F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-218.0.0.121.oe2203sp3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nASoC: SOF: Fix DSP oops stack dump output contents\r\n\r\nFix @buf arg given to hex_dump_to_buffer() and stack address used\nin dump error output.(CVE-2021-47381)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nARM: 9170/1: fix panic when kasan and kprobe are enabled\r\n\r\narm32 uses software to simulate the instruction replaced\nby kprobe. some instructions may be simulated by constructing\nassembly functions. therefore, before executing instruction\nsimulation, it is necessary to construct assembly function\nexecution environment in C language through binding registers.\nafter kasan is enabled, the register binding relationship will\nbe destroyed, resulting in instruction simulation errors and\ncausing kernel panic.\r\n\r\nthe kprobe emulate instruction function is distributed in three\nfiles: actions-common.c actions-arm.c actions-thumb.c, so disable\nKASAN when compiling these files.\r\n\r\nfor example, use kprobe insert on cap_capable+20 after kasan\nenabled, the cap_capable assembly code is as follows:\n\u0026lt;cap_capable\u0026gt;:\ne92d47f0\tpush\t{r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}\ne1a05000\tmov\tr5, r0\ne280006c\tadd\tr0, r0, #108    ; 0x6c\ne1a04001\tmov\tr4, r1\ne1a06002\tmov\tr6, r2\ne59fa090\tldr\tsl, [pc, #144]  ;\nebfc7bf8\tbl\tc03aa4b4 \u0026lt;__asan_load4\u0026gt;\ne595706c\tldr\tr7, [r5, #108]  ; 0x6c\ne2859014\tadd\tr9, r5, #20\n......\nThe emulate_ldr assembly code after enabling kasan is as follows:\nc06f1384 \u0026lt;emulate_ldr\u0026gt;:\ne92d47f0\tpush\t{r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}\ne282803c\tadd\tr8, r2, #60     ; 0x3c\ne1a05000\tmov\tr5, r0\ne7e37855\tubfx\tr7, r5, #16, #4\ne1a00008\tmov\tr0, r8\ne1a09001\tmov\tr9, r1\ne1a04002\tmov\tr4, r2\nebf35462\tbl\tc03c6530 \u0026lt;__asan_load4\u0026gt;\ne357000f\tcmp\tr7, #15\ne7e36655\tubfx\tr6, r5, #12, #4\ne205a00f\tand\tsl, r5, #15\n0a000001\tbeq\tc06f13bc \u0026lt;emulate_ldr+0x38\u0026gt;\ne0840107\tadd\tr0, r4, r7, lsl #2\nebf3545c\tbl\tc03c6530 \u0026lt;__asan_load4\u0026gt;\ne084010a\tadd\tr0, r4, sl, lsl #2\nebf3545a\tbl\tc03c6530 \u0026lt;__asan_load4\u0026gt;\ne2890010\tadd\tr0, r9, #16\nebf35458\tbl\tc03c6530 \u0026lt;__asan_load4\u0026gt;\ne5990010\tldr\tr0, [r9, #16]\ne12fff30\tblx\tr0\ne356000f\tcm\tr6, #15\n1a000014\tbne\tc06f1430 \u0026lt;emulate_ldr+0xac\u0026gt;\ne1a06000\tmov\tr6, r0\ne2840040\tadd\tr0, r4, #64     ; 0x40\n......\r\n\r\nwhen running in emulate_ldr to simulate the ldr instruction, panic\noccurred, and the log is as follows:\nUnable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address\n00000090\npgd = ecb46400\n[00000090] *pgd=2e0fa003, *pmd=00000000\nInternal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP ARM\nPC is at cap_capable+0x14/0xb0\nLR is at emulate_ldr+0x50/0xc0\npsr: 600d0293 sp : ecd63af8  ip : 00000004  fp : c0a7c30c\nr10: 00000000  r9 : c30897f4  r8 : ecd63cd4\nr7 : 0000000f  r6 : 0000000a  r5 : e59fa090  r4 : ecd63c98\nr3 : c06ae294  r2 : 00000000  r1 : b7611300  r0 : bf4ec008\nFlags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user\nControl: 32c5387d  Table: 2d546400  DAC: 55555555\nProcess bash (pid: 1643, stack limit = 0xecd60190)\n(cap_capable) from (kprobe_handler+0x218/0x340)\n(kprobe_handler) from (kprobe_trap_handler+0x24/0x48)\n(kprobe_trap_handler) from (do_undefinstr+0x13c/0x364)\n(do_undefinstr) from (__und_svc_finish+0x0/0x30)\n(__und_svc_finish) from (cap_capable+0x18/0xb0)\n(cap_capable) from (cap_vm_enough_memory+0x38/0x48)\n(cap_vm_enough_memory) from\n(security_vm_enough_memory_mm+0x48/0x6c)\n(security_vm_enough_memory_mm) from\n(copy_process.constprop.5+0x16b4/0x25c8)\n(copy_process.constprop.5) from (_do_fork+0xe8/0x55c)\n(_do_fork) from (SyS_clone+0x1c/0x24)\n(SyS_clone) from (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10)\nCode: 0050a0e1 6c0080e2 0140a0e1 0260a0e1 (f801f0e7)(CVE-2021-47618)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbtrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot\r\n\r\nAt ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and\nthen attach it to the transaction\u0026apos;s list of pending snapshots. After that\nwe call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump\nto \u0026apos;fail\u0026apos; label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can\nresult in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot:\r\n\r\n1) We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction\u0026apos;s\n   list of pending snapshots;\r\n\r\n2) We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first\n   call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups().\n   In both cases, we don\u0026apos;t abort the transaction and we release our\n   transaction handle. We jump to the \u0026apos;fail\u0026apos; label and free the pending\n   snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the\n   transaction\u0026apos;s list;\r\n\r\n3) Another task commits the transaction. This time there\u0026apos;s no error at\n   all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer\n   to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task\n   has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free.\r\n\r\nThis issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the\nfollowing warning:\r\n\r\n  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: \u0026apos;\u0026amp;pending_snapshot-\u0026gt;list\u0026apos; not removed from list\r\n\r\nSo fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the\npending snapshot to the transaction\u0026apos;s list. Instead add the pending\nsnapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction()\nwe add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error\nreturned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which\ncase the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can\naccess it anymore.(CVE-2022-48733)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/mlx5e: Avoid field-overflowing memcpy()\r\n\r\nIn preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time\nfield bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid\nintentionally writing across neighboring fields.\r\n\r\nUse flexible arrays instead of zero-element arrays (which look like they\nare always overflowing) and split the cross-field memcpy() into two halves\nthat can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler.\r\n\r\nWe were doing:\r\n\r\n\t#define ETH_HLEN  14\n\t#define VLAN_HLEN  4\n\t...\n\t#define MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN)\n\t...\n        struct mlx5e_tx_wqe      *wqe  = mlx5_wq_cyc_get_wqe(wq, pi);\n\t...\n        struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg  *eseg = \u0026amp;wqe-\u0026gt;eth;\n        struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *dseg = wqe-\u0026gt;data;\n\t...\n\tmemcpy(eseg-\u0026gt;inline_hdr.start, xdptxd-\u0026gt;data, MLX5E_XDP_MIN_INLINE);\r\n\r\ntarget is wqe-\u0026gt;eth.inline_hdr.start (which the compiler sees as being\n2 bytes in size), but copying 18, intending to write across start\n(really vlan_tci, 2 bytes). The remaining 16 bytes get written into\nwqe-\u0026gt;data[0], covering byte_count (4 bytes), lkey (4 bytes), and addr\n(8 bytes).\r\n\r\nstruct mlx5e_tx_wqe {\n        struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg   ctrl;                 /*     0    16 */\n        struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg    eth;                  /*    16    16 */\n        struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg   data[];               /*    32     0 */\r\n\r\n        /* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */\n        /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */\n};\r\n\r\nstruct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg {\n        u8                         swp_outer_l4_offset;  /*     0     1 */\n        u8                         swp_outer_l3_offset;  /*     1     1 */\n        u8                         swp_inner_l4_offset;  /*     2     1 */\n        u8                         swp_inner_l3_offset;  /*     3     1 */\n        u8                         cs_flags;             /*     4     1 */\n        u8                         swp_flags;            /*     5     1 */\n        __be16                     mss;                  /*     6     2 */\n        __be32                     flow_table_metadata;  /*     8     4 */\n        union {\n                struct {\n                        __be16     sz;                   /*    12     2 */\n                        u8         start[2];             /*    14     2 */\n                } inline_hdr;                            /*    12     4 */\n                struct {\n                        __be16     type;                 /*    12     2 */\n                        __be16     vlan_tci;             /*    14     2 */\n                } insert;                                /*    12     4 */\n                __be32             trailer;              /*    12     4 */\n        };                                               /*    12     4 */\r\n\r\n        /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 9 */\n        /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */\n};\r\n\r\nstruct mlx5_wqe_data_seg {\n        __be32                     byte_count;           /*     0     4 */\n        __be32                     lkey;                 /*     4     4 */\n        __be64                     addr;                 /*     8     8 */\r\n\r\n        /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */\n        /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */\n};\r\n\r\nSo, split the memcpy() so the compiler can reason about the buffer\nsizes.\r\n\r\n\u0026quot;pahole\u0026quot; shows no size nor member offset changes to struct mlx5e_tx_wqe\nnor struct mlx5e_umr_wqe. \u0026quot;objdump -d\u0026quot; shows no meaningful object\ncode changes (i.e. only source line number induced differences and\noptimizations).(CVE-2022-48744)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nKVM: LAPIC: Also cancel preemption timer during SET_LAPIC\r\n\r\nThe below warning is splatting during guest reboot.\r\n\r\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1931 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10322 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x874/0x880 [kvm]\n  CPU: 0 PID: 1931 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G          I       5.17.0-rc1+ #5\n  RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x874/0x880 [kvm]\n  Call Trace:\n   \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm]\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0\n   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n  RIP: 0033:0x7fd39797350b\r\n\r\nThis can be triggered by not exposing tsc-deadline mode and doing a reboot in\nthe guest. The lapic_shutdown() function which is called in sys_reboot path\nwill not disarm the flying timer, it just masks LVTT. lapic_shutdown() clears\nAPIC state w/ LVT_MASKED and timer-mode bit is 0, this can trigger timer-mode\nswitch between tsc-deadline and oneshot/periodic, which can result in preemption\ntimer be cancelled in apic_update_lvtt(). However, We can\u0026apos;t depend on this when\nnot exposing tsc-deadline mode and oneshot/periodic modes emulated by preemption\ntimer. Qemu will synchronise states around reset, let\u0026apos;s cancel preemption timer\nunder KVM_SET_LAPIC.(CVE-2022-48765)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmedia: lgdt3306a: Add a check against null-pointer-def\r\n\r\nThe driver should check whether the client provides the platform_data.\r\n\r\nThe following log reveals it:\r\n\r\n[   29.610324] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kmemdup+0x30/0x40\n[   29.610730] Read of size 40 at addr 0000000000000000 by task bash/414\n[   29.612820] Call Trace:\n[   29.613030]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[   29.613201]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x6f\n[   29.613496]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40\n[   29.613754]  print_report.cold+0x494/0x6b7\n[   29.614082]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40\n[   29.614340]  kasan_report+0x8a/0x190\n[   29.614628]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40\n[   29.614888]  kasan_check_range+0x14d/0x1d0\n[   29.615213]  memcpy+0x20/0x60\n[   29.615454]  kmemdup+0x30/0x40\n[   29.615700]  lgdt3306a_probe+0x52/0x310\n[   29.616339]  i2c_device_probe+0x951/0xa90(CVE-2022-48772)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: btusb: Add date-\u0026gt;evt_skb is NULL check\r\n\r\nfix crash because of null pointers\r\n\r\n[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8\n[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0\n[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]\n[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006\n[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001\n[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0\n[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90\n[ 6104.969697] FS:  00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000\n[ 6104.969699] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0\n[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:\n[ 6104.969708]  btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]\n[ 6104.969732]  hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]\n[ 6104.969748]  hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]\n[ 6104.969753]  rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160\n[ 6104.969755]  rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0\n[ 6104.969759]  __vfs_write+0x18/0x40\n[ 6104.969761]  vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0\n[ 6104.969763]  ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0\n[ 6104.969765]  __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20\n[ 6104.969769]  do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180\n[ 6104.969771]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef\n[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001\n[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef\n[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012\n[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017\n[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002\n[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0(CVE-2023-52833)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngenirq/cpuhotplug, x86/vector: Prevent vector leak during CPU offline\r\n\r\nThe absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of\ninterrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is\ndeferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the\noriginal CPU.\r\n\r\nWhen the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is\nenforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU,\nbut the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately\nreclaimed. Instead, apicd-\u0026gt;move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming\nprocess is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.\r\n\r\nUpon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU,\nirq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU\u0026apos;s vector_cleanup list if it\nremains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its\nvector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.\r\n\r\nHowever, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the\ninterrupt triggers again on the new CPU.\r\n\r\nIn that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU\nto reclaim the old apicd-\u0026gt;prev_vector because the interrupt isn\u0026apos;t currently\naffine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even\nthough __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it\ndoesn\u0026apos;t reclaim apicd-\u0026gt;prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both\napicd-\u0026gt;move_in_progress and apicd-\u0026gt;prev_vector to 0.\r\n\r\nAs a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a\nCPU vector leak.\r\n\r\nTo address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move()\nbefore the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd-\u0026gt;prev_vector, if the\ninterrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.\r\n\r\nAdditionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well,\nfollowing a warning message, although theoretically it should never see\napicd-\u0026gt;move_in_progress with apicd-\u0026gt;prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.(CVE-2024-31076)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nof: dynamic: Synchronize of_changeset_destroy() with the devlink removals\r\n\r\nIn the following sequence:\n  1) of_platform_depopulate()\n  2) of_overlay_remove()\r\n\r\nDuring the step 1, devices are destroyed and devlinks are removed.\nDuring the step 2, OF nodes are destroyed but\n__of_changeset_entry_destroy() can raise warnings related to missing\nof_node_put():\n  ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 2 ...\r\n\r\nIndeed, during the devlink removals performed at step 1, the removal\nitself releasing the device (and the attached of_node) is done by a job\nqueued in a workqueue and so, it is done asynchronously with respect to\nfunction calls.\nWhen the warning is present, of_node_put() will be called but wrongly\ntoo late from the workqueue job.\r\n\r\nIn order to be sure that any ongoing devlink removals are done before\nthe of_node destruction, synchronize the of_changeset_destroy() with the\ndevlink removals.(CVE-2024-35879)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/sched: act_skbmod: prevent kernel-infoleak\r\n\r\nsyzbot found that tcf_skbmod_dump() was copying four bytes\nfrom kernel stack to user space [1].\r\n\r\nThe issue here is that \u0026apos;struct tc_skbmod\u0026apos; has a four bytes hole.\r\n\r\nWe need to clear the structure before filling fields.\r\n\r\n[1]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185\n  instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\n  copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]\n  iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]\n  iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]\n  iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]\n  _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185\n  copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline]\n  simple_copy_to_iter net/core/datagram.c:532 [inline]\n  __skb_datagram_iter+0x185/0x1000 net/core/datagram.c:420\n  skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546\n  skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4050 [inline]\n  netlink_recvmsg+0x432/0x1610 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1962\n  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline]\n  sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068\n  __sys_recvfrom+0x35a/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2242\n  __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline]\n  __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2256 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x126/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2256\n do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75\r\n\r\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n  pskb_expand_head+0x30f/0x19d0 net/core/skbuff.c:2253\n  netlink_trim+0x2c2/0x330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317\n  netlink_unicast+0x9f/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1351\n  nlmsg_unicast include/net/netlink.h:1144 [inline]\n  nlmsg_notify+0x21d/0x2f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2610\n  rtnetlink_send+0x73/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:741\n  rtnetlink_maybe_send include/linux/rtnetlink.h:17 [inline]\n  tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2048 [inline]\n  tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline]\n  tc_ctl_action+0x146e/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119\n  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559\n  rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613\n  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]\n  netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361\n  netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905\n  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n  __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745\n  ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584\n  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638\n  __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]\n  __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]\n  __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674\n do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75\r\n\r\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n  __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1041 [inline]\n  nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1099\n  tcf_skbmod_dump+0x23f/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:256\n  tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline]\n  tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227\n  tcf_action_dump+0x1fd/0x460 net/sched/act_api.c:1251\n  tca_get_fill+0x519/0x7a0 net/sched/act_api.c:1628\n  tcf_add_notify_msg net/sched/act_api.c:2023 [inline]\n  tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2042 [inline]\n  tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline]\n  tc_ctl_action+0x1365/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119\n  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netli\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-35893)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr\r\n\r\nAlthough ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it\nstill means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed\nfrom the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU\nbut nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane.\r\n\r\nIn particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if\nipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry\nfrom inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(\u0026amp;ifp-\u0026gt;addr_lst)) and drops all\nreferences (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough\ntiming, this can happen:\r\n\r\n1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry.\r\n\r\n2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The\n   reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled.\r\n\r\n3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count\n   (in6_ifa_hold).\r\n\r\n4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed.\r\n\r\n5. The freed entry is returned.\r\n\r\nPrevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name\nin6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe.\r\n\r\n[   41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n[   41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130\n[   41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc\n[   41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14\n[   41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)\n[   41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130\n[   41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff\n[   41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282\n[   41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[   41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900\n[   41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff\n[   41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000\n[   41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48\n[   41.514086] FS:  00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[   41.514726] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\n[   41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[   41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[   41.516799] Call Trace:\n[   41.517037]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[   41.517249]  ? __warn+0x7b/0x120\n[   41.517535]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130\n[   41.517923]  ? report_bug+0x164/0x190\n[   41.518240]  ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70\n[   41.518541]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70\n[   41.520972]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[   41.521325]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130\n[   41.521708]  ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0\n[   41.522035]  inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0\n[   41.522376]  ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10\n[   41.522758]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0\n[   41.523102]  ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390\n[   41.523445]  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10\n[   41.523832]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100\n[   41.524157]  netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390\n[   41.524484]  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440\n[   41.524826]  __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0\n[   41.525145]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30\n[   41.525467]  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0\n[   41.525794]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a\n[   41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a\n[   41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89\n[   41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007f\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-35969)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nriscv: Fix TASK_SIZE on 64-bit NOMMU\r\n\r\nOn NOMMU, userspace memory can come from anywhere in physical RAM. The\ncurrent definition of TASK_SIZE is wrong if any RAM exists above 4G,\ncausing spurious failures in the userspace access routines.(CVE-2024-35988)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/arm/malidp: fix a possible null pointer dereference\r\n\r\nIn malidp_mw_connector_reset, new memory is allocated with kzalloc, but\nno check is performed. In order to prevent null pointer dereferencing,\nensure that mw_state is checked before calling\n__drm_atomic_helper_connector_reset.(CVE-2024-36014)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntls: fix missing memory barrier in tls_init\r\n\r\nIn tls_init(), a write memory barrier is missing, and store-store\nreordering may cause NULL dereference in tls_{setsockopt,getsockopt}.\r\n\r\nCPU0                               CPU1\n-----                              -----\n// In tls_init()\n// In tls_ctx_create()\nctx = kzalloc()\nctx-\u0026gt;sk_proto = READ_ONCE(sk-\u0026gt;sk_prot) -(1)\r\n\r\n// In update_sk_prot()\nWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u0026gt;sk_prot, tls_prots)     -(2)\r\n\r\n                                   // In sock_common_setsockopt()\n                                   READ_ONCE(sk-\u0026gt;sk_prot)-\u0026gt;setsockopt()\r\n\r\n                                   // In tls_{setsockopt,getsockopt}()\n                                   ctx-\u0026gt;sk_proto-\u0026gt;setsockopt()    -(3)\r\n\r\nIn the above scenario, when (1) and (2) are reordered, (3) can observe\nthe NULL value of ctx-\u0026gt;sk_proto, causing NULL dereference.\r\n\r\nTo fix it, we rely on rcu_assign_pointer() which implies the release\nbarrier semantic. By moving rcu_assign_pointer() after ctx-\u0026gt;sk_proto is\ninitialized, we can ensure that ctx-\u0026gt;sk_proto are visible when\nchanging sk-\u0026gt;sk_prot.