw_read_sock() hands it to the read_actor, which has no payload to consume and returns zero. The loop treats a zero return as backpressure (used <= 0), requeues the skb at the head of rx_list, and stops. rx_list is serviced head-first on the next call, so the empty record is dequeued, fails the same way, and is requeued again; every later record on the connection is blocked behind it.
tls_sw_recvmsg() does not stall on this: a zero-length data record copies nothing and falls through to consume_skb(). Mirror that in the read_sock() path by recognizing an empty data record before the actor runs, consuming it, and continuing.(CVE-2026-72330)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: fix off-by-one in BD ring consumption on build_skb failure
qede_rx_build_skb() and qede_tpa_rx_build_skb() do not check for a NULL return from qede_build_skb(). When it returns NULL under memory pressure, the functions still consume a BD from the ring before returning NULL. The callers then recycle additional BDs, resulting in one extra BD being consumed (off-by-one). This desynchronizes the BD ring, which can corrupt DMA page reference counts and lead to SLUB freelist corruption.
Commit 4e910dbe3650 ("qede: confirm skb is allocated before using") added a NULL check inside qede_build_skb() to prevent a NULL pointer dereference, but did not address the missing NULL checks in the callers, making this off-by-one reachable.
Fix this by adding NULL checks for the return value of qede_build_skb() in both qede_rx_build_skb() and qede_tpa_rx_build_skb(), returning NULL immediately before any BD ring manipulation.(CVE-2026-72339)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in hv_vhca->agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an asynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before returning to mlx5e.
The asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent's invalidate callback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the command to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:
- call cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_agent.work), or
- call queue_delayed_work(priv->wq, &sagent->work, sagent->delay).
However, the delayed_work and priv->stats_agent.agent are only initialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:
agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */
...
priv->stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */
If the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments above, it can:
- Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is NULL. queue_delayed_work() calls add_timer() unconditionally, so when the timer expires the timer softirq invokes a NULL function pointer.
- Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while the timer is already enqueued in the timer wheel, corrupting the hlist (entry.pprev cleared while the previous bucket node still points at this entry).
- When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads sagent->agent (NULL) and dereferences it inside mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_write().
Fix this by:
- Initializing priv->stats_agent.work before invoking mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(), so the work is always in a valid state when the control callback observes it.
- Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent *ctx_update out-parameter to mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper writes the agent pointer to ctx_update before publishing into hv_vhca->agents[] and triggering the agents_update flow, so any callback subsequently invoked from that flow already sees a valid priv->stats_agent.agent. This avoids having the control callback participate in agent initialization.
While at it, access priv->stats_agent.agent with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and clear priv->stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path.(CVE-2026-72342)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields.
The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer.
Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.(CVE-2026-72400)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix FDIR CTRL VSI resource leak in ice_reset_all_vfs()
Resetting all VFs causes resource leak on VFs with FDIR filters enabled as CTRL VSIs are only invalidated and not freed. Fix by using ice_vf_ctrl_vsi_release() instead of ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi() which aligns behavior with the ice_reset_vf() function.
Reproduction: echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$pf/device/sriov_numvfs ethtool -N $vf flow-type ether proto 0x9000 action 0 echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$pf/device/reset(CVE-2026-72425)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_selector_match() due to AF_UNSPEC selector with large prefixlen (e.g. 128) matched against IPv4 flow (when XFRM_STATE_AF_UNSPEC is set).
Fix this by:
- Rejecting mismatched families in xfrm_selector_match.
- Returning false in addr4_match if prefixlen > 32.
- Returning false in addr_match if prefixlen > 128 (prevents overflow).(CVE-2026-72450)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: aa_label_alloc use aa_label_free on alloc failure
aa_label_alloc() allocates a secid before allocating or taking the label proxy. If the later proxy step fails, the error path only freed the label memory, leaking any resources initialized by aa_label_init().
Use aa_label_free() on the failure path so partially initialized labels release their secid and other label resources before the backing memory is freed.(CVE-2026-72459)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: check label build before no_new_privs test
aa_change_profile() builds a replacement label with fn_label_build_in_scope() before the no_new_privs subset check. The build helper can fail and return NULL or an ERR_PTR, but the result was passed to aa_label_is_unconfined_subset() before the existing IS_ERR_OR_NULL() check.
Reuse the existing target-label build failure handling immediately after the build. This preserves the current audit handling while preventing the subset helper from dereferencing an invalid label.(CVE-2026-72460)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Repost Receive buffers for malformed replies
rpcrdma_wc_receive() decrements the transport's Receive count for every completion before it dispatches a successful Receive to rpcrdma_reply_handler(). The handler must post a replacement Receive WR before returning unless ownership of the rep has moved elsewhere, as on the backchannel path.
Commit 2ae50ad68cd7 ("xprtrdma: Close window between waking RPC senders and posting Receives") moved the Receive refill out of rpcrdma_wc_receive(), where it had run ahead of every reply, into rpcrdma_reply_handler() so that the responder's credit grant could be parsed before reposting. The bad-version and short-reply exits never reach that refill: they recycle the rep and return without calling rpcrdma_post_recvs().
A remote peer can therefore drain the client's posted Receive queue by sending a sustained stream of replies that are shorter than the fixed transport header or that carry an unrecognized RPC/RDMA version. Each such reply consumes one posted Receive without replacing it. Once the queue empties, the peer's next Send finds no posted Receive and the transport stalls until reconnect.
Route both malformed-reply exits through the shared repost tail after recycling the rep, refilling against buf->rb_credits, the most recent accepted credit grant. Neither exit updates the congestion window, so RPCs admitted under the previous grant remain in flight awaiting replies. A smaller refill target would let a stream of malformed replies ratchet the posted Receive count down to the batch floor while the congestion window still admits rb_credits RPCs; a burst of valid replies to those RPCs could then overrun the posted Receives, and because the client connects with rnr_retry_count of zero, a single RNR NAK terminates the connection. Refilling against rb_credits also restores the target that applied to malformed replies before commit 2ae50ad68cd7 ("xprtrdma: Close window between waking RPC senders and posting Receives") when rpcrdma_post_recvs() computed it from rb_credits internally. rb_credits is at least one from connection establishment onward, so the repost path always keeps Receives posted.(CVE-2026-72464)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Sanitize the reply credit grant after parsing
The out_norqst exit in rpcrdma_reply_handler() branches away before the credit clamp, so a reply that matches no pending request reaches out_post carrying the raw credit value parsed from the wire. rpcrdma_post_recvs() does not bound its @needed argument: the refill loop allocates and chains Receive WRs until the count is satisfied or allocation fails. A peer that sends a well-formed reply carrying an unknown XID and an inflated credit grant therefore drives rep allocation and Receive posting past re_max_requests on every such reply.
Move the clamp to immediately after the credit field is parsed, ahead of the first branch that can reach out_post, so every later consumer sees a sanitized value. The cwnd update stays on the matched-request path.(CVE-2026-72465)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek
rpcrdma_is_bcall() decodes a reply's first words to decide whether the frame is a backchannel call. Two issues in that decode path let a short or malformed reply leak the receive buffer and drain the Receive queue.
First, the speculative peek
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 0);
/* five p++ reads follow */
asks xdr_inline_decode() for zero bytes, which returns xdr->p without consulting xdr->end. The five subsequent __be32 reads can then walk up to 20 bytes past the wire payload into stale regbuf contents and misclassify the reply as a backchannel call.
Second, after the post-peek
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 3 * sizeof(*p));
if (unlikely(!p))
return true;
the short-header arm returns true without calling rpcrdma_bc_receive_call(). The contract with the caller is that a true return transfers ownership of rep to the backchannel path:
rpcrdma_reply_handler()
if (rpcrdma_is_bcall(r_xprt, rep))
return; /* bare return, skips out_post */
...
out_post:
rpcrdma_post_recvs(r_xprt, credits + ...);
Because rpcrdma_bc_receive_call() never ran, no one took rep, but rpcrdma_reply_handler still bare-returns past rpcrdma_rep_put() and rpcrdma_post_recvs(). The rep, with its persistently DMA-mapped receive buffer, is orphaned on rb_all_reps and freed only at transport teardown. This completion reposts nothing, so its slot is reclaimed only when a later forward-channel reply reaches out_post and rpcrdma_post_recvs() allocates a fresh rep to backfill; absent that traffic the Receive queue drains and the peer's Sends draw RNR NAKs.
Fix by consulting xdr->end after the zero-length peek so the five __be32 reads cannot run unless 20 bytes of wire payload remain. A byte-precise comparison against xdr->end is required because a non-4-aligned receive rounds the stream's word count up past the true payload. Also return false from the short-header arm so the reply falls through the normal out_norqst cleanup chain (rpcrdma_rep_put() plus rpcrdma_post_recvs()).(CVE-2026-72466)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Decouple req recycling from RPC completion
rl_kref formerly served two distinct lifetimes through a single refcount: it gated when a Reply could wake its RPC task, and it gated when an rpcrdma_req could return to its free pool. The marshal path took the Send-side reference only when SGEs needed DMA-unmap (sc_unmap_count > 0), which made a Send carrying only pre-registered buffers an exception: the Reply handler dropped rl_kref from 1 to 0 and freed the req while the HCA might still be DMA-reading from its send buffer.
Give rl_kref a narrower job. The RPC layer takes one reference when slot allocation hands a req out. rpcrdma_prepare_send_sges() takes a Send-side reference unconditionally after WR preparation succeeds. xprt_rdma_free_slot() and xprt_rdma_bc_free_rqst() drop the RPC-layer reference; rpcrdma_sendctx_unmap() drops the Send-side reference. The req returns to its free pool only after both owners have signed off.
The existing kref_init(&req->rl_kref) call in rpcrdma_prepare_send_sges() is removed. Initialization moves to the slot-allocation paths (xprt_rdma_alloc_slot and rpcrdma_bc_rqst_get), and the release callback re-arms rl_kref before the req returns to a free pool. A re-init in the marshal path would discard the RPC-layer reference that already exists on entry.
Three invariants follow:
-
Any rpcrdma_req held by an rpc_rqst has rl_kref >= 1. xprt_rdma_alloc_slot(), rpcrdma_bc_rqst_get(), and the backlog-wake branch in xprt_rdma_alloc_slot() each kref_init rl_kref before publishing the req. Without this invariant, an RPC task that aborts between slot allocation and marshal (gss_refresh failure or signal during call_connect, for example) would drive xprt_release() -> xprt_rdma_free_slot() -> kref_put against a refcount of zero, saturating refcount_t and stranding the slot.
-
The Send-side reference is taken only after WR prep succeeds. A mapping failure in rpcrdma_prepare_send_sges() runs rpcrdma_sendctx_cancel(), which DMA-unmaps the sendctx and clears sc_req without touching rl_kref. The sendctx ring walks in rpcrdma_sendctx_put_locked() and rpcrdma_sendctxs_destroy() skip entries with sc_req == NULL, so a burst of -EIO marshal failures cannot hold reqs off rb_send_bufs.
-
The release callback re-arms rl_kref so the next consumer enters with the invariant satisfied.
Replies now complete the RPC directly. rpcrdma_reply_handler() calls rpcrdma_complete_rqst() in place of kref_put on the non-LocalInv branch. The LocalInv branch already completes the RPC from frwr_unmap_async() and is unaffected.
Because Send-side references can now outlive RPC completion, connection teardown drains sendctx entries whose unsignaled Sends never had a later signaled completion to walk the ring. rpcrdma_sendctxs_destroy() walks the active range and runs rpcrdma_sendctx_unmap() on each entry with a non-NULL sc_req before the request buffers are reset, and is moved ahead of rpcrdma_reqs_reset() in rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect() so the reqs are still in their pre-reset state when the Send-side refs are released.
The drain creates a teardown-ordering hazard on the backchannel path. With the new lifetime, releasing a bc_prealloc req from rpcrdma_req_release() re-adds it to bc_pa_list. The disconnect in xprt_rdma_destroy() runs after xprt_destroy_backchannel() has already emptied bc_pa_list, so the drained reqs would otherwise leak. xprt_rdma_destroy() now runs xprt_rdma_bc_destroy(xprt, 0) a second time after the disconnect to reclaim them.(CVE-2026-72473)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: add bounds check to run_get_highest_vcn()
run_get_highest_vcn() parses a packed NTFS mapping-pairs buffer without any length bound, relying solely on a 0x00 terminator to stop. A crafted $LogFile UpdateMappingPairs record whose embedded attribute contains mapping-pairs runs without a terminator causes the function to read past the slab allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read on mount.
The sibling function run_unpack() received an analogous bounds-check in commit b62567bca474 ("ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()"), but run_get_highest_vcn() was missed.
Take a run_buf_size parameter and reject any run header whose payload would extend past the buffer end, mirroring the pattern used by run_unpack(). The caller in fslog.c passes the remaining attribute bytes after the mapping-pairs offset.
KASAN report (on mainline v7.1 merge window HEAD):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e2d5400 by task mount/72 Call Trace: run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 do_action.isra.0+0x3ba8/0x7b50 log_replay+0x9ddd/0x10200 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x4ad/0x610 ntfs_fill_super+0x214a/0x4540(CVE-2026-72478)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data
As reported by sashiko [1] we need to use access_ok to check the user space data bounds before we use __get-user to get it.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/(CVE-2026-74258)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: core: fix supplied_from allocations
If dts property power-supplies has multiple values, then accessing to psy->supplied_from[i-1] in __power_supply_populate_supplied_from will overrun supplied_from array.(CVE-2026-74271)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: require net admin for TIPCv2 netlink mutators
TIPCv2 registers mutating generic-netlink operations without admin permission flags. Generic netlink only checks CAP_NET_ADMIN when an operation sets GENL_ADMIN_PERM or GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, so a local unprivileged process can currently change TIPC state through commands such as TIPC_NL_NET_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH, and bearer enable/disable.
The legacy TIPC netlink API already checks netlink_net_capable(..., CAP_NET_ADMIN) for administrative commands. Give the TIPCv2 mutators the equivalent generic-netlink gate. Use GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, which maps to the same namespace-aware CAP_NET_ADMIN check that netlink_net_capable() performs, so the behaviour matches the legacy path and keeps working for CAP_NET_ADMIN holders in a non-initial user namespace (containers).
A QEMU/KASAN repro run as uid/gid 65534 with zero effective capabilities previously succeeded in changing the network id and node identity, setting and flushing key material, and enabling/disabling a UDP bearer. With this patch applied the same operations fail with -EPERM.(CVE-2026-74283)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate embedded address parameter length
sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP, and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header, but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.
Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload. A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.
Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.
This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried in INIT or ASCONF processing paths.(CVE-2026-74287)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays
The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's context, that is, A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) path.
Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one. Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -> B(no storage) working while rejecting the A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) bridge.(CVE-2026-74305)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject sleepable BPF_LSM_CGROUP programs at load time
The cgroup shim runs under rcu_read_lock_dont_migrate(), so we should not attach any sleepable BPF programs there. Add support to the verifier to explicitly reject attempts to load sleepable BPF programs destined for LSM cgroup attachment.
Without this, we get the following splat from a BPF_LSM_CGROUP program marked BPF_F_SLEEPABLE attached to file_open when it calls bpf_get_dentry_xattr():
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1567 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 34317, name: load preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 0 Call Trace: down_read+0x76/0x480 ext4_xattr_get+0x11f/0x700 __vfs_getxattr+0xf0/0x150 bpf_get_dentry_xattr+0xbb/0xf0 bpf_prog_e76a298dac9218c6_test_open+0x6a/0x85 __cgroup_bpf_run_lsm_current+0x326/0x840 bpf_trampoline_6442534646+0x62/0x14d security_file_open+0x34/0x60 do_dentry_open+0x340/0x1260 vfs_open+0x7a/0x440 path_openat+0x1bac/0x30a0
libbpf provides a .s named section variant for every sleepable program type except lsm_cgroup, reflecting that per-cgroup LSM programs are intended to only run in a non-sleepable context.
The above splat was obtained by bypassing libbpf by using bpf(2) directly.(CVE-2026-74338)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Clear rb node linkage when freeing bpf_rb_root
bpf_rb_root_free() detaches the root by copying the current rb_root_cached and then replacing the live root with RB_ROOT_CACHED. It then walks the copied root and drops each object contained in the tree.
This leaves the rb node state intact while dropping the object. If the object is refcounted and survives the drop, its bpf_rb_node_kern still contains an owner pointer to the freed root and stale rb tree linkage. If a later bpf_rb_root allocation reuses the same address, bpf_rbtree_remove() can incorrectly pass the owner check and call rb_erase_cached() on a node whose rb pointers belong to the old tree.
Mirror the list draining behavior by marking nodes as busy while the root is being detached, then clear the rb node and release the owner before dropping the containing object. This makes surviving nodes unowned and safe to reject from remove or accept for a later add.(CVE-2026-74344)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix UAF by restoring RCU-delayed inode freeing in bpffs
commit 4f375ade6aa9 ("bpf: Avoid RCU context warning when unpinning htab with internal structs") moved inode cleanup from ->free_inode() into ->destroy_inode() to avoid sleeping in RCU context when calling bpf_any_put(). However this removed the RCU delay on freeing the inode itself and the cached symlink body (i_link), both of which can be accessed by RCU pathwalk (pick_link, may_lookup etc.).
