CVE-2026-129706 (GCVE-0-2026-129706)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-16 08:46 – Updated: 2026-11-16 14:51- CWE-613 - Session Persistence After Password Change
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerabi… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| vulnerability-lookup | vulnerability-lookup |
Affected:
unspecified
cpe:2.3:a:vulnerability-lookup:vulnerability-lookup:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
4 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-16 08:39 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d.patch
e35954004742… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
d762810fb3b9
|
fix: [security] A password change ends the user's other | e35954004742… |
Fix summary
The session identifier is now bound to the user's current password hash. User.get_id() returns a composite string of the form '<user_id>:<digest>', where the digest is an HMAC-SHA256 of the stored password hash keyed with the application SECRET_KEY. The load_user callback validates that the digest in the session matches the digest computed from the user's current password hash using a constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest). If the password has changed, the digest no longer matches and the session is rejected, effectively logging out all sessions that were opened under the previous credential. When a user changes their own password through the profile page, they are immediately re-authenticated via login_user() so their current session is renewed with the new digest while all other sessions are invalidated.
Patch summary
In website/models/user.py, a new session_digest() method computes an HMAC-SHA256 of the password hash keyed with SECRET_KEY and returns the first 32 hex characters. User.get_id() is changed from returning the integer self.id to returning the string f'{self.id}:{self.session_digest()}'. In website/web/views/session_mgmt.py, the load_user callback is rewritten to parse the composite session ID, extract the user ID and digest, look up the user, and verify the digest with hmac.compare_digest against the user's current session_digest(); sessions with a bare ID or a mismatched digest are rejected. In website/web/views/user.py, the ineffective session.new = True assignment is removed and replaced with a call to login_user(user) after a password change so the user's own session is renewed. All test files are updated to use user.get_id() instead of user.id when setting the session, and a new test file tests/test_session_password_binding.py verifies that a password change invalidates other sessions, that bare IDs are拒绝
CVSS rationale
AV:N: the application is a network-accessible web service. AC:L: once a valid session is obtained, it persists with no additional complexity; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: no attack target manipulation is required. PR:L: the attacker must already possess a valid authenticated session for the target user (obtained via XSS, session hijacking, or a previously exposed key). UI:N: no victim interaction is needed after the session is compromised. VC:L: the attacker can read the user's profile data, subscriptions, and role-gated content. VI:L: the attacker can modify the user's profile, subscriptions, and other user-controlled data. VA:L: the attacker can continue to use the service on behalf of the user, and the user cannot revoke access by changing the password. SC/SI/SA:N: no impact on other systems or components is evidenced in the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-613 The commit message explicitly cites CWE-613. The session ID was the bare user ID with no component tied to the credential, so sessions outlived every password change, account recovery, or admin reset. This is a textbook instance of session persistence after password change.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-122 The session identifier was effectively fixed to the static user ID and never rotated or invalidated on credential change. While classic session fixation involves an attacker choosing the session ID, the underlying weakness is the same: the session ID is not bound to the current credential state and cannot be revoked by the user. CAPEC-122 is the closest available pattern; the uncertainty is that the attacker does not choose the ID but rather exploits its permanence. No CAPEC specifically covers 'session outlives credential change' as a distinct pattern, making CAPEC-122 the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The application is assumed to be a standard network-accessible Flask web application; no specific deployment topology, reverse proxy, or authentication gateway is evidenced in the patch.
- PR:L assumes the attacker must already hold a valid session for the target user. If sessions could be obtained without authentication (e.g., via a feed key or API key that does not require a prior login), PR could be N; the commit message references feed keys and API keys as a vector, but the exact authentication requirements of those keys are not detailed in the patch.
- The CAPEC-122 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically describes 'session outlives credential change' as a standalone attack pattern, so the mapping carries inherent uncertainty.
- Affected version range is unspecified because the patch does not include version tags, release notes, or a changelog entry identifying the first or last affected release.
- The commit date is 2026-11-16; the fixed version is the commit d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d and all prior commits that lacked the digest-bound session ID.
- CVSS impact metrics (VC, VI, VA) are rated Low rather than High because the attacker's capabilities are bounded by the permissions the session already carried; the vulnerability does not grant new privileges but prevents revocation of existing ones.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-15 16:36 UTC Report received maintainer Vulnerability report received by e-mail from the reporter (Michael Reimsbach), against revision 4f181ad9 on main. Besides two token findings, it reports that an existing session is not invalidated when the password or a key changes (CWE-613).
- 2026-11-16 07:40 UTC Validated maintainer Report reproduced on revision 4f181ad9: a session stays valid after the user's password, API key and feed key are all changed, because the session identifier is the bare user ID.
