Search

Find a vulnerability

Search criteria

    1 vulnerability found for Johnson Controls by unknown

    GCVE-1988-2026-0528

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 09:47 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:47
    VLAI
    Title
    [Bugtraq] Johnson Controls - DSC TL280 - home alarm system - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
    Summary
    CVE-ID: CVE-2026-27871 Vendor of Product: Johnson Controls (formerly Tyco / DSC) Affected Product Code Base: TL280, 5.62.04.003 (latest) Affected Component: Communication with the Integration server Suggested description: The DSC Neo alarm system can interface with “integration servers” to notify about alarm events. These “integration servers” can also send arm/disarm events to the alarm system. The “Type 2” (ITv2) communication between the TL280 and “integration servers” uses AES in ECB mode. ECB mode is a weak, broken cryptography mode. It does not provide forward secrecy; there is no mutual authentication, and a single shared key is used to secure the communication. Only weak integrity protection (CRC) is provided in the protocol. Additional Information: During the initial setup, the fixed key 12345678123456781234567812345678 is used for the communication. Attack Type: Network CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.0 Critical Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Contributing Weakness: AES-ECB Mode (CWE-327) - this advisory Contributing Weakness: Default Cryptographic Key (CWE-1394) - 12345678123456781234567812345678 Combined Impact: An attacker who can observe the initial TL280 handshake (which uses a default key) can decrypt the negotiated AES session key. All subsequent panel<->cloud communications are then readable, including user disarm codes and installer access codes. The use of AES-ECB mode with no proper replay protection allows the attacker to replay previously captured disarm commands, silently changing the alarm state from armed to disarmed. The panel logs a sequence mismatch error but executes the command. Affected data includes: - User arm/disarm PIN codes - Installer programming codes - Motion sensor activation events (enabling occupancy profiling) - System configuration and zone status Physical security impact: Complete silent defeat of intrusion detection for homes and businesses protected by this system. Has the vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability? Yes. Reported via VulnCheck (CNA coordinator) on 2026-02-16. The Johnson Controls PSIRT confirmed receipt on 2026-02-27, assigned CVE-2026-27871 on 2026-03-24 with the title "DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm", reproduced the issue, and committed to a patch by 2026-08-01. Vendor contact point: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/resources#Contact... Vulnerability Type: Other CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm Discoverer: z Reference: https://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/CVE-2026-27871.mdhttp... Disclosure timeline: Coordinated through VulnCheck (disclosure@vulncheck.com), with Johnson Controls PSIRT as the supplier CNA. Reporter credited as "z". - 2026-02-16 — Vulnerability reported to VulnCheck. - 2026-02-18 — VulnCheck confirms receipt; engages Johnson Controls (supplier CNA) for determination and CVE assignment. 120-day disclosure deadline set to 2026-06-18. Reporter shares the Wireshark dissector (decrypts panel↔cloud traffic given the static key and a captured session start) and notes the documented default setup key 12345678123456781234567812345678 plus a suspected key-exchange that would expose all future session keys. - 2026-02-19 — Reporter sends supporting references (OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-131A, Schneier) on why ECB is disallowed. - 2026-02-27 — Johnson Controls confirms receipt of the report. - 2026-03-24 — Johnson Controls PSIRT assigns CVE-2026-27871, title "DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"; CISA coordination draft in progress. - 2026-03-25 — Reporter shares PoC: (1) screenshot (tl280_AES_ECB.png) of the dissector decrypting initial TL280→cloud setup traffic, highlighting the server's 0x0632 (Change_Static_Keys) command — passive capture of the first session allows decryption of all future traffic, including user/installer codes; (2) screen recording demonstrating that a replayed disarm packet disarms the panel even without knowing any keys/codes, and despite the panel returning a sequence-number error. - 2026-04-23 — VulnCheck follows up with Johnson Controls (no update). - 2026-05-06 — Johnson Controls reports it is reproducing the issue; final fix tracking to ~September/October 2026; requests deadline extension. - 2026-05-14 — Johnson Controls provisionally allocates CVE-2026-27871 in its Trust Center case platform and proposes a 2026-08-31 deadline. - 2026-05-21 — Reporter agrees to an extension only to 2026-08-01. - 2026-06-02 — Johnson Controls PSIRT agrees to the 2026-08-01 deadline; states a patch is expected by 2026-08-01. - 2026-06-06 — Reporter acknowledges. - 2026-08-01 - This advisory published, no information on any patches from the vendor. - 2026-08-03 - 5.63 is allegedly published to fix these, could not download it, could not test it. Johnson Controls is silent, no communication from their side even though August 1 was an agreed date for disclosure. Bad CNA. PS: you might find some other goodies in the repo
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    unknown Johnson Controls Affected: unknown
    Create a notification for this product.
    Credits
    z
    Relationships
    analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0528 (this record)

