Search
Find a vulnerability
Search criteria
1 vulnerability found for Control Panel (VestaCP) by Vesta
GCVE-1988-2026-0482
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
VestaCP <= 0.9.8-26: authenticated config-parser eval sinks -> root RCE (VESTACP-2026-001)
Summary
Advisory ID: VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72
Product: Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP)
Versions: <= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists)
Severity: Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9
CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection)
Reporter: Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC <security () sysdop com>
SUMMARY
-------
VestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as
KEY='value' lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library
func/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run
as root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the
calling shell's environment.
Values in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron
command fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments).
Any value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted
assignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any
v-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations
and on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction.
This is the same sink class published for VestaCP's downstream fork HestiaCP
as GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -> root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5),
GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument ->
crontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself
never received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably
in VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting
providers today.
AFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26)
-------------------------------------
is_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value,
update_object_value, add_object_key: eval "$object" over a grep'd conf line.
search_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line.
ARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug).
is_format_valid: eval arg=\$$arg_name.
bin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -> raw newlines land in the crontab
(GHSA-5fpv class).
The central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26):
object=$(grep "$2='$3'" $USER_DATA/$1.conf)
eval "$object"
EXPLOITATION
------------
1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting
customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields
bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths).
2. A crafted value containing an unescaped ' is stored, e.g. a cron CMD:
CMD='x'; id > /tmp/pwned; #
3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs
the injected commands as root.
Impact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site,
mailbox and database of every account it hosts.
A self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser
neutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh).
ADDITIONAL FINDING
------------------
While certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons
against real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion -
a literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning
verbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is
equivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug.
MITIGATION
----------
No upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should:
1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository
includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY='value' regex +
`declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a
porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh).
2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user
data; quote every expansion (echo "$7" in v-add-cron-job).
3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor
$USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes.
4. Migrate to a maintained control panel.
TIMELINE
--------
2019-09 Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned.
2026-08 Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during
a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure.
2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post);
CVE requested via MITRE.
VENDOR CONTACT
--------------
None possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact,
inactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running
VestaCP in production.
REFERENCES
----------
GHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72
Repository (advisory, PoC, mitigation):
https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce
Related HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream):
https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc
https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v
https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3
--
Bryan Ramirez
SYSDOP LLC
security () sysdop com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vesta | Control Panel (VestaCP) |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Control Panel (VestaCP)",
"vendor": "Vesta",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Bryan Ramirez via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Advisory ID: VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nProduct: Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP)\nVersions: \u003c= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists)\nSeverity: Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9\nCWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection)\nReporter: Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC \u003csecurity () sysdop com\u003e\n\nSUMMARY\n-------\nVestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as\nKEY=\u0027value\u0027 lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library\nfunc/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run\nas root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the\ncalling shell\u0027s environment.\n\nValues in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron\ncommand fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments).\nAny value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted\nassignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any\nv-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations\nand on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction.\n\nThis is the same sink class published for VestaCP\u0027s downstream fork HestiaCP\nas GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -\u003e root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5),\nGHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument -\u003e\ncrontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself\nnever received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably\nin VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting\nproviders today.\n\nAFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26)\n-------------------------------------\nis_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value,\nupdate_object_value, add_object_key: eval \"$object\" over a grep\u0027d conf line.\nsearch_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line.\nARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \\$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug).\nis_format_valid: eval arg=\\$$arg_name.\nbin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -\u003e raw newlines land in the crontab\n(GHSA-5fpv class).\n\nThe central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26):\n\n object=$(grep \"$2=\u0027$3\u0027\" $USER_DATA/$1.conf)\n eval \"$object\"\n\nEXPLOITATION\n------------\n1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting\n customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields\n bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths).\n2. A crafted value containing an unescaped \u0027 is stored, e.g. a cron CMD:\n CMD=\u0027x\u0027; id \u003e /tmp/pwned; #\n3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs\n the injected commands as root.\n\nImpact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site,\nmailbox and database of every account it hosts.\n\nA self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser\nneutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh).\n\nADDITIONAL FINDING\n------------------\nWhile certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons\nagainst real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion -\na literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning\nverbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is\nequivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug.\n\nMITIGATION\n----------\nNo upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should:\n\n1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository\n includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY=\u0027value\u0027 regex +\n `declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a\n porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh).\n2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user\n data; quote every expansion (echo \"$7\" in v-add-cron-job).\n3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor\n $USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes.\n4. Migrate to a maintained control panel.\n\nTIMELINE\n--------\n2019-09 Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned.\n2026-08 Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during\n a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure.\n2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post);\n CVE requested via MITRE.\n\nVENDOR CONTACT\n--------------\nNone possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact,\ninactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running\nVestaCP in production.\n\nREFERENCES\n----------\nGHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nRepository (advisory, PoC, mitigation):\n https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce\nRelated HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream):\n https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc\n https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v\n https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3\n\n--\nBryan Ramirez\nSYSDOP LLC\nsecurity () sysdop com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-95",
"description": "CWE-95",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/26"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "VestaCP \u003c= 0.9.8-26: authenticated config-parser eval sinks -\u003e root RCE (VESTACP-2026-001)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0482",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/26",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "7eee609eba0894c6087113e1faa1fbba9a80c0b4258d5d9363bbc762123d0a41",
"evidenceScore": 10,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-06T23:23:03Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0482"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}