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1 vulnerability found for TV-IP302PI firmware by Trendnet
GCVE-1988-2026-0500
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet
TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from
TRENDnet (United States). The camera's application daemon is shipped at
/hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary,
dynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own
string pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and
PPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the
image as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM'd into this model. That
provenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may
exist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that
this finding is specific to that platform's binary, its configuration-key name
and its command template rather than to a generic NTP client.
Type and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper
input validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape.
An authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value
stored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c
inside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is
a length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64
bytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later
read back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and
unescaped, into the command template
/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s &
and handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell
re-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair
inside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client
invocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon's own context. That
context is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa
configuration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime
configuration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity
for the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage
in this chain and none is claimed or needed.
The chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary.
Link 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to
the key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming
value against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies
it into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback
raises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how
the rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is
also why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request
and no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required.
Link 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside
fcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264,
both read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it:
snprintf(buf, 0x100,
*p_fmt_at_0x3ded60, /* "/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s &" */
*(cfg + 0xe4), /* the -ts flag: server-derived */
cfg + 0x9c); /* the address: attacker-supplied */
func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf); /* enqueue for the worker */
There is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4
and is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the
write offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of
the static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the
tainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout.
Link 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string
to a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the
final executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced
through the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a
system() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic
observation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms.
Under an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one
argument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert
text passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole
vulnerability rather than an implementation detail.
Two protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather
than two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter
NtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF
path the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264,
which applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls
fcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry
point instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to
the HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path's larger cap
is the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload.
What validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing
else. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no
hostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no
character allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is
roughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no
deny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses,
angle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects
even the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no
argv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from
the picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect
in one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A
length cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from
overrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every
injection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is
17 bytes.
One sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before
reproducing this: the set callback's strcmp early-return suppresses the change
event when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same
payload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for
example by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing
about the finding.
Authentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated
vulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request
passes a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge
generator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at
0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an
absent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the
request's business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check
through func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is
a static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt,
asp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No
member of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes
are genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and
GetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks
and neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only.
The unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came
out negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding
rather than an assumption. The product's gate is present, centralised and
fail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306
and not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction
wrong.
The principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different
weights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and
fail-closed, read out of the gate's own control flow. The role requirement
specifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which
defines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP
configuration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested,
because no account below administrator was available to test with and no
comparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one.
The honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore "supported by the recovered
privilege model" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published
below as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over.
Verification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and
is not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI
hardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server
process was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of
this work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device
exploit and the research does not present itself as one.
What the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside
the product's own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an
unencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third;
that tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the
researchers chrooted into it and ran the camera's own busybox shell under
qemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in
the form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c
"<command string>", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside
the chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and
with /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the
exact command string the product's own builder produces from the product's own
template, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product's own
shell in the product's own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection
forms and one control:
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id > <marker>;# &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id > <marker>) &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id > <marker>` &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 &
marker absent - no file created
Three metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control
address 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are
rendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal
stage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence
of each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration.
The command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot
harness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by
something other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness's own tooling, o
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trendnet | TV-IP302PI firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "TV-IP302PI firmware",
"vendor": "Trendnet",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet\nTV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from\nTRENDnet (United States). The camera\u0027s application daemon is shipped at\n/hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary,\ndynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own\nstring pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and\nPPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the\nimage as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM\u0027d into this model. That\nprovenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may\nexist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that\nthis finding is specific to that platform\u0027s binary, its configuration-key name\nand its command template rather than to a generic NTP client.\n\nType and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper\ninput validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape.\nAn authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value\nstored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c\ninside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is\na length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64\nbytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later\nread back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and\nunescaped, into the command template\n\n /hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\n\nand handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell\nre-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair\ninside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client\ninvocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon\u0027s own context. That\ncontext is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa\nconfiguration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime\nconfiguration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity\nfor the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage\nin this chain and none is claimed or needed.\n\nThe chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary.\n\nLink 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to\nthe key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming\nvalue against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies\nit into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback\nraises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how\nthe rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is\nalso why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request\nand no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required.\n\nLink 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside\nfcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264,\nboth read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it:\n\n snprintf(buf, 0x100,\n *p_fmt_at_0x3ded60, /* \"/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\" */\n *(cfg + 0xe4), /* the -ts flag: server-derived */\n cfg + 0x9c); /* the address: attacker-supplied */\n func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf); /* enqueue for the worker */\n\nThere is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4\nand is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the\nwrite offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of\nthe static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the\ntainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout.\n\nLink 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string\nto a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the\nfinal executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced\nthrough the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a\nsystem() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic\nobservation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms.\nUnder an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one\nargument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert\ntext passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole\nvulnerability rather than an implementation detail.\n\nTwo protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather\nthan two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter\nNtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF\npath the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264,\nwhich applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls\nfcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry\npoint instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to\nthe HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path\u0027s larger cap\nis the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload.\n\nWhat validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing\nelse. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no\nhostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no\ncharacter allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is\nroughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no\ndeny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses,\nangle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects\neven the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no\nargv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from\nthe picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect\nin one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A\nlength cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from\noverrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every\ninjection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is\n17 bytes.\n\nOne sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before\nreproducing this: the set callback\u0027s strcmp early-return suppresses the change\nevent when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same\npayload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for\nexample by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing\nabout the finding.\n\nAuthentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated\nvulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request\npasses a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge\ngenerator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at\n0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an\nabsent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the\nrequest\u0027s business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check\nthrough func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is\na static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt,\nasp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No\nmember of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes\nare genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and\nGetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks\nand neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only.\nThe unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came\nout negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding\nrather than an assumption. The product\u0027s gate is present, centralised and\nfail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306\nand not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction\nwrong.\n\nThe principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different\nweights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and\nfail-closed, read out of the gate\u0027s own control flow. The role requirement\nspecifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which\ndefines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP\nconfiguration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested,\nbecause no account below administrator was available to test with and no\ncomparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one.\nThe honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore \"supported by the recovered\nprivilege model\" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published\nbelow as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over.\n\nVerification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and\nis not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI\nhardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server\nprocess was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of\nthis work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device\nexploit and the research does not present itself as one.\n\nWhat the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside\nthe product\u0027s own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an\nunencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third;\nthat tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the\nresearchers chrooted into it and ran the camera\u0027s own busybox shell under\nqemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in\nthe form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c\n\"\u003ccommand string\u003e\", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside\nthe chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and\nwith /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the\nexact command string the product\u0027s own builder produces from the product\u0027s own\ntemplate, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product\u0027s own\nshell in the product\u0027s own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection\nforms and one control:\n\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e;# \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e) \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e` \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 \u0026\n marker absent - no file created\n\nThree metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control\naddress 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are\nrendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal\nstage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence\nof each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration.\nThe command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot\nharness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by\nsomething other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness\u0027s own tooling, o"
}
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"description": "CWE-250",
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{
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"description": "CWE-269",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306",
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},
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)",
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