This causes a use-after-free when a concurrent unlinkat() drops the last inode reference and destroy_inode() frees the inode immediately, while another task is still walking the path in RCU mode and reads inode->i_opflags (offset +2) inside current_time() -> is_mgtime().
KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in is_mgtime include/linux/fs.h:2313 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880407e4282 (offset +2 = i_opflags)
The rules (per Al Viro): ->destroy_inode() called immediately, can sleep, use for blocking cleanup e.g. bpf_any_put() ->free_inode() called after RCU grace period, use for freeing inode and anything RCU-accessible e.g. i_link
Fix: split the two concerns properly: - keep bpf_any_put() in bpf_destroy_inode() since it is blocking and needs to run promptly - introduce bpf_free_inode() to handle kfree(i_link) and free_inode_nonrcu() with proper RCU delay, preventing the UAF(CVE-2026-74363)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path
For non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the shared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious user to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel is processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in rxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data().
Introduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE to a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach already used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is reused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP.(CVE-2026-74377)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix TOCTOU heap overflow in get_srq_wqe
get_srq_wqe() reads wqe->dma.num_sge from the shared receive queue buffer, which is mapped into userspace. It validates num_sge against max_sge, but then re-reads the same field to calculate the memcpy size. A concurrent userspace thread can modify num_sge between validation and use, causing a heap buffer overflow when copying the WQE into qp->resp.srq_wqe.
Read num_sge into a local variable and use it for both the bounds check and the size calculation.(CVE-2026-74378)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check
imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network. Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one().
Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison.(CVE-2026-74394)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx5: Fix transport-domain rollback and initialize lb mutex earlier
mlx5_ib_alloc_transport_domain() allocates a transport domain and then may fail in mlx5_ib_enable_lb(). In that case, the allocated TD is leaked.
Fix this by deallocating the TD when mlx5_ib_enable_lb() returns an error. Also return 0 explicitly in the no-loopback-capability success branch, and move dev->lb.mutex initialization to mlx5_ib_stage_init_init().(CVE-2026-74397)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: addrconf: bail out of dad_failure when state is no longer POSTDAD
addrconf_dad_failure() transitions ifp->state from DAD to POSTDAD via addrconf_dad_end(), which drops ifp->lock on return. The lock is re-acquired after net_info_ratelimited(). A concurrent ipv6_del_addr() can take the lock in that window, set ifp->state to DEAD and run list_del_rcu(&ifp->if_list).
addrconf_dad_failure() then overwrites DEAD with ERRDAD at errdad: and schedules a new dad_work. The work calls ipv6_del_addr() again, hitting the already-poisoned list entry:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:ipv6_del_addr+0xe9/0x280 RAX: dead000000000122 Call Trace: addrconf_dad_stop+0x113/0x140 addrconf_dad_work+0x28c/0x430 process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
Fold the addrconf_dad_end() logic into addrconf_dad_failure() under a single ifp->lock critical section. The STABLE_PRIVACY branch temporarily drops ifp->lock around address regeneration, so at lock_errdad: verify the state is still POSTDAD before transitioning to ERRDAD; bail out otherwise to avoid overwriting a state set by another path while the lock was released.(CVE-2026-74398)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in vxlan_gro_prepare_receive().
udp_tunnel_sock_release() could set sk->sk_user_data to NULL while vxlan_gro_prepare_receive() is running.
Let's check if rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is NULL after skb_gro_remcsum_init().(CVE-2026-74406)
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.3.29.160.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Critical"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: hns3: add VLAN id validation before using\n\nCurrently, the VLAN id may be used without validation when\nreceive a VLAN configuration mailbox from VF. The length of\nvlan_del_fail_bmap is BITS_TO_LONGS(VLAN_N_VID). It may cause\nout-of-bounds memory access once the VLAN id is bigger than\nor equal to VLAN_N_VID.\n\nTherefore, VLAN id needs to be checked to ensure it is within\nthe range of VLAN_N_VID.(CVE-2025-71112)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()\n\nstrscpy_pad() can\u0026apos;t be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term\nstring of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 (\u0026quot;string.h: Introduce\nmemtostr() and memtostr_pad()\u0026quot;) provides additional information in that\nregard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:\n\nstrnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039\n strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]\n sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]\n parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]\n __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]\n ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706\n get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636\n vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814\n do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]\n path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880\n do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]\n __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]\n __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]\n __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nSince userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63\ncharacters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer\nwhich matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job\nproperly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a\nnon-NUL-term string here.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.(CVE-2025-71123)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write\n\nib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the\nMAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP\nheader length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad().\nThis can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger\nan out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list().\n\nAdd an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the\nsend buffer.\n\nKASAN splat:\n[ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0\n[ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102\n[ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0\n[ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80(CVE-2026-23243)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()\n\nnvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to\ncalculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper\nlimit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K).\n\nA malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that\nresults in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in\nthe page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER.\n\nTo fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc().\n\nThis bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below:\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/(CVE-2026-23244)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen\n\ndvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the\nDVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which\nreinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.\n\nSince dmxdev-\u0026gt;dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the\nsame DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries\nfrom io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers\nwhile the list head is reset to {self, self}.\n\nThe waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly\ninitialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to\nreset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.\n\nReplace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct\nassignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which\nproperly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering\nwithout touching the waitqueue or spinlock.(CVE-2026-23253)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management\n\nAn unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by\nopening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by\npassing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the\nprivileged process to write to the interface.\n\nThis does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do\nthe write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is\nachieved full policy management is possible and all the possible\nimplications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or\ntarget applications by denying all execution, by-passing the\nunprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for\na local privilege escalation.\n\nThe policy management interface can not have its permissions simply\nchanged from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able\nto load policy to different policy namespaces.\n\nInstead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that\nare a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already\ndone via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate\naccess to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.(CVE-2026-23268)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race\n\nMake sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all\npossible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running\nit with only preemption disabled.\n\nThis opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go\nand free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like\nthe BPF program.(CVE-2026-23271)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: Return the correct value in vmw_translate_ptr functions\n\nBefore the referenced fixes these functions used a lookup function that\nreturned a pointer. This was changed to another lookup function that\nreturned an error code with the pointer becoming an out parameter.\n\nThe error path when the lookup failed was not changed to reflect this\nchange and the code continued to return the PTR_ERR of the now\nuninitialized pointer. This could cause the vmw_translate_ptr functions\nto return success when they actually failed causing further uninitialized\nand OOB accesses.(CVE-2026-23317)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\n\nThe root cause of this bug is that when \u0026apos;bpf_link_put\u0026apos; reduces the\nrefcount of \u0026apos;shim_link-\u0026gt;link.link\u0026apos; to zero, the resource is considered\nreleased but may still be referenced via \u0026apos;tr-\u0026gt;progs_hlist\u0026apos; in\n\u0026apos;cgroup_shim_find\u0026apos;. The actual cleanup of \u0026apos;tr-\u0026gt;progs_hlist\u0026apos; in\n\u0026apos;bpf_shim_tramp_link_release\u0026apos; is deferred. During this window, another\nprocess can cause a use-after-free via \u0026apos;bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\u0026apos;.\n\nBased on Martin KaFai Lau\u0026apos;s suggestions, I have created a simple patch.\n\nTo fix this:\n Add an atomic non-zero check in \u0026apos;bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim\u0026apos;.\n Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero.\n\nTesting:\n I verified the fix by adding a delay in\n \u0026apos;bpf_shim_tramp_link_release\u0026apos; to make the bug easier to trigger:\n\nstatic void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)\n{\n\t/* ... */\n\tif (!shim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline)\n\t\treturn;\n\n+\tmsleep(100);\n\tWARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(\u0026amp;shim_link-\u0026gt;link,\n\t\tshim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline, NULL));\n\tbpf_trampoline_put(shim_link-\u0026gt;trampoline);\n}\n\nBefore the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%)\nwith a call trace similar to KaiyanM\u0026apos;s report.\nAfter the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of\niterations.(CVE-2026-23319)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap\n\nget_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their\nindices into an array without checking bounds.\n\nAlso the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is\nMAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack,\nbut that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could\nbe larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a\nstack-out-of-bounds write.\n\nAdd a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue.\nWhen there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the\nredirect.\n\nTo reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with\nan XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS.\nThen send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path.(CVE-2026-23359)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing\n\nstruct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT\nallocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT\nbuffer.\n\nBecause the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g.,\nending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails\nto ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.\n\nThis leads to two issues:\n1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the\n structure.\n2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in\n bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT\u0026apos;d code executes ldr. On arm64,\n 64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if\n they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read,\n causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.\n\nFix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes\n(sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of\nthe JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math\nin build_plt() to correctly align the target field.(CVE-2026-23383)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSquashfs: check metadata block offset is within range\n\nSyzkaller reports a \u0026quot;general protection fault in squashfs_copy_data\u0026quot;\n\nThis is ultimately caused by a corrupted index look-up table, which\nproduces a negative metadata block offset.\n\nThis is subsequently passed to squashfs_copy_data (via\nsquashfs_read_metadata) where the negative offset causes an out of bounds\naccess.\n\nThe fix is to check that the offset is within range in\nsquashfs_read_metadata. This will trap this and other cases.(CVE-2026-23388)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl\n\nWhen page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original\nloop wasn\u0026apos;t updated so it may try to reassign one more page than\nnecessary.\n\nAdd the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen.\n\nAlso update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset\nargument.(CVE-2026-43078)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests\n\nAF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during\nrequest processing. For async requests, later socket activity can\nupdate that shared state before the original request has fully\ncompleted, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling.\n\nSnapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD\nrequest, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket\nstate.(CVE-2026-46028)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/fair: Clear rel_deadline when initializing forked entities\n\nA yield-triggered crash can happen when a newly forked sched_entity\nenters the fair class with se-\u0026gt;rel_deadline unexpectedly set.\n\nThe failing sequence is:\n\n 1. A task is forked while se-\u0026gt;rel_deadline is still set.\n 2. __sched_fork() initializes vruntime, vlag and other sched_entity\n state, but does not clear rel_deadline.\n 3. On the first enqueue, enqueue_entity() calls place_entity().\n 4. Because se-\u0026gt;rel_deadline is set, place_entity() treats se-\u0026gt;deadline\n as a relative deadline and converts it to an absolute deadline by\n adding the current vruntime.\n 5. However, the forked entity\u0026apos;s deadline is not a valid inherited\n relative deadline for this new scheduling instance, so the conversion\n produces an abnormally large deadline.\n 6. If the task later calls sched_yield(), yield_task_fair() advances\n se-\u0026gt;vruntime to se-\u0026gt;deadline.\n 7. The inflated vruntime is then used by the following enqueue path,\n where the vruntime-derived key can overflow when multiplied by the\n entity weight.\n 8. This corrupts cfs_rq-\u0026gt;sum_w_vruntime, breaks EEVDF eligibility\n calculation, and can eventually make all entities appear ineligible.\n pick_next_entity() may then return NULL unexpectedly, leading to a\n later NULL dereference.\n\nA captured trace shows the effect clearly. Before yield, the entity\u0026apos;s\nvruntime was around:\n\n 9834017729983308\n\nAfter yield_task_fair() executed:\n\n se-\u0026gt;vruntime = se-\u0026gt;deadline\n\nthe vruntime jumped to:\n\n 19668035460670230\n\nand the deadline was later advanced further to:\n\n 19668035463470230\n\nThis shows that the deadline had already become abnormally large before\nyield_task_fair() copied it into vruntime.\n\nrel_deadline is only meaningful when se-\u0026gt;deadline really carries a\nrelative deadline that still needs to be placed against vruntime. A\nfreshly forked sched_entity should not inherit or retain this state.\nClear se-\u0026gt;rel_deadline in __sched_fork(), together with the other\nsched_entity runtime state, so that the first enqueue does not interpret\nthe new entity\u0026apos;s deadline as a stale relative deadline.(CVE-2026-52980)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: hisilicon/sec2 - prevent req used-after-free for sec\n\nDuring packet transmission, if the system is under heavy load,\nthe hardware might complete processing the packet and free the\nrequest memory (req) before the transmission function finishes.\nIf the software subsequently accesses this req, a use-after-free\nerror will occur. The qp_ctx memory exists throughout the packet\nsending process, so replace the req with the qp_ctx.(CVE-2026-53055)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing\n\nWhen a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached\npeer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters\nare later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().\n\nHowever, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not\nvalidated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If\nthe length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the\nactual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential\nmemory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE\nprocessing and kmemdup() copies).\n\nAdd a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT\nchunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO\nbuffer before it is used.(CVE-2026-53246)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nserial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails\n\ndw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port()\nand then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If\nclk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the\n8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives\nin dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port\nslot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is\nrebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still\nreferences it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out\ncallbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a\nuse-after-free hazard.\n\nUnregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path.(CVE-2026-53384)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()\n\nWhen hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),\nthe code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,\npnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),\nwhich still references \u0026apos;lo\u0026apos;. This results in a use-after-free when the\ntracepoint accesses lo\u0026apos;s fields.\n\nFix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).(CVE-2026-63800)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms\n\nThe sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership\nstate. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the\nentry through writable BPF ctx-\u0026gt;data. This protects entries backed by\npages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file\npage-cache pages.\n\nSeveral sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact\nmsg-\u0026gt;sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can\nmake an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy\nbit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable\nctx-\u0026gt;data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache.\n\nKeep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are\ntransferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit\nwhen an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed.\nThis covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(),\nsk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail\nentry created during TLS open-record splitting.(CVE-2026-63830)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode\n\nchap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as\nkzalloc(chap-\u0026gt;digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,\npasses chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether\nthe input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.\n\nchap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long\nas there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and\nthe \u0026quot;0b\u0026quot; prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters\ncan reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256\n(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5\n(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.\n\nThe length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.\n\nThe HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length\nup front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing\nbase64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length\nexceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.\n\nStripping trailing \u0026apos;=\u0026apos; before the comparison handles both padded and\nunpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on \u0026apos;=\u0026apos;,\nso the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.\n\nThe mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is\nkzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at\nCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1\nbase64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,\nDIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than\nCHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is\nadded at the call site to document this.(CVE-2026-63886)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf\n\niscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates \u0026quot;key=value\\0\u0026quot; records into\nlogin-\u0026gt;rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer\nallocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call\nsites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check\nthe remaining buffer capacity:\n\n\t*length += sprintf(output_buf, \u0026quot;%s=%s\u0026quot;, er-\u0026gt;key, er-\u0026gt;value);\n\t*length += 1;\n\toutput_buf = textbuf + *length;\n\nThe 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the\n*input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal\nfour-byte \u0026quot;a=b\\0\u0026quot; pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte\n\u0026quot;a=NotUnderstood\\0\u0026quot; output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response().\n2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB\nheap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.\n\nThe fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses\nsnprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer,\nand threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through\niscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in\niscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and\niscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass\nMAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls\niscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1;\nboth caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR /\nISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning,\nso the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a\nsilent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL\ncaller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same\nshape.)(CVE-2026-63887)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()\n\nTwo latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the\noriginal LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c (\u0026quot;iscsi-target: Add\niSCSI fabric support for target v4.1\u0026quot;):\n\n1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).\n\n text_in is kzalloc()\u0026apos;d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then\n incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest\n in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the\n buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():\n\n if (conn-\u0026gt;conn_ops-\u0026gt;DataDigest) {\n ...\n rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;\n }\n ...\n if (conn-\u0026gt;conn_ops-\u0026gt;DataDigest) {\n data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);\n\n iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so\n when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the\n text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched\n mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text\n PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against\n the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to\n the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text\n PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.