Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-107811 (GCVE-0-2026-107811)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-09 15:36 – Updated: 2026-10-14 01:57

Title

0xJacky/nginx-ui /api/nodes Leaks Cluster Node Tokens and Allows Cross-Node Impersonation as initUser

Summary

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, ordinary authenticated users can access /api/nodes and /api/nodes/:id, whose responses serialize the node token field. The same token is accepted as X-Node-Secret by AuthRequired and maps the request to initUser, allowing the user to impersonate a trusted node against a reachable cluster member. This cross-node authentication bypass can expose sensitive management operations, including configuration synchronization and service restart. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-14 01:56 UTC

CWE

CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7658 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/0ecbd1…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
0xJacky	nginx-ui	Affected: >= 2.0.0, < 2.5.0	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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FKIE_CVE-2026-107811

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-09 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-14 02:16

Severity

8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/0ecbd106c37b5143be14880c9447a66135151512
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-32gc-wf3m-78w9
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-32gc-wf3m-78w9

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

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    }
  ],
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  "lastModified": "2026-10-14T02:16:58.890",
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GHSA-32GC-WF3M-78W9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 17:07 – Updated: 2026-10-09 17:07

Summary

0xJacky/nginx-ui /api/nodes Leaks Cluster Node Tokens and Allows Cross-Node Impersonation as initUser

Details

Summary 0xJacky/nginx-ui contains a high-severity trust-boundary failure between ordinary users and cluster node credentials. The source code shows that cluster node list and detail endpoints are reachable by ordinary authenticated users and return node objects containing the token field.

That same token is also used as the X-Node-Secret shared credential for node-to-node authentication. When the middleware receives a correct node secret, it upgrades the request to initUser and bypasses the normal user-authentication path. As a result, any low-privileged authenticated user can first read a node token from /api/nodes and then impersonate a trusted node against a remote node's management API, achieving cross-node administrative authentication bypass.

Details The root cause is a combination of sensitive credential exposure and improper trust elevation for node-to-node authentication. First, router/routers.go:87-105 mounts cluster.InitRouter(g) inside the shared /api authenticated route group, so any successfully authenticated user can access node list and detail endpoints.

Next, api/cluster/node.go:19-48 implements GetNode and GetNodeList by directly returning analytic.GetNode(node). Meanwhile, model/node.go:8-13 defines Token with the JSON tag json:"token", meaning the node secret is serialized into API responses. The surrounding code path does not redact that field. Therefore, a low-privileged user can call /api/nodes or /api/nodes/:id and retrieve both the target node URL and the token value used for trusted node authentication.

The second half of the exploit chain is in internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103. The middleware reads a node secret from the X-Node-Secret header or node_secret query parameter. If that supplied value matches settings.NodeSettings.Secret, the request is immediately associated with user.GetInitUser(c), stored in the context as user, and allowed to continue. In other words, possession of the node secret is treated as sufficient to become initUser and bypass the normal JWT-based user-authentication flow.

This makes the disclosed token directly reusable for privilege escalation. A low-privileged user logs in to the primary instance, retrieves the cluster node token through /api/nodes, then sends a request to the remote node with X-Node-Secret set to the leaked token. Because the remote node upgrades the request to initUser, the attacker can invoke sensitive management handlers. The verified evidence identifies api/system/router.go and api/system/restart.go as examples of reachable high-risk operations, including POST /api/system/restart.

Core vulnerable code path:

go // router/routers.go:87-105 g := root.Group("/", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy()) { debug.InitRouter(g) user.InitUserRouter(g) analytic.InitRouter(g) user.InitManageUserRouter(g) nginx.InitRouter(g) sites.InitRouter(g) streams.InitRouter(g) config.InitRouter(g) template.InitRouter(g) certificate.InitCertificateRouter(g) certificate.InitDNSCredentialRouter(g) certificate.InitAcmeUserRouter(g) dnsapi.InitRouter(g) system.InitPrivateRouter(g) settings.InitRouter(g) llm.InitRouter(g) cluster.InitRouter(g) notification.InitRouter(g) external_notify.InitRouter(g) backup.InitAutoBackupRouter(g) nginxLog.InitRouter(g) upstream.InitHTTPRouter(g) g.GET("/geolite/status", geolite.GetStatus) } This route block shows that cluster endpoints are mounted in the shared authenticated route group. Any user with a valid JWT can reach cluster management APIs; there is no administrator-only authorization gate here.

