CVE-2025-13353 (GCVE-0-2025-13353)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-02 11:03 – Updated: 2025-12-02 16:54
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password
Summary
In gokey versions <0.2.0,
a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly
being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM
authentication tag of the key seed.
This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.
Impact
This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s
option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is
also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself).
Specific impact includes:
* keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it
was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240
bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was
used
* a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated
from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without
the knowledge of the seed master password
Patches
The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0
and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions
will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed
entropy will be used now.
System secret rotation guidance
It is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0
and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems
in place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is
system-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.
Systems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation
Such systems usually have a "Forgot password" facility or a
similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by
sending a unique "magic" link to the user's email or phone. In such
cases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly
generated password secret, when prompted by the system.
Systems that require the old password/secret for rotation
Such systems usually have a modal password rotation window
usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the
old and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To
generate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:
* temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password
* use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password
* populate the system provided password rotation form
Systems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned
Such systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic
key as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the
same time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several
authorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such
systems users are advised to:
* generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above
* provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system
* verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential
* revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system
Credit
This vulnerability was found by Théo Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare's bug bounty program.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-12-02 16:50 UTC
CWE
- CWE-330 - Use of Insufficiently Random Values
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare | gokey |
Affected:
0.1.0 , < 0.2.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-330",
"description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"shortName": "cloudflare"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"assignerShortName": "cloudflare",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-13353",
"datePublished": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-11-18T11:21:27.669Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2025-13353",
"date": "2026-11-13",
"epss": "0.00172",
"percentile": "0.06672"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:gokey:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A8FEAB32-4588-4479-BCCA-5253FE85DB69",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:33:58.660",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-02T11:15:47.437",
"references": [
{
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-330"
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2025-12-05T15:27:32+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2025-13353",
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"initial_release_date": "2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-13353.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2025-13353",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T16:50:27.674442Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:50:26.636Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"product": "gokey",
"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.2.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn gokey versions \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e gokey will generate different secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eImpact\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the \u003ccode\u003e-s\u003c/code\u003e\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ekeys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ea malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePatches\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eSystem secret rotation guidance\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (\u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003etemporarily download \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3\"\u003egokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.1.3\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for their respective operating system to recover the old password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003euse gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above to generate the new password\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003epopulate the system provided password rotation form\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\u003c/h4\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003egenerate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version \u003ccode\u003e0.2.0\u003c/code\u003e or above\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eprovision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003everify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003erevoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCredit\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir (\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://hackerone.com/mister_mime?type=user\"\u003e@mister_mime\u003c/a\u003e) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In gokey versions \u003c0.2.0,\n a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly \nbeing derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM \nauthentication tag of the key seed.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.\n\n\nImpact\nThis vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s\n option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is \nalso not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). \nSpecific impact includes:\n\n\n\n * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it \nwas expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 \nbytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was \nused\n\n * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated \nfrom a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without \nthe knowledge of the seed master password\n\n\n\n\nPatches\nThe code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0\n and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions \nwill produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed \nentropy will be used now.\n\n\nSystem secret rotation guidance\nIt is advised for users to regenerate passwords/secrets using the patched version of gokey (0.2.0\n and above), and provision/rotate these secrets into respective systems \nin place of the old secret. A specific rotation procedure is \nsystem-dependent, but most common patterns are described below.\n\n\nSystems that do not require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a \"Forgot password\" facility or a\n similar facility allowing users to rotate their password/secrets by \nsending a unique \"magic\" link to the user\u0027s email or phone. In such \ncases users are advised to use this facility and input the newly \ngenerated password secret, when prompted by the system.\n\n\nSystems that require the old password/secret for rotation\nSuch systems usually have a modal password rotation window\n usually in the user settings section requiring the user to input the \nold and the new password sometimes with a confirmation. To \ngenerate/recover the old password in such cases users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * temporarily download gokey version 0.1.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/releases/tag/v0.1.3 for their respective operating system to recover the old password\n\n * use gokey version 0.2.0 or above to generate the new password\n\n * populate the system provided password rotation form\n\n\n\n\nSystems that allow multiple credentials for the same account to be provisioned\nSuch systems usually require a secret or a cryptographic \nkey as a credential for access, but allow several credentials at the \nsame time. One example is SSH: a particular user may have several \nauthorized public keys configured on the SSH server for access. For such\n systems users are advised to:\n\n\n\n * generate a new secret/key/credential using gokey version 0.2.0 or above\n\n * provision the new secret/key/credential in addition to the existing credential on the system\n\n * verify that the access or required system operation is still possible with the new secret/key/credential\n\n * revoke authorization for the existing/old credential from the system\n\n\n\n\nCredit\nThis vulnerability was found by Th\u00e9o Cusnir ( @mister_mime https://hackerone.com/mister_mime ) and responsibly disclosed through Cloudflare\u0027s bug bounty program."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-330",
"description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"shortName": "cloudflare"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/gokey/security/advisories/GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513",
"assignerShortName": "cloudflare",
"cveId": "CVE-2025-13353",
"datePublished": "2025-12-02T11:03:21.832Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-11-18T11:21:27.669Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-02T16:54:23.544Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.