(CVE-2024-36489)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvirtio: delete vq in vp_find_vqs_msix() when request_irq() fails\r\n\r\nWhen request_irq() fails, error path calls vp_del_vqs(). There, as vq is\npresent in the list, free_irq() is called for the same vector. That\ncauses following splat:\r\n\r\n[    0.414355] Trying to free already-free IRQ 27\n[    0.414403] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1899 free_irq+0x1a1/0x2d0\n[    0.414510] Modules linked in:\n[    0.414540] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #27\n[    0.414540] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014\n[    0.414540] RIP: 0010:free_irq+0x1a1/0x2d0\n[    0.414540] Code: 1e 00 48 83 c4 08 48 89 e8 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 90 8b 74 24 04 48 c7 c7 98 80 6c b1 e8 00 c9 f7 ff 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 90 48 89 ee 4c 89 ef e8 e0 20 b8 00 49 8b 47 40 48 8b 40\n[    0.414540] RSP: 0000:ffffb71480013ae0 EFLAGS: 00010086\n[    0.414540] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa099c2722000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[    0.414540] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb71480013998 RDI: 0000000000000001\n[    0.414540] RBP: 0000000000000246 R08: 00000000ffffdfff R09: 0000000000000001\n[    0.414540] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffffb18729c0 R12: ffffa099c1c91760\n[    0.414540] R13: ffffa099c1c916a4 R14: ffffa099c1d2f200 R15: ffffa099c1c91600\n[    0.414540] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa099fec40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[    0.414540] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[    0.414540] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000008e3e001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\n[    0.414540] Call Trace:\n[    0.414540]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[    0.414540]  ? __warn+0x80/0x120\n[    0.414540]  ? free_irq+0x1a1/0x2d0\n[    0.414540]  ? report_bug+0x164/0x190\n[    0.414540]  ? handle_bug+0x3b/0x70\n[    0.414540]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70\n[    0.414540]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[    0.414540]  ? free_irq+0x1a1/0x2d0\n[    0.414540]  vp_del_vqs+0xc1/0x220\n[    0.414540]  vp_find_vqs_msix+0x305/0x470\n[    0.414540]  vp_find_vqs+0x3e/0x1a0\n[    0.414540]  vp_modern_find_vqs+0x1b/0x70\n[    0.414540]  init_vqs+0x387/0x600\n[    0.414540]  virtnet_probe+0x50a/0xc80\n[    0.414540]  virtio_dev_probe+0x1e0/0x2b0\n[    0.414540]  really_probe+0xc0/0x2c0\n[    0.414540]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10\n[    0.414540]  __driver_probe_device+0x73/0x120\n[    0.414540]  driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xe0\n[    0.414540]  __driver_attach+0x88/0x180\n[    0.414540]  bus_for_each_dev+0x85/0xd0\n[    0.414540]  bus_add_driver+0xec/0x1f0\n[    0.414540]  driver_register+0x59/0x100\n[    0.414540]  ? __pfx_virtio_net_driver_init+0x10/0x10\n[    0.414540]  virtio_net_driver_init+0x90/0xb0\n[    0.414540]  do_one_initcall+0x58/0x230\n[    0.414540]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x2d0\n[    0.414540]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10\n[    0.414540]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1c0\n[    0.414540]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50\n[    0.414540]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10\n[    0.414540]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[    0.414540]  \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nFix this by calling deleting the current vq when request_irq() fails.(CVE-2024-37353)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbtrfs: fix crash on racing fsync and size-extending write into prealloc\r\n\r\nWe have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in\nbtrfs_set_item_key_safe():\r\n\r\n  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!\n  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014\n  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]\r\n\r\nWith the following stack trace:\r\n\r\n  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)\n  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)\n  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)\n  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)\n  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)\n  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)\n  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)\n  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)\n  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)\n  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)\n  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)\n  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)\n  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)\n  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)\n  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)\n  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)\n  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\r\n\r\nSo we\u0026apos;re logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an\nextent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,\ntriggering the BUG().\r\n\r\nThis is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with\ndrgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)\nto get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:\r\n\r\n  \u0026gt;\u0026gt;\u0026gt; print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0][\u0026quot;eb\u0026quot;])\n  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610\n  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000\n  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677\n  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da\n          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160\n                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198\n                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0\n                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)\n                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)\n                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)\n                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)\n                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)\n          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13\n                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193\n          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37\n                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR\n                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6\n                  name: user.a\n                  data a\n          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53\n                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)\n                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288\n                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288\n                  extent compression 0 (none)\n          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53\n                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)\n                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288\n                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192\n          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53\n                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)\n                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288\n                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096\n  ...\r\n\r\nSo the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5\n(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and\nitem 5 starts at i_size.\r\n\r\nHere is the state of \n---truncated---(CVE-2024-37354)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work\r\n\r\nsyzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]\r\n\r\nnci_rx_work() parses received packet from ndev-\u0026gt;rx_q. It should be\nvalidated header size, payload size and total packet size before\nprocessing the packet. If an invalid packet is detected, it should be\nsilently discarded.(CVE-2024-38381)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmedia: atomisp: ssh_css: Fix a null-pointer dereference in load_video_binaries\r\n\r\nThe allocation failure of mycs-\u0026gt;yuv_scaler_binary in load_video_binaries()\nis followed with a dereference of mycs-\u0026gt;yuv_scaler_binary after the\nfollowing call chain:\r\n\r\nsh_css_pipe_load_binaries()\n  |-\u0026gt; load_video_binaries(mycs-\u0026gt;yuv_scaler_binary == NULL)\n  |\n  |-\u0026gt; sh_css_pipe_unload_binaries()\n        |-\u0026gt; unload_video_binaries()\r\n\r\nIn unload_video_binaries(), it calls to ia_css_binary_unload with argument\n\u0026amp;pipe-\u0026gt;pipe_settings.video.yuv_scaler_binary[i], which refers to the\nsame memory slot as mycs-\u0026gt;yuv_scaler_binary. Thus, a null-pointer\ndereference is triggered.(CVE-2024-38547)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amd/display: Fix potential index out of bounds in color transformation function\r\n\r\nFixes index out of bounds issue in the color transformation function.\nThe issue could occur when the index \u0026apos;i\u0026apos; exceeds the number of transfer\nfunction points (TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS).\r\n\r\nThe fix adds a check to ensure \u0026apos;i\u0026apos; is within bounds before accessing the\ntransfer function points. If \u0026apos;i\u0026apos; is out of bounds, an error message is\nlogged and the function returns false to indicate an error.\r\n\r\nReported by smatch:\ndrivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:405 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow \u0026apos;output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.red\u0026apos; 1025 \u0026lt;= s32max\ndrivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:406 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow \u0026apos;output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.green\u0026apos; 1025 \u0026lt;= s32max\ndrivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:407 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow \u0026apos;output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.blue\u0026apos; 1025 \u0026lt;= s32max(CVE-2024-38552)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nax25: Fix reference count leak issue of net_device\r\n\r\nThere is a reference count leak issue of the object \u0026quot;net_device\u0026quot; in\nax25_dev_device_down(). When the ax25 device is shutting down, the\nax25_dev_device_down() drops the reference count of net_device one\nor zero times depending on if we goto unlock_put or not, which will\ncause memory leak.\r\n\r\nIn order to solve the above issue, decrease the reference count of\nnet_device after dev-\u0026gt;ax25_ptr is set to null.(CVE-2024-38554)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nrcu-tasks: Fix show_rcu_tasks_trace_gp_kthread buffer overflow\r\n\r\nThere is a possibility of buffer overflow in\nshow_rcu_tasks_trace_gp_kthread() if counters, passed\nto sprintf() are huge. Counter numbers, needed for this\nare unrealistically high, but buffer overflow is still\npossible.\r\n\r\nUse snprintf() with buffer size instead of sprintf().\r\n\r\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2024-38577)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncrypto: bcm - Fix pointer arithmetic\r\n\r\nIn spu2_dump_omd() value of ptr is increased by ciph_key_len\ninstead of hash_iv_len which could lead to going beyond the\nbuffer boundaries.\nFix this bug by changing ciph_key_len to hash_iv_len.\r\n\r\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.(CVE-2024-38579)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix potential hang in nilfs_detach_log_writer()\r\n\r\nSyzbot has reported a potential hang in nilfs_detach_log_writer() called\nduring nilfs2 unmount.\r\n\r\nAnalysis revealed that this is because nilfs_segctor_sync(), which\nsynchronizes with the log writer thread, can be called after\nnilfs_segctor_destroy() terminates that thread, as shown in the call trace\nbelow:\r\n\r\nnilfs_detach_log_writer\n  nilfs_segctor_destroy\n    nilfs_segctor_kill_thread  --\u0026gt; Shut down log writer thread\n    flush_work\n      nilfs_iput_work_func\n        nilfs_dispose_list\n          iput\n            nilfs_evict_inode\n              nilfs_transaction_commit\n                nilfs_construct_segment (if inode needs sync)\n                  nilfs_segctor_sync  --\u0026gt; Attempt to synchronize with\n                                          log writer thread\n                           *** DEADLOCK ***\r\n\r\nFix this issue by changing nilfs_segctor_sync() so that the log writer\nthread returns normally without synchronizing after it terminates, and by\nforcing tasks that are already waiting to complete once after the thread\nterminates.\r\n\r\nThe skipped inode metadata flushout will then be processed together in the\nsubsequent cleanup work in nilfs_segctor_destroy().(CVE-2024-38582)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix use-after-free of timer for log writer thread\r\n\r\nPatch series \u0026quot;nilfs2: fix log writer related issues\u0026quot;.\r\n\r\nThis bug fix series covers three nilfs2 log writer-related issues,\nincluding a timer use-after-free issue and potential deadlock issue on\nunmount, and a potential freeze issue in event synchronization found\nduring their analysis.  Details are described in each commit log.\r\n\r\n\nThis patch (of 3):\r\n\r\nA use-after-free issue has been reported regarding the timer sc_timer on\nthe nilfs_sc_info structure.\r\n\r\nThe problem is that even though it is used to wake up a sleeping log\nwriter thread, sc_timer is not shut down until the nilfs_sc_info structure\nis about to be freed, and is used regardless of the thread\u0026apos;s lifetime.\r\n\r\nFix this issue by limiting the use of sc_timer only while the log writer\nthread is alive.(CVE-2024-38583)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nRDMA/hns: Modify the print level of CQE error\r\n\r\nToo much print may lead to a panic in kernel. Change ibdev_err() to\nibdev_err_ratelimited(), and change the printing level of cqe dump\nto debug level.(CVE-2024-38590)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmd: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size\r\n\r\nIs is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will\ntrigger following softlockup:\r\n\r\nkernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976]\nCPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1\nRIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0\n raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10]\n md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020\n md_thread+0xa7/0x170\n kthread+0xcf/0x100\n ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\r\n\r\nAnd the detailed process is as follows:\r\n\r\nmd_do_sync\n j = mddev-\u0026gt;resync_min\n while (j \u0026lt; max_sectors)\n  sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, \u0026amp;skipped)\n   if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., \u0026amp;sync_blocks))\n    // md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0\n    return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe;\n  // sectors = 0;\n  j += sectors;\n  // j never change\r\n\r\nRoot cause is that commit 301867b1c168 (\u0026quot;md/raid10: check\nslab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter\u0026quot;) return early from\nmd_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks.\r\n\r\nFix this problem by always set returned blocks from\nmd_bitmap_get_counter\u0026quot;(), as it used to be.\r\n\r\nNoted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the\ncase that bitmap size doesn\u0026apos;t match array size still need to be fixed.(CVE-2024-38598)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nax25: Fix reference count leak issues of ax25_dev\r\n\r\nThe ax25_addr_ax25dev() and ax25_dev_device_down() exist a reference\ncount leak issue of the object \u0026quot;ax25_dev\u0026quot;.\r\n\r\nMemory leak issue in ax25_addr_ax25dev():\r\n\r\nThe reference count of the object \u0026quot;ax25_dev\u0026quot; can be increased multiple\ntimes in ax25_addr_ax25dev(). This will cause a memory leak.\r\n\r\nMemory leak issues in ax25_dev_device_down():\r\n\r\nThe reference count of ax25_dev is set to 1 in ax25_dev_device_up() and\nthen increase the reference count when ax25_dev is added to ax25_dev_list.\nAs a result, the reference count of ax25_dev is 2. But when the device is\nshutting down. The ax25_dev_device_down() drops the reference count once\nor twice depending on if we goto unlock_put or not, which will cause\nmemory leak.\r\n\r\nAs for the issue of ax25_addr_ax25dev(), it is impossible for one pointer\nto be on a list twice. So add a break in ax25_addr_ax25dev(). As for the\nissue of ax25_dev_device_down(), increase the reference count of ax25_dev\nonce in ax25_dev_device_up() and decrease the reference count of ax25_dev\nafter it is removed from the ax25_dev_list.(CVE-2024-38602)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrivers/perf: hisi: hns3: Actually use devm_add_action_or_reset()\r\n\r\npci_alloc_irq_vectors() allocates an irq vector. When devm_add_action()\nfails, the irq vector is not freed, which leads to a memory leak.\r\n\r\nReplace the devm_add_action with devm_add_action_or_reset to ensure\nthe irq vector can be destroyed when it fails.(CVE-2024-38603)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncpufreq: exit() callback is optional\r\n\r\nThe exit() callback is optional and shouldn\u0026apos;t be called without checking\na valid pointer first.\r\n\r\nAlso, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn\u0026apos;t\npresent.(CVE-2024-38615)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmedia: stk1160: fix bounds checking in stk1160_copy_video()\r\n\r\nThe subtract in this condition is reversed.  The -\u0026gt;length is the length\nof the buffer.  The -\u0026gt;bytesused is how many bytes we have copied thus\nfar.  When the condition is reversed that means the result of the\nsubtraction is always negative but since it\u0026apos;s unsigned then the result\nis a very high positive value.  That means the overflow check is never\ntrue.\r\n\r\nAdditionally, the -\u0026gt;bytesused doesn\u0026apos;t actually work for this purpose\nbecause we\u0026apos;re not writing to \u0026quot;buf-\u0026gt;mem + buf-\u0026gt;bytesused\u0026quot;.  Instead, the\nmath to calculate the destination where we are writing is a bit\ninvolved.  You calculate the number of full lines already written,\nmultiply by two, skip a line if necessary so that we start on an odd\nnumbered line, and add the offset into the line.\r\n\r\nTo fix this buffer overflow, just take the actual destination where we\nare writing, if the offset is already out of bounds print an error and\nreturn.  Otherwise, write up to buf-\u0026gt;length bytes.(CVE-2024-38621)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nfs/ntfs3: Use variable length array instead of fixed size\r\n\r\nShould fix smatch warning:\n\tntfs_set_label() error: __builtin_memcpy() \u0026apos;uni-\u0026gt;name\u0026apos; too small (20 vs 256)(CVE-2024-38623)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nfs/ntfs3: Check \u0026apos;folio\u0026apos; pointer for NULL\r\n\r\nIt can be NULL if bmap is called.(CVE-2024-38625)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nserial: max3100: Update uart_driver_registered on driver removal\r\n\r\nThe removal of the last MAX3100 device triggers the removal of\nthe driver. However, code doesn\u0026apos;t update the respective global\nvariable and after insmod \u2014 rmmod \u2014 insmod cycle the kernel\noopses:\r\n\r\n  max3100 spi-PRP0001:01: max3100_probe: adding port 0\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000408\n  ...\n  RIP: 0010:serial_core_register_port+0xa0/0x840\n  ...\n   max3100_probe+0x1b6/0x280 [max3100]\n   spi_probe+0x8d/0xb0\r\n\r\nUpdate the actual state so next time UART driver will be registered\nagain.\r\n\r\nHugo also noticed, that the error path in the probe also affected\nby having the variable set, and not cleared. Instead of clearing it\nmove the assignment after the successfull uart_register_driver() call.(CVE-2024-38633)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nserial: max3100: Lock port-\u0026gt;lock when calling uart_handle_cts_change()\r\n\r\nuart_handle_cts_change() has to be called with port lock taken,\nSince we run it in a separate work, the lock may not be taken at\nthe time of running. Make sure that it\u0026apos;s taken by explicitly doing\nthat. Without it we got a splat:\r\n\r\n  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10 at drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:3491 uart_handle_cts_change+0xa6/0xb0\n  ...\n  Workqueue: max3100-0 max3100_work [max3100]\n  RIP: 0010:uart_handle_cts_change+0xa6/0xb0\n  ...\n   max3100_handlerx+0xc5/0x110 [max3100]\n   max3100_work+0x12a/0x340 [max3100](CVE-2024-38634)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngreybus: lights: check return of get_channel_from_mode\r\n\r\nIf channel for the given node is not found we return null from\nget_channel_from_mode. Make sure we validate the return pointer\nbefore using it in two of the missing places.\r\n\r\nThis was originally reported in [0]:\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.\r\n\r\n[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240301190425.120605-1-m.lobanov@rosalinux.ru(CVE-2024-38637)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndma-buf/sw-sync: don\u0026apos;t enable IRQ from sync_print_obj()\r\n\r\nSince commit a6aa8fca4d79 (\u0026quot;dma-buf/sw-sync: Reduce irqsave/irqrestore from\nknown context\u0026quot;) by error replaced spin_unlock_irqrestore() with\nspin_unlock_irq() for both sync_debugfs_show() and sync_print_obj() despite\nsync_print_obj() is called from sync_debugfs_show(), lockdep complains\ninconsistent lock state warning.\r\n\r\nUse plain spin_{lock,unlock}() for sync_print_obj(), for\nsync_debugfs_show() is already using spin_{lock,unlock}_irq().(CVE-2024-38780)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/9p: fix uninit-value in p9_client_rpc()\r\n\r\nSyzbot with the help of KMSAN reported the following error:\r\n\r\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754\n trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline]\n p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754\n p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031\n v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410\n v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122\n legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662\n vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797\n do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352\n path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679\n do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]\n __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]\n __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875\n __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875\n do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\n __alloc_pages+0x9d6/0xe70 mm/page_alloc.c:4598\n __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]\n alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]\n alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2175 [inline]\n allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]\n new_slab+0x2de/0x1400 mm/slub.c:2391\n ___slab_alloc+0x1184/0x33d0 mm/slub.c:3525\n __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]\n __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]\n slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]\n kmem_cache_alloc+0x6d3/0xbe0 mm/slub.c:3852\n p9_tag_alloc net/9p/client.c:278 [inline]\n p9_client_prepare_req+0x20a/0x1770 net/9p/client.c:641\n p9_client_rpc+0x27e/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:688\n p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031\n v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410\n v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122\n legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662\n vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797\n do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352\n path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679\n do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]\n __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]\n __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875\n __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875\n do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75\r\n\r\nIf p9_check_errors() fails early in p9_client_rpc(), req-\u0026gt;rc.tag\nwill not be properly initialized. However, trace_9p_client_res()\nends up trying to print it out anyway before p9_client_rpc()\nfinishes.\r\n\r\nFix this issue by assigning default values to p9_fcall fields\nsuch as \u0026apos;tag\u0026apos; and (just in case KMSAN unearths something new) \u0026apos;id\u0026apos;\nduring the tag allocation stage.(CVE-2024-39301)\r\n\r\nRejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.(CVE-2024-39362)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nf2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()\r\n\r\nsyzbot reports a kernel bug as below:\r\n\r\nF2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076\r\n\r\nCPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]\n print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488\n kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601\n f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]\n current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]\n f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600\n f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline]\n f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925\n ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline]\n do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838\n __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline]\n __se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\r\n\r\nThe root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during\nf2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access\nnat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering\nkasan bug report, fix it.(CVE-2024-39467)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1839",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:18Z",
  "published": "2024-07-12T11:07:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1839"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47381"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47618"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48733"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48744"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48765"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48772"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52833"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31076"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35879"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35893"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35969"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35988"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36014"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36489"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37353"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37354"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38381"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38547"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38552"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38554"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38577"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38579"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38582"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38583"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38590"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38598"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38602"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38603"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38615"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38621"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38623"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38625"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38633"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38634"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38637"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38780"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39301"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39362"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39467"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-47381",
    "CVE-2021-47618",
    "CVE-2022-48733",
    "CVE-2022-48744",
    "CVE-2022-48765",
    "CVE-2022-48772",
    "CVE-2023-52833",
    "CVE-2024-31076",
    "CVE-2024-35879",
    "CVE-2024-35893",
    "CVE-2024-35969",
    "CVE-2024-35988",
    "CVE-2024-36014",
    "CVE-2024-36489",
    "CVE-2024-37353",
