CVE-2026-115690 (GCVE-0-2026-115690)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-16 09:54 – Updated: 2026-11-16 20:04- CWE-367 - Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache WSS4J |
Affected:
4.0.0 , < 4.0.3
(semver)
Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.0.7 (semver) Affected: 0 , < 2.4.5 (semver) |
guessed |
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