go // api/cluster/node.go:19-48 func GetNode(c *gin.Context) { id := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))

nodeQuery := query.Node

node, err := nodeQuery.FirstByID(id)
if err != nil {
    cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
    return
}

c.JSON(http.StatusOK, analytic.GetNode(node))

}

func GetNodeList(c *gin.Context) { core := cosy.Coremodel.Node. SetFussy("name")

// fix for sqlite
if c.Query("enabled") != "" {
    core.GormScope(func(tx *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {
        return tx.Where("enabled = ?", cast.ToInt(cast.ToBool(c.Query("enabled"))))
    })
}

core.SetTransformer(func(m *model.Node) any {
    return analytic.GetNode(m)
})

core.List()

} These handlers return node information directly to authenticated users. Because the returned object ultimately embeds the raw model.Node and that model contains a JSON token field, the API leaks the remote node shared secret.

go // model/node.go:8-13 type Node struct { Model Name string json:"name" URL string json:"url" Token string json:"token" Enabled bool json:"enabled" gorm:"default:false" } The model definition confirms that Token is JSON-serializable. This is a core part of the sensitive-information exposure because the field is not restricted to internal-only use.

go // internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103 // getNodeSecret from header or query func getNodeSecret(c *gin.Context) (secret string) { if secret = c.GetHeader("X-Node-Secret"); secret != "" { return secret }

return c.Query("node_secret")

}

// AuthRequired is a middleware that checks if the user is authenticated func AuthRequired() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(c *gin.Context) { abortWithAuthFailure := func() { c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{ "message": "Authorization failed", }) }

    xNodeID := getXNodeID(c)
    if xNodeID != "" {
        c.Set("ProxyNodeID", xNodeID)
    }

    // Check node secret authentication
    if nodeSecret := getNodeSecret(c); nodeSecret != "" && nodeSecret == settings.NodeSettings.Secret {
        initUser := user.GetInitUser(c)
        c.Set("Secret", nodeSecret)
        c.Set("user", initUser)
        c.Next()
        return
    }

This authentication logic converts knowledge of the leaked node secret into an authenticated request as initUser. That makes the disclosed token immediately reusable for cross-node privilege escalation.

POC Prerequisites: (1) the attacker has a valid low-privileged user account, (2) at least one cluster node is configured, and (3) the target node management address is reachable from the current deployment, which is typical in clustered setups.

Reproduction steps:

Log in as a low-privileged user with POST /api/login using a request body containing name and password. Capture the returned JWT token. Request GET /api/nodes or GET /api/nodes/:id with the low-privileged user's Authorization token. Inspect the JSON response and extract the target node's url and token fields. The token is the shared secret accepted by the remote node as X-Node-Secret. Send a sensitive management request directly to the target node, such as POST /api/system/restart, with the leaked token in the X-Node-Secret header. If the target node returns 200 or an equivalent success response, the request has been accepted as trusted node traffic. Expected result: the attacker performs administrative actions on the remote node without possessing a legitimate high-privileged user session on that node, demonstrating cross-node authentication bypass and privilege escalation to initUser-level access.

Impact Any ordinary authenticated user can extract cluster node shared secrets and convert them into direct authentication bypass on remote nodes. The attacker can then execute high-risk administrative actions such as system restart, Nginx reload/restart, and configuration synchronization, enabling lateral movement across managed nodes and ultimately full compromise of the cluster management plane. The issue combines sensitive information disclosure with privilege escalation.

Remediation Do not return cluster node tokens in normal API responses. Use dedicated output DTOs for node APIs and fully redact or omit the token field. Require administrator-level authorization for node-management endpoints instead of exposing them to every authenticated user. X-Node-Secret should not be shared with the normal HTTP management plane; it should be restricted to controlled network paths or stronger node-to-node trust channels such as mutually authenticated connections. Even when node-secret authentication succeeds, its capabilities should be minimized rather than mapping directly to a general-purpose initUser identity.

Disclosure Notes The affected version is identified from the report-generation context as v2.4.2. No fixing commit, patched release, or vendor advisory was verified during this reporting stage, so patched_versions is marked as to be confirmed. The narrative below is based only on verified source-code evidence and the managed-vulnerability metadata.

