CVE-2025-27093 (GCVE-0-2025-27093)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-10-28 19:29 – Updated: 2025-10-29 17:43
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Sliver does not restricted traffic between Wireguard clients.
Summary
Sliver is a command and control framework that uses a custom Wireguard netstack. In versions 1.5.43 and earlier, and in development version 1.6.0-dev, the netstack does not limit traffic between Wireguard clients. This allows clients to communicate with each other unrestrictedly, potentially enabling leaked or recovered keypairs to be used to attack operators or allowing port forwardings to be accessible from other implants.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-10-29 17:43 UTC
CWE
- CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/8e5c5f… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/912287… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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FKIE_CVE-2025-27093
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-28 20:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:03
Severity
Summary
Sliver is a command and control framework that uses a custom Wireguard netstack. In versions 1.5.43 and earlier, and in development version 1.6.0-dev, the netstack does not limit traffic between Wireguard clients. This allows clients to communicate with each other unrestrictedly, potentially enabling leaked or recovered keypairs to be used to attack operators or allowing port forwardings to be accessible from other implants.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "sliver",
"vendor": "BishopFox",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c= 1.5.43"
}
]
}
],
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}
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}
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GHSA-Q8J9-34QF-7VQ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-28 17:31 – Updated: 2025-11-05 22:05
VLAI
Summary
Silver has unrestricted traffic between Wireguard clients
Details
Summary
Sliver's custom Wireguard netstack doesn't limit traffic between Wireguard clients, this could lead to: 1. Leaked/recovered keypair (from a beacon) being used to attack operators. 2. Port forwardings usable from other implants.
Details
-
Sliver treat operators' Wireguard config and beacon/session's Wireguard config equally, they both connect to the wireguard listener created from the CLI.
-
The current netstack implementation does not filter traffic between clients. I think this piece of code handle traffic between clients, from experimental results clients can ping and connect to each other freely, and I didn't see any filtering here either:
File: server\c2\wireguard.go
246: func socketWGWriteEnvelope(connection net.Conn, envelope *sliverpb.Envelope) error {
247: data, err := proto.Marshal(envelope)
248: if err != nil {
249: wgLog.Errorf("Envelope marshaling error: %v", err)
250: return err
251: }
252: dataLengthBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)
253: binary.Write(dataLengthBuf, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(data)))
254: connection.Write(dataLengthBuf.Bytes())
255: connection.Write(data)
256: return nil
257: }
258:
-
The docs says to use a Wireguard clients and operator wg-config to connect to the same WG listener as beacons: https://sliver.sh/docs?name=Port%20Forwarding
-
If the operator uses official wireguard clients that integrates with the OS's netstack (I'm using the Windows client) then their services are accessible on the wireguard interface's IP address (for example 100.64.0.3) when the services listen on 0.0.0.0 (SSH, RDP, SMB, etc)
-
The beacon's wireguard private key can be recovered through a process dump or other forensic techniques.
- When a private key is recovered, an attacker can connect to 100.64.0.1:1337 (key exchange listener) to generate new wireguard clients without the operators' knowledge, in that way achieve persistence inside the wireguard network.
PoC
Easy way: 1. Create 2 operators wireguard config. 2. Connect them both to the wireguard listener. 3. From one machine, ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.
Slightly complicated way:
1. From the operator's machine, connect to the wireguard listener.
2. On the attacker's machine, run a beacon.
3. Dump the process
4. Find the private key, public key, endpoint, etc in the dump file:
- Construct a valid Wireguard config based on the strings found. On the attacker's machine, connect to the Wireguard listener.
- Ping/scan/connect to the other's services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.
Impact
The operator's machine is impacted, if their services contain a vulnerability, an attacker can exploit it and gain RCE. If not then it could be used to gather information (Hostname, SSH signature, etc).
Suggestion
- Filter traffic between clients with a default-deny policy.
- Differentiate between operators and beacons' wireguard config/client
- Only allow specific one-way traffic when the operator request to open a Wireguard port forward.