\n\n Fix by passing the actual padded payload length\n (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().\n\n2) Stale cmd-\u0026gt;text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL\u0026gt;0 bad DataDigest\n drop.\n\n On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel \u0026gt; 0 the handler\n silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:\n\n kfree(text_in);\n return 0;\n\n cmd-\u0026gt;text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text\n Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which\n unconditionally does\n\n kfree(cmd-\u0026gt;text_in_ptr);\n cmd-\u0026gt;text_in_ptr = NULL;\n\n freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via\n iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free\n if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.\n\n On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on\n the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so\n #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this\n patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three\n relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of\n this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after\n login produces two back-to-back splats:\n\n BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??\n BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??\n\n showing the same pointer freed in the ERL\u0026gt;0 drop path and again in\n iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once\n more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels\n with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free\n becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts\n the slab freelist.\n\n Fix by clearing cmd-\u0026gt;text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL\u0026gt;0 drop\n path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock\n tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4\n less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.\n\nBoth fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and\nthe wire protocol is unaffected.(CVE-2026-63888)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32\n\nAn adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS\nframe to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in\nthe generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network\npath; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as\na compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a\nfabric that permits source spoofing.\n\nThe Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop\ncounter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound\npname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker.\nA pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop\ncondition true indefinitely.\n\nFactor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter\nto u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the\ndescriptor body before iterating.(CVE-2026-63889)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nthunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()\n\nA DIRECTORY entry\u0026apos;s value field is used as the dir_offset for a\nrecursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.\nA crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference\nloop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the\nguard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line\ninspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST\ncontrol-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.\n\nThread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and\n__tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed\nTB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any\nobserved legitimate XDomain layout.\n\nOperators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable\nthe path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command\nline.(CVE-2026-63891)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint\n\nThe driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device\nwhich only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint.\n\nMake sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab\ncorruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max\npacket size than expected.(CVE-2026-63898)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint\n\nMake sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight\nbytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device\nreport a smaller size.(CVE-2026-63899)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints\n\nAdd the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid\nout-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious\ndevice report smaller buffers than expected.(CVE-2026-63901)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate\n\nThe ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head()\nbefore esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The\nhead-side gate currently checks skb-\u0026gt;data_len and tailen separately, but\nthe tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined\npost-trailer skb-\u0026gt;data_len.\n\nReject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a\npage. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while\nthe destination sg still spans the combined skb-\u0026gt;data_len.\n\nRestore this combined-length page gate for both IPv4 and IPv6.(CVE-2026-63912)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().\n\nip netns add ns1\nip netns add ns2\nip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7\nip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2\nip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9\nip netns del ns2\nip netns del ns1\n[ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!\n\nCommit 61220ab34948 (\u0026quot;vti6: Enable namespace changing\u0026quot;) dropped\nNETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then\nmove through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points\nat the new netns while t-\u0026gt;net stays at the creation netns.\n\nvti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and\ndev_net(t-\u0026gt;dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink\ninto another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry.\ncleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.\n\nReachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user\n--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.(CVE-2026-63917)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection\n\nTransport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb-\u0026gt;cb and\nuses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid\nuntil the deferred callback runs.\n\nTake a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop\nit after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing\npath does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down.\n\nThis keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime\nhandling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net().(CVE-2026-63919)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) \u0026amp;lt;\u0026amp;lt; 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read.(CVE-2026-63920)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().\n\nAfter patch 1/2 in this series, vti6_update() unlinks and relinks\nthe tunnel through t-\u0026gt;net. vti6_siocdevprivate() still uses\ndev_net(dev) for the collision lookup. For a tunnel moved through\nIFLA_NET_NS_FD, dev_net(dev) is the new netns, not t-\u0026gt;net.\n\nSIOCCHGTUNNEL on a migrated tunnel then runs:\n\n net = dev_net(dev) /* migrated netns */\n t = vti6_locate(net, \u0026amp;p1, false) /* misses target in t-\u0026gt;net */\n ...\n t = netdev_priv(dev)\n vti6_update(t, \u0026amp;p1, false) /* mutates t-\u0026gt;net\u0026apos;s hash */\n\nA caller in the migrated netns picks params that match a tunnel\nin the creation netns. The lookup in dev_net(dev) finds nothing.\nvti6_update() prepends the migrated tunnel at the head of the\ncreation netns hash bucket for those params. Later lookups in\nthe creation netns resolve to the migrated device. xfrm receive\ndelivers the matched packets through a device the caller controls.\n\nReachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user\n--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.\n\nSwitch the SIOCCHGTUNNEL path on a non fallback device to use\nt-\u0026gt;net for the lookup. The lookup now matches the netns\nvti6_update() operates on.\n\nAlso add ns_capable(self-\u0026gt;net-\u0026gt;user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) before\nthe lookup. The check at the top of the case is against\ndev_net(dev)-\u0026gt;user_ns, which after migration is the attacker\u0026apos;s\nnetns. A caller there can pick params absent from self-\u0026gt;net,\nthe lookup returns NULL, t becomes self, and vti6_update()\ninserts the device into the creation netns hash. The new check\nrequires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the creation netns user_ns too.\n\nSIOCADDTUNNEL and SIOCCHGTUNNEL on the fallback device keep\ndev_net(dev), which equals init_net there.(CVE-2026-63921)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()\n\nipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers.\nLet\u0026apos;s recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won\u0026apos;t mess things up.(CVE-2026-63924)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data\n\nWhen bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist\nentry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right\nfragment.\n\nThe right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with\n`start`, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a\nnon-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split\nlayout inconsistent.\n\nAdvance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta,\n`start - offset`, which matches the length removed from the front of the\noriginal entry.(CVE-2026-63926)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint\n\nMake sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the\nhardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should\na malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than\nexpected.(CVE-2026-63928)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync\n\nhci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn-\u0026gt;conn_timeout after releasing\nboth rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was\nobtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev-\u0026gt;conn_hash.list and\nis not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can\nfree the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a\nuse-after-free read.\n\nThe cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because\nhci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL:\n\n hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL);\n\nWhile hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn:\n\n hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL);\n\nSince NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never\nmatches, and the pending work item is not cancelled.\n\nFix this by saving conn-\u0026gt;conn_timeout into a local variable while the\nlocks are still held, so the stale conn pointer is never dereferenced\nafter unlock.\n\nThis is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 035c25007c9e\n(\u0026quot;Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on le_read_features_complete\u0026quot;) which\naddressed the identical pattern in a different function.\n\nThis vulnerability was identified using 0sec.ai, an open-source\nautomated security auditing platform (https://github.com/0sec-labs).(CVE-2026-63944)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: serialize iso_sock_clear_timer with socket lock\n\niso_sock_close() calls iso_sock_clear_timer() before acquiring\nlock_sock(sk).\n\niso_sock_clear_timer() reads iso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn twice without the\nsocket lock held:\n\n if (!iso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn)\n return;\n cancel_delayed_work(\u0026amp;iso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn-\u0026gt;timeout_work);\n\nConcurrently, iso_conn_del() executes under lock_sock(sk) and calls\niso_chan_del(), which sets iso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn to NULL and may result in\nthe final reference to the connection being dropped:\n\n CPU0 CPU1\n ---- ----\n iso_sock_clear_timer()\n if (conn != NULL) ... lock_sock(sk)\n iso_chan_del()\n iso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn = NULL\n cancel_delayed_work(conn) /* NULL deref or UAF */\n\niso_pi(sk)-\u0026gt;conn is not stable across the unlock window, causing a\nNULL pointer dereference or use-after-free.\n\nSerialize iso_sock_clear_timer() with the socket lock by moving it\ninside lock_sock()/release_sock(), matching the pattern used in\niso_conn_del() and all other call sites.(CVE-2026-63945)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame\n\niso_recv_frame reads conn-\u0026gt;sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock\nbefore using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill()\ncan free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk-\u0026gt;sk_state and\nsock_queue_rcv_skb().\n\nFix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which\ncalls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the\nrefcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is\ncalled on all exit paths where the hold succeeded.(CVE-2026-63946)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE\n\nWhen SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the\nimplied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not have\nany writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply\nSEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings.\n\nThis breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an\nattacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still be\nmodified arbitrarily.\n\nFix this by adding the implied seals before the call for\nmapping_deny_writable() is done.(CVE-2026-63952)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint\n\nMake sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least\neight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer\ndereference should a malicious device report a smaller size.(CVE-2026-63956)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_select_path()\n\nFound while auditing the same pattern Sashiko reported in\nrt6_fill_node() [1]. Apply the same fix as\ncommit f8d8ce1b515a (\u0026quot;ipv6: fix possible infinite loop in fib6_info_uses_dev()\u0026quot;).\n\nWriters holding tb6_lock can list_del_rcu(\u0026amp;first-\u0026gt;fib6_siblings)\nwithout waiting for RCU readers; first-\u0026gt;fib6_siblings.next then\nstill points into the old ring and this softirq-side walker never\nreaches \u0026amp;first-\u0026gt;fib6_siblings as its terminator. fib6_purge_rt()\nalways WRITE_ONCE()s first-\u0026gt;fib6_nsiblings to 0 before\nlist_del_rcu(), so an inside-loop check is a reliable detach signal.\n\n[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260526020227.4857-1-jiayuan.chen%40linux.dev(CVE-2026-63968)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff\n\nsctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while\nwaiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this\nwindow, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via\ngetsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc-\u0026gt;base.sk. After\nre-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns\nsuccess without noticing the migration \u2014 the caller then accesses\nthe association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().\n\nAdd the same sk != asoc-\u0026gt;base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf()\nalready has, returning an error if the association was migrated while\nwe slept.(CVE-2026-63971)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: Set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE during device close\n\nSince hci_dev_close_sync() can now be called during the reset path, we\nshould also set HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE. This avoids queuing timeouts\nwhile the hdev workqueue is being drained.(CVE-2026-63974)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp\n\nIf dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec\nrequires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del\nmay invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and\nin fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan-\u0026gt;dcid may be assigned\npreviously it really needs to be disconnected.\n\nCalling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so\ninstead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel\nasynchronously.(CVE-2026-63975)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: l2cap: clear chan-\u0026gt;ident on ECRED reconfiguration success\n\nl2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing\nchan-\u0026gt;ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,\nl2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan-\u0026gt;ident after a\nsuccessful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent\nresponses with the recycled ident value.\n\nA remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can\nreplay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to\nmatch and destroy the already-established channel via\nl2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).\n\nClear chan-\u0026gt;ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the\nfailure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with\nother L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident).(CVE-2026-63976)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()\n\nipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:\n\n outhdr-\u0026gt;hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 3);\n\nhdrlen is __u8. For n \u0026gt;= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently\ntruncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):\n\n (128 * 16) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8\n\nThe caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header\nat buf + ((ohdr-\u0026gt;hdrlen + 1) \u0026lt;\u0026lt; 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,\nbut the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header\nplus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the\ndecompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this\noverlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.\n\nThe existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) \u0026gt; 255, which\nprevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left\nfield), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing\n__u8. n=127 passes because 128 \u0026lt;= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not\nfit.\n\nTighten the bound to (n + 1) \u0026gt; 127. This caps n at 126, giving\nhdrlen = (127 * 16) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed\nheader then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) \u0026lt;\u0026lt; 3) = buf + 2040, exactly\npast the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127\nsegments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment.(CVE-2026-63984)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback\n\nThe Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM\n(fallback_set_params()) validates that offset \u0026lt; eeprom_len,\nbut does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len.\nThe ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has\nalways enforced both bounds:\n\n if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len \u0026gt; total_len)\n return -EINVAL;\n\nThis could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW.\nAdd the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(),\nmirroring the ioctl.\n\nSimilarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom()\nin particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers\nto avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback()\nuses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc.(CVE-2026-63985)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp()\n\nIn some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while\nskb transport header is not set.\n\nThis triggers an out-of-bound access, because\n(typeof(skb-\u0026gt;transport_header))~0U is 65535.\n\nAccess the icmp header based on IPv4 network header,\nafter making sure icmp-\u0026gt;type is present in skb linear part.\n\nNote that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine.(CVE-2026-63992)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()\n\nskb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb-\u0026gt;head.\n\nReusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF.\n\nUse instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c\nand drivers/net/geneve.c.\n\nFound by Sashiko.(CVE-2026-63993)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()\n\nSashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and\niptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()\nbefore an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb-\u0026gt;head.\n\nFix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables\nafter the skb_cow() call.\n\nRemove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed.(CVE-2026-63994)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: free net-\u0026gt;ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()\n\nipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net-\u0026gt;ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports\ntoo soon.\n\nOnly after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly\nuse the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports.(CVE-2026-64002)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues\n\nWhile a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not\nset the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future.\nThe expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI\ndevices once the recovery state is cleared.\n\nHowever, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses\nscsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed\nstate like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued\nrequests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing\nthe removal process of the device to hang.\n\nscsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro\nshost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting\nscsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or\nwhen unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all\nother devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called.(CVE-2026-64003)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsecurity/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup\n\nNicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find()\nin find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the\nassoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from\nthe tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.\n\nThe regular key handling doesn\u0026apos;t see this because holding the keyring\nsemaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling\nuses a different model.\n\nInstead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking\nthat the assoc_array was designed for.(CVE-2026-64015)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx\n\nsk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and\ndefers to psock-\u0026gt;saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present,\navoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser\u0026apos;s ownership of the receive\nqueue (commit e91de6afa81c, \u0026quot;bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types\nwith ktls\u0026quot;).\n\nsk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard. When a socket\nis inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is\nconfigured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready\nas rx_ctx-\u0026gt;saved_data_ready. On data arrival:\n\n tls_data_ready -\u0026gt; tls_strp_data_ready -\u0026gt; tls_rx_msg_ready\n -\u0026gt; saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()\n -\u0026gt; tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink()\n without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.\n\ntls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() \u0026gt;= full_len (stale), calls\ntcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and\nreturns with rx_ctx-\u0026gt;strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned\n(potentially freed) skb. tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that\nfrag_list: use-after-free.\n\nApply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context\nis present, call psock-\u0026gt;saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake\nrecv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue\nuntouched. TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the\nrecord normally through tls_sw_recvmsg().(CVE-2026-64025)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port\n\nWhen per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over\nall the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each\nport and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The\nreverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled.\n\nWhen global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all\nthe bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each\nport. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled.\n\nThe above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts\n(per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port:\n\n # ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1\n # ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy\n # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1\n # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0\n # ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1\n\nThis is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below.\nPrior to this commit, when removing a bridge port,\nbr_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context\nand the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when\nflushing VLANs.\n\nAfter this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the\nper-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled.\nIf both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed,\nthe per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the\nbridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1].\n\nFix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port\nmulticast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN\nmulticast snooping is enabled.\n\n[1]\nODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927)\nWARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n\u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n__debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116)\nkfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565)\nkobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689)\nrcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617)\nrcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869)\nhandle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)\n__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735)\nirq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752)\nsysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47))\n\u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;(CVE-2026-64032)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG. Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link. This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links, meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. TLS 1.3 can use the \u0026quot;wrapping slot\u0026quot; for its chaining if end = 0, which avoids the chain-after-chain.(CVE-2026-64046)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: tls: fix off-by-one in sg_chain entry count for wrapped sk_msg ring\n\nWhen an sk_msg scatterlist ring wraps (sg.end \u0026lt; sg.start),\ntls_push_record() chains the tail portion of the ring to the head\nusing sg_chain(). An extra entry in the sg array is reserved for\nthis:\n\n struct sk_msg_sg {\n [...]\n /* The extra two elements:\n * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes\n * partitioned (e.g. end \u0026lt; start). The crypto APIs require the\n * chaining;\n * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message.\n */\n struct scatterlist data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];\n\nThe current code uses MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 as the ring size:\n\n sg_chain(\u0026amp;msg_pl-\u0026gt;sg.data[msg_pl-\u0026gt;sg.start],\n MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl-\u0026gt;sg.start + 1,\n msg_pl-\u0026gt;sg.data);\n\nThis places the chain pointer at\n\n sg_chain(data[start], (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) .. =\n \u0026amp;data[start] + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_start + 1) - 1 =\n data[start + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - start + 1) - 1] =\n data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]\n\ninstead of the true last entry. This is likely due to a \u0026quot;race\u0026quot; of\nthe commit under Fixes landing close to\ncommit 031097d9e079 (\u0026quot;bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down\u0026quot;)\n\nConvert to ARRAY_SIZE and drop the data[start] / - start (as suggested\nby Sabrina).(CVE-2026-64047)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nirq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT\n\nOn PREEMPT_RT, non-HARD irq_work runs in per-CPU kthreads via\nrun_irq_workd(), so irq_work_sync() uses rcuwait() to wait for BUSY==0.\n\nAfter irq_work_single() clears BUSY via atomic_cmpxchg(), it still\ndereferences @work for irq_work_is_hard() and rcuwait_wake_up().\n\nAn irq_work_sync() caller on another CPU that enters after BUSY is cleared\ncan observe BUSY==0 immediately, return, and free the work before those\naccesses complete \u2014 causing a use-after-free.\n\nFix this by wrapping run_irq_workd() in guard(rcu)() so that the entire\nirq_work_single() execution is within an RCU read-side critical\nsection. Then add synchronize_rcu() in irq_work_sync() after\nrcuwait_wait_event() to ensure the caller waits for the RCU grace period\nbefore returning, preventing premature frees.(CVE-2026-64073)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: bridge: eb_tables: close module init race\n\nsashiko reports for unrelated patch:\n Does the core ebtables initialization in ebtables.c suffer from a similar race?\n Once nf_register_sockopt() completes, the sockopts are exposed globally.\n\nsockopt has to be registered last, just like in ip/ip6/arptables.(CVE-2026-64076)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ebtables: move to two-stage removal scheme\n\nLike previous patches for x_tables, follow same pattern in ebtables.\nWe can\u0026apos;t reuse xt helpers: ebt_table struct layout is incompatible.\n\ntable-\u0026gt;ops assignment is now done while still holding the ebt mutex\nto make sure we never expose partially-filled table struct.(CVE-2026-64077)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: tt: fix negative tt_buff_len\n\nbatadv_orig_node::tt_buff_len was declared as s16, but the field is never\nintended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is\nassigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.\n\nIn batadv_send_other_tt_response(), tt_buff_len is temporarily widened to\ns32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing\nbatadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but\npopulates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All\nremaining bits are kept uninitialized.\n\nUsing an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign\nextension is performed in batadv_send_other_tt_response().(CVE-2026-64088)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: tt: fix negative last_changeset_len\n\nbatadv_piv_tt::last_changeset_len len was declared as s16, but the field is\nnever intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is\nassigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.\n\nIn batadv_send_my_tt_response(), last_changeset_len is temporarily widened\nto s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing\nbatadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but\npopulates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All\nremaining bits are kept uninitialized.\n\nUsing an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign\nextension is performed in batadv_send_my_tt_response().(CVE-2026-64089)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: bla: avoid double decrement of bla.num_requests\n\nThe bla.num_requests is increased when no request_sent was in progress. And\nit is decremented in various places (announcement was received, backbone is\npurged, periodic work). But the check if the request_sent is actually set\nto a specific state and the atomic_dec/_inc are not safe because they are\nnot atomic (TOCTOU) and multiple such code portions can run concurrently.\n\nAt the same time, it is necessary to modify request_sent (state) and\nbla.num_requests atomically. Otherwise batadv_bla_send_request() might set\nrequest_sent to 1 and is interrupted. batadv_handle_announce() can then\nset request_sent back to 0 and decrement num_requests before\nbatadv_bla_send_request() incremented it.\n\nThe two operations must therefore be locked. And since state (request_sent)\nand wait_periods are only accessed inside this lock, they can be converted\nto simpler datatypes. And to avoid that the bla.num_requests is touched by\na parallel running context with a valid backbone_gw reference after\nbatadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw() ran, a third state \u0026quot;stopped\u0026quot; is required to\ncorrectly signal that a backbone_gw is in the state of being cleaned up.(CVE-2026-64095)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating\n\n[Why\u0026amp;How]\nThe GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and\nbios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS\ntable_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.\nHowever, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits\nwithin the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than\nthe actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,\ncausing an out-of-bounds read.\n\nFix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed\nstructuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the\nloop in both functions.\n\n(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/virtio: use uninterruptible resv lock for plane updates\n\nvirtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and virtio_gpu_resource_flush() lock\nthe framebuffer BO\u0026apos;s dma_resv via virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() and\nignore its return value. The function can fail with -EINTR from\ndma_resv_lock_interruptible() (signal during lock wait) or with\n-ENOMEM from dma_resv_reserve_fences() (fence slot allocation),\nleaving the resv lock not held. The queue path then walks the object\narray and calls dma_resv_add_fence(), which requires the lock held;\nwith lockdep enabled this trips dma_resv_assert_held():\n\n WARNING: drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:296 at dma_resv_add_fence+0x71e/0x840\n Call Trace:\n virtio_gpu_array_add_fence\n virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs\n virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer\n virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update\n drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes\n drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail\n commit_tail\n drm_atomic_helper_commit\n drm_atomic_commit\n drm_atomic_helper_update_plane\n __setplane_atomic\n drm_mode_cursor_universal\n drm_mode_cursor_common\n drm_mode_cursor_ioctl\n drm_ioctl\n __x64_sys_ioctl\n\nBeyond the WARN, mutating the dma_resv fence list without the lock\nraces with concurrent readers/writers and can corrupt the list.\n\nBoth call sites run inside the .atomic_update plane callback, which\nDRM atomic helpers do not allow to fail (by the time it runs, the\ncommit has been signed off to userspace and there is no clean\nrollback path). Moving the lock acquisition to .prepare_fb was\nrejected because the broader lock scope deadlocks against other BO\nlocking paths in the same atomic commit.\n\nIntroduce virtio_gpu_lock_one_resv_uninterruptible() that uses\ndma_resv_lock() instead of dma_resv_lock_interruptible(). This\neliminates the -EINTR failure mode -- the realistic syzbot trigger\n-- without extending the lock hold across the commit. The helper\nlocks a single BO and rejects nents \u0026gt; 1 with -EINVAL; both fix\nsites lock exactly one BO.\n\nUse it from virtio_gpu_cursor_plane_update() and\nvirtio_gpu_resource_flush(); check the return value to handle the\nremaining -ENOMEM case from dma_resv_reserve_fences() by freeing\nthe objs and skipping the plane update for that frame. The\nframebuffer BOs touched here are not shared with other contexts\nand lock contention is expected to be brief, so the loss of\nsignal-interruptibility is acceptable.\n\nOther callers of virtio_gpu_array_lock_resv() (the ioctl paths)\ncontinue to use the interruptible variant.\n\nThe bug was reported by syzbot, triggered via fault injection\n(fail_nth) on the DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR path, which forces the\n-ENOMEM branch in dma_resv_reserve_fences().(CVE-2026-64098)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: vgic-its: Reject restored DTE with out-of-range num_eventid_bits\n\nUserspace can restore an ITS Device Table Entry whose Size field encodes\nmore EventID bits than the virtual ITS supports. The live MAPD path\nrejects that state, but vgic_its_restore_dte() accepts it and stores the\nout-of-range value in dev-\u0026gt;num_eventid_bits.\n\nReject restored DTEs with num_eventid_bits \u0026gt; VITS_TYPER_IDBITS before\nallocating the device. This mirrors the MAPD check and prevents the\nrestored state from reaching vgic_its_restore_itt(), where the unchecked\nvalue can be converted into an oversized scan_its_table() range.(CVE-2026-64106)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_unix: Fix UAF read of tail-\u0026gt;len in unix_stream_data_wait()\n\nunix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue) without\nholding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and\nfreed.\nThis has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea (\u0026quot;unix/stream: fix\npeeking with an offset larger than data in queue\u0026quot;).\nThe first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison\n`tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an\nalready-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address;\nwhich can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new\ndata has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and\na normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a\nreal problem.\n\nBut since commit 2b514574f7e8 (\u0026quot;net: af_unix: implement splice for stream\naf_unix sockets\u0026quot;), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in\nthe following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,\nand afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in\ntwo threads:\n```\nstatic int socks[2];\nvoid test_setup(void) {\n socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);\n send(socks[1], \u0026quot;A\u0026quot;, 1, 0);\n int peekoff = 1;\n setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, \u0026amp;peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));\n}\nvoid test_thread1(void) {\n char dummy;\n recv(socks[0], \u0026amp;dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);\n}\nvoid test_thread2(void) {\n char dummy;\n recv(socks[0], \u0026amp;dummy, 1, 0);\n shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);\n}\n```\n\nwhen racing like this:\n```\nthread1 thread2\nunix_stream_read_generic\n mutex_lock(\u0026amp;u-\u0026gt;iolock)\n skb_peek(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue)\n skb_peek_next(skb, \u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue)\n mutex_unlock(\u0026amp;u-\u0026gt;iolock)\n unix_stream_read_generic\n unix_state_lock(sk)\n skb_peek(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue)\n unix_state_unlock(sk)\n unix_stream_data_wait\n unix_state_lock(sk)\n tail = skb_peek_tail(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue)\n spin_lock(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue.lock)\n __skb_unlink(skb, \u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue)\n spin_unlock(\u0026amp;sk-\u0026gt;sk_receive_queue.lock)\n consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]\n `tail != last`: false\n `tail`: true\n `tail-\u0026gt;len != last_len` ***UAF***\n```\n\nFix the UAF by removing the read of tail-\u0026gt;len; checking tail-\u0026gt;len would\nonly make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow,\nwhich can no longer happen.\n\nKuniyuki explained:\n\n\u0026gt; When commit 869e7c62486e (\u0026quot;net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage\n\u0026gt; support\u0026quot;) added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last\n\u0026gt; skb in the receiver\u0026apos;s queue.\n\u0026gt;\n\u0026gt; That\u0026apos;s why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed\n\u0026gt; while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait().\n\u0026gt;\n\u0026gt; However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 (\u0026quot;af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES\u0026quot;) and\n\u0026gt; commit 57d44a354a43 (\u0026quot;unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use\n\u0026gt; MSG_SPLICE_PAGES\u0026quot;) refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added\n\u0026gt; to a new skb.\n\nThat means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5.(CVE-2026-64109)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap\n\nGiven how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are\nwritten, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it\u0026apos;s actually needed:\nfor example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the\nmiddle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is\nexpected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork\nis benign under normal operation.\n\nA more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():\n\n if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(\u0026amp;rbd_dev-\u0026gt;lock_dwork)) {\n dout(\u0026quot;%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\\n\u0026quot;, __func__, rbd_dev);\n mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev-\u0026gt;task_wq, \u0026amp;rbd_dev-\u0026gt;lock_dwork, 0);\n }\n\nIt\u0026apos;s not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after\ndelayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to\nrequeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.\n\nWhen it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption\nof no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return\nfrom rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be\nheld. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as\nall other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn\u0026apos;t expected to get queued\nagain. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync()\n(i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation\ncan get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result\nin rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and\nrbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things.\nOne of the possible failure modes then is a violated\n\n rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev-\u0026gt;image_format));\n\nin rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from\nrbd_post_acquire_action().\n\nRedo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try\nto meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock().(CVE-2026-64112)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning\n\nixgbevf_clean_rx_irq() prunes frames whose source MAC matches the VF\u0026apos;s\nown address (VEPA multicast workaround) by freeing the skb and\ncontinuing to the next descriptor:\n\n dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);\n continue;\n\nThe skb pointer is declared outside the while loop and persists across\niterations. Because the continue skips the \u0026quot;skb = NULL\u0026quot; reset at the\nbottom of the loop, the next iteration enters the \u0026quot;else if (skb)\u0026quot; path\nand calls ixgbevf_add_rx_frag() on the freed skb, dereferencing\nskb_shinfo(skb)-\u0026gt;nr_frags - a use-after-free in NAPI softirq context.\n\nThe sibling driver iavf already handles this correctly by nulling the\npointer before continuing. Apply the same pattern here.\n\nI do not have ixgbevf hardware; the bug was found by static analysis\n(scan_drop_continue_loops.py + semgrep drop_continue_in_loop, multi-tool\ncorroboration with the highest score in the scan). The UAF was confirmed\nunder KASAN by loading a test module that reproduces the exact code\npattern (alloc skb, kfree_skb, then read skb_shinfo(skb)-\u0026gt;nr_frags):\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ixgbevf_uaf_test_init+0x100/0x1000\n Read of size 8 at addr 000000006163ae78 by task insmod/30\n freed 208-byte region [000000006163adc0, 000000006163ae90)\n\nQEMU emulates igb (82576) but not ixgbe (82599), and the igbvf VF\ndriver does not include the VEPA source pruning path, so a full\nend-to-end reproduction with emulated hardware was not possible.(CVE-2026-64113)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl \u0026lt; 5\n\nraw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header\nfits within the message length:\n\n iphlen = iph-\u0026gt;ihl * 4;\n err = -EINVAL;\n if (iphlen \u0026gt; length)\n goto error_free;\n\n if (iphlen \u0026gt;= sizeof(*iph)) {\n /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */\n }\n\nIt does not, however, reject ihl \u0026lt; 5. For such a packet the\n\u0026quot;if (iphlen \u0026gt;= sizeof(*iph))\u0026quot; branch is skipped, leaving the\ncrafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to\n__ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read\niph-\u0026gt;ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in\nparticular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph-\u0026gt;ihl * 4\nand passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t)\nresult to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to\nSIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.\n\nAn IPv4 header with ihl \u0026lt; 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791:\n\u0026quot;Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in\n32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header\nis 5.\u0026quot;). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a\npacket into its own output path.\n\nReject \u0026quot;iphlen \u0026lt; sizeof(*iph)\u0026quot; alongside the existing\n\u0026quot;iphlen \u0026gt; length\u0026quot; check. This matches the principle that locally\nconstructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same\nbasic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.\n\nOnce this lands, the \u0026quot;if (iphlen \u0026gt;= sizeof(*iph))\u0026quot; wrapper around\nthe fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the\npatch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it.\n\nNote that commit 86f4c90a1c5c (\u0026quot;ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket\nmessage is big enough to hold an IP header\u0026quot;) ensures the message\nbuffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain\nthe self-reported iph-\u0026gt;ihl.\n\nReachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with\nCAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net\nnamespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH\ncrash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing\nroute; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state\nand policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the\ntrigger uses a real netdev.\n\nReproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with\nmemcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a\nrootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock\ndistro kernel.(CVE-2026-64114)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nqed: fix double free in qed_cxt_tables_alloc()\n\nIf one of the later PF or VF CID bitmap allocations fails,\nqed_cid_map_alloc() jumps to cid_map_fail and frees the previously\nallocated CID bitmaps before returning an error. qed_cxt_tables_alloc()\nthen calls qed_cxt_mngr_free(), which invokes qed_cid_map_free()\nagain.\n\nFix this by setting each CID bitmap pointer to NULL after bitmap_free()\nto avoid double free.\n\nThe bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are\ndeveloping for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing\nv6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly\navailable. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still\npresent in v7.1-rc3.\n\nRuntime reproduction was not attempted because exercising the failing\nallocation path requires device-specific setup.(CVE-2026-64118)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: MGMT: validate Add Extended Advertising Data length\n\nMGMT_OP_ADD_EXT_ADV_DATA is registered as a variable-length command,\nwith MGMT_ADD_EXT_ADV_DATA_SIZE as the fixed header size. The handler\nthen uses cp-\u0026gt;adv_data_len and cp-\u0026gt;scan_rsp_len to validate and copy\ncp-\u0026gt;data, but it never checks that those bytes are part of the mgmt\ncommand payload.\n\nA short command can therefore make add_ext_adv_data() pass an\nout-of-bounds pointer into tlv_data_is_valid(). If the bytes beyond\nthe command buffer are addressable, they can also be copied into the\nadvertising instance as scan response data, where the caller can read\nthem back via MGMT_OP_GET_ADV_INSTANCE. The trigger requires\nCAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial user namespace; KASAN reports an 8-byte\nslab-out-of-bounds read.\n\nReject commands whose length does not match the fixed header plus both\nadvertising data lengths before parsing cp-\u0026gt;data.(CVE-2026-64126)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: protect tc_count increment in smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked()\n\nCommit 96c4af418586 (\u0026quot;cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields\u0026quot;)\nrefactored cifs code to change cifs_tcp_ses_lock for tc_lock around\ntc_count changes.\n\nThere was missing lock around tc_count increment inside\nsmb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked().(CVE-2026-64136)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the i2c-stub driver. The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() function (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c) uses data-\u0026gt;block[0] as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid overrunning the chip-\u0026gt;words[256] register array, but does not validate it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer. A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* devices can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data-\u0026gt;block[0] \u0026gt; 32, causing stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer, resulting in a stack out-of-bounds access. This vulnerability affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability.(CVE-2026-64191)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async\n\n[Why\u0026amp;How]\ndc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload-\u0026gt;length bytes into a\n16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which\nis a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length \u0026gt; 16 this\nresults in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.\n\nAdditionally, link_index is used to dereference dc-\u0026gt;links[] without\nbounds checking against dc-\u0026gt;link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.\n\nReplace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when\npayload-\u0026gt;length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds\ncheck for link_index before it is used.\n\n(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)(CVE-2026-64219)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocteontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool-\u0026gt;stack on AQ init failure\n\notx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool-\u0026gt;stack when mailbox sync or retry\nallocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later,\notx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through\notx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool-\u0026gt;stack again. The CN20K-specific\ncn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in\nits corresponding error path.\n\nSet pool-\u0026gt;stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared\ncleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up\npartially initialized pool state.\n\nThe bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are\ndeveloping for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing\nv6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly\navailable. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in\nv7.1-rc3.\n\nRuntime validation was not performed because reproducing this path\nrequires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware.(CVE-2026-64222)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use\n\nEnsure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected\nnumber of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the\nfirmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds\nreads.(CVE-2026-64237)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks\n\nWhen checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check\nthat the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for\na maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB\nflush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS,\nwithout any bounds check, i.e. isn\u0026apos;t guaranteed to be under the limit of\n4096.\n\nFailure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read\nwhen testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM\nperforming an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802\n\n CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Call Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60\n print_report+0xcb/0x5d0\n kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0\n kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0\n hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]\n kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm]\n kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm]\n vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel]\n kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm]\n kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0\n do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f\n flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)\n raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\n Memory state around the buggy address:\n ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff\n ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff\n \u0026gt;ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff\n ^\n ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff\n ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff\n ==================================================================\n Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n\nOpportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number\nof sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed\nin mask.\n\n[sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog](CVE-2026-64247)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC\n\nPOSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that\nspecifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the\nO_ACCMODE access mode.\n\nnfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to\nnfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the\nclient serves itself from a cached write delegation via the\ncan_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is\nderived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a\nfile the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the\nlocal check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is\nissued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid,\nwhich the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics.\nPOSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES.\n\nInclude MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local\ncheck matches the access the server would have enforced.(CVE-2026-64298)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching\n\nString event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter\npredicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and\nfilter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match\ncallbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.\n\nregex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called\nglob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some\nstring fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char\narray of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a\ntrailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of\nthe event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in\nglob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()\nfrom the xfs_lookup tracepoint.\n\nAdd a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()\nso glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop\nis factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.(CVE-2026-64299)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths\n\nThe generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p,\nq, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt()\nallocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each\ncomponent with:\n\n memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len)\n\nWhen a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction\nunderflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory\ncorruption.\n\nAdd a len \u0026gt; half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each\nof the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path\ninstead of writing out of bounds.(CVE-2026-64304)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock\n\nThe service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are\nadded or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but\nseveral functions iterate over the list without holding this lock.\n\nA concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call\ncould modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or\na use-after-free.\n\nFix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry()\niterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(),\nadf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(),\nadf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier().\n\nThe lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up()\nand adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no\nevent_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in\nthe reverse order.(CVE-2026-64305)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG\n\ndrbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the\noutput buffer uninitialized. Fix it.(CVE-2026-64306)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback\n\npcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before\ntrying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns\n-EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly.\n\nThat fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise\nan asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the\nrequest was never enrolled in padata.\n\nRestore the original request callback and callback data before calling\nthe child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a\ndirect AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged.(CVE-2026-64312)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication\n\nThe carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated\n(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.\n\nThe condition (r01.m_high \u0026lt; product.m_high) doesn\u0026apos;t handle the case\nwhere r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists\nfrom lower-bit overflow.\n\nWhen commit 3c4b23901a0c (\u0026quot;crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support\u0026quot;)\nintroduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the\nmicro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers.\nIt seems the check got lost in translation.\n\nAdd proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry\nfrom the lower addition.(CVE-2026-64313)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nisofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record\n\nget_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in\nparse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of\na Rock Ridge \u0026quot;SL\u0026quot; (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte\nheader (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies\nslp-\u0026gt;len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp-\u0026gt;len and advance to the next\ncomponent, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does\nmemcpy(rpnt, slp-\u0026gt;text, slp-\u0026gt;len), but neither checks that the component\nlies within the SL record before dereferencing it.\n\nA crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the\nrecord (rr-\u0026gt;len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255\nbytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for\nexample a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE\nrecord - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then\ncopies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user\nspace by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.\n\nISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -\ndesktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without\nCAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.\n\nReject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes\nbefore using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing\noutput-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink()\nfail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in\nparse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk.(CVE-2026-64317)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length\n\nnvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using\nattacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields\nwithout verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.\n\nA malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a\nsmall transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds\nheap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or\nperforms the host response memcmp.\n\nWith DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to\nsg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching\nup to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.\n\nAdd bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen \u0026lt;= tl before\nany access to the variable-length fields.\n\nDiscovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.(CVE-2026-64319)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page\n\nnvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment\nof the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then\nadded to a small kzalloc\u0026apos;d buffer that holds the discovery log page\nand the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which\nmemcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound\ncheck:\n\n u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-\u0026gt;cmd); /* 64-bit host */\n size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-\u0026gt;cmd); /* 32-bit host */\n ...\n if (offset \u0026amp; 0x3) { ... } /* only check */\n ...\n alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);\n buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);\n ...\n status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);\n\nThe Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()\nreturns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call\nis reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach\nthe nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker\nrequesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next\nslab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an\nempirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81\ncanonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the\noffset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and\ncrashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.\n\nThe attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern\n\u0026quot;nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)\u0026quot; is unique\nto nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every\nother Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and\nsilently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local\ndestination offset with a fixed source pointer.\n\nValidate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the\ncopy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder\nof the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing\nshort-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()\n(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the\nhost asks for more bytes than the log page contains.(CVE-2026-64320)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count\n\nudf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when\n\n\tsizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st-\u0026gt;reallocationTableLen) \u0026gt; sb-\u0026gt;s_blocksize\n\nis false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that\nmust fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte\nsparingEntry elements:\n\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u0026lt; le16_to_cpu(st-\u0026gt;reallocationTableLen); i++) {\n\t\tstruct sparingEntry *entry = \u0026amp;st-\u0026gt;mapEntry[i];\n\t\t... entry-\u0026gt;origLocation ...\n\t}\n\nin udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A\nreallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever\nsizeof(*st) + N \u0026lt;= blocksize, yet the consumers index\nsizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the\nblock. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in\nudf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the\nsame length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the\nblock, and its memmove() through st-\u0026gt;mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds\nwrite.\n\nValidate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with\nstruct_size().(CVE-2026-64322)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size\n\nudf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition\u0026apos;s start offset straight from\nthe on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode\nsize:\n\n\tmap-\u0026gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =\n\t\tle16_to_cpu(vat20-\u0026gt;lengthHeader);\n\tmap-\u0026gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =\n\t\t(sbi-\u0026gt;s_vat_inode-\u0026gt;i_size -\n\t\t\tmap-\u0026gt;s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) \u0026gt;\u0026gt; 2;\n\nlengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds\nthe VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge\ncount, which defeats the \u0026quot;block \u0026gt; s_num_entries\u0026quot; bound in\nudf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads\n\n\t((__le32 *)(iinfo-\u0026gt;i_data + s_start_offset))[block]\n\nso a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode\u0026apos;s in-ICB data. Mounting\na crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an\nout-of-bounds read.\n\nReject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one\nentry within the VAT inode.(CVE-2026-64323)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: validate free block extents against the partition length\n\nudf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the\npartition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A\ncrafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count\npoints past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap\narray.\n\nA single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably\npanics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop\nsystems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable\nUDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply\nthe crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable\nfile on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the\nimage have a higher prerequisite.\n\nNo confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced\nprimitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by\na kernel panic.\n\nUse the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the\npartition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an\nout-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted\ncallers cannot walk past the flexible array.(CVE-2026-64324)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap\n\nDevmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last\ndestination.\n\nFor native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,\nwhile fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the\nlinear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but\nwithout valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret\nuninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds\naccess during frame return.\n\nReject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().\n\nAdd the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in\ndev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as\nnonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast\nsupport aligned between native and generic XDP.(CVE-2026-64355)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags\n\nmt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(),\nmt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a\nper-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only\nbounded by td-\u0026gt;maxcontacts, which is taken from the device\u0026apos;s\nContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by\nBITS_PER_LONG.\n\nAs a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count\nmakes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and\ncorrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers\nrelease timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts()\nruns\n\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u0026lt; mt-\u0026gt;num_slots; i++)\n\t\tclear_bit(i, \u0026amp;td-\u0026gt;mt_io_flags);\n\nwith num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop\nclears the bits that overlap td-\u0026gt;applications.next, zeroing that list\nhead, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then\ndereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a\nKASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in\nmt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is\noffsetof(struct mt_application, num_received).\n\nThe state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID\nmultitouch device; no local privileges are required.\n\nStore the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized\nfor maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots,\nand keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two\n\u0026quot;mt_io_flags \u0026amp; MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK\u0026quot; arming checks become\nbitmap_empty(td-\u0026gt;active_slots, td-\u0026gt;maxcontacts).\n\nMove MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the\nsame commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits\ngone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned\nlong on 32-bit.(CVE-2026-64364)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT\n\nRT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high\npriority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there\u0026apos;s\nany RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher\npriority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will\npull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead.\n\nNormally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto)\nwhich contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are\nwaiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their\nCPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the\nrq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU\u0026apos;s runqueue\nto the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task.\n\nThis caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task\nat the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of\nthe CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will\nget that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock\nand see there\u0026apos;s nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of\nCPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what\nPREEMPT_RT is to allow.\n\nThe solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU\nwanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the\noverloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU,\nand that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push\ninstead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with\noverloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this\nprocess, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process\nhas already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs\ncontinue again.\n\nThe RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause\na new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded\ncontext on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT.\n\nIf an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the\ncurrent CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of\ndoing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq\nwas also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the\nsoftirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded\nas there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it.\n\nA live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic\non a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it\nwould also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be\nconstantly executed.\n\nWhen a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running\nyet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would\nsend an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are\nof higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule\nthat CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could\nschedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs\nwould slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could\nreturn back to task context, it would execute another softirq never\nallowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU.\n\nAs RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if\nPREEMPT_RT is not enabled.(CVE-2026-64374)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwriteback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()\n\nWhen a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered:\n\n==================================================================\n VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4)\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695!\n CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1\n pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100\n lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100\n Call trace:\n generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100\n kill_block_super+0x20/0x48\n ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60\n deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130\n deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0\n cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140\n __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28\n task_work_run+0x78/0xe0\n do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240\n==================================================================\n\nThe root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and\ninode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between\ninode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent\nwb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue:\n\n CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback)\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb\n atomic_inc(\u0026amp;isw_nr_in_flight)\n inode_prepare_wbs_switch\n -\u0026gt; passes SB_ACTIVE check\n __iget(inode)\n generic_shutdown_super\n sb-\u0026gt;s_flags \u0026amp;= ~SB_ACTIVE\n cgroup_writeback_umount(sb)\n smp_mb()\n atomic_read(\u0026amp;isw_nr_in_flight)\n rcu_barrier()\n -\u0026gt; no pending RCU callbacks\n flush_workqueue(isw_wq)\n -\u0026gt; nothing queued, returns\n evict_inodes(sb)\n -\u0026gt; Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref.\n sop-\u0026gt;put_super(sb)\n /* destroys percpu counters */\n -\u0026gt; VFS: Busy inodes after unmount!\n wb_queue_isw()\n queue_work(isw_wq, ...)\n /* later in work function */\n inode_switch_wbs_work_fn\n process_inode_switch_wbs\n iput() -\u0026gt; evict\n percpu_counter_dec() // UAF!\n\nFix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in\ninode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from\ninode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is\nno sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a\nsynchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing\nrcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the\nSB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue()\nis called.\n\nThe existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can\nbe backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that\nstill queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current\nmainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 (\u0026quot;writeback: Avoid contention on\nwb-\u0026gt;list_lock when switching inodes\u0026quot;)) and is removed in a follow-up\npatch.(CVE-2026-64378)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: mask server-provided mode to 07777 in modefromsid\n\nWhen modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided\nsub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to\n07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path.(CVE-2026-64379)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing\n\nposix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count,\nbut its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one\nremaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client\npaths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely.(CVE-2026-64380)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay\n\nA response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its\nresponse buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup\nretains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.\n\nReset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64382)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_flush() replay\n\nSMB2_flush() keeps its response buffer bookkeeping across replay\nattempts. If a replayable flush response is received and the retry then\nfails before cifs_send_recv() stores a replacement response, flush_exit\nwill free the stale response pointer a second time.\n\nReinitialize resp_buftype and rsp_iov at the top of the replay loop so\ncleanup only acts on response state produced by the current attempt.\nThis fixes a double-free without changing replay handling for successful\nrequests.(CVE-2026-64383)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix change notify replay double-free\n\nA response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its\nresponse buffer. If SMB2_notify_init() fails before the next send, cleanup\nretains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.