    {
      "containers": {
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "product": "Johnson Controls",
              "vendor": "unknown",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "unknown"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "z"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CVE-ID:\nCVE-2026-27871\nVendor of Product:\nJohnson Controls (formerly Tyco / DSC)\nAffected Product Code Base:\nTL280, 5.62.04.003 (latest)\nAffected Component:\nCommunication with the Integration server\nSuggested description:\nThe DSC Neo alarm system can interface with \u201cintegration servers\u201d to notify about alarm events. These \u201cintegration servers\u201d can also send arm/disarm events to the alarm system. The \u201cType 2\u201d (ITv2) communication between the TL280 and \u201cintegration servers\u201d uses AES in ECB mode.  ECB mode is a weak, broken cryptography mode. It does not provide forward secrecy; there is no mutual authentication, and a single shared key is used to secure the communication. Only weak integrity protection (CRC) is provided in the protocol.\nAdditional Information:\nDuring the initial setup, the fixed key 12345678123456781234567812345678 is used for the communication.\nAttack Type:\nNetwork\nCVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.0 Critical\nVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\nContributing Weakness: AES-ECB Mode (CWE-327) - this advisory\nContributing Weakness: Default Cryptographic Key (CWE-1394) - 12345678123456781234567812345678\nCombined Impact: An attacker who can observe the initial TL280\nhandshake (which uses a default key) can decrypt the negotiated\nAES session key. All subsequent panel\u003c-\u003ecloud communications are\nthen readable, including user disarm codes and installer access\ncodes. The use of AES-ECB mode with no proper replay protection allows\nthe attacker to replay previously captured disarm commands,\nsilently changing the alarm state from armed to disarmed. The\npanel logs a sequence mismatch error but executes the command.\nAffected data includes:\n- User arm/disarm PIN codes\n- Installer programming codes\n- Motion sensor activation events (enabling occupancy profiling)\n- System configuration and zone status\nPhysical security impact: Complete silent defeat of intrusion\ndetection for homes and businesses protected by this system.\nHas the vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability?\nYes. Reported via VulnCheck (CNA coordinator) on 2026-02-16. The Johnson Controls PSIRT confirmed receipt on 2026-02-27, assigned CVE-2026-27871 on 2026-03-24 with the title \"DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\", reproduced the issue, and committed to a patch by 2026-08-01.\nVendor contact point: https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/resources#Contact...\nVulnerability Type:\nOther\nCWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\nDiscoverer:\nz\nReference:\nhttps://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/CVE-2026-27871.mdhttp...\nDisclosure timeline:\nCoordinated through VulnCheck (disclosure@vulncheck.com), with Johnson Controls PSIRT as the supplier CNA. Reporter credited as \"z\".\n- 2026-02-16 \u2014 Vulnerability reported to VulnCheck.\n- 2026-02-18 \u2014 VulnCheck confirms receipt; engages Johnson Controls (supplier CNA) for determination and CVE assignment. 120-day disclosure deadline set to 2026-06-18. Reporter shares the Wireshark dissector (decrypts panel\u2194cloud traffic given the static key and a captured session start) and notes the documented default setup key 12345678123456781234567812345678 plus a suspected key-exchange that would expose all future session keys.\n- 2026-02-19 \u2014 Reporter sends supporting references (OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-131A, Schneier) on why ECB is disallowed.\n- 2026-02-27 \u2014 Johnson Controls confirms receipt of the report.\n- 2026-03-24 \u2014 Johnson Controls PSIRT assigns CVE-2026-27871, title \"DSC TL280 Internal Security Alarm - Use of Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm\"; CISA coordination draft in progress.