CVE-2025-53627 (GCVE-0-2025-53627)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-29 16:18 – Updated: 2025-12-29 16:52- CWE-1287 - Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/a… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| meshtastic | firmware |
Affected:
>= 2.5, < 2.7.15
|
guessed |
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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