    "CVE-2024-37354",
    "CVE-2024-38381",
    "CVE-2024-38547",
    "CVE-2024-38552",
    "CVE-2024-38554",
    "CVE-2024-38577",
    "CVE-2024-38579",
    "CVE-2024-38582",
    "CVE-2024-38583",
    "CVE-2024-38590",
    "CVE-2024-38598",
    "CVE-2024-38602",
    "CVE-2024-38603",
    "CVE-2024-38615",
    "CVE-2024-38621",
    "CVE-2024-38623",
    "CVE-2024-38625",
    "CVE-2024-38633",
    "CVE-2024-38634",
    "CVE-2024-38637",
    "CVE-2024-38780",
    "CVE-2024-39301",
    "CVE-2024-39362",
    "CVE-2024-39467"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nRDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests\r\n\r\nThe FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice\non the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the\nwork, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution\nbackground request cannot be active twice.\r\n\r\n       CPU 1                                  CPU 2\r\n\r\nrdma_resolve_addr():\n  RDMA_CM_IDLE -\u0026gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY\n  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)  #1\r\n\r\n\t\t\t process_one_req(): for #1\n                          addr_handler():\n                            RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -\u0026gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND\n                            mutex_unlock(\u0026amp;id_priv-\u0026gt;handler_mutex);\n                            [.. handler still running ..]\r\n\r\nrdma_resolve_addr():\n  RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -\u0026gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY\n  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)\n    !! two requests are now on the req_list\r\n\r\nrdma_destroy_id():\n destroy_id_handler_unlock():\n  _destroy_id():\n   cma_cancel_operation():\n    rdma_addr_cancel()\r\n\r\n                          // process_one_req() self removes it\n\t\t          spin_lock_bh(\u0026amp;lock);\n                           cancel_delayed_work(\u0026amp;req-\u0026gt;work);\n\t                   if (!list_empty(\u0026amp;req-\u0026gt;list)) == true\r\n\r\n      ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done\r\n\r\n   kfree(id_priv)\r\n\r\n\t\t\t process_one_req(): for #2\n                          addr_handler():\n\t                    mutex_lock(\u0026amp;id_priv-\u0026gt;handler_mutex);\n                            !! Use after free on id_priv\r\n\r\nrdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only\ncancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens\nafter the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the\nreq_list can have two reqs for the same \u0026quot;handle\u0026quot; but rdma_addr_cancel()\nonly cancels the first one.\r\n\r\nThe second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will\nuse-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.\r\n\r\nFix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and\nalways cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never\ngets more than one item in it and doesn\u0026apos;t cost anything in the normal flow\nthat never uses this strange error path.(CVE-2021-47391)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback\r\n\r\nWhen we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be\nsome socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket-\u0026gt;wq, such\nas eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications.\r\n\r\nAfter the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket-\u0026gt;wq\nwill be woken up. Applications can\u0026apos;t be notified by the entries\nwhich were inserted in smc socket-\u0026gt;wq before fallback. So we need\na mechanism to wake up smc socket-\u0026gt;wq at the same time if some\nentries remaining in it.\r\n\r\nThe current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket-\u0026gt;wq\nto clcsock-\u0026gt;wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash\nlike this:\r\n\r\n general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E     5.16.0+ #107\n RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170\n Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n  __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0\n  sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70\n  tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40\n  tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660\n  ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0\n  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260\n  tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0\n  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0\n  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60\n  ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110\n  ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140\n  ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140\n  ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60\n  ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230\n  ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170\n  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240\n  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320\n  napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190\n  mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core]\n  __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0\n  net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300\n  __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2\n  irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0\n  common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0\n  \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nThe crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from\nsmc socket-\u0026gt;wq to clcsock-\u0026gt;wq. The owners of these entries, such as\nepoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a\ndifferent socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock\n(smc socket-\u0026gt;wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive,\nbut it doesn\u0026apos;t work. The operations to the entries, such as removing\nfrom the waitqueue (now is clcsock-\u0026gt;wq after fallback), may cause a\ncrash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment.\r\n\r\nThis patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue\nentries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock\u0026apos;s\ncallback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will\nforward the wakeup to smc socket-\u0026gt;wq if clcsock-\u0026gt;wq is actually woken\nup and smc socket-\u0026gt;wq has remaining entries.(CVE-2022-48721)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nice: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue\r\n\r\nWhen both ice and the irdma driver are loaded, a warning in\ncheck_flush_dependency is being triggered. This is due to ice driver\nworkqueue being allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag and the irdma one\nis not.\r\n\r\nAccording to kernel documentation, this flag should be set if the\nworkqueue will be involved in the kernel\u0026apos;s memory reclamation flow.\nSince it is not, there is no need for the ice driver\u0026apos;s WQ to have this\nflag set so remove it.\r\n\r\nExample trace:\r\n\r\n[  +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM ice:ice_service_task [ice] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0\n[  +0.000139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 728 at kernel/workqueue.c:2632 check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0\n[  +0.000011] Modules linked in: bonding tls xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_cha\nin_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rfkill vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel\n_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct1\n0dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl intel_cstate rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_\ncore_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_ssif irdma mei_me ib_uverbs\nib_core intel_uncore joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi mei lpc_ich i2c_smbus intel_pch_thermal ioatdma ipmi_si acpi_power_meter\nacpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ahci ixgbe libahci ice i40e igb crc32c_intel mdio i2c_algo_bit liba\nta dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse\n[  +0.000161]  [last unloaded: bonding]\n[  +0.000006] CPU: 0 PID: 728 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G S                 6.2.0-rc2_next-queue-13jan-00458-gc20aabd57164 #1\n[  +0.000006] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020\n[  +0.000003] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]\n[  +0.000127] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0\n[  +0.000005] Code: 89 8e 02 01 e8 49 3d 40 00 49 8b 55 18 48 8d 8d d0 00 00 00 48 8d b3 d0 00 00 00 4d 89 e0 48 c7 c7 e0 3b 08\n9f e8 bb d3 07 01 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b e9 be fe ff ff 80 3d 24 89 8e 02 00 0f 85 6b ff ff ff e9 06\n[  +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff88810a39f990 EFLAGS: 00010282\n[  +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888141bc2400 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[  +0.000004] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1213a80\n[  +0.000003] RBP: ffff888194bf3400 R08: ffffed117b306112 R09: ffffed117b306112\n[  +0.000003] R10: ffff888bd983088b R11: ffffed117b306111 R12: 0000000000000000\n[  +0.000003] R13: ffff888111f84d00 R14: ffff88810a3943ac R15: ffff888194bf3400\n[  +0.000004] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888bd9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[  +0.000003] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[  +0.000003] CR2: 000056035b208b60 CR3: 000000017795e005 CR4: 00000000007706f0\n[  +0.000003] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[  +0.000003] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[  +0.000002] PKRU: 55555554\n[  +0.000003] Call Trace:\n[  +0.000002]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[  +0.000003]  __flush_workqueue+0x203/0x840\n[  +0.000006]  ? mutex_unlock+0x84/0xd0\n[  +0.000008]  ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10\n[  +0.000004]  ? __pfx___flush_workqueue+0x10/0x10\n[  +0.000006]  ? mutex_lock+0xa3/0xf0\n[  +0.000005]  ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x39/0x190 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000174]  __ib_unregister_device+0x84/0xf0 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000094]  ib_unregister_device+0x25/0x30 [ib_core]\n[  +0.000093]  irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x97/0xc0 [irdma]\n[  +0.000064]  ? __pfx_irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x10/0x10 [irdma]\n[  +0.000059]  ? up_write+0x5c/0x90\n[  +0.000005]  irdma_remove+0x36/0x90 [irdma]\n[  +0.000062]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x32/0x50\n[  +0.000007]  device_r\n---truncated---(CVE-2023-52743)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nksmbd: fix slab out of bounds write in smb_inherit_dacl()\r\n\r\nslab out-of-bounds write is caused by that offsets is bigger than pntsd\nallocation size. This patch add the check to validate 3 offsets using\nallocation size.(CVE-2023-52755)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: btusb: Add date-\u0026gt;evt_skb is NULL check\r\n\r\nfix crash because of null pointers\r\n\r\n[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8\n[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0\n[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]\n[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006\n[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001\n[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0\n[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90\n[ 6104.969697] FS:  00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000\n[ 6104.969699] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0\n[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:\n[ 6104.969708]  btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]\n[ 6104.969732]  hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]\n[ 6104.969748]  hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]\n[ 6104.969753]  rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160\n[ 6104.969755]  rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0\n[ 6104.969759]  __vfs_write+0x18/0x40\n[ 6104.969761]  vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0\n[ 6104.969763]  ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0\n[ 6104.969765]  __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20\n[ 6104.969769]  do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180\n[ 6104.969771]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef\n[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001\n[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef\n[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012\n[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017\n[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002\n[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0(CVE-2023-52833)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nf2fs: compress: fix to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock\r\n\r\nIt needs to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock\nto avoid racing with checkpoint, otherwise, filesystem metadata including\nblkaddr in dnode, inode fields and .total_valid_block_count may be\ncorrupted after SPO case.(CVE-2024-34027)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnull_blk: fix null-ptr-dereference while configuring \u0026apos;power\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;submit_queues\u0026apos;\r\n\r\nWriting \u0026apos;power\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;submit_queues\u0026apos; concurrently will trigger kernel\npanic:\r\n\r\nTest script:\r\n\r\nmodprobe null_blk nr_devices=0\nmkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0\nwhile true; do echo 1 \u0026gt; submit_queues; echo 4 \u0026gt; submit_queues; done \u0026amp;\nwhile true; do echo 1 \u0026gt; power; echo 0 \u0026gt; power; done\r\n\r\nTest result:\r\n\r\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148\nOops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\nRIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n lock_acquire+0x121/0x450\n down_write+0x5f/0x1d0\n simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0\n blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100\n blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720\n nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]\n nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk]\n configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0\n vfs_write+0x326/0x730\n ksys_write+0x74/0x150\r\n\r\nThis is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with\nblk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues():\r\n\r\nnullb_device_power_store\tnullb_apply_submit_queues\n null_del_dev\n del_gendisk\n\t\t\t\t nullb_update_nr_hw_queues\n\t\t\t\t  if (!dev-\u0026gt;nullb)\n\t\t\t\t  // still set while gendisk is deleted\n\t\t\t\t   return 0\n\t\t\t\t  blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues\n dev-\u0026gt;nullb = NULL\r\n\r\nFix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect\nnullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs.(CVE-2024-36478)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbnxt_re: avoid shift undefined behavior in bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq\r\n\r\nUndefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called\nwith hwq_attr-\u0026gt;aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr-\u0026gt;aux_stride == 0.\nIn that case, \u0026quot;roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr-\u0026gt;aux_stride)\u0026quot; gets called.\nroundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0.\r\n\r\nFix it in the one caller that had this combination.\r\n\r\nThe undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN:\n  UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13\n  shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type \u0026apos;long unsigned int\u0026apos;\n  CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4\n  Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis@abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023\n  Call Trace:\n   \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n   ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30\n   __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec\n   __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re]\n   bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re]\n   bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re]\n   bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re]\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0\n   ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]\n   ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]\n   create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]\n   ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core]\n   create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core]\n   ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core]\n   ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core]\n   add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core]\n   enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core]\n   ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core]\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re]\n   ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]\n   auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80\n   ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0\n   really_probe+0xde/0x340\n   ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90\n   ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10\n   __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110\n   driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0\n   __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0\n   bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0\n   bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220\n   driver_register+0x72/0xd0\n   __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0\n   ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]\n   bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re]\n   ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]\n   do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310\n   do_init_module+0x90/0x250\n   init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0\n   idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0\n   __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0\n   do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d\n  Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\n  RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139\n  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d\n  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b\n  RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0\n  R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d\n  R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60\n   \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n  ---[ end trace ]---(CVE-2024-38540)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6\r\n\r\nOVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.\r\n\r\nOVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure\nwith the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,\netc.  Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the\nkeys from the packet headers.\r\n\r\nWhenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it\nfirst zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery\ninformation even if it is not an ND packet.\r\n\r\nIt is an \u0026apos;ipv6.nd\u0026apos; field.  However, the \u0026apos;ipv6\u0026apos; is a union that shares\nthe space between \u0026apos;nd\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;ct_orig\u0026apos; that holds the original tuple\nconntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.\r\n\r\nND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it\u0026apos;s fine to\nshare the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of\nICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.\r\n\r\nThe issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination\naddress being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to\nincorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions\nin case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back\nto userspace.\r\n\r\nND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing\nthem should be fine.  Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to\navoid the issue.\r\n\r\nInitializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet\nmay not contain all the options.\r\n\r\nThe issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn\u0026apos;t\naffect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because\nin this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is\nalready parsed.(CVE-2024-38558)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount\r\n\r\nWhen a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that\nlockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically.  Commit\nfb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem\nunmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn\u0026apos;t want to unlock and then\nrelease the lockspace.  This didn\u0026apos;t take the bast callbacks for\nasynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain\nactive until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.\r\n\r\nTo prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the\nglocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release\nthe lockspace, and only then free those glocks.\r\n\r\nAs an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if\nthe receiving glock is dead.(CVE-2024-38570)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nr8169: Fix possible ring buffer corruption on fragmented Tx packets.\r\n\r\nAn issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented\npackets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring\nbuffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null\naddress.\r\n\r\nThis was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags\nwhich may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware\nquirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2().\r\n\r\nTo fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been\napplied.(CVE-2024-38586)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmd: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size\r\n\r\nIs is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will\ntrigger following softlockup:\r\n\r\nkernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976]\nCPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1\nRIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0\n raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10]\n md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020\n md_thread+0xa7/0x170\n kthread+0xcf/0x100\n ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\r\n\r\nAnd the detailed process is as follows:\r\n\r\nmd_do_sync\n j = mddev-\u0026gt;resync_min\n while (j \u0026lt; max_sectors)\n  sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, \u0026amp;skipped)\n   if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., \u0026amp;sync_blocks))\n    // md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0\n    return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe;\n  // sectors = 0;\n  j += sectors;\n  // j never change\r\n\r\nRoot cause is that commit 301867b1c168 (\u0026quot;md/raid10: check\nslab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter\u0026quot;) return early from\nmd_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks.\r\n\r\nFix this problem by always set returned blocks from\nmd_bitmap_get_counter\u0026quot;(), as it used to be.\r\n\r\nNoted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the\ncase that bitmap size doesn\u0026apos;t match array size still need to be fixed.(CVE-2024-38598)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nALSA: core: Fix NULL module pointer assignment at card init\r\n\r\nThe commit 81033c6b584b (\u0026quot;ALSA: core: Warn on empty module\u0026quot;)\nintroduced a WARN_ON() for a NULL module pointer passed at snd_card\nobject creation, and it also wraps the code around it with \u0026apos;#ifdef\nMODULE\u0026apos;.  This works in most cases, but the devils are always in\ndetails.  \u0026quot;MODULE\u0026quot; is defined when the target code (i.e. the sound\ncore) is built as a module; but this doesn\u0026apos;t mean that the caller is\nalso built-in or not.  Namely, when only the sound core is built-in\n(CONFIG_SND=y) while the driver is a module (CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO=m),\nthe passed module pointer is ignored even if it\u0026apos;s non-NULL, and\ncard-\u0026gt;module remains as NULL.  This would result in the missing module\nreference up/down at the device open/close, leading to a race with the\ncode execution after the module removal.\r\n\r\nFor addressing the bug, move the assignment of card-\u0026gt;module again out\nof ifdef.  The WARN_ON() is still wrapped with ifdef because the\nmodule can be really NULL when all sound drivers are built-in.\r\n\r\nNote that we keep \u0026apos;ifdef MODULE\u0026apos; for WARN_ON(), otherwise it would\nlead to a false-positive NULL module check.  Admittedly it won\u0026apos;t catch\nperfectly, i.e. no check is performed when CONFIG_SND=y.  But, it\u0026apos;s no\nreal problem as it\u0026apos;s only for debugging, and the condition is pretty\nrare.(CVE-2024-38605)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncpufreq: exit() callback is optional\r\n\r\nThe exit() callback is optional and shouldn\u0026apos;t be called without checking\na valid pointer first.\r\n\r\nAlso, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn\u0026apos;t\npresent.(CVE-2024-38615)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvfio/pci: fix potential memory leak in vfio_intx_enable()\r\n\r\nIf vfio_irq_ctx_alloc() failed will lead to \u0026apos;name\u0026apos; memory leak.(CVE-2024-38632)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nkdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete\r\n\r\nCurrently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb\nwill use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer.\nUnfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the\ndestination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously\nif the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in\nthe middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied\nbuffer.\r\n\r\nFix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy()\ncalls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space\nbefore we start moving characters around.(CVE-2024-39480)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbonding: Fix out-of-bounds read in bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set()\r\n\r\nIn function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval-\u0026gt;string is an\nempty string, newval-\u0026gt;string+1 will point to the byte after the\nstring, causing an out-of-bound read.\r\n\r\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107\nCPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]\n print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475\n kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588\n strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418\n __fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline]\n in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130\n bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910\ndrivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201\n __bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767\n __bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792\n bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817\n bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156\n dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366\n sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584\n ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\n---[ end trace ]---\r\n\r\nFix it by adding a check of string length before using it.