\n- 2026-03-25 \u2014 Reporter shares PoC: (1) screenshot (tl280_AES_ECB.png) of the dissector decrypting initial TL280\u2192cloud setup traffic, highlighting the server\u0027s 0x0632 (Change_Static_Keys) command \u2014 passive capture of the first session allows decryption of all future traffic, including user/installer codes; (2) screen recording demonstrating that a replayed disarm packet disarms the panel even without knowing any keys/codes, and despite the panel returning a sequence-number error.\n- 2026-04-23 \u2014 VulnCheck follows up with Johnson Controls (no update).\n- 2026-05-06 \u2014 Johnson Controls reports it is reproducing the issue; final fix tracking to ~September/October 2026; requests deadline extension.\n- 2026-05-14 \u2014 Johnson Controls provisionally allocates CVE-2026-27871 in its Trust Center case platform and proposes a 2026-08-31 deadline.\n- 2026-05-21 \u2014 Reporter agrees to an extension only to 2026-08-01.\n- 2026-06-02 \u2014 Johnson Controls PSIRT agrees to the 2026-08-01 deadline; states a patch is expected by 2026-08-01.\n- 2026-06-06 \u2014 Reporter acknowledges.\n- 2026-08-01 - This advisory published, no information on any patches from the vendor.\n- 2026-08-03 - 5.63 is allegedly published to fix these, could not download it, could not test it. Johnson Controls is silent, no communication from their side even though August 1 was an agreed date for disclosure. Bad CNA.\nPS: you might find some other goodies in the repo"
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-1394",
                  "description": "CWE-1394",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                },
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-327",
                  "description": "CWE-327",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T09:47:22Z",
            "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
            "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "tags": [
                "technical-description",
                "exploit"
              ],
              "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/8956114097a68fb12b88e89a439aa37c04dfccc16feb40d9e456fc161e360705"
            },
            {
              "tags": [
                "technical-description"
              ],
              "url": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@securityfocus.com/message/3AA4HBZRWRD3D237X7FFSUM4LUCWPMOM/"
            },
            {
              "url": "https://github.com/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/D-S-C-O-M-G-N-E-O/CVE-2026-27871.mdhttp://dsc.com"
            },
            {
              "url": "https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/resources#ContactUs"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "defect": [
              "OzGxtx_--F-9%40tutanota.com"
            ],
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "[Bugtraq] Johnson Controls - DSC TL280 - home alarm system - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm",
          "x_gcve": [
            {
              "recordType": "analysis",
              "relationships": [
                {
                  "destId": "CVE-2026-27871",
                  "type": "related"
                }
              ],
              "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0528",
              "x_vulnarchive": {
                "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/8956114097a68fb12b88e89a439aa37c04dfccc16feb40d9e456fc161e360705",
                "automated": true,
                "contentSha256": "8956114097a68fb12b88e89a439aa37c04dfccc16feb40d9e456fc161e360705",
                "evidenceScore": 11,
                "messageId": "OzGxtx_--F-9%40tutanota.com",
                "originalUrl": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@securityfocus.com/message/3AA4HBZRWRD3D237X7FFSUM4LUCWPMOM/",
                "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
                "sourceFormat": "text/html",
                "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-11-02T09:47:22Z"
              }
            },
            {
              "recordType": "advisory",
              "vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0528"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-02T09:47:22Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T09:47:22Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0528"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }