CVE-2026-123867 (GCVE-0-2026-123867)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 18:23 – Updated: 2026-11-11 18:23
VLAI
Title
Node.js is vulnerable to a per-host mTLS authorization bypass via a CA-only SNI context failing open to the default CA
Summary
A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA }) but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc, CertCbDone installs the SNI context's CA only when setSniContext succeeds, but setSniContext returns false for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with requestCert and rejectUnauthorized enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.
Severity
4.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
CWE
  • CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Assigner
openjs CNA under the redhat root
CNA scorecard C 66/100 over 142 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
nodejs node Affected: 0.0.0 , < 22.23.5 (semver)
Affected: 23.0.0 , < 24.22.3 (semver)
Affected: 25.0.0 , < 26.13.1 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
aur0r4_glyph mcollina UlisesGascon pimterry aduh95
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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