(CVE-2024-39487)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\narm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes\nto bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will\nbe ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior\nentries in the table will be handled correctly.\r\n\r\nThe arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are\nnaturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct\nare suitably aligned within arrays.\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:\r\n\r\n\tstruct bug_entry {\n\t\tsigned int      bug_addr_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tsigned int      file_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  line;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  flags;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t}\r\n\r\n... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.\r\n\r\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:\r\n\r\n\tstruct bug_entry {\n\t\tsigned int      bug_addr_disp;\t// 4 bytes\n\t\tunsigned short  flags;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t\t\u0026lt; implicit padding \u0026gt;\t\t// 2 bytes\n\t}\r\n\r\n... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing\npadding, requiring 4-byte alginment.\r\n\r\nWhen we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry\nto 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.\nHowever, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when\nCONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding\nbytes.\r\n\r\nFor the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn\u0026apos;t\ndepend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:\r\n\r\n\tfor (bug = __start___bug_table; bug \u0026lt; __stop___bug_table; ++bug)\n\t\tif (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))\n\t\t\treturn bug;\r\n\r\nHowever for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing\nbytes when calculating the number of entries:\r\n\r\n\tmod-\u0026gt;num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);\r\n\r\n... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry\nwill not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:\r\n\r\n\tsechdrs[i].sh_size == 6\n\tsizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;\r\n\r\n\tsechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;\r\n\r\nConsequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:\r\n\r\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u0026lt; mod-\u0026gt;num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)\n\t\tif (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))\n\t\t\tgoto out;\r\n\r\n... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.\r\n\r\nThis can be demonstrated with the following module:\r\n\r\n\tstatic int __init buginit(void)\n\t{\n\t\tWARN(1, \u0026quot;hello\\n\u0026quot;);\n\t\treturn 0;\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tstatic void __exit bugexit(void)\n\t{\n\t}\r\n\r\n\tmodule_init(buginit);\n\tmodule_exit(bugexit);\n\tMODULE_LICENSE(\u0026quot;GPL\u0026quot;);\r\n\r\n... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:\r\n\r\n\t------------[ cut here ]------------\n\thello\n\tUnexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1\n\tInternal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n\tModules linked in: hello(O+)\n\tCPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O       6.9.1 #8\n\tHardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n\tpstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n\tpc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\tlr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\tsp : ffff800080533ae0\n\tx29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000\n\tx26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58\n\tx23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0\n\tx20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006\n\tx17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720\n\tx14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312\n\tx11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8\n\tx8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000\n\tx5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\n\tx2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0\n\tCall trace:\n\t buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]\n\t do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8\n\t do_init_module+0x60/0x218\n\t load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70\n\t __do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0\n\t __arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28\n\t invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114\n\t el0_svc\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-39488)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: sr: fix memleak in seg6_hmac_init_algo\r\n\r\nseg6_hmac_init_algo returns without cleaning up the previous allocations\nif one fails, so it\u0026apos;s going to leak all that memory and the crypto tfms.\r\n\r\nUpdate seg6_hmac_exit to only free the memory when allocated, so we can\nreuse the code directly.(CVE-2024-39489)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put\r\n\r\nsk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which\nwill happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,\nsk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still\npoint to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.\r\n\r\nThis can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,\nwhile the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.\r\n\r\nThat will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:\r\n\r\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nRIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701\nCode: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840\nR13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870\nFS:  000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048\n __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]\n sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421\n __fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422\n __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]\n __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]\n __x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070\nCode: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c\nRSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070\nRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nUse sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to\nNULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,\nthen, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel\npsock-\u0026gt;work.\r\n\r\nAs suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is\nless convoluted.\r\n\r\nAfter that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE\nanymore.(CVE-2024-39500)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmptcp: ensure snd_una is properly initialized on connect\r\n\r\nThis is strictly related to commit fb7a0d334894 (\u0026quot;mptcp: ensure snd_nxt\nis properly initialized on connect\u0026quot;). It turns out that syzkaller can\ntrigger the retransmit after fallback and before processing any other\nincoming packet - so that snd_una is still left uninitialized.\r\n\r\nAddress the issue explicitly initializing snd_una together with snd_nxt\nand write_seq.(CVE-2024-40931)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nf2fs: remove clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag in default_options\r\n\r\nIn f2fs_remount, SB_INLINECRYPT flag will be clear and re-set.\nIf create new file or open file during this gap, these files\nwill not use inlinecrypt. Worse case, it may lead to data\ncorruption if wrappedkey_v0 is enable.\r\n\r\nThread A:                               Thread B:\r\n\r\n-f2fs_remount\t\t\t\t-f2fs_file_open or f2fs_new_inode\n  -default_options\n\t\u0026lt;- clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag\r\n\r\n                                          -fscrypt_select_encryption_impl\r\n\r\n  -parse_options\n\t\u0026lt;- set SB_INLINECRYPT again(CVE-2024-40971)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1860",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:19Z",
  "published": "2024-07-19T11:07:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47391"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48721"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52743"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52755"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52833"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34027"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36478"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38540"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38558"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38570"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38586"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38598"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38605"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38615"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38632"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39480"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39487"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39488"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39489"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39500"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40931"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40971"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-47391",
    "CVE-2022-48721",
    "CVE-2023-52743",
    "CVE-2023-52755",
    "CVE-2023-52833",
    "CVE-2024-34027",
    "CVE-2024-36478",
    "CVE-2024-38540",
    "CVE-2024-38558",
    "CVE-2024-38570",
    "CVE-2024-38586",
    "CVE-2024-38598",
    "CVE-2024-38605",
    "CVE-2024-38615",
    "CVE-2024-38632",
    "CVE-2024-39480",
    "CVE-2024-39487",
    "CVE-2024-39488",
    "CVE-2024-39489",
    "CVE-2024-39500",
    "CVE-2024-40931",
    "CVE-2024-40971"
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "kernel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-devel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-headers-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0-127.0.0.113.oe2403"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work\n\nsyzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]\n\nnci_rx_work() parses received packet from ndev-\u0026gt;rx_q. It should be\nvalidated header size, payload size and total packet size before\nprocessing the packet. If an invalid packet is detected, it should be\nsilently discarded.(CVE-2024-38381)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:net: ti: icssg_prueth: Fix NULL pointer dereference in prueth_probe()In the prueth_probe() function, if one of the calls to emac_phy_connect()fails due to of_phy_connect() returning NULL, then the subsequent call tophy_attached_info() will dereference a NULL pointer.Check the return code of emac_phy_connect and fail cleanly if there is anerror.(CVE-2024-38584)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:cpufreq: exit() callback is optionalThe exit() callback is optional and shouldn t be called without checkinga valid pointer first.Also, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn tpresent.(CVE-2024-38615)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:serial: max3100: Update uart_driver_registered on driver removalThe removal of the last MAX3100 device triggers the removal ofthe driver. However, code doesn t update the respective globalvariable and after insmod \u2014 rmmod \u2014 insmod cycle the kerneloopses:  max3100 spi-PRP0001:01: max3100_probe: adding port 0  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000408  ...  RIP: 0010:serial_core_register_port+0xa0/0x840  ...   max3100_probe+0x1b6/0x280 [max3100]   spi_probe+0x8d/0xb0Update the actual state so next time UART driver will be registeredagain.Hugo also noticed, that the error path in the probe also affectedby having the variable set, and not cleared. Instead of clearing itmove the assignment after the successfull uart_register_driver() call.(CVE-2024-38633)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nenic: Validate length of nl attributes in enic_set_vf_port\n\nenic_set_vf_port assumes that the nl attribute IFLA_PORT_PROFILE\nis of length PORT_PROFILE_MAX and that the nl attributes\nIFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID, IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID are of length PORT_UUID_MAX.\nThese attributes are validated (in the function do_setlink in rtnetlink.c)\nusing the nla_policy ifla_port_policy. The policy defines IFLA_PORT_PROFILE\nas NLA_STRING, IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID as NLA_BINARY and\nIFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID as NLA_STRING. That means that the length validation\nusing the policy is for the max size of the attributes and not on exact\nsize so the length of these attributes might be less than the sizes that\nenic_set_vf_port expects. This might cause an out of bands\nread access in the memcpys of the data of these\nattributes in enic_set_vf_port.(CVE-2024-38659)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:riscv: prevent pt_regs corruption for secondary idle threadsTop of the kernel thread stack should be reserved for pt_regs. Howeverthis is not the case for the idle threads of the secondary boot harts.Their stacks overlap with their pt_regs, so both may get corrupted.Similar issue has been fixed for the primary hart, see c7cdd96eca28( riscv: prevent stack corruption by reserving task_pt_regs(p) early ).However that fix was not propagated to the secondary harts. The problemhas been noticed in some CPU hotplug tests with V enabled. The functionsmp_callin stored several registers on stack, corrupting top of pt_regsstructure including status field. As a result, kernel attempted to saveor restore inexistent V context.(CVE-2024-38667)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:jfs: xattr: fix buffer overflow for invalid xattrWhen an xattr size is not what is expected, it is printed out to thekernel log in hex format as a form of debugging.  But when that xattrsize is bigger than the expected size, printing it out can cause anaccess off the end of the buffer.Fix this all up by properly restricting the size of the debug hex dumpin the kernel log.(CVE-2024-40902)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages\n\nThe syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in\nthe cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver\u0026apos;s immediate\nresubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the\ndummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:\n\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]\nCPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:\n\t#1:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#2:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#3:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#4:  98% system,\t  0% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\n\t#5:  98% system,\t  1% softirq,\t  3% hardirq,\t  0% idle\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 73096\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]\nhardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [\u0026lt;ffff80008037bc00\u0026gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [\u0026lt;ffff80008af10b00\u0026gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]\nsoftirqs last  enabled at (73048): [\u0026lt;ffff8000801ea530\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582\nsoftirqs last disabled at (73043): [\u0026lt;ffff800080020de8\u0026gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588\nCPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\n\nTesting showed that the problem did not occur if the two error\nmessages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding\nmaterial to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.\n\nIn any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to\navoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is\nto ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with\ndev_err_ratelimited().(CVE-2024-40904)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:nvmet: always initialize cqe.resultThe spec doesn t mandate that the first two double words (aka results)for the command queue entry need to be set to 0 when they are notused (not specified). Though, the target implemention returns 0 for TCPand FC but not for RDMA.Let s make RDMA behave the same and thus explicitly initializing theresult field. This prevents leaking any data from the stack.(CVE-2024-41079)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:drm/nouveau: fix null pointer dereference in nouveau_connector_get_modesIn nouveau_connector_get_modes(), the return value of drm_mode_duplicate()is assigned to mode, which will lead to a possible NULL pointerdereference on failure of drm_mode_duplicate(). Add a check to avoid npd.(CVE-2024-42101)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:Revert  mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again Patch series  mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling .Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into32-bits.  This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 formore details).This patch (of 2):This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.The commit is broken in several ways.  Firstly, the removed (u64) castfrom the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bitarchs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh \u0026gt;= 1\u0026lt;\u0026lt;32 (which is actually common - thedefault settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this).  Secondly, thediv64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs.  We havediv64_ul() in case we want to be safe \u0026amp; cheap.  Thirdly, if dirtythresholds are larger than 1\u0026lt;\u0026lt;32 pages, then dirty balancing is going toblow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix onepossible overflow is just moot.(CVE-2024-42102)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:Revert  sched/fair: Make sure to try to detach at least one movable task This reverts commit b0defa7ae03ecf91b8bfd10ede430cff12fcbd06.b0defa7ae03ec changed the load balancing logic to ignore env.max_loop ifall tasks examined to that point were pinned. The goal of the patch wasto make it more likely to be able to detach a task buried in a long listof pinned tasks. However, this has the unfortunate side effect ofcreating an O(n) iteration in detach_tasks(), as we now must fullyiterate every task on a cpu if all or most are pinned. Since this loadbalance code is done with rq lock held, and often in softirq context, itis very easy to trigger hard lockups. We observed such hard lockups witha user who affined O(10k) threads to a single cpu.When I discussed this with Vincent he initially suggested that we keepthe limit on the number of tasks to detach, but increase the number oftasks we can search. However, after some back and forth on the mailinglist, he recommended we instead revert the original patch, as it seemslikely no one was actually getting hit by the original issue.(CVE-2024-42245)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:wireguard: allowedips: avoid unaligned 64-bit memory accessesOn the parisc platform, the kernel issues kernel warnings becauseswap_endian() tries to load a 128-bit IPv6 address from an unalignedmemory location: Kernel: unaligned access to 0x55f4688c in wg_allowedips_insert_v6+0x2c/0x80 [wireguard] (iir 0xf3010df) Kernel: unaligned access to 0x55f46884 in wg_allowedips_insert_v6+0x38/0x80 [wireguard] (iir 0xf2010dc)Avoid such unaligned memory accesses by instead using theget_unaligned_be64() helper macro.[Jason: replace src[8] in original patch with src+8](CVE-2024-42247)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:f2fs: fix to don t dirty inode for readonly filesystemsyzbot reports f2fs bug as below:kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:933!RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1576/0x1590 fs/f2fs/inode.c:933Call Trace: evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664 dispose_list fs/inode.c:697 [inline] evict_inodes+0x5f8/0x690 fs/inode.c:747 generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2c0 fs/super.c:675 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667 kill_f2fs_super+0x303/0x3b0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4894 deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484 cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256 task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 ptrace_notify+0x2cd/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2399 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:411 [inline] ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:473 [inline] syscall_exit_work kernel/entry/common.c:251 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:278 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15c/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6bThe root cause is:- do_sys_open - f2fs_lookup  - __f2fs_find_entry   - f2fs_i_depth_write    - f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync     - f2fs_dirty_inode      - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)- umount - kill_f2fs_super  - kill_block_super   - generic_shutdown_super    - sync_filesystem    : sb is readonly, skip sync_filesystem()    - evict_inodes     - iput      - f2fs_evict_inode       - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE))       : trigger kernel panicWhen we try to repair i_current_depth in readonly filesystem, let sskip dirty inode to avoid panic in later f2fs_evict_inode().(CVE-2024-42297)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:vhost/scsi: null-ptr-dereference in vhost_scsi_get_req()Since commit 3f8ca2e115e5 ( vhost/scsi: Extract common handling codefrom control queue handler ) a null pointer dereference bug can betriggered when guest sends an SCSI AN request.In vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq(), `vc.target` is assigned with`\u0026amp;v_req.tmf.lun[1]` within a switch-case block and is then passed tovhost_scsi_get_req() which extracts `vc-\u0026gt;req` and `tpg`. However, fora `VIRTIO_SCSI_T_AN_*` request, tpg is not required, so `vc.target` isset to NULL in this branch. Later, in vhost_scsi_get_req(),`vc-\u0026gt;target` is dereferenced without being checked, leading to a nullpointer dereference bug. This bug can be triggered from guest.When this bug occurs, the vhost_worker process is killed while holding`vq-\u0026gt;mutex` and the corresponding tpg will remain occupiedindefinitely.Below is the KASAN report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 PID: 840 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014RIP: 0010:vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 0048 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 65 30 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; b604 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 be 01 00 00RSP: 0018:ffff888017affb50 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801b000000 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888017affcb8RBP: ffff888017affb80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000R13: ffff888017affc88 R14: ffff888017affd1c R15: ffff888017993000FS:  000055556e076500(0000) GS:ffff88806b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00000000200027c0 CR3: 0000000010ed0004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0Call Trace: \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt; ? show_regs+0x86/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x4b/0xd0 ? exc_general_protection+0x163/0x260 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x2a4/0xca0 ? __pfx_vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x721/0xeb0 ? __schedule+0xda5/0x5710 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x82/0xf0 vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_kick+0x52/0x90 vhost_run_work_list+0x134/0x1b0 vhost_task_fn+0x121/0x350... \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---Let s add a check in vhost_scsi_get_req.[whitespace fixes](CVE-2024-49863)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warningExt4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum erroroccurs, resulting in the following WARNING.Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.nfsd_buffered_readdir iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74  ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared   ext4_dx_readdir    ext4_htree_fill_tree     htree_dirblock_to_tree      ext4_read_dirblock       __ext4_read_dirblock        ext4_dirblock_csum_verify         warn_no_space_for_csum          __warn_no_space_for_csum        return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74 nfserrno // WARNING[  161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------[  161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74[  161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0[  161.118596] Modules linked in:[  161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138[  161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014[  161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0[  161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6 05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33[  161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286[  161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000[  161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a[  161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827[  161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021[  161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8[  161.135244] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000[  161.136695] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033[  161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0[  161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000[  161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400[  161.141519] PKRU: 55555554[  161.142076] Call Trace:[  161.142575]  ? __warn+0x9b/0x140[  161.143229]  ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0[  161.143872]  ? report_bug+0x125/0x150[  161.144595]  ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90[  161.145284]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70[  161.146009]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20[  161.146816]  ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0[  161.147487]  nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0[  161.148333]  ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380[  161.149258]  ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0[  161.150093]  ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170[  161.151004]  ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160[  161.151895]  nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190[  161.152606]  ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380[  161.153516]  ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380[  161.154256]  ? override_creds+0x45/0x60[  161.155006]  nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0[  161.155850]  ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210[  161.156731]  ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0[  161.157598]  ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0[  161.158494]  ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90[  161.159232]  ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10[  161.160092]  nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440[  161.160959]  nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90[  161.161818]  nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0[  161.162586]  svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50[  161.163403]  ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380[  161.164137]  ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160[  161.164846]  ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380[  161.165808]  ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380[  161.166523]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40[  161.167309]  svc_process+0x1a5/0x200[  161.168019]  nfsd+0x1f5/0x380[  161.168663]  ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260[  161.169554]  kthread+0x1c4/0x210[  161.170224]  ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80[  161.171246]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30(CVE-2024-49875)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:drm/amd/display: Fix index out of bounds in degamma hardware format translationFixes index out of bounds issue in`cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format` function. The issuecould occur when the index  i  exceeds the number of transfer functionpoints (TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS).The fix adds a check to ensure  i  is within bounds before accessing thetransfer function points. If  i  is out of bounds the function returnsfalse to indicate an error.Reported by smatch:drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:594 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow  output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.red  1025 \u0026lt;= s32maxdrivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:595 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow  output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.green  1025 \u0026lt;= s32maxdrivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:596 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow  output_tf-\u0026gt;tf_pts.blue  1025 \u0026lt;= s32max(CVE-2024-49894)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:drm/amd/display: Add null check for  afb  in amdgpu_dm_plane_handle_cursor_update (v2)This commit adds a null check for the  afb  variable in theamdgpu_dm_plane_handle_cursor_update function. Previously,  afb  wasassumed to be null, but was used later in the code without a null check.This could potentially lead to a null pointer dereference.Changes since v1:- Moved the null check for  afb  to the line where  afb  is used. (Alex)Fixes the below:drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_plane.c:1298 amdgpu_dm_plane_handle_cursor_update() error: we previously assumed  afb  could be null (see line 1252)(CVE-2024-49905)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:fbdev: efifb: Register sysfs groups through driver coreThe driver core can register and cleanup sysfs groups already.Make use of that functionality to simplify the error handling andcleanup.Also avoid a UAF race during unregistering where the sysctl attributeswere usable after the info struct was freed.