CVE-2026-129784 (GCVE-0-2026-129784)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-16 10:53 – Updated: 2026-11-16 18:13
VLAI
Title
Insecure deserializaiton in the httpx Ruby gem via unsafe Oj object-mode
Summary
The httpx Ruby gem parses JSON response bodies through its transcoder layer. HTTPX::Response#json delegates to Transcoder::JSON.decode, and when the oj gem is loaded and multi_json is absent, the decoder falls back to json_load, which calls Oj.load(response.to_s) with no mode option. Oj.load defaults to :object mode, in which a response document can allocate any already-loaded Ruby class ("^o":"ClassName") and set its instance variables, or resolve a class or module reference ("^c":"Name"). An attacker who controls, or can influence, the URL an application fetches with HTTPX.get(url).json therefore controls object instantiation in the victim process. With a matching gadget chain, this issue can potentially cause remote code execution. Affects httpx 1.9.0; fixed in 1.9.1.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-16 14:38 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Assigner
JFROG CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 67 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
os85 httpx Affected: 1.9.0 , < 1.9.1 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to httpx 1.9.1, which calls \u003ccode\u003eOj.load\u003c/code\u003e with an explicit \u003ccode\u003e{ mode: :strict }\u003c/code\u003e default. If upgrading is not possible, pass a safe mode at the call site (\u003ccode\u003eresponse.json(mode: :strict)\u003c/code\u003e), or set a safe process-wide default such as \u003ccode\u003eOj.default_options = { mode: :strict }\u003c/code\u003e (or \u003ccode\u003e:rails\u003c/code\u003e) before any untrusted JSON is parsed. Do not rely on Oj\u0027s shipped \u003ccode\u003e:object\u003c/code\u003e default for data that arrived over the network.\u003c/p\u003e"
                }
              ],
              "value": "Upgrade to httpx 1.9.1, which calls Oj.load with an explicit { mode: :strict } default. If upgrading is not possible, pass a safe mode at the call site (response.json(mode: :strict)), or set a safe process-wide default such as Oj.default_options = { mode: :strict } (or :rails) before any untrusted JSON is parsed. Do not rely on Oj\u0027s shipped :object default for data that arrived over the network."
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "timeline": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-11-04T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "JFrog reports the issue to the httpx maintainer via email."
            },
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "time": "2026-11-13T00:00:00.000Z",
              "value": "Maintainer commits the fix (eeb785d) changing json_load to use Oj :strict mode; released as httpx v1.9.1."
            }
          ],
          "title": "Insecure deserializaiton in the httpx Ruby gem via unsafe Oj object-mode",
          "x_generator": {
            "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
          }
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
        "assignerShortName": "JFROG",
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-129784",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-16T10:53:51.915Z",
        "dateReserved": "2026-11-16T10:52:48.547Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-16T18:13:11.328Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }
  }
}


Solutions

CNA · JFROG
Upgrade to httpx 1.9.1, which calls Oj.load with an explicit { mode: :strict } default. If upgrading is not possible, pass a safe mode at the call site (response.json(mode: :strict)), or set a safe process-wide default such as Oj.default_options = { mode: :strict } (or :rails) before any untrusted JSON is parsed. Do not rely on Oj's shipped :object default for data that arrived over the network.

Configurations

CNA · JFROG
Affects httpx 1.9.0 only when the oj gem is loaded (and loaded before httpx), multi_json is absent from the bundle, and the process has not pinned a safe Oj.default_options. Reaching code execution additionally requires a gadget chain and an attacker-influenced URL passed to response.json. Applications that keep multi_json, pin a safe Oj mode, or call response.json with an explicit safe mode are not exploitable.

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