CVE-2024-53267 (GCVE-0-2024-53267)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-11-26 18:41 – Updated: 2024-11-26 19:46- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/securit… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-conformance/… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/pull/856 | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sigstore | sigstore-java |
Affected:
>= 1.0.0, < 1.1.0
|
guessed | |
| sigstore | sigstore-java |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 1.1.0
(custom)
cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:sigstore-java:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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