(CVE-2024-49925)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:wifi: ath11k: fix array out-of-bound access in SoC statsCurrently, the ath11k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error array is defined with amaximum size of DP_REO_DST_RING_MAX. However, the ath11k_dp_process_rx()function access ath11k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error using the REOdestination SRNG ring ID, which is incorrect. SRNG ring ID differ fromnormal ring ID, and this usage leads to out-of-bounds array access. To fixthis issue, modify ath11k_dp_process_rx() to use the normal ring IDdirectly instead of the SRNG ring ID to avoid out-of-bounds array access.Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1(CVE-2024-49930)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ACPI: PAD: fix crash in exit_round_robin()The kernel occasionally crashes in cpumask_clear_cpu(), which is calledwithin exit_round_robin(), because when executing clear_bit(nr, addr) withnr set to 0xffffffff, the address calculation may cause misalignment withinthe memory, leading to access to an invalid memory address.----------BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffe0740618        ...CPU: 3 PID: 2919323 Comm: acpi_pad/14 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE  X --------- -  - 4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64 #1        ...RIP: 0010:power_saving_thread+0x313/0x411 [acpi_pad]Code: 89 cd 48 89 d3 eb d1 48 c7 c7 55 70 72 c0 e8 64 86 b0 e4 c6 05 0d a1 02 00 01 e9 bc fd ff ff 45 89 e4 42 8b 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 \u0026lt;f0\u0026gt; 48 0f b3 05 f4 9c 01 00 42 c7 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 ff ff ff ff 31RSP: 0018:ff72a5d51fa77ec8 EFLAGS: 00010202RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ff462981e5d8cb80 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246RBP: ff46297556959d80 R08: 0000000000000382 R09: ff46297c8d0f38d8R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000000eR13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 000000000000000eFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff46297a800c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: ffffffffe0740618 CR3: 0000007e20410004 CR4: 0000000000771ee0DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400PKRU: 55555554Call Trace: ? acpi_pad_add+0x120/0x120 [acpi_pad] kthread+0x10b/0x130 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40        ...CR2: ffffffffe0740618crash\u0026gt; dis -lr ffffffffc0726923        .../usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 1140xffffffffc0726918 \u0026lt;power_saving_thread+776\u0026gt;: mov    %r12d,%r12d/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 3250xffffffffc072691b \u0026lt;power_saving_thread+779\u0026gt;: mov    -0x3f8d7de0(,%r12,4),%eax/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h: 800xffffffffc0726923 \u0026lt;power_saving_thread+787\u0026gt;: lock btr %rax,0x19cf4(%rip)        # 0xffffffffc0740620 \u0026lt;pad_busy_cpus_bits\u0026gt;crash\u0026gt; px tsk_in_cpu[14]$66 = 0xffffffffcrash\u0026gt; px 0xffffffffc072692c+0x19cf4$99 = 0xffffffffc0740620crash\u0026gt; sym 0xffffffffc0740620ffffffffc0740620 (b) pad_busy_cpus_bits [acpi_pad]crash\u0026gt; px pad_busy_cpus_bits[0]$42 = 0xfffc0----------To fix this, ensure that tsk_in_cpu[tsk_index] != -1 before callingcpumask_clear_cpu() in exit_round_robin(), just as it is done inround_robin_cpu().[ rjw: Subject edit, avoid updates to the same value ](CVE-2024-49935)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assumingskb-\u0026gt;len is bigger than hdr_len.virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers,it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes.It is possible for an user to provide a malicious  GSO  packet,total length of 80 bytes.- 20 bytes of IPv4 header- 60 bytes TCP header- a small gso_size like 8virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normalGSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload,bigger than gso_size.We need to make detect this case to not underflowqdisc_skb_cb(skb)-\u0026gt;pkt_len.(CVE-2024-49948)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFOAfter commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ( net: be more gentle about silly gsorequests coming from user ) virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity checkto detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet.Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ( net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: counttransport header in UFO ) while fixing one issue, allowed user spaceto cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic :IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb-\u0026gt;len = 28.When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end upwith hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb-\u0026gt;lenThen the following sets gso_segs to 0 :gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb-\u0026gt;len - hdr_len,                        shinfo-\u0026gt;gso_size);Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)-\u0026gt;pkt_len to back to zero :/qdisc_skb_cb(skb)-\u0026gt;pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1]qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimationof the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel.This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following oneadds more sanity checks for another potential bug.[1][   70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000[   70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode[   70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page[   70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0[   70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI[   70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991[   70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014[   70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel[ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 \u0026lt;49\u0026gt; 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49All code========   0: 24 08                 and    $0x8,%al   2: 49 c1 e1 06           shl    $0x6,%r9   6: 44 89 7c 24 18        mov    %r15d,0x18(%rsp)   b: 45 31 ed              xor    %r13d,%r13d   e: 45 31 c0              xor    %r8d,%r8d  11: 31 ff                 xor    %edi,%edi  13: 89 44 24 14           mov    %eax,0x14(%rsp)  17: 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00  add    0x190(%rbx),%r9  1e: eb 04                 jmp    0x24  20: 39 ca                 cmp    %ecx,%edx  22: 73 37                 jae    0x5b  24: 4d 8b 39              mov    (%r9),%r15  27: 83 c7 01              add    $0x1,%edi  2a:* 49 8b 17              mov    (%r15),%rdx  \u0026lt;-- trapping instruction  2d: 49 89 11              mov    %rdx,(%r9)  30: 41 8b 57 28           mov    0x28(%r15),%edx  34: 45 8b 5f 34           mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d  38: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00  movq   $0x0,(%r15)  3f: 49                    rex.WBCode starting with the faulting instruction===========================================   0: 49 8b 17              mov    (%r15),%rdx   3: 49 89 11              mov    %rdx,(%r9)   6: 41 8b 57 28           mov    0x28(%r15),%edx   a: 45 8b 5f 34           mov    0x34(%r15),%r11d   e: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00  movq   $0x0,(%r15)  15: 49                    rex.WB[   70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202[   70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000[   70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001[   70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000[   70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58[   70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000[   70.724561] FS:  000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000[   70.724561] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 C---truncated---(CVE-2024-49949)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix uaf in l2cap_connect[Syzbot reported]BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect.constprop.0+0x10d8/0x1270 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3949Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880241e9800 by task kworker/u9:0/54CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00268-g788220eee30d #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_workCall Trace: \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt; __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 l2cap_connect.constprop.0+0x10d8/0x1270 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:3949 l2cap_connect_req net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4080 [inline] l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4772 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5543 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xf0b/0x8eb0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6825 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x9b4/0xb70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7514 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3791 [inline] hci_rx_work+0xaab/0x1610 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4028 process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1b40 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xed0 kernel/workqueue.c:3389 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244...Freed by task 5245: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object+0xf7/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:240 __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:256 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2256 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4477 [inline] kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4598 l2cap_conn_free net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1810 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] l2cap_conn_put net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1822 [inline] l2cap_conn_del+0x59d/0x730 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1802 l2cap_connect_cfm+0x9e6/0xf80 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7241 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1960 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x1c3/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1265 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x75a/0xb50 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5583 abort_conn_sync+0x197/0x360 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2917 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1a4/0x410 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:328 process_one_work+0x9c5/0x1b40 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xed0 kernel/workqueue.c:3389 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-49950)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ocfs2: fix null-ptr-deref when journal load failed.During the mounting process, if journal_reset() fails because of too shortjournal, then lead to jbd2_journal_load() fails with NULL j_sb_buffer. Subsequently, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() callsjbd2_journal_flush()-\u0026gt;jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail()-\u0026gt;__jbd2_update_log_tail()-\u0026gt;jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail()-\u0026gt;lock_buffer(journal-\u0026gt;j_sb_buffer), resulting in a null-pointerdereference error.To resolve this issue, we should check the JBD2_LOADED flag to ensure thejournal was properly loaded.  Additionally, use journal instead ofosb-\u0026gt;journal directly to simplify the code.(CVE-2024-49957)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ACPICA: check null return of ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED() in acpi_db_convert_to_package()ACPICA commit 4d4547cf13cca820ff7e0f859ba83e1a610b9fd0ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED() may fail, elements might be NULL and will causeNULL pointer dereference later.[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ](CVE-2024-49962)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:static_call: Handle module init failure correctly in static_call_del_module()Module insertion invokes static_call_add_module() to initialize the staticcalls in a module. static_call_add_module() invokes __static_call_init(),which allocates a struct static_call_mod to either encapsulate the built-instatic call sites of the associated key into it so further modules can beadded or to append the module to the module chain.If that allocation fails the function returns with an error code and themodule core invokes static_call_del_module() to clean up eventually addedstatic_call_mod entries.This works correctly, when all keys used by the module were converted overto a module chain before the failure. If not then static_call_del_module()causes a #GP as it blindly assumes that key::mods points to a valid structstatic_call_mod.The problem is that key::mods is not a individual struct member of structstatic_call_key, it s part of a union to save space:        union {                /* bit 0: 0 = mods, 1 = sites */                unsigned long type;                struct static_call_mod *mods;                struct static_call_site *sites; };key::sites is a pointer to the list of built-in usage sites of the staticcall. The type of the pointer is differentiated by bit 0. A mods pointerhas the bit clear, the sites pointer has the bit set.As static_call_del_module() blidly assumes that the pointer is a validstatic_call_mod type, it fails to check for this failure case anddereferences the pointer to the list of built-in call sites, which isobviously bogus.Cure it by checking whether the key has a sites or a mods pointer.If it s a sites pointer then the key is not to be touched. As the sites arewalked in the same order as in __static_call_init() the site walk can beterminated because all subsequent sites have not been touched by the initcode due to the error exit.If it was converted before the allocation fail, then the inner loop whichsearches for a module match will find nothing.A fail in the second allocation in __static_call_init() is harmless anddoes not require special treatment. The first allocation succeeded andconverted the key to a module chain. That first entry has mod::mod == NULLand mod::next == NULL, so the inner loop of static_call_del_module() willneither find a module match nor a module chain. The next site in the walkwas either already converted, but can t match the module, or it will exitthe outer loop because it has a static_call_site pointer and not astatic_call_mod pointer.(CVE-2024-50002)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mac802154: Fix potential RCU dereference issue in mac802154_scan_workerIn the `mac802154_scan_worker` function, the `scan_req-\u0026gt;type` field wasaccessed after the RCU read-side critical section was unlocked. Accordingto RCU usage rules, this is illegal and can lead to unpredictablebehavior, such as accessing memory that has been updated or causinguse-after-free issues.This possible bug was identified using a static analysis tool developedby myself, specifically designed to detect RCU-related issues.To address this, the `scan_req-\u0026gt;type` value is now stored in a localvariable `scan_req_type` while still within the RCU read-side criticalsection. The `scan_req_type` is then used after the RCU lock is released,ensuring that the type value is safely accessed without violating RCUrules.(CVE-2024-50005)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnilfs2: fix null-ptr-deref in block_touch_buffer tracepoint\n\nPatch series \u0026quot;nilfs2: fix null-ptr-deref bugs on block tracepoints\u0026quot;.\n\nThis series fixes null pointer dereference bugs that occur when using\nnilfs2 and two block-related tracepoints.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2):\n\nIt has been reported that when using \u0026quot;block:block_touch_buffer\u0026quot;\ntracepoint, touch_buffer() called from __nilfs_get_folio_block() causes a\nNULL pointer dereference, or a general protection fault when KASAN is\nenabled.\n\nThis happens because since the tracepoint was added in touch_buffer(), it\nreferences the dev_t member bh-\u0026gt;b_bdev-\u0026gt;bd_dev regardless of whether the\nbuffer head has a pointer to a block_device structure.  In the current\nimplementation, the block_device structure is set after the function\nreturns to the caller.\n\nHere, touch_buffer() is used to mark the folio/page that owns the buffer\nhead as accessed, but the common search helper for folio/page used by the\ncaller function was optimized to mark the folio/page as accessed when it\nwas reimplemented a long time ago, eliminating the need to call\ntouch_buffer() here in the first place.\n\nSo this solves the issue by eliminating the touch_buffer() call itself.(CVE-2024-53131)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:drm: adv7511: Fix use-after-free in adv7533_attach_dsi()The host_node pointer was assigned and freed in adv7533_parse_dt(), andlater, adv7533_attach_dsi() uses the same. Fix this use-after-free issueby\u00a0dropping of_node_put() in adv7533_parse_dt() and calling of_node_put()in error path of probe() and also in the remove().(CVE-2024-57887)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ila: serialize calls to nf_register_net_hooks()syzbot found a race in ila_add_mapping() [1]commit 031ae72825ce ( ila: call nf_unregister_net_hooks() sooner )attempted to fix a similar issue.Looking at the syzbot repro, we have concurrent ILA_CMD_ADD commands.Add a mutex to make sure at most one thread is calling nf_register_net_hooks().[1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028f40008 by task dhcpcd/5501CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5501 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024Call Trace: \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]  dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]  print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489  kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602  rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]  __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604  rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline]  rhashtable_lookup_fast include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 [inline]  ila_lookup_wildcards net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:127 [inline]  ila_xlat_addr net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:652 [inline]  ila_nf_input+0x1ee/0x620 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:185  nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]  nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:626  nf_hook.constprop.0+0x42e/0x750 include/linux/netfilter.h:269  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline]  ipv6_rcv+0xa4/0x680 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5672  __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:5785  process_backlog+0x443/0x15f0 net/core/dev.c:6117  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb7/0x550 net/core/dev.c:6883  napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6952 [inline]  net_rx_action+0xa94/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7074  handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:561  __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline]  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline]  __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:662  irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678  instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049(CVE-2024-57900)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call\n\nAdded a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`\nand `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only\nmounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.\n\nCall trace:\n txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154\n extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78\n jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248\n __block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128\n __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]\n block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236\n jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299(CVE-2024-58095)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb2_lock\n\nIf smb_lock-\u0026gt;zero_len has value, -\u0026gt;llist of smb_lock is not delete and\nflock is old one. It will cause use-after-free on error handling\nroutine.(CVE-2025-21945)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Fix slab-use-after-free on hdcp_work\n\n[Why]\nA slab-use-after-free is reported when HDCP is destroyed but the\nproperty_validate_dwork queue is still running.\n\n[How]\nCancel the delayed work when destroying workqueue.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 725a04ba5a95e89c89633d4322430cfbca7ce128)(CVE-2025-21968)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: xhci: Apply the link chain quirk on NEC isoc endpoints\n\nTwo clearly different specimens of NEC uPD720200 (one with start/stop\nbug, one without) were seen to cause IOMMU faults after some Missed\nService Errors. Faulting address is immediately after a transfer ring\nsegment and patched dynamic debug messages revealed that the MSE was\nreceived when waiting for a TD near the end of that segment:\n\n[ 1.041954] xhci_hcd: Miss service interval error for slot 1 ep 2 expected TD DMA ffa08fe0\n[ 1.042120] xhci_hcd: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0005 address=0xffa09000 flags=0x0000]\n[ 1.042146] xhci_hcd: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0005 address=0xffa09040 flags=0x0000]\n\nIt gets even funnier if the next page is a ring segment accessible to\nthe HC. Below, it reports MSE in segment at ff1e8000, plows through a\nzero-filled page at ff1e9000 and starts reporting events for TRBs in\npage at ff1ea000 every microframe, instead of jumping to seg ff1e6000.\n\n[ 7.041671] xhci_hcd: Miss service interval error for slot 1 ep 2 expected TD DMA ff1e8fe0\n[ 7.041999] xhci_hcd: Miss service interval error for slot 1 ep 2 expected TD DMA ff1e8fe0\n[ 7.042011] xhci_hcd: WARN: buffer overrun event for slot 1 ep 2 on endpoint\n[ 7.042028] xhci_hcd: All TDs skipped for slot 1 ep 2. Clear skip flag.\n[ 7.042134] xhci_hcd: WARN: buffer overrun event for slot 1 ep 2 on endpoint\n[ 7.042138] xhci_hcd: ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD ep_index 2 comp_code 31\n[ 7.042144] xhci_hcd: Looking for event-dma 00000000ff1ea040 trb-start 00000000ff1e6820 trb-end 00000000ff1e6820\n[ 7.042259] xhci_hcd: WARN: buffer overrun event for slot 1 ep 2 on endpoint\n[ 7.042262] xhci_hcd: ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD ep_index 2 comp_code 31\n[ 7.042266] xhci_hcd: Looking for event-dma 00000000ff1ea050 trb-start 00000000ff1e6820 trb-end 00000000ff1e6820\n\nAt some point completion events change from Isoch Buffer Overrun to\nShort Packet and the HC finally finds cycle bit mismatch in ff1ec000.\n\n[ 7.098130] xhci_hcd: ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD ep_index 2 comp_code 13\n[ 7.098132] xhci_hcd: Looking for event-dma 00000000ff1ecc50 trb-start 00000000ff1e6820 trb-end 00000000ff1e6820\n[ 7.098254] xhci_hcd: ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD ep_index 2 comp_code 13\n[ 7.098256] xhci_hcd: Looking for event-dma 00000000ff1ecc60 trb-start 00000000ff1e6820 trb-end 00000000ff1e6820\n[ 7.098379] xhci_hcd: Overrun event on slot 1 ep 2\n\nIt\u0026apos;s possible that data from the isochronous device were written to\nrandom buffers of pending TDs on other endpoints (either IN or OUT),\nother devices or even other HCs in the same IOMMU domain.\n\nLastly, an error from a different USB device on another HC. Was it\ncaused by the above? I don\u0026apos;t know, but it may have been. The disk\nwas working without any other issues and generated PCIe traffic to\nstarve the NEC of upstream BW and trigger those MSEs. The two HCs\nshared one x1 slot by means of a commercial \u0026quot;PCIe splitter\u0026quot; board.\n\n[ 7.162604] usb 10-2: reset SuperSpeed USB device number 3 using xhci_hcd\n[ 7.178990] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] tag#0 UNKNOWN(0x2003) Result: hostbyte=0x07 driverbyte=DRIVER_OK cmd_age=0s\n[ 7.179001] sd 9:0:0:0: [sdb] tag#0 CDB: opcode=0x28 28 00 04 02 ae 00 00 02 00 00\n[ 7.179004] I/O error, dev sdb, sector 67284480 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x80700 phys_seg 5 prio class 0\n\nFortunately, it appears that this ridiculous bug is avoided by setting\nthe chain bit of Link TRBs on isochronous rings. Other ancient HCs are\nknown which also expect the bit to be set and they ignore Link TRBs if\nit\u0026apos;s not. Reportedly, 0.95 spec guaranteed that the bit is set.\n\nThe bandwidth-starved NEC HC running a 32KB/uframe UVC endpoint reports\ntens of MSEs per second and runs into the bug within seconds. Chaining\nLink TRBs allows the same workload to run for many minutes, many times.\n\nNo ne\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-22022)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: put dl_stid if fail to queue dl_recall\n\nBefore calling nfsd4_run_cb to queue dl_recall to the callback_wq, we\nincrement the reference count of dl_stid.\nWe expect that after the corresponding work_struct is processed, the\nreference count of dl_stid will be decremented through the callback\nfunction nfsd4_cb_recall_release.\nHowever, if the call to nfsd4_run_cb fails, the incremented reference\ncount of dl_stid will not be decremented correspondingly, leading to the\nfollowing nfs4_stid leak:\nunreferenced object 0xffff88812067b578 (size 344):\n  comm \u0026quot;nfsd\u0026quot;, pid 2761, jiffies 4295044002 (age 5541.241s)\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b b8 02 c0 e2 81 88 ff ff  ....kkkk........\n    00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de  .kkkkkkk.....N..