- 2026-11-16 08:04 UTC Fix developed maintainer Corrective change authored (d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d): fix: [security] A password change ends the user's other sessions. The session identifier is bound to the password hash; sessions holding a bare ID are refused, which also ends the sessions a feed key or an API key could open before 3605d5b6. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d.patch
- 2026-11-16 08:06 UTC Fix available maintainer Fix pushed to the public main branch of the repository, together with 3605d5b6. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d.patch
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}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-129706",
"lastModified": "2026-11-16T15:17:21.950",
"metrics": {
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"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"vulnrichment": {
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"cna": {
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{
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"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The session identifier is now bound to the user\u0027s current password hash. User.get_id() returns a composite string of the form \u0027\u003cuser_id\u003e:\u003cdigest\u003e\u0027, where the digest is an HMAC-SHA256 of the stored password hash keyed with the application SECRET_KEY. The load_user callback validates that the digest in the session matches the digest computed from the user\u0027s current password hash using a constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest). If the password has changed, the digest no longer matches and the session is rejected, effectively logging out all sessions that were opened under the previous credential. When a user changes their own password through the profile page, they are immediately re-authenticated via login_user() so their current session is renewed with the new digest while all other sessions are invalidated."
}
],
"title": "vulnerability-lookup: Session Persists After Password Change (CWE-613)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
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],
"review_status": "partial",
"scope": "record",
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]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The application is assumed to be a standard network-accessible Flask web application; no specific deployment topology, reverse proxy, or authentication gateway is evidenced in the patch.",
"PR:L assumes the attacker must already hold a valid session for the target user. If sessions could be obtained without authentication (e.g., via a feed key or API key that does not require a prior login), PR could be N; the commit message references feed keys and API keys as a vector, but the exact authentication requirements of those keys are not detailed in the patch.",
"The CAPEC-122 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically describes \u0027session outlives credential change\u0027 as a standalone attack pattern, so the mapping carries inherent uncertainty.",
"Affected version range is unspecified because the patch does not include version tags, release notes, or a changelog entry identifying the first or last affected release.",
"The commit date is 2026-11-16; the fixed version is the commit d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d and all prior commits that lacked the digest-bound session ID.",
"CVSS impact metrics (VC, VI, VA) are rated Low rather than High because the attacker\u0027s capabilities are bounded by the permissions the session already carried; the vulnerability does not grant new privileges but prevents revocation of existing ones."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-122",
"rationale": "The session identifier was effectively fixed to the static user ID and never rotated or invalidated on credential change. While classic session fixation involves an attacker choosing the session ID, the underlying weakness is the same: the session ID is not bound to the current credential state and cannot be revoked by the user. CAPEC-122 is the closest available pattern; the uncertainty is that the attacker does not choose the ID but rather exploits its permanence. No CAPEC specifically covers \u0027session outlives credential change\u0027 as a distinct pattern, making CAPEC-122 the best available match."
}
],
"commit": "d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
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"type": "reporter",
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},
{
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"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: the application is a network-accessible web service. AC:L: once a valid session is obtained, it persists with no additional complexity; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: no attack target manipulation is required. PR:L: the attacker must already possess a valid authenticated session for the target user (obtained via XSS, session hijacking, or a previously exposed key). UI:N: no victim interaction is needed after the session is compromised. VC:L: the attacker can read the user\u0027s profile data, subscriptions, and role-gated content. VI:L: the attacker can modify the user\u0027s profile, subscriptions, and other user-controlled data. VA:L: the attacker can continue to use the service on behalf of the user, and the user cannot revoke access by changing the password. SC/SI/SA:N: no impact on other systems or components is evidenced in the patch.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The session identifier is now bound to the user\u0027s current password hash. User.get_id() returns a composite string of the form \u0027\u003cuser_id\u003e:\u003cdigest\u003e\u0027, where the digest is an HMAC-SHA256 of the stored password hash keyed with the application SECRET_KEY. The load_user callback validates that the digest in the session matches the digest computed from the user\u0027s current password hash using a constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest). If the password has changed, the digest no longer matches and the session is rejected, effectively logging out all sessions that were opened under the previous credential. When a user changes their own password through the profile page, they are immediately re-authenticated via login_user() so their current session is renewed with the new digest while all other sessions are invalidated.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-16T08:39:36.754806Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 6,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "e359540047428f45208a6edd589f39b561414e337fbaf9fcba7f34d63e1dae0f",
"patchSummary": "In website/models/user.py, a new session_digest() method computes an HMAC-SHA256 of the password hash keyed with SECRET_KEY and returns the first 32 hex characters. User.get_id() is changed from returning the integer self.id to returning the string f\u0027{self.id}:{self.session_digest()}\u0027. In website/web/views/session_mgmt.py, the load_user callback is rewritten to parse the composite session ID, extract the user ID and digest, look up the user, and verify the digest with hmac.compare_digest against the user\u0027s current session_digest(); sessions with a bare ID or a mismatched digest are rejected. In website/web/views/user.py, the ineffective session.new = True assignment is removed and replaced with a call to login_user(user) after a password change so the user\u0027s own session is renewed. All test files are updated to use user.get_id() instead of user.id when setting the session, and a new test file tests/test_session_password_binding.py verifies that a password change invalidates other sessions, that bare IDs are\u62d2\u7edd",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
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}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"actor": "maintainer",
"description": "Vulnerability report received by e-mail from the reporter (Michael Reimsbach), against revision 4f181ad9 on main. Besides two token findings, it reports that an existing session is not invalidated when the password or a key changes (CWE-613).",
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{
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"timestamp": "2026-11-16T08:06:43Z",
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"cveMetadata": {
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Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.