Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-115693 (GCVE-0-2026-115693)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 13:49 – Updated: 2026-10-26 13:49

Title

Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney

Summary

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root. The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname. This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation

Assigner

EEF CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard A 97/100 over 345 records in the last 180 days details

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978	related
https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html	related
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693	related
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0	vendor-advisoryrelated
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afc…	related
https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb57…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
benoitc	hackney	Affected: 1.24.0 , < 4.9.0 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney::::::::
benoitc	hackney	Affected: d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c , < 915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4 (git) cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney::::::::

Date Public

2026-10-25 00:00

Credits

Martin Karrer Martin Karrer Jonatan Männchen / EEF

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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              "value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in `hackney_ssl` in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds `{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}` to every `verify_peer` configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured `cacerts`. `hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3` kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with `cacerts` or `cacertfile` in `ssl_options`, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0."
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003ePass your own \u003ccode\u003e{partial_chain, Fun}\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003essl_options\u003c/code\u003e alongside \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ecacertfile\u003c/code\u003e. A caller-supplied \u003ccode\u003epartial_chain\u003c/code\u003e replaces hackney\u0027s in the merge, and a callback that returns \u003ccode\u003eunknown_ca\u003c/code\u003e makes OTP validate against the configured \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e only.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Default trust options.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ehackney_ssl:check_hostname_opts/1\u003c/code\u003e builds the \u003ccode\u003everify_peer\u003c/code\u003e options for every TLS connection: the certifi \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e, a hostname \u003ccode\u003everify_fun\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003e{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}\u003c/code\u003e. The callback walks the peer chain and returns \u003ccode\u003e{trusted_ca, Cert}\u003c/code\u003e for the first certificate whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store, which lets OTP accept chains that end in a cross-signed root.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Merge keeps the callback.\u003c/strong\u003e When the caller passes \u003ccode\u003essl_options\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ehackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3\u003c/code\u003e merges them over the defaults with the caller\u0027s values winning per key. \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ecacertfile\u003c/code\u003e replace the trust store, and a \u003ccode\u003ecacertfile\u003c/code\u003e removes the default \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e, but \u003ccode\u003epartial_chain\u003c/code\u003e has no counterpart in the caller\u0027s options and stays.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Validation.\u003c/strong\u003e OTP consults \u003ccode\u003epartial_chain\u003c/code\u003e before the configured trust store. A peer chain that carries any publicly trusted root therefore gets that root as its trust anchor, and the pinned \u003ccode\u003ecacerts\u003c/code\u003e are never consulted. Only the hostname \u003ccode\u003everify_fun\u003c/code\u003e still constrains the attacker.\u003c/p\u003e"
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            "value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-115693",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-26T16:59:16.113",
        "metrics": {
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                "baseScore": 9.1,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-10-26T14:16:31.853",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
          },
          {
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-295"
              }
            ],
            "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-115693

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-26 14:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 16:59

Severity

9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0
	6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "hackney_ssl"
          ],
          "packageName": "hackney",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney",
          "product": "hackney",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/hackney_ssl.erl"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:ssl_opts/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
          "vendor": "benoitc",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.9.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.24.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "hackney_ssl"
          ],
          "packageName": "benoitc/hackney",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney",
          "product": "hackney",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/hackney_ssl.erl"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:ssl_opts/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
          "vendor": "benoitc",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-115693",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-26T16:59:16.113",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 9.1,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-26T14:16:31.853",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-295"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G7GG-9JHV-68H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-26 15:34 – Updated: 2026-10-26 15:34

Details

The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.

This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-115693"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T14:16:31Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-g7gg-9jhv-68h6",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T15:34:42Z",
  "published": "2026-10-26T15:34:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115693"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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CVE-2026-115693 (GCVE-0-2026-115693)

FKIE_CVE-2026-115693

GHSA-G7GG-9JHV-68H6

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Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

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