\n  backtrace:\n    kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700\n    nfsd4_process_open1+0x34/0x300\n    nfsd4_open+0x2d1/0x9d0\n    nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30\n    nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0\n    svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0\n    svc_process+0x2a3/0x320\n    nfsd+0x180/0x2e0\n    kthread+0x199/0x1d0\n    ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50\n    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\nunreferenced object 0xffff8881499f4d28 (size 368):\n  comm \u0026quot;nfsd\u0026quot;, pid 2761, jiffies 4295044005 (age 5541.239s)\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff  ........0M.I....\n    30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  0M.I.... .......\n  backtrace:\n    kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700\n    nfs4_alloc_stid+0x29/0x210\n    alloc_init_deleg+0x92/0x2e0\n    nfs4_set_delegation+0x284/0xc00\n    nfs4_open_delegation+0x216/0x3f0\n    nfsd4_process_open2+0x2b3/0xee0\n    nfsd4_open+0x770/0x9d0\n    nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30\n    nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0\n    svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0\n    svc_process+0x2a3/0x320\n    nfsd+0x180/0x2e0\n    kthread+0x199/0x1d0\n    ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50\n    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\nFix it by checking the result of nfsd4_run_cb and call nfs4_put_stid if\nfail to queue dl_recall.(CVE-2025-22025)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: don\u0026apos;t ignore the return code of svc_proc_register()\n\nCurrently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of\nsvc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel\nwill WARN when it tries to remove the entry later.\n\nFix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as\nsvc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail\nthe nfsd_net construction if it occurs.\n\nsvc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can\u0026apos;t be allocated, or if an\nidentical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in\nthe nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM.(CVE-2025-22026)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check\n\nThe dacloffset field was originally typed as int and used in an\nunchecked addition, which could overflow and bypass the existing\nbounds check in both smb_check_perm_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl().\n\nThis could result in out-of-bounds memory access and a kernel crash\nwhen dereferencing the DACL pointer.\n\nThis patch converts dacloffset to unsigned int and uses\ncheck_add_overflow() to validate access to the DACL.(CVE-2025-22039)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: add bounds check for create lease context\n\nAdd missing bounds check for create lease context.(CVE-2025-22042)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: add bounds check for durable handle context\n\nAdd missing bounds check for durable handle context.(CVE-2025-22043)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath11k: update channel list in reg notifier instead reg worker\n\nCurrently when ath11k gets a new channel list, it will be processed\naccording to the following steps:\n1. update new channel list to cfg80211 and queue reg_work.\n2. cfg80211 handles new channel list during reg_work.\n3. update cfg80211\u0026apos;s handled channel list to firmware by\nath11k_reg_update_chan_list().\n\nBut ath11k will immediately execute step 3 after reg_work is just\nqueued. Since step 2 is asynchronous, cfg80211 may not have completed\nhandling the new channel list, which may leading to an out-of-bounds\nwrite error:\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath11k_reg_update_chan_list\nCall Trace:\n    ath11k_reg_update_chan_list+0xbfe/0xfe0 [ath11k]\n    kfree+0x109/0x3a0\n    ath11k_regd_update+0x1cf/0x350 [ath11k]\n    ath11k_regd_update_work+0x14/0x20 [ath11k]\n    process_one_work+0xe35/0x14c0\n\nShould ensure step 2 is completely done before executing step 3. Thus\nWen raised patch[1]. When flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER is set,\ncfg80211 will notify ath11k after step 2 is done.\n\nSo enable the flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER then cfg80211 will\nnotify ath11k after step 2 is done. At this time, there will be no\nKASAN bug during the execution of the step 3.\n\n[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-wireless/patch/(CVE-2025-23133)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: uprobes: Add missing fence.i after building the XOL buffer\n\nThe XOL (execute out-of-line) buffer is used to single-step the\nreplaced instruction(s) for uprobes. The RISC-V port was missing a\nproper fence.i (i$ flushing) after constructing the XOL buffer, which\ncan result in incorrect execution of stale/broken instructions.\n\nThis was found running the BPF selftests \u0026quot;test_progs:\nuprobe_autoattach, attach_probe\u0026quot; on the Spacemit K1/X60, where the\nuprobes tests randomly blew up.(CVE-2025-37822)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: mpi3mr: Synchronous access b/w reset and tm thread for reply queue\n\nWhen the task management thread processes reply queues while the reset\nthread resets them, the task management thread accesses an invalid queue ID\n(0xFFFF), set by the reset thread, which points to unallocated memory,\ncausing a crash.\n\nAdd flag \u0026apos;io_admin_reset_sync\u0026apos; to synchronize access between the reset,\nI/O, and admin threads. Before a reset, the reset handler sets this flag to\nblock I/O and admin processing threads. If any thread bypasses the initial\ncheck, the reset thread waits up to 10 seconds for processing to finish. If\nthe wait exceeds 10 seconds, the controller is marked as unrecoverable.(CVE-2025-37861)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix use-after-free in session logoff\n\nThe sess-\u0026gt;user object can currently be in use by another thread, for\nexample if another connection has sent a session setup request to\nbind to the session being free\u0026apos;d. The handler for that connection could\nbe in the smb2_sess_setup function which makes use of sess-\u0026gt;user.(CVE-2025-37899)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: fix out-of-bounds access during multi-link element defragmentation\n\nCurrently during the multi-link element defragmentation process, the\nmulti-link element length added to the total IEs length when calculating\nthe length of remaining IEs after the multi-link element in\ncfg80211_defrag_mle(). This could lead to out-of-bounds access if the\nmulti-link element or its corresponding fragment elements are the last\nelements in the IEs buffer.\n\nTo address this issue, correctly calculate the remaining IEs length by\ndeducting the multi-link element end offset from total IEs end offset.(CVE-2025-37973)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: ucsi: displayport: Fix NULL pointer access\n\nThis patch ensures that the UCSI driver waits for all pending tasks in the\nucsi_displayport_work workqueue to finish executing before proceeding with\nthe partner removal.(CVE-2025-37994)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ipset: fix region locking in hash types\n\nRegion locking introduced in v5.6-rc4 contained three macros to handle\nthe region locks: ahash_bucket_start(), ahash_bucket_end() which gave\nback the start and end hash bucket values belonging to a given region\nlock and ahash_region() which should give back the region lock belonging\nto a given hash bucket. The latter was incorrect which can lead to a\nrace condition between the garbage collector and adding new elements\nwhen a hash type of set is defined with timeouts.(CVE-2025-37997)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: ti: k3-udma: Add missing locking\n\nRecent kernels complain about a missing lock in k3-udma.c when the lock\nvalidator is enabled:\n\n[    4.128073] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 746 at drivers/dma/ti/../virt-dma.h:169 udma_start.isra.0+0x34/0x238\n[    4.137352] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 746 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.12.9-arm64 #28\n[    4.144867] Hardware name: pp-v12 (DT)\n[    4.148648] Workqueue: events udma_check_tx_completion\n[    4.153841] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n[    4.160834] pc : udma_start.isra.0+0x34/0x238\n[    4.165227] lr : udma_start.isra.0+0x30/0x238\n[    4.169618] sp : ffffffc083cabcf0\n[    4.172963] x29: ffffffc083cabcf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff800001b005\n[    4.180167] x26: ffffffc0812f0000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000\n[    4.187370] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000e21eabe9 x21: ffffff8000fa0670\n[    4.194571] x20: ffffff8001b6bf00 x19: ffffff8000fa0430 x18: ffffffc083b95030\n[    4.201773] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 00000000f0000000 x15: 0000000000000048\n[    4.208976] x14: 0000000000000048 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001\n[    4.216179] x11: ffffffc08151a240 x10: 0000000000003ea1 x9 : ffffffc08046ab68\n[    4.223381] x8 : ffffffc083cabac0 x7 : ffffffc081df3718 x6 : 0000000000029fc8\n[    4.230583] x5 : ffffffc0817ee6d8 x4 : 0000000000000bc0 x3 : 0000000000000000\n[    4.237784] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 00000000001fffff x0 : 0000000000000000\n[    4.244986] Call trace:\n[    4.247463]  udma_start.isra.0+0x34/0x238\n[    4.251509]  udma_check_tx_completion+0xd0/0xdc\n[    4.256076]  process_one_work+0x244/0x3fc\n[    4.260129]  process_scheduled_works+0x6c/0x74\n[    4.264610]  worker_thread+0x150/0x1dc\n[    4.268398]  kthread+0xd8/0xe8\n[    4.271492]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n[    4.275107] irq event stamp: 220\n[    4.278363] hardirqs last  enabled at (219): [\u0026lt;ffffffc080a27c7c\u0026gt;] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x38/0x50\n[    4.287183] hardirqs last disabled at (220): [\u0026lt;ffffffc080a1c154\u0026gt;] el1_dbg+0x24/0x50\n[    4.294879] softirqs last  enabled at (182): [\u0026lt;ffffffc080037e68\u0026gt;] handle_softirqs+0x1c0/0x3cc\n[    4.303437] softirqs last disabled at (177): [\u0026lt;ffffffc080010170\u0026gt;] __do_softirq+0x1c/0x28\n[    4.311559] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nThis commit adds the missing locking.(CVE-2025-38005)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\n__legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock\n\n... or we risk stealing final mntput from sync umount - raising mnt_count\nafter umount(2) has verified that victim is not busy, but before it\nhas set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT; in that case __legitimize_mnt() doesn\u0026apos;t see\nthat it\u0026apos;s safe to quietly undo mnt_count increment and leaves dropping\nthe reference to caller, where it\u0026apos;ll be a full-blown mntput().\n\nCheck under mount_lock is needed; leaving the current one done before\ntaking that makes no sense - it\u0026apos;s nowhere near common enough to bother\nwith.(CVE-2025-38058)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/mm: Check return value from memblock_phys_alloc_range()\n\nAt least with CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START=0x100000, if there is \u0026lt; 4 MiB of\ncontiguous free memory available at this point, the kernel will crash\nand burn because memblock_phys_alloc_range() returns 0 on failure,\nwhich leads memblock_phys_free() to throw the first 4 MiB of physical\nmemory to the wolves.\n\nAt a minimum it should fail gracefully with a meaningful diagnostic,\nbut in fact everything seems to work fine without the weird reserve\nallocation.(CVE-2025-38071)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5: Fix ECVF vports unload on shutdown flow\n\nFix shutdown flow UAF when a virtual function is created on the embedded\nchip (ECVF) of a BlueField device. In such case the vport acl ingress\ntable is not properly destroyed.\n\nECVF functionality is independent of ecpf_vport_exists capability and\nthus functions mlx5_eswitch_(enable|disable)_pf_vf_vports() should not\ntest it when enabling/disabling ECVF vports.\n\nkernel log:\n[] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n[] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at lib/refcount.c:28\n   refcount_warn_saturate+0x124/0x220\n----------------\n[] Call trace:\n[] refcount_warn_saturate+0x124/0x220\n[] tree_put_node+0x164/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_destroy_flow_table+0x98/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]\n[] esw_acl_ingress_table_destroy+0x28/0x40 [mlx5_core]\n[] esw_acl_ingress_lgcy_cleanup+0x80/0xf4 [mlx5_core]\n[] esw_legacy_vport_acl_cleanup+0x44/0x60 [mlx5_core]\n[] esw_vport_cleanup+0x64/0x90 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_esw_vport_disable+0xc0/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_eswitch_unload_ec_vf_vports+0xcc/0x150 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_eswitch_disable_sriov+0x198/0x2a0 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_device_disable_sriov+0xb8/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_sriov_detach+0x40/0x50 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_unload+0x40/0xc4 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x6c/0xe4 [mlx5_core]\n[] mlx5_unload_one+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_core]\n[] shutdown+0x7c/0xa4 [mlx5_core]\n[] pci_device_shutdown+0x3c/0xa0\n[] device_shutdown+0x170/0x340\n[] __do_sys_reboot+0x1f4/0x2a0\n[] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x40\n[] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100\n[] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x54/0x184\n[] do_el0_svc+0x30/0xac\n[] el0_svc+0x48/0x160\n[] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c\n[] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8\n[] --[ end trace 9c4601d68c70030e ]---(CVE-2025-38109)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: Initialize ssc before laundromat_work to prevent NULL dereference\n\nIn nfs4_state_start_net(), laundromat_work may access nfsd_ssc through\nnfs4_laundromat -\u0026gt; nfsd4_ssc_expire_umount. If nfsd_ssc isn\u0026apos;t initialized,\nthis can cause NULL pointer dereference.\n\nNormally the delayed start of laundromat_work allows sufficient time for\nnfsd_ssc initialization to complete. However, when the kernel waits too\nlong for userspace responses (e.g. in nfs4_state_start_net -\u0026gt;\nnfsd4_end_grace -\u0026gt; nfsd4_record_grace_done -\u0026gt; nfsd4_cld_grace_done -\u0026gt;\ncld_pipe_upcall -\u0026gt; __cld_pipe_upcall -\u0026gt; wait_for_completion path), the\ndelayed work may start before nfsd_ssc initialization finishes.\n\nFix this by moving nfsd_ssc initialization before starting laundromat_work.(CVE-2025-38231)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkernfs: Relax constraint in draining guard\n\nThe active reference lifecycle provides the break/unbreak mechanism but\nthe active reference is not truly active after unbreak -- callers don\u0026apos;t\nuse it afterwards but it\u0026apos;s important for proper pairing of kn-\u0026gt;active\ncounting. Assuming this mechanism is in place, the WARN check in\nkernfs_should_drain_open_files() is too sensitive -- it may transiently\ncatch those (rightful) callers between\nkernfs_unbreak_active_protection() and kernfs_put_active() as found out by Chen\nRidong:\n\n\tkernfs_remove_by_name_ns\tkernfs_get_active // active=1\n\t__kernfs_remove\t\t\t\t\t  // active=0x80000002\n\tkernfs_drain\t\t\t...\n\twait_event\n\t//waiting (active == 0x80000001)\n\t\t\t\t\tkernfs_break_active_protection\n\t\t\t\t\t// active = 0x80000001\n\t// continue\n\t\t\t\t\tkernfs_unbreak_active_protection\n\t\t\t\t\t// active = 0x80000002\n\t...\n\tkernfs_should_drain_open_files\n\t// warning occurs\n\t\t\t\t\tkernfs_put_active\n\nTo avoid the false positives (mind panic_on_warn) remove the check altogether.\n(This is meant as quick fix, I think active reference break/unbreak may be\nsimplified with larger rework.)(CVE-2025-38282)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: Always pass notifications when child class becomes empty\n\nCertain classful qdiscs may invoke their classes\u0026apos; dequeue handler on an\nenqueue operation. This may unexpectedly empty the child qdisc and thus\nmake an in-flight class passive via qlen_notify(). Most qdiscs do not\nexpect such behaviour at this point in time and may re-activate the\nclass eventually anyways which will lead to a use-after-free.\n\nThe referenced fix commit attempted to fix this behavior for the HFSC\ncase by moving the backlog accounting around, though this turned out to\nbe incomplete since the parent\u0026apos;s parent may run into the issue too.\nThe following reproducer demonstrates this use-after-free:\n\n    tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: drr\n    tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1\n    tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 drr\n    tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: hfsc def 1\n    tc class add dev lo parent 2: classid 2:1 hfsc rt m1 8 d 1 m2 0\n    tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2:1 handle 3: netem\n    tc qdisc add dev lo parent 3:1 handle 4: blackhole\n\n    echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888\n    tc class delete dev lo classid 1:1\n    echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888\n\nSince backlog accounting issues leading to a use-after-frees on stale\nclass pointers is a recurring pattern at this point, this patch takes\na different approach. Instead of trying to fix the accounting, the patch\nensures that qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog always calls qlen_notify when\nthe child qdisc is empty. This solves the problem because deletion of\nqdiscs always involves a call to qdisc_reset() and / or\nqdisc_purge_queue() which ultimately resets its qlen to 0 thus causing\nthe following qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() to report to the parent. Note\nthat this may call qlen_notify on passive classes multiple times. This\nis not a problem after the recent patch series that made all the\nclassful qdiscs qlen_notify() handlers idempotent.(CVE-2025-38350)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Check dce_hwseq before dereferencing it\n\n[WHAT]\n\nhws was checked for null earlier in dce110_blank_stream, indicating hws\ncan be null, and should be checked whenever it is used.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 79db43611ff61280b6de58ce1305e0b2ecf675ad)(CVE-2025-38361)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnbd: fix uaf in nbd_genl_connect() error path\n\nThere is a use-after-free issue in nbd:\n\nblock nbd6: Receive control failed (result -104)\nblock nbd6: shutting down sockets\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022\nWrite of size 4 at addr ffff8880295de478 by task kworker/u33:0/67\n\nCPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00123-g2c89c1b655c0 #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: nbd6-recv recv_work\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]\n print_report+0xc3/0x670 mm/kasan/report.c:521\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634\n check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]\n kasan_check_range+0xef/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189\n instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline]\n atomic_dec include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:592 [inline]\n recv_work+0x694/0xa80 drivers/block/nbd.c:1022\n process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238\n process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]\n worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400\n kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464\n ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\nnbd_genl_connect() does not properly stop the device on certain\nerror paths after nbd_start_device() has been called. This causes\nthe error path to put nbd-\u0026gt;config while recv_work continue to use\nthe config after putting it, leading to use-after-free in recv_work.\n\nThis patch moves nbd_start_device() after the backend file creation.(CVE-2025-38443)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: Abort __tc_modify_qdisc if parent class does not exist\n\nLion\u0026apos;s patch [1] revealed an ancient bug in the qdisc API.\nWhenever a user creates/modifies a qdisc specifying as a parent another\nqdisc, the qdisc API will, during grafting, detect that the user is\nnot trying to attach to a class and reject. However grafting is\nperformed after qdisc_create (and thus the qdiscs\u0026apos; init callback) is\nexecuted. In qdiscs that eventually call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog\nduring init or change (such as fq, hhf, choke, etc), an issue\narises. For example, executing the following commands:\n\nsudo tc qdisc add dev lo root handle a: htb default 2\nsudo tc qdisc add dev lo parent a: handle beef fq\n\nQdiscs such as fq, hhf, choke, etc unconditionally invoke\nqdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() in their control path init() or change() which\nthen causes a failure to find the child class; however, that does not stop\nthe unconditional invocation of the assumed child qdisc\u0026apos;s qlen_notify with\na null class. All these qdiscs make the assumption that class is non-null.\n\nThe solution is ensure that qdisc_leaf() which looks up the parent\nclass, and is invoked prior to qdisc_create(), should return failure on\nnot finding the class.\nIn this patch, we leverage qdisc_leaf to return ERR_PTRs whenever the\nparentid doesn\u0026apos;t correspond to a class, so that we can detect it\nearlier on and abort before qdisc_create is called.\n\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/(CVE-2025-38457)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: vlan: fix VLAN 0 refcount imbalance of toggling filtering during runtime\n\nAssuming the \u0026quot;rx-vlan-filter\u0026quot; feature is enabled on a net device, the\n8021q module will automatically add or remove VLAN 0 when the net device\nis put administratively up or down, respectively. There are a couple of\nproblems with the above scheme.\n\nThe first problem is a memory leak that can happen if the \u0026quot;rx-vlan-filter\u0026quot;\nfeature is disabled while the device is running:\n\n # ip link add bond1 up type bond mode 0\n # ethtool -K bond1 rx-vlan-filter off\n # ip link del dev bond1\n\nWhen the device is put administratively down the \u0026quot;rx-vlan-filter\u0026quot;\nfeature is disabled, so the 8021q module will not remove VLAN 0 and the\nmemory will be leaked [1].\n\nAnother problem that can happen is that the kernel can automatically\ndelete VLAN 0 when the device is put administratively down despite not\nadding it when the device was put administratively up since during that\ntime the \u0026quot;rx-vlan-filter\u0026quot; feature was disabled. null-ptr-unref or\nbug_on[2] will be triggered by unregister_vlan_dev() for refcount\nimbalance if toggling filtering during runtime:\n\n$ ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0\n$ ip link add link bond0 name vlan0 type vlan id 0 protocol 802.1q\n$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter off\n$ ifconfig bond0 up\n$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter on\n$ ifconfig bond0 down\n$ ip link del vlan0\n\nRoot cause is as below:\nstep1: add vlan0 for real_dev, such as bond, team.\nregister_vlan_dev\n    vlan_vid_add(real_dev,htons(ETH_P_8021Q),0) //refcnt=1\nstep2: disable vlan filter feature and enable real_dev\nstep3: change filter from 0 to 1\nvlan_device_event\n    vlan_filter_push_vids\n        ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid //No refcnt added to real_dev vlan0\nstep4: real_dev down\nvlan_device_event\n    vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0); //refcnt=0\n        vlan_info_rcu_free //free vlan0\nstep5: delete vlan0\nunregister_vlan_dev\n    BUG_ON(!vlan_info); //vlan_info is null\n\nFix both problems by noting in the VLAN info whether VLAN 0 was\nautomatically added upon NETDEV_UP and based on that decide whether it\nshould be deleted upon NETDEV_DOWN, regardless of the state of the\n\u0026quot;rx-vlan-filter\u0026quot; feature.\n\n[1]\nunreferenced object 0xffff8880068e3100 (size 256):\n  comm \u0026quot;ip\u0026quot;, pid 384, jiffies 4296130254\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    00 20 30 0d 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  . 0.............\n    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................\n  backtrace (crc 81ce31fa):\n    __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2b5/0x340\n    vlan_vid_add+0x434/0x940\n    vlan_device_event.cold+0x75/0xa8\n    notifier_call_chain+0xca/0x150\n    __dev_notify_flags+0xe3/0x250\n    rtnl_configure_link+0x193/0x260\n    rtnl_newlink_create+0x383/0x8e0\n    __rtnl_newlink+0x22c/0xa40\n    rtnl_newlink+0x627/0xb00\n    rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fb/0xb70\n    netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350\n    netlink_unicast+0x426/0x710\n    netlink_sendmsg+0x75a/0xc20\n    __sock_sendmsg+0xc1/0x150\n    ____sys_sendmsg+0x5aa/0x7b0\n    ___sys_sendmsg+0xfc/0x180\n\n[2]\nkernel BUG at net/8021q/vlan.c:99!\nOops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 382 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #61 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),\nBIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:unregister_vlan_dev (net/8021q/vlan.c:99 (discriminator 1))\nRSP: 0018:ffff88810badf310 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810da84000 RCX: ffffffffb47ceb9a\nRDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88810e8b43c8\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6cefe80\nR10: ffffffffb677f407 R11: ffff88810badf3c0 R12: ffff88810e8b4000\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810642a5c0 R15: 000000000000017e\nFS:  00007f1ff68c20c0(0000) GS:ffff888163a24000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f1ff5dad240 CR3: 0000000107e56000 CR4: 00000000000006f0\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-38470)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: sch_qfq: Fix race condition on qfq_aggregate\n\nA race condition can occur when \u0026apos;agg\u0026apos; is modified in qfq_change_agg\n(called during qfq_enqueue) while other threads access it\nconcurrently. For example, qfq_dump_class may trigger a NULL\ndereference, and qfq_delete_class may cause a use-after-free.\n\nThis patch addresses the issue by:\n\n1. Moved qfq_destroy_class into the critical section.\n\n2. Added sch_tree_lock protection to qfq_dump_class and\nqfq_dump_class_stats.(CVE-2025-38477)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_oplock_break\n\nA race condition can occur in cifs_oplock_break() leading to a\nuse-after-free of the cinode structure when unmounting:\n\n  cifs_oplock_break()\n    _cifsFileInfo_put(cfile)\n      cifsFileInfo_put_final()\n        cifs_sb_deactive()\n          [last ref, start releasing sb]\n            kill_sb()\n              kill_anon_super()\n                generic_shutdown_super()\n                  evict_inodes()\n                    dispose_list()\n                      evict()\n                        destroy_inode()\n                          call_rcu(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_rcu, i_callback)\n    spin_lock(\u0026amp;cinode-\u0026gt;open_file_lock)  \u0026lt;- OK\n                            [later] i_callback()\n                              cifs_free_inode()\n                                kmem_cache_free(cinode)\n    spin_unlock(\u0026amp;cinode-\u0026gt;open_file_lock)  \u0026lt;- UAF\n    cifs_done_oplock_break(cinode)       \u0026lt;- UAF\n\nThe issue occurs when umount has already released its reference to the\nsuperblock. When _cifsFileInfo_put() calls cifs_sb_deactive(), this\nreleases the last reference, triggering the immediate cleanup of all\ninodes under RCU. However, cifs_oplock_break() continues to access the\ncinode after this point, resulting in use-after-free.\n\nFix this by holding an extra reference to the superblock during the\nentire oplock break operation. This ensures that the superblock and\nits inodes remain valid until the oplock break completes.(CVE-2025-38527)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts\n\nScott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in\ntls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from\nthe msg iterator\u0026apos;s kvec..