\n\nReset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64384)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_ioctl() replay\n\nA response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its\nresponse buffer. If SMB2_ioctl_init() fails before the next send, cleanup\nretains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.\n\nReset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64385)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free\n\nA response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its\nresponse buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send,\ncleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.\n\nReset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64386)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the SMB client. smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received (\u0026quot;server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]\u0026quot;). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, causing the subsequent decoder to read past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server, affecting both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders.(CVE-2026-64448)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()\n\nrandom_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into\nvi-\u0026gt;data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi-\u0026gt;data[] using\nvi-\u0026gt;data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a\nmemcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted\nbuffer size sizeof(vi-\u0026gt;data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32\nor 64).\n\nA malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond\nsizeof(vi-\u0026gt;data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline\narray into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes\nthose bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe\nthem directly via /dev/hwrng.\n\nConcrete impact is inside the guest:\n\n - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that\n over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi-\u0026gt;data\n into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread\n that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace\n interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.\n\n - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a\n malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised\n guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for\n guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest\n root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest\n kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi-\u0026gt;data. In\n practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually\n disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the\n fix is still worth carrying because the underlying\n memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.\n\nKASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend\nhas been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0\n Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52\n Call Trace:\n __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60\n virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0\n hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470\n kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0\n Allocated by task 1:\n probe_common+0xa5/0x660\n virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)\n\nSame class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 (\u0026quot;net/9p: Fix buffer\noverflow in USB transport layer\u0026quot;), which hardened\nusb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in\nthe USB 9p transport.\n\nWith the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place,\nthe same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the\nbogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are\ndiscarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.(CVE-2026-64456)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown\n\ncs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the\ncs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue\nfw_load_work.\n\nThose controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove\nonly cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is\nskipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart\ndisabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been\ninitialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued\nwork runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver\nstate that is no longer valid.\n\nTrack the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control\ncallback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel\nfw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel\nthe work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown.(CVE-2026-64481)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race\n\n`iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with\n`anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous\nfile and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the\ncaller.\n\nThe IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned,\nbut before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace.\nBut since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess\nthe newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd\nhas been installed.\n\nThis means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in\nparallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`.\n\nThe kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it\nis called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader.\nOtherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as\n`kfifo_reset()`.\n\nIf that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based\non state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out`\nindex to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out`\nindex past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed\nFIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This\ncan result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to\nuserspace.\n\nMove the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is\nmarked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot\naccess it while the FIFO is reset.(CVE-2026-64496)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs\n\nOpen vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len\nfield is u16. Commit a1e64addf3ff (\u0026quot;net: openvswitch: remove\nmisbehaving actions length check\u0026quot;) allowed the total sw_flow_actions\nstream to grow beyond 64 KiB, which is valid, but also removed the last\nguard preventing a generated nested action attribute from exceeding\nU16_MAX.\n\nAn oversized generated container can thus be closed with a truncated\nnla_len. A later dump or teardown then walks a structurally different\nstream than the one that was validated. In particular, an oversized\nnested CLONE/CT action may cause subsequent bytes in the generated\nstream to be interpreted as independent actions.\n\nKeep the larger total-action-stream behavior, but make nested action\nclose reject generated containers that do not fit in nla_len, and return\nthe error through all callers. For recursive SAMPLE, CLONE, DEC_TTL, and\nCHECK_PKT_LEN builders, trim resource-owning action-list tails in reverse\nconstruction order before discarding failed wrappers, so resources copied\ninto the rejected tails are released before the wrappers are removed.\n\nMost failed outer wrappers are discarded by truncating actions_len after\nchild resources have been released. CHECK_PKT_LEN also trims its parent\nafter branch resources are gone. SET/TUNNEL close failures unwind their\nknown tun_dst ownership directly, and SET_TO_MASKED has no external\nownership and truncates on close failure.(CVE-2026-64531)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nperf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec\\n\\nperf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling\\nperf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from\\nthe context with DETACH_EXIT only.\\n\\nThis can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group\\nleader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group\\nwas active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the\\nremoved leader\u0026apos;s sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid\\ngroup leader on the PMU context active lists.\\n\\nA later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the\\nstill-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can\\nthen add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU\\ncontext active list.\\n\\nWith DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in\\nmerge_sched_in().\\n\\nFix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an\\nevent. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while\\nensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves\\nthe context.(CVE-2026-64556)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability exists caused by a non-leader exec() race condition in posix-cpu-timers. When sys_timer_delete() observes the old leader, while de_thread() executes switch_leader() and releases the old leader, a race condition occurs. Specifically, posix_cpu_timer_del() in sys_timer_delete() obtains the old leader via pid_task(), while de_thread() is executing release_task(old_leader) and setting old_leader-\u0026gt;sighand = NULL. When lock_task_sighand() returns NULL, sys_timer_delete() frees the posix timer object. However, if the timer was armed and enqueued in p-\u0026gt;signal (a TGID targeted timer is inherited on exec()), run_posix_cpu_timers() or other timerqueue add/delete operations will access the freed object\u0026apos;s timerqueue node, resulting in a use-after-free. This issue similarly affects posix_cpu_timer_set() and posix_cpu_timer_rearm(). The history of this vulnerability goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers implementation.(CVE-2026-64560)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nKVM: x86: Check for invalid/obsolete root *after* making MMU pages available\\n\\nCheck for a \\\u0026quot;stale\\\u0026quot; page fault, i.e. for an invalid and/or obsolete root, after making MMU pages available for the shadow MMU. If reclaiming shadow pages zaps an in-use root, i.e. marks it invalid, then KVM will attempt to map memory into an invalid root. On its own, populating an invalid root is \\\u0026quot;fine\\\u0026quot;, but because child shadow pages inherit their parent\u0026apos;s role, any children created during the map/fetch will be created as invalid pages, thus violating KVM\u0026apos;s invariant that invalid pages are never on the list of active MMU pages.\\n\\nNote, the underlying flaw has existed since KVM first started tracking invalid roots in 2008 (commit 2e53d63acba7, \\\u0026quot;KVM: MMU: ignore zapped root pagetables\\\u0026quot;), but the true badness only came along in 2020 (Linux 5.9) with the invariant that invalid shadow pages can\u0026apos;t be on the list of active pages.\\n\\nNote #2, inheriting role.invalid when creating child shadow pages is also far from ideal; that flaw will be addressed separately.(CVE-2026-64561)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_close() replay\n\nA response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its\nresponse buffer. If SMB2_close_init() fails before the next send, cleanup\nretains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.\n\nReset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.(CVE-2026-64597)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: reload ip header after head reallocation. __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls skb_ensure_writable() which may reallocate skb-\u0026gt;head, causing the previously obtained IP header pointer to become a dangling pointer, leading to a use-after-free vulnerability.(CVE-2026-68476)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: fix more places with wrong ipv6 transport offsets\n\nSashiko reports for more incorrect IPv6 transport offsets.\n\nThe app code for TCP was assuming IPv4 network header\neven after the ipvsh argument was provided. This can\ncause problems with apps over IPv6. As for the only\nofficial app in the kernel tree (FTP) this problem is\nharmless because we use Netfilter to mangle the FTP\nports and we do not adjust the TCP seq numbers.\n\nAlso, provide correct offset of the ICMPV6 header in\nip_vs_out_icmp_v6() for correct checksum checks when\nthe IPv6 packet has extension headers.(CVE-2026-68477)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup\n\nset_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the\nIPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with\nsizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from\nip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped\nextension headers and found the real transport header.\n\nThis makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP\npackets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an\n8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by\nsctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the\nSCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves\nfrom NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established\ntimeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters\nincorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not\ncompleted.\n\nUse the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for\nthe SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without\nextension headers this preserves the existing offset.(CVE-2026-72021)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations\n\nIn net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table\nbuilds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV,\nLLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which\nsets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern\nnl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via\nNL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM.\n\nAny local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve\nthe \u0026quot;802.15.4 MAC\u0026quot; family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev\nthat has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw\n16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied\nverbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply.\nRecovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality\nand authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates\nand encrypts frames.\n\nImpact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte\nAES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has\nan administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY\ndump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family.\n\nIntroduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but\nsetting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump\nentries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the\nmodern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged\nreaders by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and\nNL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry \u0026quot;can be retrieved by unprivileged\nusers\u0026quot; annotations).(CVE-2026-72049)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink\n\nip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two\nnetns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t-\u0026gt;net. They differ once\nthe device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the\nrequest runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only\nagainst dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t-\u0026gt;net can\nrewrite a tunnel that lives in t-\u0026gt;net.\n\nGate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any\nattribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72052)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ipip: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink\n\nipip_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the\ntunnel link netns t-\u0026gt;net. They differ once the device is created in or\nmoved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl\nchangelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a\ncaller privileged there but not in t-\u0026gt;net can rewrite a tunnel that\nlives in t-\u0026gt;net.\n\nGate ipip_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,\nbefore any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72053)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink\n\nvti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the\ntunnel link netns t-\u0026gt;net. They differ once the device is created in or\nmoved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl\nchangelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a\ncaller privileged there but not in t-\u0026gt;net can rewrite a tunnel that\nlives in t-\u0026gt;net.\n\nGate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,\nbefore any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72054)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: sit: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink\n\nipip6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the\ntunnel link netns t-\u0026gt;net. They differ once the device is created in or\nmoved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl\nchangelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a\ncaller privileged there but not in t-\u0026gt;net can rewrite a tunnel that\nlives in t-\u0026gt;net.\n\nGate ipip6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,\nbefore any attribute is parsed. sit was the one tunnel type not covered\nby the recent series that added this check to the other changelink()\nhandlers.(CVE-2026-72061)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: macsec: fix use-after-free of metadata_dst on RX SC delete\n\nWhen an offloaded MACsec RX SC is deleted, macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() freed\nthe per-SC metadata_dst with metadata_dst_free(), which kfree()s the\nobject unconditionally and ignores the dst reference count. The RX\ndatapath in mlx5e_macsec_offload_handle_rx_skb() looks up the SC under\nrcu_read_lock() via xa_load(), takes a reference with dst_hold() and\nattaches the dst to the skb with skb_dst_set(). A reader that already\nobtained the rx_sc pointer can race with the delete path and operate on\nfreed memory.\n\nFix the owner side by dropping the reference with dst_release() instead\nof freeing unconditionally, and convert the RX datapath to\ndst_hold_safe() so a reader racing the SC delete cannot attach a dst\nwhose last reference was just dropped; only attach it when a reference\nwas actually taken.\n\nmlx5e_macsec_add_rxsc() also published sc_xarray_element via xa_alloc()\nbefore rx_sc-\u0026gt;md_dst was allocated and initialised, so a datapath reader\nthat looked the SC up by fs_id could observe rx_sc with md_dst still\nNULL or, on weakly-ordered architectures, a non-NULL md_dst pointer\nwhose contents were not yet visible. NULL-check the xa_load() result and\nmd_dst on the datapath, and reorder add_rxsc() so the xa_alloc() publish\nhappens only after md_dst is fully initialised; the xarray RCU publish\nthen pairs with the rcu_read_lock()/xa_load() in the datapath.\n\nNote: macsec_del_rxsc_ctx() also kfree()s rx_sc-\u0026gt;sc_xarray_element\nwithout an RCU grace period while the same datapath reads it under\nrcu_read_lock(); that is a separate pre-existing issue left to a\nfollow-up patch.\n\nFound by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).(CVE-2026-72072)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm-log: fix a bitset_size overflow on 32bit machines\n\nCommit c20e36b7631d (\u0026quot;dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to\nregion_count overflow\u0026quot;) made sure that region_count could fit in an\nunsigned int. But the bitmap memory isn\u0026apos;t allocated based on\nregion_count. It uses bitset_size (a size_t variable). The first step of\ncalculating bitset_size is to set it to region_count, rounded up to a\nmultiple of BITS_PER_LONG. If region_size is less than BITS_PER_LONG\nsmaller than UINT_MAX, it will get rounded up to 2^32. On a 32bit\narchitecture, this will make bitset_size wrap around to 0 and fail,\ndespite region_count being valid.\n\nSince bitset_size gets divided by 8, it can hold any valid region_count.\nIt just needs a special case to handle the rollover. If it is 0, the\nvalue rolled over, and bitset size should be set to the number of bytes\nneeded to hold 2^32 bits.(CVE-2026-72105)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf,fork: wipe -\u0026gt;bpf_storage before bailouts that access it\n\nCurrently, copy_process() can bail out to free_task() before p-\u0026gt;bpf_storage\nhas been initialized, with this call graph (shown here for the\n!CONFIG_MEMCG case):\n\ncopy_process\n dup_task_struct\n arch_dup_task_struct\n [copies the entire task_struct, including -\u0026gt;bpf_storage member]\n [RLIMIT_NPROC check fails]\n delayed_free_task\n free_task\n bpf_task_storage_free\n rcu_dereference(task-\u0026gt;bpf_storage)\n bpf_local_storage_destroy\n\nIn this case, the nascent task\u0026apos;s -\u0026gt;bpf_storage member that\nbpf_local_storage_destroy() operates on is a plain copy of the parent\u0026apos;s\n-\u0026gt;bpf_storage pointer, not a real initialized pointer.\nThis leads to badness (kernel hangs, UAF).\n\nThis is reachable as long as the process calling fork() has been inserted\ninto a task storage map.(CVE-2026-72110)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset\n\nnvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset\ninto the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any\noffset with off + len \u0026lt;= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes\nthe data begins in the first inline page:\n\n\tsg-\u0026gt;offset = off;\n\tsg-\u0026gt;length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);\n\nWhen a port is configured with inline_data_size \u0026gt; PAGE_SIZE (settable up\nto max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size]\nmakes \u0026quot;PAGE_SIZE - off\u0026quot; underflow, so sg-\u0026gt;length is set to ~4 GiB and\nthe block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len)\nalso ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len)\nspan crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist.\n\nMap the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page\noffset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from\npage_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at\ninline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL\nidentity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the\npersistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and\nnvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in\nfree_large_kmalloc()).(CVE-2026-72129)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntpm: Make the TPM character devices non-seekable\n\nThe TPM character devices expose a sequential command/response\ninterface, but their open handlers leave FMODE_PREAD and FMODE_PWRITE\nenabled.\n\nAfter a command leaves a response pending, pread(fd, buf, 16, 0x1400)\npasses 0x1400 as *off to tpm_common_read(). The transfer length is\nbounded by response_length, but the offset is used unchecked when\nforming data_buffer + *off. A sufficiently large offset therefore causes\nan out-of-bounds heap read through copy_to_user() and, if the copy\nsucceeds, an out-of-bounds zero-write through the following memset().\n\nPositional I/O does not provide coherent semantics for this interface.\nAn arbitrary pread offset cannot represent how much of a response has\nbeen consumed sequentially. The write callback always stores a command\nat the start of data_buffer, while pwrite() does not update file-\u0026gt;f_pos\nand can leave the sequential read cursor stale.\n\nCall nonseekable_open() from both open handlers. This removes\nFMODE_PREAD and FMODE_PWRITE, causing positional reads and writes to\nfail with -ESPIPE before reaching the TPM callbacks, and explicitly\nmarks the files non-seekable. Normal read() and write() continue to use\nthe existing sequential f_pos cursor, leaving the response state machine\nunchanged.\n\nTested on Linux 6.12 with KASAN and a swtpm TPM2 device:\n\n - sequential partial reads returned the complete response\n - pread() and preadv() with offset 0x1400 returned -ESPIPE\n - pwrite() and pwritev() with offset zero returned -ESPIPE\n - the pending response remained intact after the rejected operations\n - a subsequent normal command/response cycle completed normally\n - no KASAN report was produced.(CVE-2026-72135)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: xfrm_interface: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink\n\nxfrmi_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the\ninterface link netns xi-\u0026gt;net. They differ once the device is created in\nor moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl\nchangelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a\ncaller privileged there but not in xi-\u0026gt;net can rewrite an interface that\nlives in xi-\u0026gt;net.\n\nGate xfrmi_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,\nbefore any attribute is parsed.(CVE-2026-72136)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count. tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as a page fragment. A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1 fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()-\u0026gt;frags[] and corrupts memory after the shared info.(CVE-2026-72157)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mm_init: fix uninitialized struct pages for ZONE_DEVICE. If DAX memory is hotplugged into an unoccupied subsection of an early section, section_activate() reuses the unoptimized boot memmap. However, compound_nr_pages() still assumes that vmemmap optimization is in effect and initializes only the reduced number of struct pages. As a result, the remaining tail struct pages are left uninitialized, which can later lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. Fix this by treating early sections as unoptimized when calculating how many struct pages to initialize.(CVE-2026-72172)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: Bound-check xdr_buf_to_bvec() stores before writing\n\nxdr_buf_to_bvec() writes a bio_vec into the caller\u0026apos;s array before\ntesting whether that slot is in range, and the head branch performs\nthe store with no check at all. When the caller\u0026apos;s budget is exactly\nused up, the next store lands one element past the end of the array.\nThe overflow label returns count - 1, which masks the surplus store\nbut cannot undo it.\n\nrq_bvec, the array passed by nfsd_vfs_write(), is allocated to\nexactly rq_maxpages entries with no slack. The OOB store can land in\nadjacent slab memory; the bv_len and bv_offset fields written there\nare derived from client-supplied RPC payload sizes.\n\nMove the in-range check ahead of the store in the head, page-loop,\nand tail branches. With the check at the top of each sequence, count\nis incremented only after a successful store, so the overflow label\ncan return count directly.(CVE-2026-72217)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: wait for in-flight TLS handshake callback when cancel loses race\n\nWhen wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() in\nsvc_tcp_handshake() returns 0 (timeout) or -ERESTARTSYS (signal) and\ntls_handshake_cancel() then returns false, handshake_complete() has\nwon the cancellation race: it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and\nis about to invoke svc_tcp_handshake_done(), but the callback\u0026apos;s\nside effects on xpt_flags and on svsk-\u0026gt;sk_handshake_done have not\nyet committed.\n\nThe current code reads xpt_flags immediately to decide whether the\nsession succeeded. Two races result.\n\nIf the callback has executed set_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION) but not yet\nclear_bit(XPT_HANDSHAKE), svc_tcp_handshake() sees a session,\nenqueues the transport, and returns. svc_xprt_received() then\nclears XPT_BUSY, a worker thread picks the transport up, the\ndispatcher in svc_handle_xprt() observes XPT_HANDSHAKE still set,\nand xpo_handshake is invoked a second time. That svc_tcp_handshake()\ncalls init_completion(\u0026amp;svsk-\u0026gt;sk_handshake_done) while the original\ncallback concurrently calls complete_all() on it, corrupting the\nembedded swait_queue.\n\nIf the callback has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but not yet\nentered svc_tcp_handshake_done(), svc_tcp_handshake() reads\nXPT_TLS_SESSION as clear and tears the connection down even though\nthe handshake is about to succeed.\n\nWait for the callback to commit before inspecting xpt_flags. The\ncompletion is guaranteed to fire because handshake_complete()\ninvokes svc_tcp_handshake_done() unconditionally once it has set\nHANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED.(CVE-2026-72221)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback\n\nsvc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in\ntls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through\ntls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only\nsock_hold(req-\u0026gt;hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct\nsvc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of().\n\nTwo close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed\nsvc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards\nits return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has\nalready set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have\nfinished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The\ncancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces\nthe same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout()\nreturns \u0026lt;= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns\nfalse, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt()\ncalls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the\nlast reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while\nsvc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking\nsvsk-\u0026gt;sk_handshake_done.\n\nThe corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed\nxpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the\nfreed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a\nslab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable\non any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps\nthe tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means\nsignal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry.\n\nTake svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509()\nso the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the\ntwo edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission\nfailure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful\ntls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of\nsvc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all().\n\n[cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change](CVE-2026-72222)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: retrieve ethhdr after potential skb realloc on RX\n\npskb_may_pull() in batadv_interface_rx() could reallocate the buffer behind\nthe skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be\nreassigned to avoid an use-after-free.\n\nThis was done correctly for the VLAN header but missed for the ethernet\nheader which is later used for the TT and AP isolation handling.(CVE-2026-72235)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: Move kvm_io_bus_get_dev() locking responsibilities to callers\n\nkvm_io_bus_get_dev() returns a device that is only matched by the\naddress, and nothing else. This can cause a lifetime issue if\nthe matched device is not the expected type, as by the time\nthe caller can introspect the object, it might be gone (the srcu\nlock having been dropped).\n\nGiven that there is only a single user of this helper, the simplest\noption is to move the locking responsibility to the caller, which\ncan keep the srcu lock held for as long as it wants.\n\nNote that this aligns with other kvm_io_bus*() helpers, which\nalready require the srcu lock to be held by the callers.(CVE-2026-72282)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check. smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer, leading to an out-of-bounds read.(CVE-2026-72310)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm era: fix NULL pointer dereference in metadata_open()\n\nmetadata_open() returns NULL when kzalloc_obj() fails, but the\ncaller era_ctr() only checks IS_ERR(md). Since IS_ERR(NULL)\nreturns false, the NULL pointer is treated as a valid result\nand later assigned to era-\u0026gt;md, leading to a NULL pointer\ndereference when the metadata is accessed.\n\nFix this by returning ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on allocation failure,\nconsistent with dm-cache-metadata.c, dm-thin-metadata.c, and\ndm-clone-metadata.c which all use ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) for the\nsame pattern.(CVE-2026-72316)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: pin upper rpc_clnt across the TLS connect_worker\n\nThe TLS connect path has a use-after-free: nothing pins the\nupper rpc_clnt across the delayed connect_worker. xs_connect()\nstores task-\u0026gt;tk_client in sock_xprt::clnt as a raw pointer\nand queues the worker; for TLS-secured transports that worker\nis xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(), which reads several fields out\nof the saved pointer (cl_timeout, cl_program, cl_prog,\ncl_vers, cl_cred, cl_stats) to construct the args for the\ninner handshake rpc_clnt.\n\nThe xprt does not reference the rpc_clnt; the rpc_clnt\nreferences the xprt. xs_destroy() does cancel the\nconnect_worker, but it runs only when the xprt\u0026apos;s refcount\ndrops to zero, which cannot happen until the rpc_clnt\nreleases its cl_xprt reference in rpc_free_client_work().\nWhen a TLS handshake fails fatally (for example, an mTLS\nmount whose client cert does not match the server), the\nconnecting task is woken with -EACCES and exits, the mount\ncaller invokes rpc_shutdown_client(), and the upper rpc_clnt\nis freed before the queued connect_worker fires.\nxs_tcp_tls_setup_socket() then dereferences the freed clnt,\nproducing the refcount_t underflow Michael Nemanov reported.\n\nTake a reference on the upper rpc_clnt in xs_connect() for\nTLS transports via a new rpc_hold_client() helper, and drop\nit in the connect_worker\u0026apos;s exit path with rpc_release_client().\nThe xprt_lock_connect() / xprt_unlock_connect() pairing\nalready serialises xs_connect() with xs_tcp_tls_setup_socket(),\nso the take and release are balanced one-for-one.\n\nThe non-TLS connect worker (xs_tcp_setup_socket) never reads\nsock_xprt::clnt, so leave that path alone and avoid the\nclnt-holds-xprt-holds-clnt cycle that would otherwise prevent\nxprt destruction.(CVE-2026-72317)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncifs: validate DFS referral string offsets\n\nparse_dfs_referrals() validates that the response header and referral\narray fit in the received buffer, but each referral also contains string\noffsets supplied by the server.\n\nThose offsets are used to compute the DfsPath and NetworkAddress string\npointers without checking whether they still point inside the response\nbuffer. A malformed referral can therefore make the computed pointer\nexceed the end of the buffer. The resulting negative max_len is then\npassed to cifs_strndup_from_utf16(), and the non-Unicode path forwards it\nto kstrndup() as a size_t, allowing strnlen() to read out of bounds.\n\nValidate each string offset before deriving the string pointer.(CVE-2026-72318)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: ensure inner headers in ICMP errors are in headroom\n\nSashiko points out that after stripping the outer headers\nwith pskb_pull() we should ensure the inner IP headers\nin ICMP errors from tunnels are present in the skb headroom\nfor functions like ipv4_update_pmtu(), icmp_send() and\nIP_VS_DBG().\n\nAlso, add more checks for the length of the inner headers.(CVE-2026-72319)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_read_sock()\n\nA peer may send a zero-length TLS application_data record; TLS 1.3\nexplicitly permits these as a traffic-analysis countermeasure (RFC\n8446, Section 5.1). After decryption such a record has full_len ==\n0. tls_sw_read_sock() hands it to the read_actor, which has no\npayload to consume and returns zero. The loop treats a zero return\nas backpressure (used \u0026lt;= 0), requeues the skb at the head of\nrx_list, and stops. rx_list is serviced head-first on the next\ncall, so the empty record is dequeued, fails the same way, and is\nrequeued again; every later record on the connection is blocked\nbehind it.\n\ntls_sw_recvmsg() does not stall on this: a zero-length data record\ncopies nothing and falls through to consume_skb(). Mirror that in\nthe read_sock() path by recognizing an empty data record before\nthe actor runs, consuming it, and continuing.(CVE-2026-72330)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nqede: fix off-by-one in BD ring consumption on build_skb failure\n\nqede_rx_build_skb() and qede_tpa_rx_build_skb() do not check for a\nNULL return from qede_build_skb(). When it returns NULL under memory\npressure, the functions still consume a BD from the ring before\nreturning NULL. The callers then recycle additional BDs, resulting in\none extra BD being consumed (off-by-one). This desynchronizes the BD\nring, which can corrupt DMA page reference counts and lead to SLUB\nfreelist corruption.\n\nCommit 4e910dbe3650 (\u0026quot;qede: confirm skb is allocated before using\u0026quot;)\nadded a NULL check inside qede_build_skb() to prevent a NULL pointer\ndereference, but did not address the missing NULL checks in the\ncallers, making this off-by-one reachable.\n\nFix this by adding NULL checks for the return value of\nqede_build_skb() in both qede_rx_build_skb() and\nqede_tpa_rx_build_skb(), returning NULL immediately before any BD ring\nmanipulation.(CVE-2026-72339)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats agent registration race\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() registers the stats agent through\nmlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper publishes the agent in\nhv_vhca-\u0026gt;agents[type] under agents_lock and immediately schedules an\nasynchronous control invalidation on the HV VHCA workqueue before\nreturning to mlx5e.\n\nThe asynchronous invalidation invokes the control agent\u0026apos;s invalidate\ncallback, which reads the hypervisor control block and forwards the\ncommand to mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_control(). That callback may either:\n\n - call cancel_delayed_work_sync(\u0026amp;priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.work), or\n - call queue_delayed_work(priv-\u0026gt;wq, \u0026amp;sagent-\u0026gt;work, sagent-\u0026gt;delay).\n\nHowever, the delayed_work and priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.agent are only\ninitialized after mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create() returns to mlx5e:\n\n agent = mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(...); /* publish + invalidate */\n ...\n priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.agent = agent; /* too late */\n INIT_DELAYED_WORK(\u0026amp;priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.work, ...); /* too late */\n\nIf the asynchronous control path runs before the two assignments\nabove, it can:\n\n - Operate on an uninitialized delayed_work whose timer.function is\n NULL. queue_delayed_work() calls add_timer() unconditionally, so\n when the timer expires the timer softirq invokes a NULL function\n pointer.\n - Re-initialize the timer later through INIT_DELAYED_WORK() while\n the timer is already enqueued in the timer wheel, corrupting the\n hlist (entry.pprev cleared while the previous bucket node still\n points at this entry).\n - When the worker eventually runs, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() reads\n sagent-\u0026gt;agent (NULL) and dereferences it inside\n mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_write().\n\nFix this by:\n\n - Initializing priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.work before invoking\n mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(), so the work is always in a valid\n state when the control callback observes it.\n - Adding a struct mlx5_hv_vhca_agent **ctx_update out-parameter\n to mlx5_hv_vhca_agent_create(). The helper writes the agent\n pointer to *ctx_update before publishing into hv_vhca-\u0026gt;agents[]\n and triggering the agents_update flow, so any callback\n subsequently invoked from that flow already sees a valid\n priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.agent. This avoids having the control\n callback participate in agent initialization.\n\nWhile at it, access priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.agent with\nREAD_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for the cross-CPU access with the worker, and\nclear priv-\u0026gt;stats_agent.buf on the agent_create() failure path.(CVE-2026-72342)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields\n\nseg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh-\u0026gt;type and\nsrh-\u0026gt;hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed\nstruct ipv6_sr_hdr fields.\n\nThe BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer\nand length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and\nEND_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the\nlength to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6\nencap header can therefore make the validator read srh-\u0026gt;type at offset 2\nbeyond the caller-supplied buffer.\n\nReject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of\nseg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper\npath and keeps the common validator robust.(CVE-2026-72400)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix FDIR CTRL VSI resource leak in ice_reset_all_vfs()\n\nResetting all VFs causes resource leak on VFs with FDIR filters\nenabled as CTRL VSIs are only invalidated and not freed. Fix by using\nice_vf_ctrl_vsi_release() instead of ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi() which\naligns behavior with the ice_reset_vf() function.\n\nReproduction:\n echo 1 \u0026gt; /sys/class/net/$pf/device/sriov_numvfs\n ethtool -N $vf flow-type ether proto 0x9000 action 0\n echo 1 \u0026gt; /sys/class/net/$pf/device/reset(CVE-2026-72425)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match\n\nsyzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_selector_match()\ndue to AF_UNSPEC selector with large prefixlen (e.g. 128) matched\nagainst IPv4 flow (when XFRM_STATE_AF_UNSPEC is set).\n\nFix this by:\n\n- Rejecting mismatched families in xfrm_selector_match.\n- Returning false in addr4_match if prefixlen \u0026gt; 32.\n- Returning false in addr_match if prefixlen \u0026gt; 128 (prevents overflow).(CVE-2026-72450)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: aa_label_alloc use aa_label_free on alloc failure\n\naa_label_alloc() allocates a secid before allocating or taking the label\nproxy. If the later proxy step fails, the error path only freed the label\nmemory, leaking any resources initialized by aa_label_init().\n\nUse aa_label_free() on the failure path so partially initialized labels\nrelease their secid and other label resources before the backing memory is\nfreed.(CVE-2026-72459)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: check label build before no_new_privs test\n\naa_change_profile() builds a replacement label with\nfn_label_build_in_scope() before the no_new_privs subset check. The build\nhelper can fail and return NULL or an ERR_PTR, but the result was passed\nto aa_label_is_unconfined_subset() before the existing IS_ERR_OR_NULL()\ncheck.\n\nReuse the existing target-label build failure handling immediately after\nthe build. This preserves the current audit handling while preventing the\nsubset helper from dereferencing an invalid label.(CVE-2026-72460)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxprtrdma: Repost Receive buffers for malformed replies\n\nrpcrdma_wc_receive() decrements the transport\u0026apos;s Receive count for\nevery completion before it dispatches a successful Receive to\nrpcrdma_reply_handler(). The handler must post a replacement\nReceive WR before returning unless ownership of the rep has moved\nelsewhere, as on the backchannel path.\n\nCommit 2ae50ad68cd7 (\u0026quot;xprtrdma: Close window between waking RPC\nsenders and posting Receives\u0026quot;) moved the Receive refill out of\nrpcrdma_wc_receive(), where it had run ahead of every reply, into\nrpcrdma_reply_handler() so that the responder\u0026apos;s credit grant could\nbe parsed before reposting. The bad-version and short-reply exits\nnever reach that refill: they recycle the rep and return without\ncalling rpcrdma_post_recvs().\n\nA remote peer can therefore drain the client\u0026apos;s posted Receive\nqueue by sending a sustained stream of replies that are shorter\nthan the fixed transport header or that carry an unrecognized\nRPC/RDMA version. Each such reply consumes one posted Receive\nwithout replacing it. Once the queue empties, the peer\u0026apos;s next\nSend finds no posted Receive and the transport stalls until\nreconnect.\n\nRoute both malformed-reply exits through the shared repost tail\nafter recycling the rep, refilling against buf-\u0026gt;rb_credits, the\nmost recent accepted credit grant. Neither exit updates the\ncongestion window, so RPCs admitted under the previous grant\nremain in flight awaiting replies. A smaller refill target would\nlet a stream of malformed replies ratchet the posted Receive count\ndown to the batch floor while the congestion window still admits\nrb_credits RPCs; a burst of valid replies to those RPCs could then\noverrun the posted Receives, and because the client connects with\nrnr_retry_count of zero, a single RNR NAK terminates the\nconnection. Refilling against rb_credits also restores the target\nthat applied to malformed replies before commit 2ae50ad68cd7\n(\u0026quot;xprtrdma: Close window between waking RPC senders and posting\nReceives\u0026quot;) when rpcrdma_post_recvs() computed it from rb_credits\ninternally. rb_credits is at least one from connection\nestablishment onward, so the repost path always keeps Receives\nposted.(CVE-2026-72464)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxprtrdma: Sanitize the reply credit grant after parsing\n\nThe out_norqst exit in rpcrdma_reply_handler() branches away before\nthe credit clamp, so a reply that matches no pending request reaches\nout_post carrying the raw credit value parsed from the wire.\nrpcrdma_post_recvs() does not bound its @needed argument: the refill\nloop allocates and chains Receive WRs until the count is satisfied or\nallocation fails. A peer that sends a well-formed reply carrying an\nunknown XID and an inflated credit grant therefore drives rep\nallocation and Receive posting past re_max_requests on every such\nreply.\n\nMove the clamp to immediately after the credit field is parsed,\nahead of the first branch that can reach out_post, so every later\nconsumer sees a sanitized value. The cwnd update stays on the\nmatched-request path.(CVE-2026-72465)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek\n\nrpcrdma_is_bcall() decodes a reply\u0026apos;s first words to decide whether\nthe frame is a backchannel call. Two issues in that decode path\nlet a short or malformed reply leak the receive buffer and drain\nthe Receive queue.\n\nFirst, the speculative peek\n\n p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 0);\n /* five p++ reads follow */\n\nasks xdr_inline_decode() for zero bytes, which returns xdr-\u0026gt;p\nwithout consulting xdr-\u0026gt;end. The five subsequent __be32 reads can\nthen walk up to 20 bytes past the wire payload into stale regbuf\ncontents and misclassify the reply as a backchannel call.\n\nSecond, after the post-peek\n\n p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 3 * sizeof(*p));\n if (unlikely(!p))\n return true;\n\nthe short-header arm returns true without calling\nrpcrdma_bc_receive_call(). The contract with the caller is that a\ntrue return transfers ownership of rep to the backchannel path:\n\n rpcrdma_reply_handler()\n if (rpcrdma_is_bcall(r_xprt, rep))\n return; /* bare return, skips out_post */\n ...\n out_post:\n rpcrdma_post_recvs(r_xprt, credits + ...);\n\nBecause rpcrdma_bc_receive_call() never ran, no one took rep, but\nrpcrdma_reply_handler still bare-returns past rpcrdma_rep_put()\nand rpcrdma_post_recvs(). The rep, with its persistently\nDMA-mapped receive buffer, is orphaned on rb_all_reps and freed\nonly at transport teardown. This completion reposts nothing, so\nits slot is reclaimed only when a later forward-channel reply\nreaches out_post and rpcrdma_post_recvs() allocates a fresh rep to\nbackfill; absent that traffic the Receive queue drains and the\npeer\u0026apos;s Sends draw RNR NAKs.\n\nFix by consulting xdr-\u0026gt;end after the zero-length peek so the five\n__be32 reads cannot run unless 20 bytes of wire payload remain. A\nbyte-precise comparison against xdr-\u0026gt;end is required because a\nnon-4-aligned receive rounds the stream\u0026apos;s word count up past the\ntrue payload. Also return false from the short-header arm so the\nreply falls through the normal out_norqst cleanup chain\n(rpcrdma_rep_put() plus rpcrdma_post_recvs()).(CVE-2026-72466)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxprtrdma: Decouple req recycling from RPC completion\n\nrl_kref formerly served two distinct lifetimes through a single\nrefcount: it gated when a Reply could wake its RPC task, and it\ngated when an rpcrdma_req could return to its free pool. The\nmarshal path took the Send-side reference only when SGEs needed\nDMA-unmap (sc_unmap_count \u0026gt; 0), which made a Send carrying only\npre-registered buffers an exception: the Reply handler dropped\nrl_kref from 1 to 0 and freed the req while the HCA might still\nbe DMA-reading from its send buffer.\n\nGive rl_kref a narrower job. The RPC layer takes one reference\nwhen slot allocation hands a req out. rpcrdma_prepare_send_sges()\ntakes a Send-side reference unconditionally after WR preparation\nsucceeds. xprt_rdma_free_slot() and xprt_rdma_bc_free_rqst() drop\nthe RPC-layer reference; rpcrdma_sendctx_unmap() drops the\nSend-side reference. The req returns to its free pool only after\nboth owners have signed off.\n\nThe existing kref_init(\u0026amp;req-\u0026gt;rl_kref) call in\nrpcrdma_prepare_send_sges() is removed. Initialization moves to\nthe slot-allocation paths (xprt_rdma_alloc_slot and\nrpcrdma_bc_rqst_get), and the release callback re-arms rl_kref\nbefore the req returns to a free pool. A re-init in the marshal\npath would discard the RPC-layer reference that already exists\non entry.\n\nThree invariants follow:\n\n - Any rpcrdma_req held by an rpc_rqst has rl_kref \u0026gt;= 1.\n xprt_rdma_alloc_slot(), rpcrdma_bc_rqst_get(), and the\n backlog-wake branch in xprt_rdma_alloc_slot() each kref_init\n rl_kref before publishing the req. Without this invariant,\n an RPC task that aborts between slot allocation and marshal\n (gss_refresh failure or signal during call_connect, for\n example) would drive xprt_release() -\u0026gt;\n xprt_rdma_free_slot() -\u0026gt; kref_put against a refcount of\n zero, saturating refcount_t and stranding the slot.\n\n - The Send-side reference is taken only after WR prep\n succeeds. A mapping failure in rpcrdma_prepare_send_sges()\n runs rpcrdma_sendctx_cancel(), which DMA-unmaps the sendctx\n and clears sc_req without touching rl_kref. The sendctx\n ring walks in rpcrdma_sendctx_put_locked() and\n rpcrdma_sendctxs_destroy() skip entries with sc_req == NULL,\n so a burst of -EIO marshal failures cannot hold reqs off\n rb_send_bufs.\n\n - The release callback re-arms rl_kref so the next consumer\n enters with the invariant satisfied.\n\nReplies now complete the RPC directly. rpcrdma_reply_handler()\ncalls rpcrdma_complete_rqst() in place of kref_put on the\nnon-LocalInv branch. The LocalInv branch already completes the\nRPC from frwr_unmap_async() and is unaffected.\n\nBecause Send-side references can now outlive RPC completion,\nconnection teardown drains sendctx entries whose unsignaled\nSends never had a later signaled completion to walk the ring.\nrpcrdma_sendctxs_destroy() walks the active range and runs\nrpcrdma_sendctx_unmap() on each entry with a non-NULL sc_req\nbefore the request buffers are reset, and is moved ahead of\nrpcrdma_reqs_reset() in rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect() so the reqs\nare still in their pre-reset state when the Send-side refs are\nreleased.\n\nThe drain creates a teardown-ordering hazard on the backchannel\npath. With the new lifetime, releasing a bc_prealloc req from\nrpcrdma_req_release() re-adds it to bc_pa_list. The disconnect\nin xprt_rdma_destroy() runs after xprt_destroy_backchannel() has\nalready emptied bc_pa_list, so the drained reqs would otherwise\nleak. xprt_rdma_destroy() now runs xprt_rdma_bc_destroy(xprt, 0)\na second time after the disconnect to reclaim them.