Vulnerable versions
All versions containing wireguard functionality.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
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],
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"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-28T20:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSliver\u0027s custom Wireguard netstack doesn\u0027t limit traffic between Wireguard clients, this could lead to:\n1. Leaked/recovered keypair (from a beacon) being used to attack operators.\n2. Port forwardings usable from other implants.\n\n\n### Details\n1. Sliver treat operators\u0027 Wireguard config and beacon/session\u0027s Wireguard config equally, they both connect to the wireguard listener created from the CLI.\n\n2. The current netstack implementation does not filter traffic between clients. \nI think this piece of code handle traffic between clients, from experimental results clients can ping and connect to each other freely, and I didn\u0027t see any filtering here either:\n```\nFile: server\\c2\\wireguard.go\n246: func socketWGWriteEnvelope(connection net.Conn, envelope *sliverpb.Envelope) error {\n247: \tdata, err := proto.Marshal(envelope)\n248: \tif err != nil {\n249: \t\twgLog.Errorf(\"Envelope marshaling error: %v\", err)\n250: \t\treturn err\n251: \t}\n252: \tdataLengthBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)\n253: \tbinary.Write(dataLengthBuf, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(data)))\n254: \tconnection.Write(dataLengthBuf.Bytes())\n255: \tconnection.Write(data)\n256: \treturn nil\n257: }\n258: \n\n```\n3. The docs says to use a Wireguard clients and operator wg-config to connect to the same WG listener as beacons:\nhttps://sliver.sh/docs?name=Port%20Forwarding\n\n4. If the operator uses official wireguard clients that integrates with the OS\u0027s netstack (I\u0027m using the [Windows client](https://www.wireguard.com/install/)) then their services are accessible on the wireguard interface\u0027s IP address (for example 100.64.0.3) when the services listen on 0.0.0.0 (SSH, RDP, SMB, etc) \n\n\n5. The beacon\u0027s wireguard private key can be recovered through a process dump or other forensic techniques.\n6. When a private key is recovered, an attacker can connect to 100.64.0.1:1337 (key exchange listener) to generate new wireguard clients without the operators\u0027 knowledge, in that way achieve persistence inside the wireguard network.\n\n\n### PoC\nEasy way:\n1. Create 2 operators wireguard config.\n2. Connect them both to the wireguard listener.\n3. From one machine, ping/scan/connect to the other\u0027s services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.\n\nSlightly complicated way:\n1. From the operator\u0027s machine, connect to the wireguard listener.\n2. On the attacker\u0027s machine, run a beacon.\n3. Dump the process\n4. Find the private key, public key, endpoint, etc in the dump file:\n\n\n\n\n\n5. Construct a valid Wireguard config based on the strings found. On the attacker\u0027s machine, connect to the Wireguard listener.\n6. Ping/scan/connect to the other\u0027s services like RDP (3389), SSH (22), etc.\n\n### Impact\nThe operator\u0027s machine is impacted, if their services contain a vulnerability, an attacker can exploit it and gain RCE. If not then it could be used to gather information (Hostname, SSH signature, etc).\n\n### Suggestion\n1. Filter traffic between clients with a default-deny policy.\n2. Differentiate between operators and beacons\u0027 wireguard config/client\n3. Only allow specific one-way traffic when the operator request to open a Wireguard port forward.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\nAll versions containing wireguard functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7",
"modified": "2025-11-05T22:05:52Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T17:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-q8j9-34qf-7vq7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/8e5c5f14506d6d60ebb3362e6b9857ab1e0d76ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/9122878cbbcae543eb8210f616550382af2065fd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4079"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Silver has unrestricted traffic between Wireguard clients"
}
OPENSUSE-SU-2025:15710-1
Vulnerability from csaf_opensuse - Published: 2025-11-07 00:00 - Updated: 2025-11-07 00:00Summary
govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20251105T184115-1.1 on GA media
Severity
Moderate
Scope
70 vulnerabilities in this advisory, including CVE-2025-27093.
CVE-2025-27093
Recommended: 4 products
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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