\n\nkTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between\nthe control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS\naler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS\nalert\u0026apos;s level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer.\n\nThis patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and\nused by sock_recvmsg().\n\nIf no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and\nprocess TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control\nmessage, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a\nkvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a\nTLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of\nthe copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling\ninto the tls_alert_recv.(CVE-2025-38566)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: prevent infinite loop in rt6_nlmsg_size()\n\nWhile testing prior patch, I was able to trigger\nan infinite loop in rt6_nlmsg_size() in the following place:\n\nlist_for_each_entry_rcu(sibling, \u0026amp;f6i-\u0026gt;fib6_siblings,\n\t\t\tfib6_siblings) {\n\trt6_nh_nlmsg_size(sibling-\u0026gt;fib6_nh, \u0026amp;nexthop_len);\n}\n\nThis is because fib6_del_route() and fib6_add_rt2node()\nuses list_del_rcu(), which can confuse rcu readers,\nbecause they might no longer see the head of the list.\n\nRestart the loop if f6i-\u0026gt;fib6_nsiblings is zero.(CVE-2025-38588)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\neventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion\n\nEnsure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than\nEP_MAX_NESTS+1 links.\n\nCurrently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and\ndoes some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don\u0026apos;t\nlimit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons:\n\n - They don\u0026apos;t look upwards in the tree.\n - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of\n   the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit\n   28d82dc1c4ed (\u0026quot;epoll: limit paths\u0026quot;).\n\nEssentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just\nserves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops.\n\nA more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph\nedge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no\npaths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5\nedges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files.\n\nAs a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500,\ntested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may\nhave changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 (\u0026quot;eventpoll: Fix priority inversion\nproblem\u0026quot;).)\n\nTo fix it:\n\n1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node,\nand use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree\nhas already been visited.\n2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum\ndepth of an upwards walk.\n3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length\nbetween epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges.(CVE-2025-38614)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: fix a race in packet_set_ring() and packet_notifier()\n\nWhen packet_set_ring() releases po-\u0026gt;bind_lock, another thread can\nrun packet_notifier() and process an NETDEV_UP event.\n\nThis race and the fix are both similar to that of commit 15fe076edea7\n(\u0026quot;net/packet: fix a race in packet_bind() and packet_notifier()\u0026quot;).\n\nThere too the packet_notifier NETDEV_UP event managed to run while a\npo-\u0026gt;bind_lock critical section had to be temporarily released. And\nthe fix was similarly to temporarily set po-\u0026gt;num to zero to keep\nthe socket unhooked until the lock is retaken.\n\nThe po-\u0026gt;bind_lock in packet_set_ring and packet_notifier precede the\nintroduction of git history.(CVE-2025-38617)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrv: Use strings in da monitors tracepoints\n\nUsing DA monitors tracepoints with KASAN enabled triggers the following\nwarning:\n\n BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in do_trace_event_raw_event_event_da_monitor+0xd6/0x1a0\n Read of size 32 at addr ffffffffaada8980 by task ...\n Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n [...]\n  do_trace_event_raw_event_event_da_monitor+0xd6/0x1a0\n  ? __pfx_do_trace_event_raw_event_event_da_monitor+0x10/0x10\n  ? trace_event_sncid+0x83/0x200\n  trace_event_sncid+0x163/0x200\n [...]\n The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n  automaton_snep+0x4e0/0x5e0\n\nThis is caused by the tracepoints reading 32 bytes __array instead of\n__string from the automata definition. Such strings are literals and\nreading 32 bytes ends up in out of bound memory accesses (e.g. the next\nautomaton\u0026apos;s data in this case).\nThe error is harmless as, while printing the string, we stop at the null\nterminator, but it should still be fixed.\n\nUse the __string facilities while defining the tracepoints to avoid\nreading out of bound memory.(CVE-2025-38636)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: Fix a null pointer dereference in ice_copy_and_init_pkg()\n\nAdd check for the return value of devm_kmemdup()\nto prevent potential null pointer dereference.(CVE-2025-38664)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: core: Check for rtd == NULL in snd_soc_remove_pcm_runtime()\n\nsnd_soc_remove_pcm_runtime() might be called with rtd == NULL which will\nleads to null pointer dereference.\nThis was reproduced with topology loading and marking a link as ignore\ndue to missing hardware component on the system.\nOn module removal the soc_tplg_remove_link() would call\nsnd_soc_remove_pcm_runtime() with rtd == NULL since the link was ignored,\nno runtime was created.(CVE-2025-38706)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetlink: avoid infinite retry looping in netlink_unicast()\n\nnetlink_attachskb() checks for the socket\u0026apos;s read memory allocation\nconstraints. Firstly, it has:\n\n  rmem \u0026lt; READ_ONCE(sk-\u0026gt;sk_rcvbuf)\n\nto check if the just increased rmem value fits into the socket\u0026apos;s receive\nbuffer. If not, it proceeds and tries to wait for the memory under:\n\n  rmem + skb-\u0026gt;truesize \u0026gt; READ_ONCE(sk-\u0026gt;sk_rcvbuf)\n\nThe checks don\u0026apos;t cover the case when skb-\u0026gt;truesize + sk-\u0026gt;sk_rmem_alloc is\nequal to sk-\u0026gt;sk_rcvbuf. Thus the function neither successfully accepts\nthese conditions, nor manages to reschedule the task - and is called in\nretry loop for indefinite time which is caught as:\n\n  rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU\n  rcu:     0-....: (25999 ticks this GP) idle=ef2/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=262269/262269 fqs=6212\n  (t=26000 jiffies g=230833 q=259957)\n  NMI backtrace for cpu 0\n  CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kauditd Not tainted 5.10.240 #68\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc42 04/01/2014\n  Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n  dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:120\n  nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold lib/nmi_backtrace.c:105\n  nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62\n  rcu_dump_cpu_stacks kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:335\n  rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold kernel/rcu/tree.c:2590\n  update_process_times kernel/time/timer.c:1953\n  tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:227\n  tick_sched_timer kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1399\n  __hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1652\n  hrtimer_interrupt kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1717\n  __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1113\n  asm_call_irq_on_stack arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:808\n  \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n\n  netlink_attachskb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1234\n  netlink_unicast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1349\n  kauditd_send_queue kernel/audit.c:776\n  kauditd_thread kernel/audit.c:897\n  kthread kernel/kthread.c:328\n  ret_from_fork arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\nRestore the original behavior of the check which commit in Fixes\naccidentally missed when restructuring the code.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).(CVE-2025-38727)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: Add null pointer check in mod_hdcp_hdcp1_create_session()\n\nThe function mod_hdcp_hdcp1_create_session() calls the function\nget_first_active_display(), but does not check its return value.\nThe return value is a null pointer if the display list is empty.\nThis will lead to a null pointer dereference.\n\nAdd a null pointer check for get_first_active_display() and return\nMOD_HDCP_STATUS_DISPLAY_NOT_FOUND if the function return null.\n\nThis is similar to the commit c3e9826a2202\n(\u0026quot;drm/amd/display: Add null pointer check for get_first_active_display()\u0026quot;).\n\n(cherry picked from commit 5e43eb3cd731649c4f8b9134f857be62a416c893)(CVE-2025-39675)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: Fix backlog accounting in qdisc_dequeue_internal\n\nThis issue applies for the following qdiscs: hhf, fq, fq_codel, and\nfq_pie, and occurs in their change handlers when adjusting to the new\nlimit. The problem is the following in the values passed to the\nsubsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call given a tbf parent:\n\n   When the tbf parent runs out of tokens, skbs of these qdiscs will\n   be placed in gso_skb. Their peek handlers are qdisc_peek_dequeued,\n   which accounts for both qlen and backlog. However, in the case of\n   qdisc_dequeue_internal, ONLY qlen is accounted for when pulling\n   from gso_skb. This means that these qdiscs are missing a\n   qdisc_qstats_backlog_dec when dropping packets to satisfy the\n   new limit in their change handlers.\n\n   One can observe this issue with the following (with tc patched to\n   support a limit of 0):\n\n   export TARGET=fq\n   tc qdisc del dev lo root\n   tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: tbf rate 8bit burst 100b latency 1ms\n   tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 1000\n   echo \u0026apos;\u0026apos;; echo \u0026apos;add child\u0026apos;; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo\n   ping -I lo -f -c2 -s32 -W0.001 127.0.0.1 2\u0026gt;\u0026amp;1 \u0026gt;/dev/null\n   echo \u0026apos;\u0026apos;; echo \u0026apos;after ping\u0026apos;; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo\n   tc qdisc change dev lo handle 3: parent 1:1 $TARGET limit 0\n   echo \u0026apos;\u0026apos;; echo \u0026apos;after limit drop\u0026apos;; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo\n   tc qdisc replace dev lo handle 2: parent 1:1 sfq\n   echo \u0026apos;\u0026apos;; echo \u0026apos;post graft\u0026apos;; tc -s -d qdisc show dev lo\n\n   The second to last show command shows 0 packets but a positive\n   number (74) of backlog bytes. The problem becomes clearer in the\n   last show command, where qdisc_purge_queue triggers\n   qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog with the positive backlog and causes an\n   underflow in the tbf parent\u0026apos;s backlog (4096 Mb instead of 0).\n\nTo fix this issue, the codepath for all clients of qdisc_dequeue_internal\nhas been simplified: codel, pie, hhf, fq, fq_pie, and fq_codel.\nqdisc_dequeue_internal handles the backlog adjustments for all cases that\ndo not directly use the dequeue handler.\n\nThe old fq_codel_change limit adjustment loop accumulated the arguments to\nthe subsequent qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog call through the cstats field.\nHowever, this is confusing and error prone as fq_codel_dequeue could also\npotentially mutate this field (which qdisc_dequeue_internal calls in the\nnon gso_skb case), so we have unified the code here with other qdiscs.(CVE-2025-39677)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncomedi: Fix use of uninitialized memory in do_insn_ioctl() and do_insnlist_ioctl()\n\nsyzbot reports a KMSAN kernel-infoleak in `do_insn_ioctl()`.  A kernel\nbuffer is allocated to hold `insn-\u0026gt;n` samples (each of which is an\n`unsigned int`).  For some instruction types, `insn-\u0026gt;n` samples are\ncopied back to user-space, unless an error code is being returned.  The\nproblem is that not all the instruction handlers that need to return\ndata to userspace fill in the whole `insn-\u0026gt;n` samples, so that there is\nan information leak.  There is a similar syzbot report for\n`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, although it does not have a reproducer for it at\nthe time of writing.\n\nOne culprit is `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` which is used as the handler for\n`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that do not have\na specific handler for that instruction, but do have an `INSN_BITS`\nhandler.  For `INSN_READ` it only fills in at most 1 sample, so if\n`insn-\u0026gt;n` is greater than 1, the remaining `insn-\u0026gt;n - 1` samples copied\nto userspace will be uninitialized kernel data.\n\nAnother culprit is `vm80xx_ai_insn_read()` in the \u0026quot;vm80xx\u0026quot; driver.  It\nnever returns an error, even if it fails to fill the buffer.\n\nFix it in `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` by making sure\nthat uninitialized parts of the allocated buffer are zeroed before\nhandling each instruction.\n\nThanks to Arnaud Lecomte for their fix to `do_insn_ioctl()`.  That fix\nreplaced the call to `kmalloc_array()` with `kcalloc()`, but it is not\nalways necessary to clear the whole buffer.(CVE-2025-39684)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: Fix a race when updating an existing write\n\nAfter nfs_lock_and_join_requests() tests for whether the request is\nstill attached to the mapping, nothing prevents a call to\nnfs_inode_remove_request() from succeeding until we actually lock the\npage group.\nThe reason is that whoever called nfs_inode_remove_request() doesn\u0026apos;t\nnecessarily have a lock on the page group head.\n\nSo in order to avoid races, let\u0026apos;s take the page group lock earlier in\nnfs_lock_and_join_requests(), and hold it across the removal of the\nrequest in nfs_inode_remove_request().(CVE-2025-39697)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbnxt_en: Fix memory corruption when FW resources change during ifdown\n\nbnxt_set_dflt_rings() assumes that it is always called before any TC has\nbeen created.  So it doesn\u0026apos;t take bp-\u0026gt;num_tc into account and assumes\nthat it is always 0 or 1.\n\nIn the FW resource or capability change scenario, the FW will return\nflags in bnxt_hwrm_if_change() that will cause the driver to\nreinitialize and call bnxt_cancel_reservations().  This will lead to\nbnxt_init_dflt_ring_mode() calling bnxt_set_dflt_rings() and bp-\u0026gt;num_tc\nmay be greater than 1.  This will cause bp-\u0026gt;tx_ring[] to be sized too\nsmall and cause memory corruption in bnxt_alloc_cp_rings().\n\nFix it by properly scaling the TX rings by bp-\u0026gt;num_tc in the code\npaths mentioned above.  Add 2 helper functions to determine\nbp-\u0026gt;tx_nr_rings and bp-\u0026gt;tx_nr_rings_per_tc.(CVE-2025-39810)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nefivarfs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in efivarfs_d_compare\n\nObserved on kernel 6.6 (present on master as well):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x98/0xd0\n  Call trace:\n   kasan_check_range+0xe8/0x190\n   __asan_loadN+0x1c/0x28\n   memcmp+0x98/0xd0\n   efivarfs_d_compare+0x68/0xd8\n   __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare+0x178/0x218\n   __d_lookup_rcu+0x1f8/0x228\n   d_alloc_parallel+0x150/0x648\n   lookup_open.isra.0+0x5f0/0x8d0\n   open_last_lookups+0x264/0x828\n   path_openat+0x130/0x3f8\n   do_filp_open+0x114/0x248\n   do_sys_openat2+0x340/0x3c0\n   __arm64_sys_openat+0x120/0x1a0\n\nIf dentry-\u0026gt;d_name.len \u0026lt; EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN , \u0026apos;guid\u0026apos; can become\nnegative, leadings to oob. The issue can be triggered by parallel\nlookups using invalid filename:\n\n  T1\t\t\tT2\n  lookup_open\n   -\u0026gt;lookup\n    simple_lookup\n     d_add\n     // invalid dentry is added to hash list\n\n\t\t\tlookup_open\n\t\t\t d_alloc_parallel\n\t\t\t  __d_lookup_rcu\n\t\t\t   __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare\n\t\t\t    hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu\n\t\t\t    // invalid dentry can be retrieved\n\t\t\t     -\u0026gt;d_compare\n\t\t\t      efivarfs_d_compare\n\t\t\t      // oob\n\nFix it by checking \u0026apos;guid\u0026apos; before cmp.(CVE-2025-39817)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix race with concurrent opens in rename(2)\n\nBesides sending the rename request to the server, the rename process\nalso involves closing any deferred close, waiting for outstanding I/O\nto complete as well as marking all existing open handles as deleted to\nprevent them from deferring closes, which increases the race window\nfor potential concurrent opens on the target file.\n\nFix this by unhashing the dentry in advance to prevent any concurrent\nopens on the target.(CVE-2025-39825)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty()\n\nAn use-after-free issue occurred when __mark_inode_dirty() get the\nbdi_writeback that was in the progress of switching.\n\nCPU: 1 PID: 562 Comm: systemd-random- Not tainted 6.6.56-gb4403bd46a8e #1\n......\npstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418\nlr : __mark_inode_dirty+0x118/0x418\nsp : ffffffc08c9dbbc0\n........\nCall trace:\n __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418\n generic_update_time+0x4c/0x60\n file_modified+0xcc/0xd0\n ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x58/0x124\n ext4_file_write_iter+0x54/0x704\n vfs_write+0x1c0/0x308\n ksys_write+0x74/0x10c\n __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28\n invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0\n do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28\n el0_svc+0x40/0xe4\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c\n el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198\n\nRoot cause is:\n\nsystemd-random-seed                         kworker\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n___mark_inode_dirty                     inode_switch_wbs_work_fn\n\n  spin_lock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock);\n  inode_attach_wb\n  locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list\n     get inode-\u0026gt;i_wb\n     spin_unlock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock);\n     spin_lock(\u0026amp;wb-\u0026gt;list_lock)\n  spin_lock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock)\n  inode_io_list_move_locked\n  spin_unlock(\u0026amp;wb-\u0026gt;list_lock)\n  spin_unlock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock)\n                                    spin_lock(\u0026amp;old_wb-\u0026gt;list_lock)\n                                      inode_do_switch_wbs\n                                        spin_lock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock)\n                                        inode-\u0026gt;i_wb = new_wb\n                                        spin_unlock(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;i_lock)\n                                    spin_unlock(\u0026amp;old_wb-\u0026gt;list_lock)\n                                    wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched)\n                                      cgwb_release\n                                      old wb released\n  wb_wakeup_delayed() accesses wb,\n  then trigger the use-after-free\n  issue\n\nFix this race condition by holding inode spinlock until\nwb_wakeup_delayed() finished.(CVE-2025-39866)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkernfs: Fix UAF in polling when open file is released\n\nA use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability was identified in the PSI (Pressure\nStall Information) monitoring mechanism:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in psi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff3de3d50bd308 by task systemd/1\n\npsi_trigger_poll+0x3c/0x140\ncgroup_pressure_poll+0x70/0xa0\ncgroup_file_poll+0x8c/0x100\nkernfs_fop_poll+0x11c/0x1c0\nep_item_poll.isra.0+0x188/0x2c0\n\nAllocated by task 1:\ncgroup_file_open+0x88/0x388\nkernfs_fop_open+0x73c/0xaf0\ndo_dentry_open+0x5fc/0x1200\nvfs_open+0xa0/0x3f0\ndo_open+0x7e8/0xd08\npath_openat+0x2fc/0x6b0\ndo_filp_open+0x174/0x368\n\nFreed by task 8462:\ncgroup_file_release+0x130/0x1f8\nkernfs_drain_open_files+0x17c/0x440\nkernfs_drain+0x2dc/0x360\nkernfs_show+0x1b8/0x288\ncgroup_file_show+0x150/0x268\ncgroup_pressure_write+0x1dc/0x340\ncgroup_file_write+0x274/0x548\n\nReproduction Steps:\n1. Open test/cpu.pressure and establish epoll monitoring\n2. Disable monitoring: echo 0 \u0026gt; test/cgroup.pressure\n3. Re-enable monitoring: echo 1 \u0026gt; test/cgroup.pressure\n\nThe race condition occurs because:\n1. When cgroup.pressure is disabled (echo 0 \u0026gt; cgroup.pressure), it:\n   - Releases PSI triggers via cgroup_file_release()\n   - Frees of-\u0026gt;priv through kernfs_drain_open_files()\n2. While epoll still holds reference to the file and continues polling\n3. Re-enabling (echo 1 \u0026gt; cgroup.pressure) accesses freed of-\u0026gt;priv\n\nepolling\t\t\tdisable/enable cgroup.pressure\nfd=open(cpu.pressure)\nwhile(1)\n...\nepoll_wait\nkernfs_fop_poll\nkernfs_get_active = true\techo 0 \u0026gt; cgroup.pressure\n...\t\t\t\tcgroup_file_show\n\t\t\t\tkernfs_show\n\t\t\t\t// inactive kn\n\t\t\t\tkernfs_drain_open_files\n\t\t\t\tcft-\u0026gt;release(of);\n\t\t\t\tkfree(ctx);\n\t\t\t\t...\nkernfs_get_active = false\n\t\t\t\techo 1 \u0026gt; cgroup.pressure\n\t\t\t\tkernfs_show\n\t\t\t\tkernfs_activate_one(kn);\nkernfs_fop_poll\nkernfs_get_active = true\ncgroup_file_poll\npsi_trigger_poll\n// UAF\n...\nend: close(fd)\n\nTo address this issue, introduce kernfs_get_active_of() for kernfs open\nfiles to obtain active references. This function will fail if the open file\nhas been released. Replace kernfs_get_active() with kernfs_get_active_of()\nto prevent further operations on released file descriptors.(CVE-2025-39881)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni40e: fix IRQ freeing in i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix error path\n\nIf request_irq() in i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix() fails in an iteration\nlater than the first, the error path wants to free the IRQs requested\nso far. However, it uses the wrong dev_id argument for free_irq(), so\nit does not free the IRQs correctly and instead triggers the warning:\n\n Trying to free already-free IRQ 173\n WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 1091 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1829 __free_irq+0x192/0x2c0\n Modules linked in: i40e(+) [...]\n CPU: 25 UID: 0 PID: 1091 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Hardware name: [...]\n RIP: 0010:__free_irq+0x192/0x2c0\n [...]\n Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  free_irq+0x32/0x70\n  i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix.cold+0x63/0x8b [i40e]\n  i40e_vsi_request_irq+0x79/0x80 [i40e]\n  i40e_vsi_open+0x21f/0x2f0 [i40e]\n  i40e_open+0x63/0x130 [i40e]\n  __dev_open+0xfc/0x210\n  __dev_change_flags+0x1fc/0x240\n  netif_change_flags+0x27/0x70\n  do_setlink.isra.0+0x341/0xc70\n  rtnl_newlink+0x468/0x860\n  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x375/0x450\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x110\n  netlink_unicast+0x288/0x3c0\n  netlink_sendmsg+0x20d/0x430\n  ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a2/0x3d0\n  ___sys_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0\n  __sys_sendmsg+0x8a/0xf0\n  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x2c0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n  [...]\n  \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nUse the same dev_id for free_irq() as for request_irq().\n\nI tested this with inserting code to fail intentionally.(CVE-2025-39911)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Harden uplink netdev access against device unbind\n\nThe function mlx5_uplink_netdev_get() gets the uplink netdevice\npointer from mdev-\u0026gt;mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev. However, the netdevice can\nbe removed and its pointer cleared when unbound from the mlx5_core.eth\ndriver. This results in a NULL pointer, causing a kernel panic.\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001300\n at RIP: 0010:mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x22a/0x270 [mlx5_core]\n Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x68/0xe0 [mlx5_core]\n  esw_offloads_enable+0x593/0x910 [mlx5_core]\n  mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x341/0x420 [mlx5_core]\n  mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x17e/0x3a0 [mlx5_core]\n  devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x60/0xd0\n  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130\n  genl_rcv_msg+0x183/0x290\n  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4b/0xf0\n  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40\n  netlink_unicast+0x255/0x380\n  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x420\n  __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60\n  __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180\n  do_syscall_64+0x53/0x1d0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\nEnsure the pointer is valid before use by checking it for NULL. If it\nis valid, immediately call netdev_hold() to take a reference, and\npreventing the netdevice from being freed while it is in use.(CVE-2025-39947)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: tuner: xc5000: Fix use-after-free in xc5000_release\n\nThe original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in xc5000_release(), which\ndoes not guarantee that the delayed work item timer_sleep has fully\ncompleted if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios\nwhere xc5000_release() may free the xc5000_priv while timer_sleep is still\nactive and attempts to dereference the xc5000_priv.\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 (release thread)                 | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)\nxc5000_release()                       | xc5000_do_timer_sleep()\n  cancel_delayed_work()                |\n  hybrid_tuner_release_state(priv)     |\n    kfree(priv)                        |\n                                       |   priv = container_of() // UAF\n\nReplace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure\nthat the timer_sleep is properly canceled before the xc5000_priv memory\nis deallocated.\n\nA deadlock concern was considered: xc5000_release() is called in a process\ncontext and is not holding any locks that the timer_sleep work item might\nalso need. Therefore, the use of the _sync() variant is safe here.\n\nThis bug was initially identified through static analysis.\n\n[hverkuil: fix typo in Subject: tunner -\u0026gt; tuner](CVE-2025-39994)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: b2c2: Fix use-after-free causing by irq_check_work in flexcop_pci_remove\n\nThe original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in flexcop_pci_remove(), which\ndoes not guarantee that the delayed work item irq_check_work has fully\ncompleted if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios\nwhere flexcop_pci_remove() may free the flexcop_device while irq_check_work\nis still active and attempts to dereference the device.\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 (remove)                         | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)\nflexcop_pci_remove()                   | flexcop_pci_irq_check_work()\n  cancel_delayed_work()                |\n  flexcop_device_kfree(fc_pci-\u0026gt;fc_dev) |\n                                       |   fc = fc_pci-\u0026gt;fc_dev; // UAF\n\nThis is confirmed by a KASAN report:\n\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\nWrite of size 8 at addr ffff8880093aa8c8 by task bash/135\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70\n print_report+0xcf/0x610\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n ? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10\n ? ktime_get+0x60/0x140\n ? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20\n ? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0\n run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190\n handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550\n irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n...\n\nAllocated by task 1:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90\n __kmalloc_noprof+0x1be/0x460\n flexcop_device_kmalloc+0x54/0xe0\n flexcop_pci_probe+0x1f/0x9d0\n local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190\n pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470\n really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0\n __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120\n __driver_attach+0xd2/0x310\n bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170\n bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500\n driver_register+0x132/0x460\n do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300\n kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720\n kernel_init+0x1a/0x150\n ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nFreed by task 135:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50\n kfree+0x137/0x370\n flexcop_device_kfree+0x32/0x50\n pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0\n device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210\n pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150\n pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30\n remove_store+0xcc/0xe0\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440\n vfs_write+0x871/0xd70\n ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0\n do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n...\n\nReplace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure\nthat the delayed work item is properly canceled and any executing delayed\nwork has finished before the device memory is deallocated.\n\nThis bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce\nand test it, I simulated the B2C2 FlexCop PCI device in QEMU and introduced\nartificial delays within the flexcop_pci_irq_check_work() function to\nincrease the likelihood of triggering the bug.(CVE-2025-39996)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID\n\nPer UVC 1.1+ specification 3.7.2, units and terminals must have a non-zero\nunique ID.\n\n```\nEach Unit and Terminal within the video function is assigned a unique\nidentification number, the Unit ID (UID) or Terminal ID (TID), contained in\nthe bUnitID or bTerminalID field of the descriptor. The value 0x00 is\nreserved for undefined ID,\n```\n\nIf we add a new entity with id 0 or a duplicated ID, it will be marked\nas UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID.\n\nIn a previous attempt commit 3dd075fe8ebb (\u0026quot;media: uvcvideo: Require\nentities to have a non-zero unique ID\u0026quot;), we ignored all the invalid units,\nthis broke a lot of non-compatible cameras. Hopefully we are more lucky\nthis time.\n\nThis also prevents some syzkaller reproducers from triggering warnings due\nto a chain of entities referring to themselves. In one particular case, an\nOutput Unit is connected to an Input Unit, both with the same ID of 1. But\nwhen looking up for the source ID of the Output Unit, that same entity is\nfound instead of the input entity, which leads to such warnings.\n\nIn another case, a backward chain was considered finished as the source ID\nwas 0. Later on, that entity was found, but its pads were not valid.\n\nHere is a sample stack trace for one of those cases.\n\n[   20.650953] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd\n[   20.830206] usb 1-1: Using ep0 maxpacket: 8\n[   20.833501] usb 1-1: config 0 descriptor??\n[   21.038518] usb 1-1: string descriptor 0 read error: -71\n[   21.038893] usb 1-1: Found UVC 0.00 device \u0026lt;unnamed\u0026gt; (2833:0201)\n[   21.039299] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Output 1 was not initialized!\n[   21.041583] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Input 1 was not initialized!\n[   21.042218] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[   21.042536] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:1147 media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0\n[   21.043195] Modules linked in:\n[   21.043535] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00030-g3480e43aeccf #444\n[   21.044101] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n[   21.044639] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event\n[   21.045100] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0\n[   21.045508] Code: fe e8 20 01 00 00 b8 f4 ff ff ff 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b eb e9 0f 0b eb 0a 0f 0b eb 06 \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00\n[   21.046801] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004b318 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[   21.047227] RAX: ffff888004e5d458 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff818fccf1\n[   21.047719] RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888004313290\n[   21.048241] RBP: ffff888004313290 R08: 0001ffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000\n[   21.048701] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0001888004313290 R12: 0000000000000003\n[   21.049138] R13: ffff888004313080 R14: ffff888004313080 R15: 0000000000000000\n[   21.049648] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[   21.050271] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   21.050688] CR2: 0000592cc27635b0 CR3: 000000000431c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\n[   21.051136] PKRU: 55555554\n[   21.051331] Call Trace:\n[   21.051480]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[   21.051611]  ? __warn+0xc4/0x210\n[   21.051861]  ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0\n[   21.052252]  ? report_bug+0x11b/0x1a0\n[   21.052540]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x31/0x40\n[   21.052901]  ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70\n[   21.053197]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50\n[   21.053511]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[   21.053924]  ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0\n[   21.054364]  ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0\n[   21.054834]  ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0\n[   21.055131]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1e/0x40\n[   21.055441]  ? __v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x202/0x210\n[   21.055837]  uvc_mc_register_entities+0x358/0x400\n[   21.056144]  uvc_register_chains+0x1\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-40016)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSquashfs: fix uninit-value in squashfs_get_parent\n\nSyzkaller reports a \u0026quot;KMSAN: uninit-value in squashfs_get_parent\u0026quot; bug.\n\nThis is caused by open_by_handle_at() being called with a file handle\ncontaining an invalid parent inode number.  In particular the inode number\nis that of a symbolic link, rather than a directory.\n\nSquashfs_get_parent() gets called with that symbolic link inode, and\naccesses the parent member field.\n\n\tunsigned int parent_ino = squashfs_i(inode)-\u0026gt;parent;\n\nBecause non-directory inodes in Squashfs do not have a parent value, this\nis uninitialised, and this causes an uninitialised value access.\n\nThe fix is to initialise parent with the invalid inode 0, which will cause\nan EINVAL error to be returned.\n\nRegular inodes used to share the parent field with the block_list_start\nfield.  This is removed in this commit to enable the parent field to\ncontain the invalid inode number 0.(CVE-2025-40049)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix crypto buffers in non-linear memory\n\nThe crypto API, through the scatterlist API, expects input buffers to be\nin linear memory.  We handle this with the cifs_sg_set_buf() helper\nthat converts vmalloc\u0026apos;d memory to their corresponding pages.\n\nHowever, when we allocate our aead_request buffer (@creq in\nsmb2ops.c::crypt_message()), we do so with kvzalloc(), which possibly\nputs aead_request-\u0026gt;__ctx in vmalloc area.\n\nAEAD algorithm then uses -\u0026gt;__ctx for its private/internal data and\noperations, and uses sg_set_buf() for such data on a few places.\n\nThis works fine as long as @creq falls into kmalloc zone (small\nrequests) or vmalloc\u0026apos;d memory is still within linear range.\n\nTasks\u0026apos; stacks are vmalloc\u0026apos;d by default (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y), so too\nmany tasks will increment the base stacks\u0026apos; addresses to a point where\nvirt_addr_valid(buf) will fail (BUG() in sg_set_buf()) when that\nhappens.\n\nIn practice: too many parallel reads and writes on an encrypted mount\nwill trigger this bug.\n\nTo fix this, always alloc @creq with kmalloc() instead.\nAlso drop the @sensitive_size variable/arguments since\nkfree_sensitive() doesn\u0026apos;t need it.\n\nBacktrace:\n\n[  945.272081] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[  945.272774] kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:209!\n[  945.273520] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI\n[  945.274412] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 56 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.0-lku-11779-g8e9d6efccdd7-dirty #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n[  945.275736] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[  945.276877] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-cifs-2)\n[  945.277457] RIP: 0010:crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1f9/0x220\n[  945.278018] Code: b0 00 00 00 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c0 00 00 00 80 48 2b 05 5c 58 e5 00 e9 58 ff ff ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 48 c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 48 8b\n[  945.279992] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a27360 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[  945.280578] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90001d85060 RCX: 0000000000000030\n[  945.281376] RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffc90081d85070\n[  945.282145] RBP: ffffc90001d85010 R08: ffffc90001d85000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[  945.282898] R10: ffffc90001d85090 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffffc90001d85070\n[  945.283656] R13: ffff888113522948 R14: ffffc90001d85060 R15: ffffc90001d85010\n[  945.284407] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882e66cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[  945.285262] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[  945.285884] CR2: 00007fa7ffdd31f4 CR3: 000000010540d000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0\n[  945.286683] Call Trace:\n[  945.286952]  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n[  945.287184]  ? crypt_message+0x33f/0xad0 [cifs]\n[  945.287719]  crypto_gcm_encrypt+0x36/0xe0\n[  945.288152]  crypt_message+0x54a/0xad0 [cifs]\n[  945.288724]  smb3_init_transform_rq+0x277/0x300 [cifs]\n[  945.289300]  smb_send_rqst+0xa3/0x160 [cifs]\n[  945.289944]  cifs_call_async+0x178/0x340 [cifs]\n[  945.290514]  ? __pfx_smb2_writev_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n[  945.291177]  smb2_async_writev+0x3e3/0x670 [cifs]\n[  945.291759]  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90\n[  945.292212]  ? netfs_advance_write+0xf2/0x310\n[  945.292723]  netfs_advance_write+0xf2/0x310\n[  945.293210]  netfs_write_folio+0x346/0xcc0\n[  945.293689]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x10/0x10\n[  945.294250]  netfs_writepages+0x117/0x460\n[  945.294724]  do_writepages+0xbe/0x170\n[  945.295152]  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90\n[  945.295600]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20\n[  945.296103]  __writeback_single_inode+0x56/0x4b0\n[  945.296643]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x229/0x550\n[  945.297140]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0\n[  945.297642]  wb_writeback+0x2f1/0x3f0\n[  945.298069]  wb_workfn+0x300/0x490\n[  945.298472]  process_one_work+0x1fe/0x590\n[  945.298949]  worker_thread+0x1ce/0x3c0\n[  945.299397]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[  945.299900]  kthr\n---truncated---(CVE-2025-40052)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/vt-d: Disallow dirty tracking if incoherent page walk\n\nDirty page tracking relies on the IOMMU atomically updating the dirty bit\nin the paging-structure entry. For this operation to succeed, the paging-\nstructure memory must be coherent between the IOMMU and the CPU. In\nanother word, if the iommu page walk is incoherent, dirty page tracking\ndoesn\u0026apos;t work.\n\nThe Intel VT-d specification, Section 3.10 \u0026quot;Snoop Behavior\u0026quot; states:\n\n\u0026quot;Remapping hardware encountering the need to atomically update A/EA/D bits\n in a paging-structure entry that is not snooped will result in a non-\n recoverable fault.\u0026quot;\n\nTo prevent an IOMMU from being incorrectly configured for dirty page\ntracking when it is operating in an incoherent mode, mark SSADS as\nsupported only when both ecap_slads and ecap_smpwc are supported.(CVE-2025-40058)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: Fix race in do_task() when draining\n\nWhen do_task() exhausts its iteration budget (!ret), it sets the state\nto TASK_STATE_IDLE to reschedule, without a secondary check on the\ncurrent task-\u0026gt;state. This can overwrite the TASK_STATE_DRAINING state\nset by a concurrent call to rxe_cleanup_task() or rxe_disable_task().\n\nWhile state changes are protected by a spinlock, both rxe_cleanup_task()\nand rxe_disable_task() release the lock while waiting for the task to\nfinish draining in the while(!is_done(task)) loop. The race occurs if\ndo_task() hits its iteration limit and acquires the lock in this window.\nThe cleanup logic may then proceed while the task incorrectly\nreschedules itself, leading to a potential use-after-free.\n\nThis bug was introduced during the migration from tasklets to workqueues,\nwhere the special handling for the draining case was lost.\n\nFix this by restoring the original pre-migration behavior. If the state is\nTASK_STATE_DRAINING when iterations are exhausted, set cont to 1 to\nforce a new loop iteration. This allows the task to finish its work, so\nthat a subsequent iteration can reach the switch statement and correctly\ntransition the state to TASK_STATE_DRAINED, stopping the task as intended.(CVE-2025-40061)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: start using dst_dev_rcu()\n\nChange icmpv4_xrlim_allow(), ip_defrag() to prevent possible UAF.\n\nChange ipmr_prepare_xmit(), ipmr_queue_fwd_xmit(), ip_mr_output(),\nipv4_neigh_lookup() to use lockdep enabled dst_dev_rcu().(CVE-2025-40074)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp_metrics: use dst_dev_net_rcu()\n\nReplace three dst_dev() with a lockdep enabled helper.(CVE-2025-40075)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nixgbevf: fix mailbox API compatibility by negotiating supported features\n\nThere was backward compatibility in the terms of mailbox API. Various\ndrivers from various OSes supporting 10G adapters from Intel portfolio\ncould easily negotiate mailbox API.\n\nThis convention has been broken since introducing API 1.4.\nCommit 0062e7cc955e (\u0026quot;ixgbevf: add VF IPsec offload code\u0026quot;) added support\nfor IPSec which is specific only for the kernel ixgbe driver. None of the\nrest of the Intel 10G PF/VF drivers supports it. And actually lack of\nsupport was not included in the IPSec implementation - there were no such\ncode paths. No possibility to negotiate support for the feature was\nintroduced along with introduction of the feature itself.\n\nCommit 339f28964147 (\u0026quot;ixgbevf: Add support for new mailbox communication\nbetween PF and VF\u0026quot;) increasing API version to 1.5 did the same - it\nintroduced code supported specifically by the PF ESX driver. It altered API\nversion for the VF driver in the same time not touching the version\ndefined for the PF ixgbe driver. It led to additional discrepancies,\nas the code provided within API 1.6 cannot be supported for Linux ixgbe\ndriver as it causes crashes.\n\nThe issue was noticed some time ago and mitigated by Jake within the commit\nd0725312adf5 (\u0026quot;ixgbevf: stop attempting IPSEC offload on Mailbox API 1.5\u0026quot;).\nAs a result we have regression for IPsec support and after increasing API\nto version 1.6 ixgbevf driver stopped to support ESX MBX.\n\nTo fix this mess add new mailbox op asking PF driver about supported\nfeatures. Basing on a response determine whether to set support for IPSec\nand ESX-specific enhanced mailbox.\n\nNew mailbox op, for compatibility purposes, must be added within new API\nrevision, as API version of OOT PF \u0026amp; VF drivers is already increased to\n1.6 and doesn\u0026apos;t incorporate features negotiate op.\n\nFeatures negotiation mechanism gives possibility to be extended with new\nfeatures when needed in the future.(CVE-2025-40104)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5651: Fix invalid quirk input mapping\n\nWhen an invalid value is passed via quirk option, currently\nbytcr_rt5640 driver just ignores and leaves as is, which may lead to\nunepxected results like OOB access.\n\nThis patch adds the sanity check and corrects the input mapping to the\ncertain default value if an invalid value is passed.(CVE-2025-40121)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: use RCU in ip6_xmit()\n\nUse RCU in ip6_xmit() in order to use dst_dev_rcu() to prevent\npossible UAF.(CVE-2025-40135)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set().\n\nsmc_clc_prfx_set() is called during connect() and not under RCU\nnor RTNL.\n\nUsing sk_dst_get(sk)-\u0026gt;dev could trigger UAF.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s use __sk_dst_get() and dev_dst_rcu() under rcu_read_lock()\nafter kernel_getsockname().\n\nNote that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_set() is not used\nin the caller.\n\nWhile at it, we change the 1st arg of smc_clc_prfx_set[46]_rcu()\nnot to touch dst there.(CVE-2025-40139)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in get_netdev_for_sock().\n\nget_netdev_for_sock() is called during setsockopt(),\nso not under RCU.\n\nUsing sk_dst_get(sk)-\u0026gt;dev could trigger UAF.\n\nLet\u0026apos;s use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu().\n\nNote that the only -\u0026gt;ndo_sk_get_lower_dev() user is\nbond_sk_get_lower_dev(), which uses RCU.(CVE-2025-40149)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/vt-d: debugfs: Fix legacy mode page table dump logic\n\nIn legacy mode, SSPTPTR is ignored if TT is not 00b or 01b. SSPTPTR\nmaybe uninitialized or zero in that case and may cause oops like:\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n       0xf00087d3f000f000: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 786 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.16.0 #191 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014\n RIP: 0010:pgtable_walk_level+0x98/0x150\n RSP: 0018:ffffc90000f279c0 EFLAGS: 00010206\n RAX: 0000000040000000 RBX: ffffc90000f27ab0 RCX: 000000000000001e\n RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: f00087d3f000f000 RDI: f00087d3f0010000\n RBP: ffffc90000f27a00 R08: ffffc90000f27a98 R09: 0000000000000002\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: f00087d3f000f000\n R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000040000000 R15: ffffc90000f27a98\n FS:  0000764566dcb740(0000) GS:ffff8881f812c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000764566d44000 CR3: 0000000109d81003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0\n PKRU: 55555554\n Call Trace:\n  \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n  pgtable_walk_level+0x88/0x150\n  domain_translation_struct_show.isra.0+0x2d9/0x300\n  dev_domain_translation_struct_show+0x20/0x40\n  seq_read_iter+0x12d/0x490\n...\n\nAvoid walking the page table if TT is not 00b or 01b.(CVE-2025-40155)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: use RCU in ip6_output()\n\nUse RCU in ip6_output() in order to use dst_dev_rcu() to prevent\npossible UAF.\n\nWe can remove rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() pairs\nfrom ip6_finish_output2().(CVE-2025-40158)",
  "id": "OESA-2025-2802",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:09:55Z",
  "published": "2025-12-12T11:09:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-2802"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38381"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38584"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38615"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38633"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38659"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38667"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40902"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40904"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41079"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42101"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42102"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42245"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42247"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42297"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49863"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49875"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49894"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49905"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49925"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49930"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49935"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49948"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49949"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49950"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49957"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49962"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50002"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50005"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53131"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57887"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57900"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58095"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21945"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21968"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22022"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22025"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22026"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22039"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22042"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22043"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23133"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37822"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37861"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37899"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37973"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37994"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37997"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38005"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38058"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38071"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38109"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38231"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38282"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38350"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38361"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38443"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38457"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38470"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38477"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38527"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38566"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38588"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38614"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38617"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38636"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38664"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38706"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38727"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39675"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39677"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39684"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39697"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39810"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39817"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39825"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39866"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39881"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39911"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39947"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39994"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39996"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40016"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40049"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40052"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40058"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40061"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40074"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40075"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40104"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40121"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40135"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40139"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40149"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40155"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40158"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-38381",
    "CVE-2024-38584",
    "CVE-2024-38615",
    "CVE-2024-38633",
    "CVE-2024-38659",
    "CVE-2024-38667",
    "CVE-2024-40902",
    "CVE-2024-40904",
    "CVE-2024-41079",
    "CVE-2024-42101",
    "CVE-2024-42102",
    "CVE-2024-42245",
    "CVE-2024-42247",
    "CVE-2024-42297",
    "CVE-2024-49863",
    "CVE-2024-49875",
    "CVE-2024-49894",
    "CVE-2024-49905",
    "CVE-2024-49925",
    "CVE-2024-49930",
    "CVE-2024-49935",
    "CVE-2024-49948",
    "CVE-2024-49949",
    "CVE-2024-49950",
    "CVE-2024-49957",
    "CVE-2024-49962",
    "CVE-2024-50002",
    "CVE-2024-50005",
    "CVE-2024-53131",
    "CVE-2024-57887",
    "CVE-2024-57900",
    "CVE-2024-58095",
    "CVE-2025-21945",
    "CVE-2025-21968",
    "CVE-2025-22022",
    "CVE-2025-22025",
    "CVE-2025-22026",
    "CVE-2025-22039",
    "CVE-2025-22042",
    "CVE-2025-22043",
    "CVE-2025-23133",
    "CVE-2025-37822",
    "CVE-2025-37861",
    "CVE-2025-37899",
    "CVE-2025-37973",
    "CVE-2025-37994",
    "CVE-2025-37997",
    "CVE-2025-38005",
    "CVE-2025-38058",
    "CVE-2025-38071",
    "CVE-2025-38109",
    "CVE-2025-38231",
    "CVE-2025-38282",
    "CVE-2025-38350",
    "CVE-2025-38361",
    "CVE-2025-38443",
    "CVE-2025-38457",
    "CVE-2025-38470",
    "CVE-2025-38477",
    "CVE-2025-38527",
    "CVE-2025-38566",
    "CVE-2025-38588",
    "CVE-2025-38614",
    "CVE-2025-38617",
    "CVE-2025-38636",
    "CVE-2025-38664",
    "CVE-2025-38706",
    "CVE-2025-38727",
    "CVE-2025-39675",
    "CVE-2025-39677",
    "CVE-2025-39684",
    "CVE-2025-39697",
    "CVE-2025-39810",
    "CVE-2025-39817",
    "CVE-2025-39825",
    "CVE-2025-39866",
    "CVE-2025-39881",
    "CVE-2025-39911",
    "CVE-2025-39947",
    "CVE-2025-39994",
    "CVE-2025-39996",
    "CVE-2025-40016",
    "CVE-2025-40049",
    "CVE-2025-40052",
    "CVE-2025-40058",
    "CVE-2025-40061",
    "CVE-2025-40074",
    "CVE-2025-40075",
    "CVE-2025-40104",
    "CVE-2025-40121",
    "CVE-2025-40135",
    "CVE-2025-40139",
    "CVE-2025-40149",
    "CVE-2025-40155",
    "CVE-2025-40158"
  ]
}