(CVE-2026-72473)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: add bounds check to run_get_highest_vcn()\n\nrun_get_highest_vcn() parses a packed NTFS mapping-pairs buffer without\nany length bound, relying solely on a 0x00 terminator to stop. A\ncrafted $LogFile UpdateMappingPairs record whose embedded attribute\ncontains mapping-pairs runs without a terminator causes the function to\nread past the slab allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds\nread on mount.\n\nThe sibling function run_unpack() received an analogous bounds-check in\ncommit b62567bca474 (\u0026quot;ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()\u0026quot;),\nbut run_get_highest_vcn() was missed.\n\nTake a run_buf_size parameter and reject any run header whose payload\nwould extend past the buffer end, mirroring the pattern used by\nrun_unpack(). The caller in fslog.c passes the remaining attribute\nbytes after the mapping-pairs offset.\n\nKASAN report (on mainline v7.1 merge window HEAD):\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e2d5400 by task mount/72\n Call Trace:\n run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410\n do_action.isra.0+0x3ba8/0x7b50\n log_replay+0x9ddd/0x10200\n ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x4ad/0x610\n ntfs_fill_super+0x214a/0x4540(CVE-2026-72478)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data\n\nAs reported by sashiko [1] we need to use access_ok to check the user\nspace data bounds before we use __get-user to get it.\n\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/(CVE-2026-74258)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npower: supply: core: fix supplied_from allocations\n\nIf dts property power-supplies has multiple values, then accessing to\npsy-\u0026gt;supplied_from[i-1] in __power_supply_populate_supplied_from will\noverrun supplied_from array.(CVE-2026-74271)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: require net admin for TIPCv2 netlink mutators\n\nTIPCv2 registers mutating generic-netlink operations without admin\npermission flags. Generic netlink only checks CAP_NET_ADMIN when an\noperation sets GENL_ADMIN_PERM or GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, so a local\nunprivileged process can currently change TIPC state through commands\nsuch as TIPC_NL_NET_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH, and\nbearer enable/disable.\n\nThe legacy TIPC netlink API already checks netlink_net_capable(...,\nCAP_NET_ADMIN) for administrative commands. Give the TIPCv2 mutators\nthe equivalent generic-netlink gate. Use GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, which\nmaps to the same namespace-aware CAP_NET_ADMIN check that\nnetlink_net_capable() performs, so the behaviour matches the legacy\npath and keeps working for CAP_NET_ADMIN holders in a non-initial user\nnamespace (containers).\n\nA QEMU/KASAN repro run as uid/gid 65534 with zero effective\ncapabilities previously succeeded in changing the network id and node\nidentity, setting and flushing key material, and enabling/disabling a\nUDP bearer. With this patch applied the same operations fail with\n-EPERM.(CVE-2026-74283)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate embedded address parameter length\n\nsctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP,\nand SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct\nsctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer\nparameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header,\nbut does not verify that the embedded address parameter\u0026apos;s declared length\nfits within the bounds of the outer parameter.\n\nLater, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the\nembedded address parameter and pass it to af-\u0026gt;from_addr_param(), which uses\nthe address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload.\nA malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter\nlength that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.\n\nValidate that addr_param-\u0026gt;p.length does not exceed the space available\nafter the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address\nparameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length\nextends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.\n\nThis prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried\nin INIT or ASCONF processing paths.(CVE-2026-74287)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays\n\nThe fix in commit abad3d0bad72 (\u0026quot;bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local\nstorage\u0026quot;) is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check\ntreats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored\nstorage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail\ncall chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even\nthough cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller\u0026apos;s\ncontext, that is, A -\u0026gt; B(no storage) -\u0026gt; C(storage) path.\n\nRequiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a\nstorage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one.\nInstead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot\nperform tail calls itself. This keeps A -\u0026gt; B(no storage) working\nwhile rejecting the A -\u0026gt; B(no storage) -\u0026gt; C(storage) bridge.(CVE-2026-74305)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject sleepable BPF_LSM_CGROUP programs at load time\n\nThe cgroup shim runs under rcu_read_lock_dont_migrate(), so we should\nnot attach any sleepable BPF programs there. Add support to the verifier\nto explicitly reject attempts to load sleepable BPF programs destined\nfor LSM cgroup attachment.\n\nWithout this, we get the following splat from a BPF_LSM_CGROUP\nprogram marked BPF_F_SLEEPABLE attached to file_open when it calls\nbpf_get_dentry_xattr():\n\n BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1567\n in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 34317, name: load\n preempt_count: 0, expected: 0\n RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 0\n Call Trace:\n down_read+0x76/0x480\n ext4_xattr_get+0x11f/0x700\n __vfs_getxattr+0xf0/0x150\n bpf_get_dentry_xattr+0xbb/0xf0\n bpf_prog_e76a298dac9218c6_test_open+0x6a/0x85\n __cgroup_bpf_run_lsm_current+0x326/0x840\n bpf_trampoline_6442534646+0x62/0x14d\n security_file_open+0x34/0x60\n do_dentry_open+0x340/0x1260\n vfs_open+0x7a/0x440\n path_openat+0x1bac/0x30a0\n\nlibbpf provides a .s named section variant for every sleepable\nprogram type except lsm_cgroup, reflecting that per-cgroup LSM programs\nare intended to only run in a non-sleepable context.\n\nThe above splat was obtained by bypassing libbpf by using bpf(2)\ndirectly.(CVE-2026-74338)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Clear rb node linkage when freeing bpf_rb_root\n\nbpf_rb_root_free() detaches the root by copying the current rb_root_cached\nand then replacing the live root with RB_ROOT_CACHED. It then walks the\ncopied root and drops each object contained in the tree.\n\nThis leaves the rb node state intact while dropping the object. If the\nobject is refcounted and survives the drop, its bpf_rb_node_kern still\ncontains an owner pointer to the freed root and stale rb tree linkage. If\na later bpf_rb_root allocation reuses the same address, bpf_rbtree_remove()\ncan incorrectly pass the owner check and call rb_erase_cached() on a node\nwhose rb pointers belong to the old tree.\n\nMirror the list draining behavior by marking nodes as busy while the root\nis being detached, then clear the rb node and release the owner before\ndropping the containing object. This makes surviving nodes unowned and\nsafe to reject from remove or accept for a later add.(CVE-2026-74344)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: fix UAF by restoring RCU-delayed inode freeing in bpffs\n\ncommit 4f375ade6aa9 (\u0026quot;bpf: Avoid RCU context warning when unpinning\nhtab with internal structs\u0026quot;) moved inode cleanup from -\u0026gt;free_inode()\ninto -\u0026gt;destroy_inode() to avoid sleeping in RCU context when calling\nbpf_any_put(). However this removed the RCU delay on freeing the\ninode itself and the cached symlink body (i_link), both of which\ncan be accessed by RCU pathwalk (pick_link, may_lookup etc.).\n\nThis causes a use-after-free when a concurrent unlinkat() drops the\nlast inode reference and destroy_inode() frees the inode immediately,\nwhile another task is still walking the path in RCU mode and reads\ninode-\u0026gt;i_opflags (offset +2) inside current_time() -\u0026gt; is_mgtime().\n\nKASAN reports:\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in is_mgtime include/linux/fs.h:2313\n Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880407e4282 (offset +2 = i_opflags)\n\nThe rules (per Al Viro):\n -\u0026gt;destroy_inode() called immediately, can sleep, use for blocking\n cleanup e.g. bpf_any_put()\n -\u0026gt;free_inode() called after RCU grace period, use for freeing\n inode and anything RCU-accessible e.g. i_link\n\nFix: split the two concerns properly:\n - keep bpf_any_put() in bpf_destroy_inode() since it is blocking\n and needs to run promptly\n - introduce bpf_free_inode() to handle kfree(i_link) and\n free_inode_nonrcu() with proper RCU delay, preventing the UAF(CVE-2026-74363)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path\n\nFor non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the\nshared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious\nuser to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel\nis processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in\nrxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data().\n\nIntroduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE\nto a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach\nalready used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is\nreused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP.(CVE-2026-74377)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: Fix TOCTOU heap overflow in get_srq_wqe\n\nget_srq_wqe() reads wqe-\u0026gt;dma.num_sge from the shared receive queue\nbuffer, which is mapped into userspace. It validates num_sge against\nmax_sge, but then re-reads the same field to calculate the memcpy\nsize. A concurrent userspace thread can modify num_sge between\nvalidation and use, causing a heap buffer overflow when copying the\nWQE into qp-\u0026gt;resp.srq_wqe.\n\nRead num_sge into a local variable and use it for both the bounds\ncheck and the size calculation.(CVE-2026-74378)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check\n\nimm_buf-\u0026gt;len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network.\nAdding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a\nmalicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap\naround to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently\npassing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one().\n\nUse check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison.(CVE-2026-74394)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nIB/mlx5: Fix transport-domain rollback and initialize lb mutex earlier\n\nmlx5_ib_alloc_transport_domain() allocates a transport domain and then\nmay fail in mlx5_ib_enable_lb(). In that case, the allocated TD is leaked.\n\nFix this by deallocating the TD when mlx5_ib_enable_lb() returns an\nerror. Also return 0 explicitly in the no-loopback-capability success\nbranch, and move dev-\u0026gt;lb.mutex initialization to mlx5_ib_stage_init_init().(CVE-2026-74397)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: addrconf: bail out of dad_failure when state is no longer POSTDAD\n\naddrconf_dad_failure() transitions ifp-\u0026gt;state from DAD to POSTDAD\nvia addrconf_dad_end(), which drops ifp-\u0026gt;lock on return. The lock\nis re-acquired after net_info_ratelimited(). A concurrent\nipv6_del_addr() can take the lock in that window, set ifp-\u0026gt;state\nto DEAD and run list_del_rcu(\u0026amp;ifp-\u0026gt;if_list).\n\naddrconf_dad_failure() then overwrites DEAD with ERRDAD at errdad:\nand schedules a new dad_work. The work calls ipv6_del_addr()\nagain, hitting the already-poisoned list entry:\n\n general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 4 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1\n Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work\n RIP: 0010:ipv6_del_addr+0xe9/0x280\n RAX: dead000000000122\n Call Trace:\n addrconf_dad_stop+0x113/0x140\n addrconf_dad_work+0x28c/0x430\n process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0\n worker_thread+0x4d/0x400\n kthread+0x104/0x140\n ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40\n\nFold the addrconf_dad_end() logic into addrconf_dad_failure() under\na single ifp-\u0026gt;lock critical section. The STABLE_PRIVACY branch\ntemporarily drops ifp-\u0026gt;lock around address regeneration, so at\nlock_errdad: verify the state is still POSTDAD before transitioning\nto ERRDAD; bail out otherwise to avoid overwriting a state set by\nanother path while the lock was released.(CVE-2026-74398)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in vxlan_gro_prepare_receive().\n\nudp_tunnel_sock_release() could set sk-\u0026gt;sk_user_data to NULL\nwhile vxlan_gro_prepare_receive() is running.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s check if rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is NULL after\nskb_gro_remcsum_init().(CVE-2026-74406)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3704",
"modified": "2026-09-05T15:04:08Z",
"published": "2026-09-05T15:04:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3704"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71112"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71123"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23243"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23244"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23253"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23268"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23271"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23317"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23319"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23359"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23383"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23388"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43078"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46028"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52980"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53055"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53246"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53384"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63800"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63830"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63886"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63887"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63888"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63889"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63891"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63898"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63899"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63901"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63912"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63917"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63919"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63920"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63921"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63924"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63926"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63928"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63944"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63945"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63946"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63952"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63956"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63968"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63971"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63974"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63975"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63976"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63984"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63985"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63992"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63993"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63994"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64002"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64003"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64015"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64025"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64032"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64046"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64047"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64073"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64076"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64077"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64088"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64089"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64095"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64097"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64098"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64106"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64109"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64112"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64113"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64114"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64118"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64126"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64136"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64191"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64219"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64222"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64237"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64247"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64298"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64299"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64304"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64305"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64306"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64312"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64313"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64317"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64319"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64320"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64322"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64323"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64324"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64355"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64364"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64374"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64378"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64379"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64380"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64382"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64383"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64384"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64385"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64386"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64448"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64456"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64481"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64496"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64531"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64556"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64560"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64561"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64597"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68476"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68477"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72021"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72049"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72052"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72053"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72054"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72061"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72072"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72105"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72110"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72129"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72135"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72136"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72157"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72172"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72217"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72221"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72222"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72235"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72282"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72310"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72316"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72317"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72318"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72319"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72330"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72339"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72342"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72400"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72425"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72450"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72459"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72460"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72464"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72465"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72466"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72473"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72478"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74258"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74271"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74283"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74287"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74305"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74338"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74344"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74363"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74377"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74378"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74394"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74397"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74398"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74406"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-71112",
"CVE-2025-71123",
"CVE-2026-23243",
"CVE-2026-23244",
"CVE-2026-23253",
"CVE-2026-23268",
"CVE-2026-23271",
"CVE-2026-23317",
"CVE-2026-23319",
"CVE-2026-23359",
"CVE-2026-23383",
"CVE-2026-23388",
"CVE-2026-43078",
"CVE-2026-46028",
"CVE-2026-52980",
"CVE-2026-53055",
"CVE-2026-53246",
"CVE-2026-53384",
"CVE-2026-63800",
"CVE-2026-63830",
"CVE-2026-63886",
"CVE-2026-63887",
"CVE-2026-63888",
"CVE-2026-63889",
"CVE-2026-63891",
"CVE-2026-63898",
"CVE-2026-63899",
"CVE-2026-63901",
"CVE-2026-63912",
"CVE-2026-63917",
"CVE-2026-63919",
"CVE-2026-63920",
"CVE-2026-63921",
"CVE-2026-63924",
"CVE-2026-63926",
"CVE-2026-63928",
"CVE-2026-63944",
"CVE-2026-63945",
"CVE-2026-63946",
"CVE-2026-63952",
"CVE-2026-63956",
"CVE-2026-63968",
"CVE-2026-63971",
"CVE-2026-63974",
"CVE-2026-63975",
"CVE-2026-63976",
"CVE-2026-63984",
"CVE-2026-63985",
"CVE-2026-63992",
"CVE-2026-63993",
"CVE-2026-63994",
"CVE-2026-64002",
"CVE-2026-64003",
"CVE-2026-64015",
"CVE-2026-64025",
"CVE-2026-64032",
"CVE-2026-64046",
"CVE-2026-64047",
"CVE-2026-64073",
"CVE-2026-64076",
"CVE-2026-64077",
"CVE-2026-64088",
"CVE-2026-64089",
"CVE-2026-64095",
"CVE-2026-64097",
"CVE-2026-64098",
"CVE-2026-64106",
"CVE-2026-64109",
"CVE-2026-64112",
"CVE-2026-64113",
"CVE-2026-64114",
"CVE-2026-64118",
"CVE-2026-64126",
"CVE-2026-64136",
"CVE-2026-64191",
"CVE-2026-64219",
"CVE-2026-64222",
"CVE-2026-64237",
"CVE-2026-64247",
"CVE-2026-64298",
"CVE-2026-64299",
"CVE-2026-64304",
"CVE-2026-64305",
"CVE-2026-64306",
"CVE-2026-64312",
"CVE-2026-64313",
"CVE-2026-64317",
"CVE-2026-64319",
"CVE-2026-64320",
"CVE-2026-64322",
"CVE-2026-64323",
"CVE-2026-64324",
"CVE-2026-64355",
"CVE-2026-64364",
"CVE-2026-64374",
"CVE-2026-64378",
"CVE-2026-64379",
"CVE-2026-64380",
"CVE-2026-64382",
"CVE-2026-64383",
"CVE-2026-64384",
"CVE-2026-64385",
"CVE-2026-64386",
"CVE-2026-64448",
"CVE-2026-64456",
"CVE-2026-64481",
"CVE-2026-64496",
"CVE-2026-64531",
"CVE-2026-64556",
"CVE-2026-64560",
"CVE-2026-64561",
"CVE-2026-64597",
"CVE-2026-68476",
"CVE-2026-68477",
"CVE-2026-72021",
"CVE-2026-72049",
"CVE-2026-72052",
"CVE-2026-72053",
"CVE-2026-72054",
"CVE-2026-72061",
"CVE-2026-72072",
"CVE-2026-72105",
"CVE-2026-72110",
"CVE-2026-72129",
"CVE-2026-72135",
"CVE-2026-72136",
"CVE-2026-72157",
"CVE-2026-72172",
"CVE-2026-72217",
"CVE-2026-72221",
"CVE-2026-72222",
"CVE-2026-72235",
"CVE-2026-72282",
"CVE-2026-72310",
"CVE-2026-72316",
"CVE-2026-72317",
"CVE-2026-72318",
"CVE-2026-72319",
"CVE-2026-72330",
"CVE-2026-72339",
"CVE-2026-72342",
"CVE-2026-72400",
"CVE-2026-72425",
"CVE-2026-72450",
"CVE-2026-72459",
"CVE-2026-72460",
"CVE-2026-72464",
"CVE-2026-72465",
"CVE-2026-72466",
"CVE-2026-72473",
"CVE-2026-72478",
"CVE-2026-74258",
"CVE-2026-74271",
"CVE-2026-74283",
"CVE-2026-74287",
"CVE-2026-74305",
"CVE-2026-74338",
"CVE-2026-74344",
"CVE-2026-74363",
"CVE-2026-74377",
"CVE-2026-74378",
"CVE-2026-74394",
"CVE-2026-74397",
"CVE-2026-74398",
"CVE-2026-74406"
]
}
OPENSUSE-SU-2026:20826-1
Vulnerability from csaf_opensuse - Published: 2026-05-28 12:58 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:33SUSE-SU-2026:0961-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-23 09:08 - Updated: 2026-09-16 19:10SUSE-SU-2026:0962-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-23 09:09 - Updated: 2026-09-16 19:10SUSE-SU-2026:0984-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-23 22:20 - Updated: 2026-03-23 22:20SUSE-SU-2026:1003-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-25 09:25 - Updated: 2026-09-16 19:10SUSE-SU-2026:1041-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-25 14:13 - Updated: 2026-09-16 19:11SUSE-SU-2026:1077-1
Vulnerability from csaf_suse - Published: 2026-03-26 12:42 - Updated: 2026-09-16 19:11Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.