Supplemental Information Affected products Ecosystem: self-hosted Package name: 0xJacky/nginx-ui Affected versions: v2.4.2 Patched versions: to be confirmed

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.10-0.20260728091109-0ecbd106c37b"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107811"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:07:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Summary\n0xJacky/nginx-ui contains a high-severity trust-boundary failure between ordinary users and cluster node credentials. The source code shows that cluster node list and detail endpoints are reachable by ordinary authenticated users and return node objects containing the token field.\n\nThat same token is also used as the X-Node-Secret shared credential for node-to-node authentication. When the middleware receives a correct node secret, it upgrades the request to initUser and bypasses the normal user-authentication path. As a result, any low-privileged authenticated user can first read a node token from /api/nodes and then impersonate a trusted node against a remote node\u0027s management API, achieving cross-node administrative authentication bypass.\n\nDetails\nThe root cause is a combination of sensitive credential exposure and improper trust elevation for node-to-node authentication. First, router/routers.go:87-105 mounts cluster.InitRouter(g) inside the shared /api authenticated route group, so any successfully authenticated user can access node list and detail endpoints.\n\nNext, api/cluster/node.go:19-48 implements GetNode and GetNodeList by directly returning analytic.GetNode(node). Meanwhile, model/node.go:8-13 defines Token with the JSON tag json:\"token\", meaning the node secret is serialized into API responses. The surrounding code path does not redact that field. Therefore, a low-privileged user can call /api/nodes or /api/nodes/:id and retrieve both the target node URL and the token value used for trusted node authentication.\n\nThe second half of the exploit chain is in internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103. The middleware reads a node secret from the X-Node-Secret header or node_secret query parameter. If that supplied value matches settings.NodeSettings.Secret, the request is immediately associated with user.GetInitUser(c), stored in the context as user, and allowed to continue. In other words, possession of the node secret is treated as sufficient to become initUser and bypass the normal JWT-based user-authentication flow.\n\nThis makes the disclosed token directly reusable for privilege escalation. A low-privileged user logs in to the primary instance, retrieves the cluster node token through /api/nodes, then sends a request to the remote node with X-Node-Secret set to the leaked token. Because the remote node upgrades the request to initUser, the attacker can invoke sensitive management handlers. The verified evidence identifies api/system/router.go and api/system/restart.go as examples of reachable high-risk operations, including POST /api/system/restart.\n\nCore vulnerable code path:\n\ngo\n// router/routers.go:87-105\ng := root.Group(\"/\", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy())\n{\n\tdebug.InitRouter(g)\n\tuser.InitUserRouter(g)\n\tanalytic.InitRouter(g)\n\tuser.InitManageUserRouter(g)\n\tnginx.InitRouter(g)\n\tsites.InitRouter(g)\n\tstreams.InitRouter(g)\n\tconfig.InitRouter(g)\n\ttemplate.InitRouter(g)\n\tcertificate.InitCertificateRouter(g)\n\tcertificate.InitDNSCredentialRouter(g)\n\tcertificate.InitAcmeUserRouter(g)\n\tdnsapi.InitRouter(g)\n\tsystem.InitPrivateRouter(g)\n\tsettings.InitRouter(g)\n\tllm.InitRouter(g)\n\tcluster.InitRouter(g)\n\tnotification.InitRouter(g)\n\texternal_notify.InitRouter(g)\n\tbackup.InitAutoBackupRouter(g)\n\tnginxLog.InitRouter(g)\n\tupstream.InitHTTPRouter(g)\n\tg.GET(\"/geolite/status\", geolite.GetStatus)\n}\nThis route block shows that cluster endpoints are mounted in the shared authenticated route group. Any user with a valid JWT can reach cluster management APIs; there is no administrator-only authorization gate here.\n\ngo\n// api/cluster/node.go:19-48\nfunc GetNode(c *gin.Context) {\n\tid := cast.ToUint64(c.Param(\"id\"))\n\n\tnodeQuery := query.Node\n\n\tnode, err := nodeQuery.FirstByID(id)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, analytic.GetNode(node))\n}\n\nfunc GetNodeList(c *gin.Context) {\n\tcore := cosy.Core[model.Node](c).\n\t\tSetFussy(\"name\")\n\n\t// fix for sqlite\n\tif c.Query(\"enabled\") != \"\" {\n\t\tcore.GormScope(func(tx *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {\n\t\t\treturn tx.Where(\"enabled = ?\", cast.ToInt(cast.ToBool(c.Query(\"enabled\"))))\n\t\t})\n\t}\n\n\tcore.SetTransformer(func(m *model.Node) any {\n\t\treturn analytic.GetNode(m)\n\t})\n\n\tcore.List()\n}\nThese handlers return node information directly to authenticated users. Because the returned object ultimately embeds the raw model.Node and that model contains a JSON token field, the API leaks the remote node shared secret.\n\ngo\n// model/node.go:8-13\ntype Node struct {\n\tModel\n\tName    string `json:\"name\"`\n\tURL     string `json:\"url\"`\n\tToken   string `json:\"token\"`\n\tEnabled bool   `json:\"enabled\" gorm:\"default:false\"`\n}\nThe model definition confirms that Token is JSON-serializable. This is a core part of the sensitive-information exposure because the field is not restricted to internal-only use.\n\ngo\n// internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103\n// getNodeSecret from header or query\nfunc getNodeSecret(c *gin.Context) (secret string) {\n\tif secret = c.GetHeader(\"X-Node-Secret\"); secret != \"\" {\n\t\treturn secret\n\t}\n\n\treturn c.Query(\"node_secret\")\n}\n\n// AuthRequired is a middleware that checks if the user is authenticated\nfunc AuthRequired() gin.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn func(c *gin.Context) {\n\t\tabortWithAuthFailure := func() {\n\t\t\tc.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{\n\t\t\t\t\"message\": \"Authorization failed\",\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}\n\n\t\txNodeID := getXNodeID(c)\n\t\tif xNodeID != \"\" {\n\t\t\tc.Set(\"ProxyNodeID\", xNodeID)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Check node secret authentication\n\t\tif nodeSecret := getNodeSecret(c); nodeSecret != \"\" \u0026\u0026 nodeSecret == settings.NodeSettings.Secret {\n\t\t\tinitUser := user.GetInitUser(c)\n\t\t\tc.Set(\"Secret\", nodeSecret)\n\t\t\tc.Set(\"user\", initUser)\n\t\t\tc.Next()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\nThis authentication logic converts knowledge of the leaked node secret into an authenticated request as initUser. That makes the disclosed token immediately reusable for cross-node privilege escalation.\n\nPOC\nPrerequisites: (1) the attacker has a valid low-privileged user account, (2) at least one cluster node is configured, and (3) the target node management address is reachable from the current deployment, which is typical in clustered setups.\n\nReproduction steps:\n\nLog in as a low-privileged user with POST /api/login using a request body containing name and password. Capture the returned JWT token.\nRequest GET /api/nodes or GET /api/nodes/:id with the low-privileged user\u0027s Authorization token.\nInspect the JSON response and extract the target node\u0027s url and token fields. The token is the shared secret accepted by the remote node as X-Node-Secret.\nSend a sensitive management request directly to the target node, such as POST /api/system/restart, with the leaked token in the X-Node-Secret header.\nIf the target node returns 200 or an equivalent success response, the request has been accepted as trusted node traffic.\nExpected result: the attacker performs administrative actions on the remote node without possessing a legitimate high-privileged user session on that node, demonstrating cross-node authentication bypass and privilege escalation to initUser-level access.\n\nImpact\nAny ordinary authenticated user can extract cluster node shared secrets and convert them into direct authentication bypass on remote nodes. The attacker can then execute high-risk administrative actions such as system restart, Nginx reload/restart, and configuration synchronization, enabling lateral movement across managed nodes and ultimately full compromise of the cluster management plane. The issue combines sensitive information disclosure with privilege escalation.\n\nRemediation\nDo not return cluster node tokens in normal API responses. Use dedicated output DTOs for node APIs and fully redact or omit the token field. Require administrator-level authorization for node-management endpoints instead of exposing them to every authenticated user. X-Node-Secret should not be shared with the normal HTTP management plane; it should be restricted to controlled network paths or stronger node-to-node trust channels such as mutually authenticated connections. Even when node-secret authentication succeeds, its capabilities should be minimized rather than mapping directly to a general-purpose initUser identity.\n\nDisclosure Notes\nThe affected version is identified from the report-generation context as v2.4.2. No fixing commit, patched release, or vendor advisory was verified during this reporting stage, so patched_versions is marked as to be confirmed. The narrative below is based only on verified source-code evidence and the managed-vulnerability metadata.\n\nSupplemental Information\nAffected products\nEcosystem: self-hosted\nPackage name: 0xJacky/nginx-ui\nAffected versions: v2.4.2\nPatched versions: to be confirmed",
  "id": "GHSA-32gc-wf3m-78w9",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T17:07:23Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T17:07:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-32gc-wf3m-78w9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/0ecbd106c37b5143be14880c9447a66135151512"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "0xJacky/nginx-ui /api/nodes Leaks Cluster Node Tokens and Allows Cross-Node Impersonation as initUser"
}

Sightings

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Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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CVE-2026-107811 (GCVE-0-2026-107811)

FKIE_CVE-2026-107811

GHSA-32GC-WF3M-78W9

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