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2 vulnerabilities by Lantronix
GCVE-1988-2026-0426
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Lantronix SGX5150 9.13.0.0R7 Authenticated FsBrowseClean command injection to root RCE (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lantronix
SGX5150, firmware 9.13.0.0R7, an IT/OT device server.
Type: authenticated OS command injection (CWE-78) in the FsBrowseClean AJAX
handler (0x5eea0) of /bin/ltrx_evo. A per-character filter blocks & | < ; ! $
backslash backtick and > but permits single quote, hash and newline. The path
POST parameter is concatenated into /sbin/ltrx_usb_umount '%s' and run through
/bin/sh -c as root. Sending path=x'%0a<cmd>%20%23 closes the quoted argument,
opens a new shell line carrying the attacker's command, and comments out the
trailing quote. The sink is blind.
Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, and the conditional figure is NOT
verified, which is stated rather than glossed:
- PRIMARY, adopted, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
PR:H rests on a genuine privileged web session being required.
- CONDITIONAL, NOT verified, 9.8 Critical,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Applies only if the device
serial number is obtainable, which would make the factory administrator
password (recorded as serial-derived) no secret and the chain effectively
unauthenticated. Serial recovery was NOT verified, and neither was the
derivation itself.
- SEPARATE secondary defect, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, reachable only where Digest
authentication is configured: the
Digest username extractor at 0xff838 verifies no nonce, realm or response, so a
forged Authorization: Digest username="admin" header alone sets the identity to
admin. This is independent of, and not additive to, the primary finding.
Scoring note. The research record attached 8.8 to the PR:H vector. That vector
computes to 7.2, not 8.8 under CVSS 3.1; this advisory recomputes from the vector
printed beside it and reports 7.2, keeping 8.8 only as a labelled PR:L
hypothetical (no lower-privileged account passing the filesystem write test was
enumerated, so it is not claimed).
Impact: root execution on an industrial gateway (ltrx_evo runs as root), giving
full read of configuration and serial traffic, arbitrary root modification,
persistent implantation, total availability loss and a pivot into segmented
networks.
Authentication: an authenticated web session satisfying
IsGroupListWritable(identity, "filesystem"); the session precondition is static
analysis, not dynamically verified.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. No physical SGX5150 hardware was used at
any point; verification is sink-faithful rather than full-stack. The character
filter, the IseUSB gate and the sink construction were replicated in a chroot of
the extracted ARM rootfs under qemu-arm-static, and the injected newline vector
passed the product's own filter and ran as root via the product's own /bin/sh and
marker owned by root:root. End-to-end HTTP against a live daemon was not
achievable, because ltrx_evo requires NVRAM state, the encrypted factory.xcr
device-serial material and a ZMQ IPC stack that could not be reconstructed
outside the device.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lantronix-sgx5150-fsbrowseclean-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to
this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
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"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lantronix\nSGX5150, firmware 9.13.0.0R7, an IT/OT device server.\n\nType: authenticated OS command injection (CWE-78) in the FsBrowseClean AJAX\nhandler (0x5eea0) of /bin/ltrx_evo. A per-character filter blocks \u0026 | \u003c ; ! $\nbackslash backtick and \u003e but permits single quote, hash and newline. The path\nPOST parameter is concatenated into /sbin/ltrx_usb_umount \u0027%s\u0027 and run through\n/bin/sh -c as root. Sending path=x\u0027%0a\u003ccmd\u003e%20%23 closes the quoted argument,\nopens a new shell line carrying the attacker\u0027s command, and comments out the\ntrailing quote. The sink is blind.\n\nScoring. This finding is dual-scored, and the conditional figure is NOT\nverified, which is stated rather than glossed:\n- PRIMARY, adopted, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.\n PR:H rests on a genuine privileged web session being required.\n- CONDITIONAL, NOT verified, 9.8 Critical,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Applies only if the device\n serial number is obtainable, which would make the factory administrator\n password (recorded as serial-derived) no secret and the chain effectively\n unauthenticated. Serial recovery was NOT verified, and neither was the\n derivation itself.\n- SEPARATE secondary defect, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, reachable only where Digest \nauthentication is configured: the\n Digest username extractor at 0xff838 verifies no nonce, realm or response, so a\n forged Authorization: Digest username=\"admin\" header alone sets the identity to\n admin. This is independent of, and not additive to, the primary finding.\n\nScoring note. The research record attached 8.8 to the PR:H vector. That vector\ncomputes to 7.2, not 8.8 under CVSS 3.1; this advisory recomputes from the vector\nprinted beside it and reports 7.2, keeping 8.8 only as a labelled PR:L\nhypothetical (no lower-privileged account passing the filesystem write test was\nenumerated, so it is not claimed).\n\nImpact: root execution on an industrial gateway (ltrx_evo runs as root), giving\nfull read of configuration and serial traffic, arbitrary root modification,\npersistent implantation, total availability loss and a pivot into segmented\nnetworks.\n\nAuthentication: an authenticated web session satisfying\nIsGroupListWritable(identity, \"filesystem\"); the session precondition is static\nanalysis, not dynamically verified.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. No physical SGX5150 hardware was used at\nany point; verification is sink-faithful rather than full-stack. The character\nfilter, the IseUSB gate and the sink construction were replicated in a chroot of\nthe extracted ARM rootfs under qemu-arm-static, and the injected newline vector\npassed the product\u0027s own filter and ran as root via the product\u0027s own /bin/sh and\nmarker owned by root:root. End-to-end HTTP against a live daemon was not\nachievable, because ltrx_evo requires NVRAM state, the encrypted factory.xcr\ndevice-serial material and a ZMQ IPC stack that could not be reconstructed\noutside the device.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lantronix-sgx5150-fsbrowseclean-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to\nthis finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0165
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:35 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:56
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Lantronix EDS3000PR 3.2.0.0R2 two vulnerabilities
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing two vulnerabilities in Lantronix EDS3000PR 3.2.0.0R2.
Vulnerability 1 — Authenticated command injection to root RCE in FsUnmount (CVSS 8.8,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, CWE-78)
Lantronix EDS3000PR is an industrial serial device server (CII/OT). Its FsUnmount page handler validates a
user-supplied path against a character bitmask that rejects most shell metacharacters but allows single quotes and
newlines, then executes /sbin/ltrx_usb_umount '/ltrx_user<path>' via /bin/sh -c. A newline breaks out of the
single-quoted command and the injected command executes as root. Verified with a root-owned marker in a qemu-arm chroot
using the real rootfs /bin/sh.
Authentication: authenticated (requires valid session)
Vulnerability 2 — Authenticated command injection to root RCE in SSL certificate import and diagnostics (CVSS 8.8,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, CWE-78)
On the same Lantronix EDS3000PR device, the SSL certificate upload handler builds openssl rsa|dsa|ec|pkcs12 -passin
pass:%s commands from the attacker-controlled certificate password and executes them via system(); the diagnostics
handler builds ping and traceroute commands from the attacker-controlled host field the same way. No shell-character
sanitization exists. An authenticated admin submits a semicolon or command-substitution payload in the password or host
field; the injected command executes as root. Verified with root markers for 5/5 SSL vectors and 3/3 diagnostics
vectors.
Authentication: authenticated (requires valid session)
Full technical analyses and reproducible proofs-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lantronix-eds3000pr-fsunmount-command-injection
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lantronix-eds3000pr-passin-pass-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE IDs are pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
8 references
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